

Polem. 684^c

Tavenant

BISHOP DAVENANT

ON

JUSTIFICATION,

&c., &c.



Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
München

A
TREATISE ON JUSTIFICATION,
OR THE
DISPUTATIO DE JUSTITIA
HABITUALI ET ACTUALI,
OF
THE RIGHT REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.,
BISHOP OF SALISBURY,
AND LADY MARGARET'S PROFESSOR, CAMBRIDGE;
DELIVERED TO THE DIVINITY STUDENTS IN THAT UNIVERSITY;
PUBLISHED FIRST IN THE YEAR 1631,
AND NOW TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN,
TOGETHER WITH
TRANSLATIONS OF THE "DETERMINATIONES"
OF THE SAME PRELATE:
BY THE
REV. JOSIAH ALLPORT,
P. C. OF ST. JAMES'S, BIRMINGHAM,
AND CHAPLAIN TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF MANCHESTER.

~~~~~  
*Our Righteousness (if we have any) is of little value; it is sincere, perhaps, but not pure; unless we believe ourselves to be better than our fathers, who no less truly than humbly said, All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags. For how can that righteousness be pure, which cannot yet be free from imperfection?*

BERNARD, *Serm. 5 de Verbis Esaie Prophetæ*, vi., 1, 2.

~~~~~  
VOL. II.

~~~~~  
LONDON:

HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.;  
CURRY AND CO., DUBLIN;  
RAGG AND CO., BIRMINGHAM.

1846.




TREATISE ON JUSTIFICATION  
ON THE  
DISPUTATIO DE JUSTITIA  
PABULUM ET ACTUM

THE RIGHT REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.

BISHOP OF SALISBURY.

THE FIRST EDITION OF THIS WORK WAS  
PUBLISHED FIRST IN THE YEAR 1676  
AND NOW TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN

BY THE REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.



THE SECOND EDITION OF THIS WORK WAS  
PUBLISHED IN THE YEAR 1676  
AND NOW TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN

BY THE REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.

LONDON  
PRINTED BY J. STURGEON, AT THE SIGN OF THE  
CROWN, IN ST. MARTIN'S LANE, NEAR ST. JOHN'S CHURCH.

1710

1710



## THE TRANSLATOR TO HIS SUBSCRIBERS.

---

ON putting this volume of translations from Bishop Davenant's works into circulation among the subscribers to the undertaking, an apology seems necessary in consequence of the great length of time that has elapsed since the former volume was issued ; and a variety of circumstances might be mentioned to account for it. But it may suffice to assure the most distant ones that the delay has neither arisen through any indifference to the fulfilment of the engagement, nor from any indulgence in other pursuits. Every moment that could be snatched from ordinary clerical duties, and the incessant demands on time and attention, in such a sphere as I occupy, has been applied to the work ; and the application that has been requisite has been pushed to the utmost extent of endurance, and in hours stolen from rest, under an anxiety to complete the work in a way suited, it is hoped, to sustain the Bishop's reputation, and promote the great object desired by that esteemed Prelate, to whose generous encouragement the inducement to enter upon the task is owing. That every possible exertion has been made my more intimate friends well know ; especially such of them as I have had occasion to consult and confer with, in the literary character, on the difficulties of the subjects encountered. I have now to thank God, after three years' efforts, for a measure of health and strength (under application and toil with which any preceding exertions bear no comparison) unimpaired and not previously enjoyed ; and I beg also to thank my numerous and more distant subscribers for their indulgence and forbearance.

During the time which has elapsed, an incident has oc-



curred, of which I deem it not irrelevant to take some notice here. In the month of November of last year a letter, of sufficient interest to arrest my attention, appeared in the *Christian Observer*, from a correspondent signing himself "PACIFICUS." After some introductory remarks respecting the difficulty of meeting with copies of Bishop Davenant's writings, and some flattering comments on the services rendered by me in bringing them into notice, and especially those portions of them of which I have published translations, the writer proceeded to animadvert on the discrepancy alleged to exist between Bishops Davenant and Bull, and adduced in the Preface to the first volume of the present work. It may not be without its use to recite here the substance of my reply; disclaiming, at the same time, any intention to enter into a controversy on the views of the two Prelates.

"As to the matter in question:—Whoever has gone deep into the controversy concerning justification, knows that the real difference often hinges upon the use of peculiar terms or modes of expression, carefully selected by the one party, and as carefully avoided by the other. Just as it was with the Arian controversy, where the introduction or omission of an *iota* in the Creed involved systems 'diametrically opposed' to each other. For instance: Mr. Perceval, in his book on the Roman Schism, and the whole race of Romanizers, maintain, that there is really no great difference between the two Churches on this great doctrine, because very similar language is often used in the formularies of both. So also on the same subject said the Bishop of St. David's, in his Charge, three years ago, with respect to the Tractarians and faithful members of the Church of England. But both Churches, and the most serious learned theologians, know, that the case is quite otherwise, and that the difference affects the whole question of practical divinity.

"To maintain, with Davenant, the 'necessity of good works;' or to hold, with Bull, that they are 'identical with justifying faith:' to maintain with the former, that good works are 'concurrentes vel præcursioræ,' *running with or forerunning* justification, or to main-



tain that they are of the form or essence of justification, evidently marks systems 'diametrically opposed:' as the opinion which should make the forerunner or companion of Christ equal with Christ, would be opposed to that which should make him the servant of Christ. No doubt, to those who do not well consider the subtleties which the self-justifying tenet has introduced, the difference will often appear to be merely verbal. Hooker, for instance, is as zealous for the necessity, and in this sense, for the 'concurrence,' of good works, as he is eloquent against every approach to that Romish system, which the Church of England so carefully renounced, but which, in a somewhat varied form, Bull has the ill reputation of re-introducing. The essence of Bull's system was, in the words of his partial biographer, Nelson, that 'justification is not by faith alone, in the strict application of the word, but by a union of faith with obedience, charity,' &c.; or, in the language of Professor Garbett, 'Justification, with him, is the *result* of faith and works.' Surely this is 'diametrically opposed,' not merely to Davenant, but to those formularies and other authorities of the Church, which '*it is painful*' to find him referring to, as though they accorded with his own sentiments. Mr. Bricknell, in his valuable work just published, '*The Judgment of the Bishops upon Tractarian Theology*,' has adduced evidence sufficiently satisfactory to demonstrate not only the specific allegation in question, but other points adverted to in connection with it.

"Without referring, however, to the differences, which are manifold, I am satisfied that whoever is imbued with the glowing and consistent theology of Davenant, will find, though it may be imperceptibly, that he has forsaken the cold and incongruous divinity of Bull, though he will still meet with many passages of real or apparent agreement in both. As it is not my intention to be led into farther discussion on the subject, I may say, as indeed I alluded in my Preface to the Treatise on Justification, that in referring to Bishop Bull, I had a direct eye to the work of one of the most able and learned theologians of the present day—Professor Garbett—who (with far higher authority than I can pretend to, and in pages that will remain so long as solid divinity is valued in preference to the superficial folly with which the Church has been inundated), has strongly pointed out the erroneous teaching



introduced by the above-mentioned prelate. If there are those, therefore, who think that the system of Bishop Bull is capable of defence, it would be better for them to apply their weapons against one who has so boldly assailed him as the author of most serious error in the Church, rather than to dwell on a casual remark in a preface, which could scarcely be avoided by any one who noted the commendatory passage of Bull; and who at the same time recollected, that whatever may be his qualifications as a divine, his candour has never been considered as peculiarly conspicuous."

Birmingham, Nov. 7, 1845.

To the letter of which the above is the substance, I would have added the following Postscript, but it was too late for admission :—

"P.S.—I may refer 'Pacificus' to Bishop O'Brien's volume of 'Sermons on Faith;' who, in his Appendix, has exhibited somewhat distinctly the very point in question; as also the character and tendency of Bull's erroneous view of the great doctrine of Justification.

---

The following remarks on Tractarianism by the Bishop of Ohio (Bishop M'Ilvaine), which I have met with since the above occurrence, appear so much to the point, so admirably sum up the whole question, and afford such a just description of the pith and marrow of Bishop Davenant's two principal treatises, that I cannot forego this opportunity of adducing them, as calculated to exhibit, in a very strong light, the importance of the study of the questions at issue in the present day :—

"To minds skilled in the old contests of the truth against the corruptions of Rome, it was not difficult to see where they (the Tractarians) were making their main, though often masked, attack. To get away from the Church that palladium of her strength—the doctrine of justification by a righteousness *external* to us, and only in Christ—and to substitute the precise opposite—a justification by a righteousness *in* us, and not *in* Christ, implanted by sacra-



ments, and increased by good works—this was the first and main object. This gained, the citadel of Protestant faith was gained—their cause was gained; the Church was '*unprotestantized*.'—Page 6.

"Next to the *rule* of faith, comes the *substance of the faith*.

"If I were asked what is the place to begin at for the purpose of attacking the Tractarian system, as a thing of *external* evidence, I should answer, the Rule of Faith. Settle the point that the Bible alone is to be the final arbiter of the controversy, and the work is done. But if I were asked, what is the point whence to survey the Tractarian system, and try it to the heart as a *doctrinal theory professing to be the Gospel of Christ*, so as best to get all its bearings into one view, I should answer—*The great Scripture doctrine of justification by faith only, through the imputed or accounted righteousness of Christ*. Take your stand at that central eminence. All the lines of Gospel truth meet therein. Let your eye trace them out. The whole map of this false pretence of truth in the manifest opposition of its every course and bearing, will lie out before you.

"As to the substance of the faith, you know, brethren, what the doctrine of this system is concerning the righteousness whereby a sinner must be justified before God. We say, as our Church says,\* and the Bible says,—the righteousness of Christ's obedience unto death as our surety, whereby he fulfilled the law and paid our ransom; a righteousness external to us, and becoming ours by being accounted of God unto us, when we put forth the hand of a living faith to Christ. This the Tractarian system rejects with utter disdain and execration, and sets up in its place a righteousness in man implanted by the Spirit in baptism, and increased by good works. It distinctly asserts that the righteousness in which we must stand at the last day is *not Christ's own imputed obedience*, but of *our good works*.† Righteousness imparted and inherent in us, instead of righteousness accounted unto us and inherent only in Christ, is their whole basis of a sinner's hope."

J. A.

Birmingham, March 30, 1846.

\* See Art. xi., and Homily on Salvation.

† Newman on Justification, p. 59.







# CONTENTS

## OF THE CONCLUDING CHAPTERS ON JUSTIFICATION. IN VOL. II.

|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | PAGE. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| CHAP. XLVII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |       |
| Takes up the second proposition in Chap. xxxix. of vol. i. And                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| 1. The opinion of the Papists is laid down . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 1     |
| 2. The opposite opinion of our Divines is explained . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 5     |
| CHAP. XLVIII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| It is confirmed by arguments . . . . . , . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | 7     |
| CHAP. XLIX.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |
| By the testimonies of the Fathers . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | 29    |
| CHAP. L.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |       |
| The arguments of our opponents derived from Scripture examined . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 36    |
| CHAP. LI.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |       |
| Testimonies derived from the Fathers answered . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 45    |
| CHAP. LII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |
| Bellarmino's arguments confuted . . . . . , . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 53    |
| 4.—OF THE MERIT OF GOOD WORKS.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| CHAP. LIII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |
| <i>The Fourth Question</i> , of the merit of good works. In treating which<br>some things from the Fathers concerning the words merit and me-<br>riting are premised, 66 ; from the sounder Schoolmen, 69 ; the Je-<br>suits, 70 ; and the differing opinions of the Romanists, whence the<br>worthiness of works arises, are examined . . . . . | 71    |
| CHAP. LIV.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |
| The opinion of our Divines is set forth, 75, and comprised in two propo-<br>sitions :—                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |       |
| 1. That the good works of the regenerate flowing from the grace of<br>the Holy Spirit are not meritorious of life eternal <i>ex condigno</i> ; nei-<br>ther do they make this reward due to the workers as a matter of jus-<br>tice . . . . .                                                                                                    | 77    |
| CHAP. LV.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |       |
| Proved by arguments derived from the condition of the doer . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | 78    |
| CHAP. LVI.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |
| From the quality of the works . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | 89    |
| CHAP. LVII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |
| From a consideration of the rewarder . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 100   |
| CHAP. LVIII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |       |
| From the nature of the reward . . . . . , . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 108   |
| CHAP. LIX.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |       |
| The merit of condignity refuted by the opinion of Fathers, 117 ; of<br>Schoolmen and modern Romanists . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | 122   |



|                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | PAGE. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| CHAP. LX.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |       |
| The arguments of Romanists for the merit of <i>condignity</i> refuted . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | 130   |
| CHAP. LXI.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |       |
| Other arguments of Bellarmine discussed . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | 148   |
| Bellarmino can find none of the Fathers to favour the merit of <i>condignity</i>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | 155   |
| CHAP. LXII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| Some expedients among Romanists of the more perspicacious class premised concerning the worthiness of works from the Divine promise, &c. .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 159   |
| 2.—The second proposition set forth. That the good works of the regenerate which are considered in themselves are not worthy of life eternal, neither do they oblige God, on the score of justice, to the payment of such a reward; nor can they from any contract or promise of God acquire either a meritorious worthiness, or the power of obliging God to make recompence as regards justice properly understood . . . . . | 160   |
| CHAP. LXIII.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |       |
| It is proved against Alfonsus de Castro, Gregory de Valentia, and others, that good works themselves neither acquire <i>condignity</i> , nor that any right to life eternal accrues to the workers in strict justice, from the Divine promise . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                        | 160   |
| CHAP. LXIV.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| Suarez, Bellarmine, and others are refuted, who think that God is <i>bound</i> to render the reward of eternal life, and that, <i>too</i> , in accordance with justice properly so called . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 169   |
| CHAP. LXV.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |       |
| The arguments of those who would establish the doctrine of the <i>condignity</i> of human works upon the ground of the promise of God, propounded and refuted . . . . .                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | 178   |
| CHAP. LXVI.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |       |
| Arguments refuted, by which Suarez endeavours to prove that, on the principles of commutative justice, God is, by virtue of his promise, <i>bound</i> to render a reward of life eternal in return for our works . .                                                                                                                                                                                                           | 184   |

#### ERRATA ET EMENDANDA.

- Page 4, Note \*, line 4, for "hominus" read *homini*.  
 .... 5, line 19, place the parenthetic mark ) after God.  
 .... 69, line 19, for "opposite" read *apposite*.  
 .... 128, Notes, line 13, for "Varnica" read *Varmia*.  
 .... 153 ..... 3 from the bottom, for "eum" read *enim*.  
 .... 159 ..... 4, for "provabi" read *probavi*.  
 .... — ..... 6, for "it" read *id*.  
 .... 165 ..... 3, for "curquam" read *cui*.  
 .... 374 ..... 1, for "ομοουσιον" read *ομοουσιον*.  
 .... 436 ..... last line but one, for "contradicted" read *contrasted*.  
 .... 444, line 16 from the bottom, for "Sardium" read *Sardica*.

A few other such errata have been observed, chiefly in the Notes, but being obviously mere typographical lapses, the learned reader will readily correct them.



OF ACTUAL RIGHTEOUSNESS,  
OR  
THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF WORKS.

---

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE REAL SUBJECT IN DEBATE ENQUIRED INTO.

HAVING utterly overturned that peculiarly vain and proud notion of supererogation,\* we will now proceed to the other subject under dispute, concerning the perfection of actual righteousness, in which our opponents conduct themselves with a little more moderation.

Let it then be considered as fully admitted, that no man can by his own holiness or righteousness surpass the rule of holiness and righteousness as contained in the Law; we must next enquire, whether the regenerate themselves can altogether come up to, or perfectly fulfil this entire law of God, by the completeness of their actual righteousness? And here, first, we shall lay before you the opinion of the Papists drawn from their own writings; secondly, we will give you the opposite opinion, as set forth by our divines: lastly, we will enter upon an examination of the conflicting arguments; in which we shall endeavour to support our defence by clear reasonings, and to set aside the objections of our opponents by convincing answers.

First (as is just) let us take the opinion of the Roman Church from the Fathers assembled at Trent. Thus they then say (Sess. vi. can. 18,) *If any one shall say that it is impossible even for a man who is justified and living in a*

\* See vol. i. ch. xxxix. Prop. 2. p. 384.



*state of grace to keep the commandments of God, let him be accursed.* Now I wish you to observe the Papistic craft made use of in drawing up this canon. Our opponents are well aware that we do not deny the duty of a diligent observance of the Divine commands by the regenerate; but that we maintain that there is no perfect and entire keeping of them, such as so fully satisfies the law, that no one point of it is violated, and which so entirely fulfils the conditions of the law, that a man can obtain the inheritance of life eternal by virtue thereof. In vain then are these anathema hurled against Protestants, seeing that they do not assert that it is impossible for the regenerate to keep the commandments of God; for they diligently exercise themselves in the practice of them all; but that it is impossible, in the practice of them, fully to come up to the righteousness of the law, or to avoid any, the least aberration (*ᾠνομίαν*) from it. For until the infirmity be entirely healed in the regenerate, and such a perfect degree of liberty be received, that by a voluntary and happy necessity they cannot but live well, and never sin; it is impossible that they should attain to a righteousness altogether equal to the demands of the Divine law.\* But, to dismiss the men of Trent:—

The Romanists, during the Conference at Ratisbon, thus expressed their opinion: *The regenerate can satisfy the requirements of the Divine law even in this life;† or, Divine grace aiding, they are able so far to accomplish the commands of God, as to fulfil their duties both to God and their neighbour.‡* Now these speak more openly than the Tridentine theologians do; for *in satisfying the law, and in rendering to God and our neighbour whatever is due*, such a perfection of righteousness must be understood, as to set aside any need of remission of sin at all. Still to this opinion there nevertheless attaches some ambiguity, inasmuch as they say, that *this can be done by the regenerate by the help of Divine grace.* For if they mean such assistance as God by his Almighty power would be able to give to the regenerate even in this life, we do not mean to gainsay it; if they mean such as he ordinarily bestows and has

\* Vide Augustinum de perfect. Just. resp. 8, et 9. [tom. x. col. 170. edit. Benedict.]

† Page 265.

‡ Page 909.



promised to give, we deny that the regenerate can, by the help of this grace, fully satisfy the demands of the Divine law, and render to God and his neighbour whatever it is his duty to do. Nay our opponents themselves, upon better consideration of the matter, have admitted as much: their words are,\*—*God, knowing our infirmity, does not require from us an absolute perfection in the fulfilment of his law, but such a fulfilling as we can perform by the help of his grace if we exert ourselves.* They concede, therefore, that an absolute fulfilling of the law, so far as depends on the infirmity of the flesh, is impossible; but what God requires as a lawgiver must be learnt and determined by the legal covenant itself, not in connection with any allowance for human imbecility. To leave then those who have themselves abandoned their own cause, let us proceed to canvass the statements made by others.

Alfonsus de Castro has stated the case in the manner following:†—*The keeping of all the commandments of God is possible to us with that help of God which he is always ready to impart, if we are willing to use it.* If by the keeping of all the Divine commandments he understands an absolute and perfect keeping, he has set out the point in debate correctly; and we unhesitatingly deny that men can, even with the help of that grace which God is wont ordinarily to bestow upon the regenerate, in this manner (that is, absolutely and perfectly) keep all the commandments of God. They can perform acts of inchoate righteousness because they have received inchoate grace; but an entire conformity in righteousness, they will be able to exhibit then only, when the fullest measure of grace shall have wholly expelled indwelling sin.

But let us attend to the opinions of the Jesuits. Vasquez treats this controversy, in 1. 2. tom. 2. quæst. 114, disp. 212. cap. 1, where he makes his statement of the Papal doctrine in manner following:—*It is possible for men to keep the law of God in this life unblamably; and to perform, according to the rule of virtue, such works as are really good;*—positions, each of which he affirms is denied by our

\* Page 267.

† Contra hæres. lib. 12, in verbo *Præceptum*; [fol. 185, edit. Coloniae, 1543.]



party. But in both cases the Jesuit is either mistaken, or is purposely trifling; for he has not ventured to, nor indeed could he assail the actual truth of our doctrine. With Augustine, therefore, we assert:—*We read indeed of persons being without blame, or free from reproach; but we do not read of any one without sin, except the Son of God alone, and he also the alone Son of God.\** We deny then that any of the regenerate can so completely satisfy the law, as to be free from all ἀνομία. We admit that a man may so live, as to be free from all blame, even from reproach; although scarcely one of a thousand of the regenerate is found ordinarily to make good even this. Whilst engaged, therefore, in proving such a point, our opponent is contending without an adversary. And when he adds, that *the regenerate do some works which are good according to the rule of virtue*, who would gainsay it? They perform many good works, yet imperfectly good: they mingle also with them many bad works; hence we must conclude that they do not entirely satisfy the demands of the Divine law.

Last of all we cite Bellarmine himself, who in the name of all the Romanists (in libro 4. *de Justificatione*, cap. 10) presents this sentiment as generally received, that *regenerate men are, by the help of Divine grace, and by the spirit of faith and love infused into us in justification itself, competent absolutely to fulfil the law of God.*

It has been my object to bring together these different opinions of different Romanists, in order that you may understand that our adversaries themselves do not greatly confide in the goodness of their cause, seeing they most frequently either disguise or misrepresent the exact point under debate, by the use of general and ambiguous terms.

\* *De perfect. Justit.* [cap. xii. §. 29; tom. x. col. 180. Job is the instance alluded to, as read of by Augustine. The passage runs thus: *Legitur sani homo sine crimine, legitur sine querela: at non legitur sine peccato, nisi Filius homini unus, idemque Dei Filius unicus.*

*Sine crimine* here, and in the quotation given above from Vasquez, evidently represents the Vulgate translation of ἀνέγκλητοι, the rendering of which may be seen in our translation in 1 Cor. i. 8; Tit. i. 6, 7; 1 Tim. iii. 10: with these instances, the above is made to correspond.

In like manner, *sine querela*, in the passage from Augustine, refers doubtless to the Vulgate rendering ἁμέμπλος by *sine querelâ*, the precise meaning whereof may be seen in our version of Luke i. 6; 1 Thess. iii. 13; v. 23, and ii. 10.

*Sine peccato* obviously refers to Heb. iv. 15.



For that notable assembly at Trent (which attributes the keeping of the Divine commandments to the regenerate man, but does not make it plain, in the mean time, whether it be a perfect and unswerving keeping, or one merely inchoate and imperfect) seems purposely to have employed general terms in the expression of its opinion.\* At the Ratisbon Conference, however, (where it is laid down that God does not require an absolute fulfilment of his law, but such as the regenerate are able to render according to the measure of the grace received,) it is admitted that the truth rests with us in this controversy; and on that account they raise a *new* ground of dispute. And Vasquez (who brings the matter to such a point as to prove that the regenerate may live free from blame, that is, free from any shameful and flagitious sin, and can do good works,) does but trifle in labouring to prove what nobody denies. Alfonsus and Bellarmine (whose doctrine it is that such a measure of grace is infused and bestowed upon all the justified as renders them entirely conformed to the law of God,) do really touch the very point in question.

For our Divines, albeit they admit that God can do this if he pleases, yet are unanimous in denying that God does ordinarily, or is willing to, impart to the regenerate in this life, such a degree of perfect grace as shall qualify them perfectly, and in all respects, for an entire fulfilling of his law. So Bucer, in his Conference at Ratisbon† states,‡—*We*

\* The Council at Trent is, perhaps, sometimes more hardly dealt with on this ground than need be. A perusal of Father Paul's account of the debates, or of Cardinal Paleotto's *Acta Conc. Tridentini*, lately printed from M.S., for the first time, by the Rev. J. Mendham, will prove that, to have any decrees passed at all (in some cases) it was found absolutely necessary to employ such *general* expressions, as would, not unfrequently, suit a variety of opinions: while in other cases,—so much had knowledge and improved sentiment been circulated through the medium of Lutheran Reformation—it became just as necessary, in order to keep Romish doctrine on its legs at all, actually to approach in her decrees to *Protestant* statement and *Protestant* doctrine. This view, if correct, (as we believe it) will account for the vagueness and ambiguity of the Trent Oracle, and her enouncements in various cases. See Cramp's *Text-Book of Popery*, pp. 107, 284: Edit. 1841. And also, Palmer's *Letters to Wiseman*; I. p. 9, 10.

† In the year 1546; upon which, see Buddei *Dissertatt. ad Theol. Hist Eccles. spectantium*, tom. iii. pp. 457, 60; and Seckendorf. *Hist. Lutheranismi*, lib. iii. pp. 625, 7.

‡ Page 265.



*affirm that no one in this life can fully satisfy the requirements of the Divine law. And again,\* that the justified man by the help of grace can so entirely fulfil the commands of God, as to render what is due both to God and his neighbour, is diametrically opposed to the Scriptures; if we understand by that term the ordinary assistance of grace which God imparts to his own children in this life. Where, be careful to observe, (for the same misrepresentations which the Pelagians formerly laid upon the ancient Fathers, do the Papists in the present day lay on us,) that an impossibility of fulfilling the law is not unqualifiedly and absolutely denied to the regenerate, but when the Divine will and ordination are taken into consideration. For it is certain that any of the regenerate might perfectly fulfil the law of God in this life, if God were pleased to bestow upon them the perfection of righteousness. We do not say then, that either on the part of God, or as respects the thing itself, it is impossible that the law should be fulfilled by the regenerate; but we maintain that God, for just reasons, has not been pleased so completely to remedy a vitiated nature, by the medicine of infused grace, as to enable it completely to fulfil the law of God in this life. Neither Luther nor Calvin, assailed as they were by Papists, most unjustly with ceaseless revilings, have thought or taught otherwise. Calvin says,†—*When I assert that the keeping of the law is impossible, I call that impossible which never has been, and to which the appointment of God is an obstacle to its ever existing at all.* As though he had said, I do not mean that it is impossible for God to strengthen any one of the regenerate for keeping of the law perfectly; nor is it impossible that the regenerate should be so far strengthened; but that God himself has ordained otherwise, has resolved otherwise; namely, that he would impart here to each one of the regenerate a pious desire, not an absolute possibility of fulfilling the law. To Calvin may be added that most learned man, Peter Martyr, who says,‡—*We cannot deny that God, if he so pleased, might bring it to pass, and bestow so large a measure of his Spirit and grace, that every degree of inclination to evil should be removed from the regenerate,**

\* Page 610.

† Instit. lib. 2. cap. 7. sect. 5.

‡ Loc. Comm. Class. 2. cap. 15. sect. 1. [Loc. x. §. 3.]



*and his law be unfailingly observed by them in this life ; but he has never done that, nor has he promised to do it.*

Let Chemnitz close the band of our Theologians, who has most lucidly explained the true state of the question in these words,\*—*The question respecting the good works of the regenerate is, whether they so fully satisfy the Divine law by a perfect fulfilment of it, that the law cannot discover any thing to accuse and condemn in them, even if God should enter into judgment with them.*

From this comparison of contrary opinions, you perceive now what points must be set aside in this present controversy, and what we must endeavour to prove and establish. We must reject philosophical speculations about absolute possibility or impossibility ; for the question is not what God *can*, but what he *will* and *really does*, effect, in the regenerate. We must set aside the question concerning the reality of good works, on which we have already treated ; because the question is not, whether by the assistance of grace the regenerate can do works *truly* good ; but whether they can perform works *purely* good, and escape all and every measure of evil, as required by the law. The only point then which we have to prove and demonstrate is,—That none of the regenerate are sanctified to such a degree in plenitude of grace in this life, as to be enabled perfectly to fulfil the spiritual law of God, by doing all those things which are commanded in it, and by avoiding all those things which are forbidden by the same. With these explanatory statements, let us prepare for argument.

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

THAT THE REGENERATE CANNOT ENTIRELY FULFIL THE LAW  
PROVED BY ARGUMENTS.

I WILL not enlarge much in treating upon this portion of the controversy, because most conclusive arguments may be drawn for the confirmation of our opinion from the previous discussions. For seeing that we have already shown in the

\* Exam. part. 1, quæst. 3. *de bon. oper.*



second question concerning habitual righteousness,\* that *infused righteousness does not forthwith or altogether expel indwelling sin*, it is clear, that the spiritual law cannot be fulfilled by him who, while on earth, remains always in a measure carnal. Moreover, our conclusion in the third question,† namely, that *the regenerate do not stand justified in the judgment of God through inherent righteousness*, proves this also, that their righteousness does not come up to an exact fulfilment of the law. What was said on the question concerning the reality of good works, or of actual righteousness, equally appertains to this subject also; for in it we proved clearly, that the works of the regenerate are *truly* good, and yet that they are not *purely* good, that is, that they always possess some spiritual goodness, through the influence of *grace*, and yet are nevertheless stained by some defilement, from the prevalence of the *flesh*. But works of this character do not imply a righteousness equal to meet the requirements of the Divine law. Lastly, in the discussion just closed, against the doctrine of supererogation, we introduced many topics which prove not only that the law cannot be exceeded by the regenerate by any supererogatory works, but that it is not even fulfilled in an exact adherence to it. Although, therefore, in those preceding discussions, we have abundantly supplied any one with the means both for strengthening our defence, and for weakening the opposing system; yet because our opponents make this question concerning the fulfilment of the law a distinct one, we also will treat it separately, and shall collect our hitherto scattered, and, as it were, wandering arguments into one view.

1.—First we argue against the Romanists from the issue itself, thus:—If the grace which is infused into the justified renders all of them capable and sufficiently strong for an entire fulfilling of the law, then, among the many thousands of regenerate men, to all of whom it was possible to fulfil the law, many in point of fact would have fulfilled it; or if not many, yet some, doubtless one at least out of so many thousands.‡ The connexion appears sound enough; for no

[\* See vol. i. chap. iv. to chap. xxi.; or pp. 14—156.]

[† Vol. i. chap. xxii. to chap. xxix.; or pp. 157—372.]

‡ Vide Hieron. adversus Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 2 et 3.



probable reason can be adduced why, on the supposition that the fulfilment of the law were possible to all the regenerate, not so much as one, among so many labouring and exerting themselves with all their might, ever attained the fulfilment of it. Therefore, that which never occurs, namely, the fulfilment of the law; and that which always occurs in all the regenerate, namely, the transgression of the law, must necessarily depend on some universal or uniform cause. If therefore this be evident, that not one out of so many of the regenerate has, at any period, completely fulfilled the law; it will also follow, that no one could have done it. But let us proceed to an induction of particular instances. Job fulfilled not the law. Job. ix. 2:—

*I know it is so of a truth :*

*But how should man be just with God ?*

*If he will contend with him,*

*He cannot answer him one of a thousand.*

And verse 15:—

*Though I were righteous, yet would I not answer,*

*But I would make supplication to my Judge.*

Upon this Gregory has offered these remarkable expressions:—*A holy man perceives all the merit of our virtue to be sin, if it be strictly examined by the inward monitor.* Again, says he,†—*If a man's life be scrutinised without the intervention of mercy, even that of the righteous would fail.* In fine, he adds,‡ *All human righteousness is proved to be unrighteousness, if it is strictly canvassed.* Prayer therefore is needed after righteousness, that what if scrutinised would fail, may recover strength by the mere compassion of the Judge. That most holy man, David, fulfilled not the law. Thus, says he, Psal. cxxx. 3:—

*If thou, Lord, shouldst mark iniquities,*

*O Lord, who shall stand ?*

And in Psal. cxliii. 2:—

*Enter not into judgment with thy servant ;*

*For in thy sight shall no man living be justified.*

Upon these passages Augustine thus writes:—On the former,§ *He said not, I shall not stand ; but, Who shall*

\* Moral. 9. cap 1.

† Cap. 11.

‡ Cap. 14.

§ In Enarrat. in Psal. cxxix. [§ 2. tom. iv. col. 1455.]



*stand? For he saw that almost the whole course of man's life was surrounded with crying sins; the consciences of all were accused by their own reflections, that a pure heart, able to rely on its own righteousness, could not be found. On the latter passage\* he says:—No man living; that is living here on earth, living in the flesh, living in a state of liability to death;—every one so living may perhaps stand justified in his own sight, but not in thy sight.*

But let us proceed to some instances from the New Testament, lest our opponents should pretend that under it such a measure of grace is given to the regenerate, as to render them fit and competent for an exact fulfilling of the law. That Apostle so singularly beloved by Christ fulfilled it not. 1 John i. 8.—*If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.* St. James, who dwelt with so much earnestness upon good works, fulfilled not the law. Thus says he (iii. 2) *In many things we all offend.* Lastly, neither did the Apostle Paul fulfil it; Rom. vii. 19. *The good that I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.* And I might add to these examples that concluding sentence made use of in the Schools,—*Nor is the contrary to be found in any other cases; which I shall confirm by the testimony of Augustine:†—If we except the holy Virgin Mary, (concerning whom, for the honour of the Lord, when we are speaking of sin, I do not wish to enter on any discussion,) if we could assemble all the saints and holy when they were living on earth, and should ask, whether they were free from sin; they would exclaim with one voice, IF WE SAY THAT WE HAVE NO SIN, WE DECEIVE OURSELVES, AND THE TRUTH IS NOT IN US.*

We have then made good in this our first argument, that no one of the regenerate has actually fulfilled the law; and consequently that no one could have fulfilled it.

2.—A second argument shall be derived from the confession of our adversaries in this manner:—According to the opinion of the Papists themselves, no one lives or can live in this

\* In Enarrat. in Psal. cxlii. [§ 6. col. 1592.]

It may be well to observe, on these references, that Augustine follows the numbering of the Vulgate and lxx., in which translations, Ps. cxxx., and cxlii., stand respectively as cxxix., and cxlii.

† De natura et grat. contra Pelagianos, cap. 36.



corruptible flesh free from actual sin ; therefore no one can fulfil the law ; since actual sin is nothing else than *ἀνομία*, that is, the transgression of the law ; or, as Augustine has defined it, *a word, a deed, or desire against the law of God*. As regards the antecedent, it is clearly contained in the Scriptures, is solidly demonstrated by Augustine in many parts of his writings against the Pelagians, and is admitted by Bellarmine himself. Hear his confession :—*Chemnitz* (says he\*) *as usual confounds two questions, Whether the commandments can be fully observed, and whether a man can live free from sin. For those questions are so distinct that Augustine always answers the former affirmatively ; but the latter he always denies. He uniformly teaches, that no man can, in this life, avoid all venial sins ; but venial sins are not against, but beside the commandments. So forsooth notwithstanding these, a man does, according to the doctrine of Bellarmine, fulfil the law. We gladly receive what our opponent so freely grants, that no one can in this life avoid all venial sins ; and hence take occasion to wrest from him what he denies, that no one can completely fulfil the law of God. The main point under controversy hinges upon this argument : suffer me therefore to explain it somewhat more at large.*

First, then, I prove that these are not two distinct questions ; but are always reckoned as one and the same, both by the Pelagians and by Augustine. If therefore, Augustine affirms that no one can altogether avoid sin, he denies likewise that any one can fulfil the law of God. It is manifest that these are one and the same question, seeing that Bellarmine, who was doubtless very conversant with the writings of Augustine, could not adduce even one passage in order to prove that these questions are diverse and distinct ; but thrusts forward, impudently enough, his own bare affirmation (false as it is) just as if it were the response of an undoubted oracle. The Pelagians, we see, in the course of argument, always employ these two expressions,—namely, *to fulfil the law of God*, and *to live without sin*—as equivalent terms. Celestius,† in his sixth argument, says, *We*

\* De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 12.

† CELESTIUS, an Irishman by birth, was a fellow-student with Pelagius at Rome, whom he afterwards accompanied into Africa. These two men set out



*must enquire, whether man is commanded to live without sin; for either he cannot, and is not commanded; or because he is commanded he can do so. For why should that be enjoined, which it is impossible to comply with?\** Here he plainly intimates that there is no difference in *being without sin*, and *fulfilling the commands of God*. In his xith argument he speaks still more plainly. *Again (says he) we must enquire under how many forms all sins may be classed? Under two forms, if I mistake not; since either those things are done which are forbidden, or those things are not done which are commanded. As certainly can all those things be avoided which are forbidden, as those be performed which are commanded. — How then shall we deny that it is possible for a man to be without sin, when we must acknowledge that he is able both to avoid all those things which are forbidden, and to perform the things which are commanded?* In this passage Celestius does not doubt that he has established his case, and shewn that man can live without sin, when he has proved that he can keep the law of God. He, then, did not suppose those to be distinct and separate questions, as Bellarmine feigns them to be. Lastly, Augustine himself, when he assails these arguments of the Pelagians, never distinguishes between these two questions; but, as he maintains that no one is without sin, so he also holds that no one fulfils the law in this life; because these two things are connected, and follow one another by a necessary consequence. Consult the answers which we have recorded to those questions of Celestius; and it will be found in various parts of that treatise concerning the perfection of righteousness, and in all others against the Pelagians, that Augustine allows in the same sense that man is capable of being without sin, and that he is capable of fulfilling the law;

by adopting the notion, “that the doctrines taught by Christians, concerning the innate depravity of man, and the necessity of internal Divine grace, in order to the illumination and renovation of the soul, were a great impediment to the progress of holiness; and therefore, should be rooted out of the Church.” — Being condemned of heresy, by a Council held at Carthage in 412, Celestius appealed to the then Bishop of Rome. But in 418 he was condemned by a Synod there, and being banished the Empire, he retired into concealment in the East, where it is supposed he died.—See Soames’s *Mosheim*, vol. i. pp. 498, 499.

\* Vide August. *de perfect. Justitiæ contra Cælest.* [cap. 5, col. 171, tom. x.]



namely, that he has the capability to do both, subject to the limitation that this capability *then only effectually manifests itself in the saints, when the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts in the largest measure which our nature, having been healed and cleansed, can receive.\** In the same sense, also, he grants that man is *without sin*, and *keeps the law*. Certainly every believer is without sin; because, although there does not exist any believer by whom all sin is avoided, yet in all, daily remission being obtained through faith, all sins are blotted out and healed.† So likewise the commandments are observed by every believer, when *whatever is omitted to be done is forgiven.‡* Lastly, It is in the same sense, also, that Augustine denies these two propositions, *that any one exists altogether free from sin in this life; and, that there is any one who completely fulfils the law of God in this life; that is to say, if the life of believers is examined, apart from mercy and the forgiveness of sins.* It is not Chemnitz, therefore, who has confounded distinct questions, but Bellarmine who endeavours dishonestly to put asunder subjects most intimately united.

I will close this branch of the subject with the statement that, in the judgment of Augustine, there is a real difference between the following two questions:—*whether any one of the regenerate has been without blame; which he answers affirmatively; and, whether any one of the regenerate has been without sin; which he always answers negatively.§* In his treatise against Celestius *on the perfection of righteousness*, he says,|| *We read of persons without blame; we do not read of any one without sin.* And in the same treatise, *It does not follow, that a man is free from all sin because he is without spot or blame.¶* Augustine, however, has nowhere said, *We read of some who have lived without any transgression of the law 'ανομία; but we read not of any who have lived without any sin.* Bellarmine's first

\* De Nat. et Grat. cap. 42.—Vide et cap. 66.

† Vide de perfect. Justitiæ, pag. 1428, 1429. [Tom. x. col. 167—186, edit. Benedict.]

‡ Retract. lib. 1. cap. 19; and ad Bonifacium contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 7.

§ Vide de Pec. Orig. lib. 1. cap. 48. [col. 251.]

|| Page 1430. [cap. 12.]

¶ [Non habet maculam criminis.] Page 1434 [cap. 17. § 38.]



assertion, accordingly, has vanished. I will now, in the second place, shew, that the sins which he calls venial, and which he admits cannot be avoided, are against the law; and on that account, the law is not fully kept by man who commits even these venial sins. First, because every transgression of the law is something committed against the law: but every sin (understood morally) is a transgression of the Divine law. For thus says the Apostle (1 John iii, 4) *ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*. *Sin is the transgression of the law*. So Augustine (whom we have before quoted) *Sin is a word, an act, or a desire contrary to the law of God*.<sup>\*</sup> So says Bernard: *All sin is understood to be committed against the commands of God*.<sup>†</sup> So, in fine, Durandus, Gerson, Vega, and others among the Romanists themselves.<sup>‡</sup> Secondly, that which is forbidden by the law is against the law; for, to act contrary to the law, what else is it, than to do that which is forbidden by the law? Now all those sins which are generally called venial, are forbidden by the law of God; for if they were not forbidden they would not be sins; since it is the nature of sin, that *it is opposed to the rule of our conduct, that is, to the law of God*; as Aquinas truly remarks, *Quæst. disput. de Peccat. Orig. art. 1*. Thirdly, whatsoever is opposed to right reason, is contrary also to the Divine law. Now those sins which are called venial are opposed to right reason; for right reason says, that idle words, inordinate desires, and all other things which are classed under the name of venial sins, are evils unlawful and to be avoided. As, therefore, they are contrary to reason, so, also, are they against the law. Fourthly, if they were not against the law, or forbidden by virtue of the law, then he who should abstain from these things would be performing an act of *Counsel*, not of *Precept*. Therefore, to abstain from idle words, from lying jests, and little thefts, would be matter of *Counsel*, not of *Precept*. But Christ prohibits us from giving credence to this new theology, when he plainly declares, that for even one idle word you shall give account in the day of judgment. Fifthly, he who does any work *beside* the law, which, however, is not contrary to the law,

<sup>\*</sup> Contra Faustum lib. 22. cap. 27.

<sup>†</sup> De Præcepto et Dispens. cap. xi. [§ 25.]

<sup>‡</sup> Vide Bellarminum de Justif. lib. 4. cap. 13.



is performing an act indifferent, but not unlawful ; but every sin, even a venial sin, is an unlawful act ; therefore, contrary to the law. Lastly, Augustine himself, when speaking of those lighter sins free from which man does not live, plainly intimates that even they are, nevertheless, contrary to the law of God. For where he speaks of the saints, and the righteous, he says, that for sins of this kind, God the Judge might bring them into *condemnation*.\* But a judge cannot pronounce an individual guilty, unless for something committed against the law. On account of these sins, he says that the just themselves acknowledge that they are *unjust*. But no one becomes unjust merely because he has done something as it were beside the law. When discoursing on these sins he admits that they are contrary to the Divine injunction : *For they would not be sins, if God had not forbidden them to be done*.† But he who does that which God has forbidden to be done, is doubtless acting contrary to the will of God, and thereby against the law of God. In fine, he acknowledges that by these very sins *the purity of the heart is violated, and defilement of the heart is contracted*.‡ But nothing can be assigned which tends to violate the purity, and induce a defilement of the heart, but must at the same time contravene the law.

And now to present our reasoning before you in a short compass :—He who cannot live free from those sins which are called venial, cannot entirely fulfil the law, because such sins are contrary to the law. But no one saint has lived, or ever could have lived, free from these sins ; therefore none of them could sufficiently fulfil the law. *In many things we all offend*. (James iii. 2.)

3. A third argument is derived from the determination and unchangeableness of the Divine appointment, which stands thus : God has not determined, neither has he been pleased to impart to the regenerate such a measure of grace as shall suffice for enabling them completely to fulfil the law : consequently they are not able to fulfil it. The connexion holds good ; seeing that in the gifts and operations

\* De Peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 12. cap. 10 et 11. [cap. 14.]

† Ibid. cap. 16 [§ 23.]

‡ De perfect. Justit. pag. 1432.



of grace, every one has and can perform only so much as he receives from God. *For what hast thou which thou hast not received?* 1 Cor. iv. 7. *Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights;* Jas. i. 17. With respect to the antecedent, that the most wise God, for reasons known to himself, although he is able, is nevertheless not pleased to impart perfect righteousness to the regenerate in this life, or to bestow upon them such a fulness of strength, as to enable them entirely to fulfil the law and to avoid all sin, is plain from the example of Paul, who bewails this matter in Rom. vii. 14, &c., as well as from the answer of God to him, who assures him that *his strength is made perfect in the weakness* of the regenerate; 2 Cor. xii. 9. Augustine has both admitted the fact, and has glanced at the reason: \* *In some cases God does not aid even his saints, considering that that they are too liable to be elated in working out righteousness; in order that whilst no one living is justified in his sight, we may ever feel bound to render him thanks for his merciful kindness, and may be preserved from swellings of pride by a holy abasement.* Here you perceive the reason why no one of the regenerate fulfils the law in all things; because God in some cases withholds his assistance; and without the help of God free-will avails not, even in the regenerate themselves, for the exercise of pious and holy actions. Moreover, you perceive there is also a two-fold reason, why God sees fit not to give sufficient assistance for the complete fulfilment of righteousness; the former is, that the regenerate may live in subjection to God, and conscious of their need of pardon; the latter is, that these same regenerate persons may not be subject to pride, and guilty of self-dependence. Augustine treats of the same subject in his book *de natura et gratia* (chap. 27, and the four following chapters); where he defends this Catholic doctrine against Pelagius:—*It was necessary, in order to remove from man occasion for pride or boasting, to leave him not altogether free from sin.* But even from among the Jesuits themselves, we have Vasquez agreeing with us; † *It has not been granted to any of the just in this life, to be*

\* De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 3 cap. ult.

† In 1. 2. tom. 3. disp. 212. cap. 2.



*able entirely to avoid all venial sins on every occasion, &c.* The sum of the argument is:—God has not been pleased to give strength and grace for completely fulfilling the law, and the avoiding of all sin; therefore, we are not able to fulfil the law.

4.—A fourth argument, deduced from those internal causes, whence an incapacity for fulfilling the law necessarily arises, will bring us to the same conclusion. Now these causes are referable either to certain wants and deficiencies; or, to some affections and dispositions which are opposed to that righteousness which ought to be in us. The argument is framed thus: Such persons are unable to fulfil the law of God, in whom there remain defects and affections opposing and impeding perfection in righteousness. But such exist in all the regenerate; it is not possible, therefore, that they should fulfil the law. The truth of the major proposition, not even a philosopher would think of calling in question. For the perfection of an action must always flow from the perfection of the agent; and an imperfect and vitiated agent always produces imperfect and vitiated actions; seeing that effects cannot rise higher than the powers which originate them. Paul acknowledges the force of this argument: *The law is spiritual; I am in part carnal; I cannot, therefore, accomplish thoroughly the good which the law enjoins; Rom vii.* So also, in chapter viii. verse 3, he infers *the impossibility of completely fulfilling the law*, from the infirmity of the flesh, that is, of the old man, as yet imperfectly renewed and but partially cleansed. Finally, to the Galatians v. 17: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* In these, and many other passages, the Apostle plainly teaches that man is not yet perfectly renewed, but is in part carnal, and cannot come up to the perfection and spirituality of the law.

But let us pass to the minor proposition. Every regenerate person labours under defect of knowledge in the performance of some particular actions. Hence all the godly desire that sins of ignorance may be forgiven them, and the High Priest under the Old Testament used to offer sacrifices for his own and the people's ignorance; Heb. ix. 7. In



the same manner the will of the regenerate fails in the entireness of its love—fails of an adequate delighting in spiritual good; from which there must necessarily attach defect and irregularity to many particular actions. Augustine not unfrequently inculcates this, from whom I will quote some testimonies: *Ignorance and infirmity are evils which obstruct the will in its movements towards the accomplishment of any good work, or the abstinence from any evil work.\** A little after: *Consequently, there is none of us who does not sometimes know, and at other times feel ignorant, how to undertake, to persist in, and to accomplish a good work; who does not one time feel an enjoyment, and at another time feel indisposed to the same work: so that a man may hence learn, that it is not from his own ability, but from the Divine bounty, that he either knows how, or that he is disposed, &c.* The Lord God, on this account, does not confer on his saints a perfect righteousness in any work, nor a sure knowledge, nor a triumphant enjoyment; that they may understand, that not from themselves, but from Him proceeds that light by which their darkness is enlightened, &c.† And when writing concerning the grace of Christ, in opposition to Pelagius and Celestius, cap. xi., he infers, from those words, *My strength is made perfect in weakness*, that there was infirmity both of the flesh and the mind in the Apostle Paul himself. Of the same Apostle he thus speaks: *How can health be said to be full, where the buffetting of a messenger of satan is necessary as a medicine?‡* But the most plain of all is, when writing of the perfection of righteousness to Celestius, he observes:—*Then will there be fulness of righteousness, when there is fulness of health; then will there be fulness of health, when there is fulness of love; then will there be fulness of love, when we shall see God as he is.§* From all which he infers, that they in whom so many defects are found, cannot but fall short of an entire fulfilment of the law.

But I proceed further yet in confirmation of the minor proposition; and besides these defects, I affirm that there is in the regenerate a nature or disposition contrary to the

\* De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 2. cap. 17.

† Ibid. cap. 19.

‡ Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 7.

§ Page 1420. [cap. 3. §. 8.]



law, which the Apostle calls the *old man*, *concupiscence*, or *indwelling sin*; and such as are affected by an evil tendency of this kind cannot fulfil the law. Concerning this old man, the Apostle thus speaks; Ephes. iv. 22.—*Put off the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts*: respecting this concupiscible [as is alluded to] and indwelling sin, he says, Rom. vii. 23: *I see another law in my members, &c.* (verse 19, 24) *The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.—O wretched man that I am, &c.* This is not the language of a man who is perfectly fulfilling the law, and doing even more than it requires; but of one groaning under a weight of sin, and hungering after the righteousness and grace of Christ. Let us hear Augustine, who, upon those questions which are in dispute with the Pelagians, may be considered to stand for all the Fathers. Now he shews that this inordinate and rebellious concupiscence does exist in the regenerate; and hence he terms them, to a certain extent, evil, and children of the world. *The children of God* (says he\*) *sin, but they sin inasmuch as they are yet children of the world.* A little after: *They are children of God, and yet they are evil. Are they evil from that principle by which they are children of God? By no means. But their condition, as evil, arises from their being as yet children of this world.* Elsewhere he terms this rebellious inclination *a desire after what is sinful*; and this desire itself he shews to be *evil*, and *inordinate*, and *opposed to the law*. He thus addresses the Pelagians:† *I ask, if you have any common sense remaining, whether it is possible for sin to be evil, and yet that to desire sin can be a good thing? And what is the operation of that evil concupiscence in the flesh, of those holy men who exercise self-control, but a desire after sinful things? &c.* Here we are shewn that concupiscence is an inclination towards what is sinful. Now; whether this desire has in it the nature of sin, let us learn from Augustine:‡ *Whilst we live* (says he) *here, where the flesh lusteth against the spirit, however we come off superior in that conflict, yet in the very motions and inclinations of our thoughts, if we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves.*

\* Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 3. [§. 4, col. 449.]

† Contra Julian. lib. 4. cap. 2.

‡ Ibid. lib. 5. cap. 5.



Lastly, let us enquire whether this sin be contrary to the law; or, which comes to the same thing, whether such as are harrassed by these outbreaks of concupiscence can be fulfillers of the law? *He does much good, who acts according to what is written, GO NOT AFTER THY LUSTS;\** but he is not perfect, because he does not fulfil what is also written, THOU SHALT NOT COVET AT ALL.† To bring this argument into a short compass:—He who is deficient in a perfect knowledge of all such things as ought either to be practised or avoided, and has not a perfect delight in that which is good; and who is, on the contrary, infected with an evil concupiscence and a desire after what is sinful; such an one neither does nor can properly fulfil the law. Now, even the very best of the regenerate, whilst they carry about this corruptible flesh, fall under this description: consequently, they do not actually come up to all the requirements of the law.

5.—Fifthly, from the necessary and universal obligation of all the saints to seek forgiveness, we prove that the fulfilment of the law by them is altogether impossible. Our argument is formed thus:—If it be possible for the regenerate fully to satisfy the demands of the law of God, then it is possible that they may not be in need of the forgiveness of sin, it is possible for them to be under no obligation to say, according to the direction of the Saviour, *Forgive us our debts*. But this latter is impossible, consequently the former is also. The logical sequence of the members of the major proposition is both valid and clear; because, if there be a man in whom no transgression of any command is found, in him it is impossible to imagine any occasion of forgiveness; *there* there can exist no necessity for seeking forgiveness.

Let us proceed now to the minor proposition. It is, I maintain, impossible that any one should live accompanied with corruptible flesh, and not frequently stand in need of the forgiveness of sins. Firstly, because whatever is directed to be sought for in the Lord's Prayer is necessary for all the children of God in this life: amongst the other petitions, therefore, it is necessary also that we should pray daily to God, *Forgive us our debts*. Secondly, because the Apostle

\* De nupt. et concupisc. lib. 1. cap. 29.

[† Ecclus. xviii. 30.]



John has charged all with being liars, who suppose that they are in no need of forgiveness. *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness; 1 John i. 8, 9.* But with Augustine, who frequently beats down the Pelagians with this argument, we affirm, that *Whosoever asserts that this prayer, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS, was not necessary for every man, even though he be holy, and both knows and performs the will of God, he greatly errs.\** And elsewhere,† *Such as maintain that there are, or have been, righteous persons, who, while on earth, have lived altogether free from sin, are by this presumption, most plainly contradicting the petition in the Lord's Prayer.* He cites also that saying of Cyprian:‡ *How necessary, how exactly adapted to our wants, how wholesome is the admonition that we are sinners, inasmuch as we are urged to ask the pardon of our sins, &c.*

But Bellarmine and the rest of the Papists suppose, that they turn aside the edge of this weapon by replying, That the saints cannot but have need of forgiveness of sins; but that this expression must be understood of *venial sins*, which are *beside the law*, not of *more serious sins*, which are *against the law*. We have already refuted this distinction; we may now add, that it is not consistent with the Romanist line of defence. For they who maintain that the law can not only be fulfilled by the regenerate, but even surpassed by some degree of super-eminent sanctity, are contradicting themselves; when they are compelled to affirm, that the same may indeed be satisfactorily fulfilled, but so imperfectly, that men nevertheless fall daily into venial sins, although they abstain from deadly crimes. Moreover, where there is need of forgiveness, there transgression has preceded; and where there is transgression, there an undue act has been committed in violation of the law. Either, then, those venial sins transgress the law of God, or they do not require pardon from God as the framer of the law.

\* De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 3. cap. 13.

† Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 4. cap. 10. [tom. x. col. 485.]

‡ De dono persev. cap. 5. [Augustine quotes from Cyprian's treatise on the Lord's Prayer, cap. 7.]



Our argument, therefore, derived from the Lord's Prayer, stands firm: There is no one, even the best of the regenerate, but needs forgiveness; consequently, the best of the regenerate do not come up to the demands of the law.

6.—Sixthly, we argue from a consideration of the law itself. The law obliges us to an exact conformity and obedience, both as regards internal affections and external actions. But it is impossible that such an uniform and complete course can be maintained, either of affections or actions, as is required by the law; no one, therefore, can entirely fulfil the law. As regards the affections, we may infer from the very form, and from the express words of the law, that it is not any affection whatever of the will that can suffice to fulfil the command; but it requires the most fervent emotions, that is, the love of God with all the heart, with all the soul, and with all the strength; and a love of our neighbour no less free and sincere, than that wherewith every one loves himself. Now no one attains to this degree of entire perfection in the inward disposition of his soul; no one, therefore, is complete in fulfilling the law. Augustine has taught this clearly:—*Whereas there still exists some measure of carnal concupiscence, which needs to be curbed by self-restraint, God is not altogether loved with all the soul.* Bernard, in his 50th sermon on the Canticles, agrees with this statement, where he teaches that the command of God, so far as relates to the love of the heart, or affections, neither can, nor ever could have been, fulfilled by any man.†

\* De perfectione Justitiæ [cap. 8. §. 19.]

† The passage is quoted more at length by Chemnitz, *Examen Decret. Conc. Trid.* part. 2. Loc. x. §. 3—5.

Bernard, in the opening of the Sermon here referred to, on Cant. ii. 4, *His banner over me is Love*, (rendered in the Vulgate, *Ordinavit in me Charitatem*: meaning, He hath spread over me love; which Bernard misunderstands as if it meant, He has enjoined upon me love; applying the *Charitas* to the love of the Spouse, instead of the love of Christ)—says, (§. 2.) “Love is twofold, in *act*, and in *affection*. And I think that the command is given to men, and the precept is formed in reference to that branch of love which consists in operation. For, as to the love of inward affection, who is in the state required by the command? We do not, indeed, deny that this present life may, by the grace of God, experience the commencement of this heart-love, and the increase of it; but we maintain, that the perfection of it belongs to the state of happiness to come. For why was that to be enjoined, which was by no means to be fulfilled? But if you incline to the opinion, that the command



Now what they affirm as regards God, that he is not loved with all the soul, whilst any degree of carnal concupiscence remains in the human heart, *that* we apply with equal reason to the command of loving our neighbour; and we say that, so long as any measure of inordinate self-love occupies the human heart, no one can love his neighbour as himself. But to dwell no longer on the internal disposition; I further assert, that no man fulfils the law as to the external act. The law requires that we do good to those who hate us; that we feed our enemies when in hunger; that we do to all men as we would that they should do to us; that we lay down (when the case requires) even life itself for our brethren's sake; that we rejoice with them that do rejoice, and weep with them that weep; that we bear one another's burdens, and numerous points of this description: in the practice of all which, men cannot but frequently both offend and fail, so far as that bitter root of covetousness and self-love retains its place in their hearts. Consequently, no one exists who does wholly fulfil, or can fulfil the law; either as to the manner and degree of love in the affections, or as regards those effects and manifestations of love, which we are required to exhibit in actual operation.

7.—Seventhly, we reason from the office of Christ as Mediator, in this manner: They who, after receiving justification and sanctification, do actually fulfil the law of God, stand in no farther need of Christ as a Mediator, in order to the appeasing God the Father and obtaining on their behalf the forgiveness of sins, by virtue of the sacrifice once offered on the Cross. But all the regenerate, after receiving grace and inherent righteousness, need, and cannot but continue needing, this Mediation and this blood of Christ, for the expiation of the guilt of their daily sins: consequently,

was given in reference to the love of the affections, (to internal, or heart-love) I do not oppose the sentiment, provided you also grant to me, that *in the present life it cannot by any means, nor ever could have been, fulfilled by any man*. For who can dare to ascribe to himself that, which even Paul acknowledges he has not attained?"

This extract shews the exact distinction made by Bernard: which is nothing more than the obvious distinction between the principle of perfect love in the heart, and the external actings of love as expressed at the close of the paragraph subsequent to the above; or, as Bernard says, in a subsequent part of his Sermon, *Actualis inferiora præfert affectualis superiora*, §. 5.



there is no one of them who does fulfil the law of God, or can fulfil it entirely. Each of the propositions is sufficiently clear from the sacred Scriptures. For the blood of Christ washes and reconciles to God, not the righteous and those who are fulfilling the law, but sinners and the transgressors of the law. *If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and he is the propitiation for our sins; 1 John ii. 1, 2.* They therefore who commit sin no more, need no more the propitiation and advocacy of Christ. For there is no need of the application of the balm of Christ's blood, where there is a freedom from the guilt of sin. *They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick; Mark ii. 17.*

As to the minor proposition, that the regenerate themselves, even after their first justification, are continually needing this blood, and the advocacy of Christ for expiating the sins which they commit afterwards, cannot be doubted. Hence those most consolatory words, Rom. viii. 33, 34—*Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again; who is even at the right hand of God; who also maketh intercession for us:* in which words Paul comforts the elect and justified, not after the Papistic manner, namely, that being now in a justified state, they are able henceforth both to fulfil, yea, and to transcend the whole law; but apostolically and in a truly divine manner, namely, because they have Christ, seated at the right hand of the Father, interceding for them, and by the eternal virtue of his cross and death, expiating and taking away the guilt of their sins.\* That Christ is also necessary as a Mediator for the regenerate, and that for the special purpose of appeasing God and expiating their daily offences, is a truth which Augustine is constantly recognising: *How great soever was the excellence of the righteous of an-*

\* The foregoing argument is equally as applicable to some other advocates, for a state of sinless perfection in this life, as it is to the inconsistent and contradictory doctrine of the Romanists.

To this the following may be usefully appended:—"A man who thinks himself to have attained Christian perfection, in the sense in which it has been insisted on by some persons, either deceives himself by calling sin infirmity; or Satan leaves him undisturbed in false security; or the demon of pride overcomes the demon of lust."—*Cecil's Remains*, p. 323, 8vo. Edition.



*cient days, it was not that which saved them, but faith in the Mediator, who shed his blood for the remission of sins.\** Where he shews, in opposition to the opinion of Pelagians, that even the justified and sanctified cannot be kept in safety henceforward through their fulfilling of the law, but are saved by the mediation and blood of Christ, whilst by faith they seek daily remission for their daily sins. But he speaks more clearly still in Book 3, chap. 5—*There is but this one hope for all the godly, while groaning under the burden of this corruptible flesh and the infirmity of this life, that we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins.* Behold the alone hope of the godly! not that they can fulfil the law after the grace of sanctification has been received; but that they have a continual advocate, who by virtue of his passion can and will blot out the guilt of their sins.

But to meet this argument Bellarmine has ready a twofold answer. First he says,† that they do not make Christ an idle Mediator after the first reconciliation, even though they hold the opinion that the justified and reconciled do actually fulfil the law of God; because Christ supplies those succours and that grace by which they accomplish good works, and thus fulfil the law of God. This answer misses the point of the argument; for we have not said, on the supposition of the law being fulfilled, that the work of the Mediator altogether ceases; but so far as the effect of reconciliation, and of the obtaining of forgiveness is concerned; for that man has no farther need of God being appeased, nor of the forgiveness of sin, who is actually now fulfilling the law, and does not offend against God by any evil deed. In this respect, then, the work of mediation would cease;—an opinion which we have shewn from Scripture and Augustine to be most erroneous. Secondly, perceiving that his former answer was insufficient to break the force of the argument, he offers another; namely, that the mediation of Christ does not entirely cease, seeing that he purges away the sins of the regenerate, although light,‡ and occurring daily, by his blood; and if at any time they have violated the law,

\* Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 21. [§. 39.]

† De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 14.

[‡ See Conc. Trident. Sessio vi. cap. xi; or Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, p. 90.]



yet he reconciles them to his Father upon their repentance. This answer, however, is weaker than the former; such peccadilloes as they assert to be venial, and *beside the law*, not *against the law*, not requiring at all to be purged away by the blood of Christ; considering that such matters, if the Papal writers themselves are to be credited, may be purged by alms-giving, by penal satisfactions in this life, or by the flames of Purgatory in another. Besides, how absurd is it to assume that that sin, which needs expiation by the blood of the Son of God, is not contrary to the law of God! Where, then, these light and daily-occurring sins have been committed, there the law has not been completely fulfilled; seeing that (by the confession of our opponent himself) there is a need of the expiatory sacrifice of Christ. Moreover, Bellarmine's last position—that *the mediation of Christ does not cease, because, if the regenerate should transgress the law, Christ by his intercession undertakes for them, and reconciles God the Father to them*, is the very truest and completest answer, provided he omits that conditional particle, and says with us—*Because there is none of the regenerate but very frequently transgresses the law of God, therefore, as long as they live in this corruptible flesh, they stand in need of Christ as a Mediator*. This answer, which is the only sufficient one, clearly shews, that no man actually fulfils the demands of the law of God.

8.—If the regenerate are able to fulfil the law, then they may be saved by the law, and attain to life eternal through the legal Covenant: But no one can acquire salvation, or attain to life eternal, by the law and the legal Covenant; consequently, no one is able to fulfil the law. Our opponents raise no dispute with us about the validity of the major proposition; for we have self-evident testimonies from Scripture upon the subject: *He who doeth those things shall live by them*; (Gal. iii. 12); and (Rom. ii. 13) *Not the hearers of the law are just before God; but the doers of the law shall be justified*. Let us pass to the minor, and again hear the voice of Scripture: *Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law; for by the works*



*of the law shall no flesh be justified; Gal. ii. 16. And still more manifestly: For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse; for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them; Gal. iii. 10.* Here the Apostle assumes it as a thing beyond all question certain, that no one is able to continue in all things which are written in the book of the law; that is, no one can completely fulfil the law, for he shews in this supposition, that all are exposed to the curse who look for eternal life from a legal Covenant. With this decision of the Apostle, the following, also, is quite accordant: *If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. But the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, &c. Gal. iii. 21, 22.* If it were to take the form of a syllogism, this would be the drift of the Apostle's argument: Whosoever transgresses the law, while seeking justification from the law, or from the Covenant of works, lies under its curse: But all men violate the law of God; therefore, all seeking justification from the law lie under the curse of the law.

Bellarmino answers, that the Apostle's argument is to be laid out otherwise, namely, in this form: *He who, while seeking to be justified through obedience to the law, does not keep the whole law, comes under the curse thereof. Now no one keeps the whole law in his own strength, without faith and grace; therefore, they are under the curse, who, in their own strength, unassisted by the grace of God, are seeking for justification from obedience to the law.* But this plainly contradicts the Apostle's meaning. For the Apostle, while excluding legal justification, or justification through works, is not speaking of those, who, by the powers of their own free will, without the assistance of grace, suppose that they can fulfil the law; but of the regenerate, who, being aided by the grace of God, are still unequal to a complete fulfilment of the law. The Apostles, who were sanctified by Divine grace, admit that they were unable to bear the yoke of the law, that they could be justified in no other way than by believing in Christ, through faith; Acts xv. 10, 11. Paul contends that Abraham was justified not by his fulfilling of the law, but by the remission of sins obtained through faith; Rom. iv. He lays down the same con-



cerning David. Yet they endeavoured to fulfil the law of God, not in their own strength, but by the help of the Most High.

Lastly, the Apostle, in Galat. iii. 11, says: *That no one is justified by the law in the sight of God is manifest; for THE JUST SHALL LIVE BY FAITH.* He is plainly speaking here, not of the proud, who are seeking justification through obedience to the law, in their own strength, without the grace of God; but of believers, who, he says, may nevertheless be justified before God, not by fulfilling the law, but by believing. Augustine fully agrees with the Apostle, and contradicts Bellarmine's notions in these words: \* *This is the reason why God is more slow in wholly sanctifying even his own holy and believing people in some of their faults, so that, in regard to those faults, they experience less enjoyment in that which is good than suffices to constitute a complete fulfilment of righteousness: namely, that so far as relates to the most perfect standard of his truth, no flesh living may be justified in his sight.* Augustine here affirms that justification is unattainable through works, or through the fulfilling of the law, not by Pelagians merely, who confide in the powers of their own free-will without grace; but by saints and believers also, every one of whom is ready to say with the Apostle, *By the grace of God, I am what I am*; 1 Cor. xv. 10. And he gives a reason for it which utterly subverts Bellarmine's position, but establishes ours most firmly: namely, that God himself is not pleased perfectly to heal the regenerate in this life; because God himself is not pleased to impart to them so much grace, as would suffice for enabling them adequately to fulfil the Divine law.

We have now sufficiently discussed this argument; nor, in a matter so plain, is it necessary to say more. Let every one consult his own conscience, which, to every pious and humble mind, will be better than a thousand arguments, both to refute the ravings of Romanism, and to establish the doctrines of Protestantism.

\* De Peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 2. cap. 19. [§. 33. tom. x. col. 57.]

The Translator cannot avoid adding here the following passage from Chemnitz:—

“Eadem artificio ludunt [Conc. Trid.] vocabulo *impossibilitatis*. Memine-



runt enim, Pelagianos olim Augustino negotium fecisse illa cavillatione: quod secundum absolutam Dei potentiam non sit impossibile, ut per gratiam Dei renatus aliquis in hac vita sit sine peccato. Augustinus vero de peccatorum meritis, lib. 2. cap. 6. respondet:—*aliam esse quæstionem utrum esse possit, et aliam, utrum sit.* Et addit. cap. 7, Si quærat, utrum in hac vita aliquis sit sine peccato, esse non credo: magis enim credo Scripturæ ubi sanctorum vox est:—Si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, &c. Inde igitur Augustinus dicit ibidem cap. 6. et *de natura et gratia* cap. 43, Deum non præcepisse homini impossibilia.” Chemnitz *Examen Decrett. Conc. Trid.*; pars. i. Loc. x. quæst. 3. §. 5.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

### THE ORTHODOX OPINION CONFIRMED BY TESTIMONIES FROM THE FATHERS.

I COME now to the Fathers, whose opinions I shall adduce sparingly, because, in the course of the argument, I have already interspersed many testimonies from them, and especially from Augustine.

1.—In the first place, then, let Jerome be heard. In his second book against the Pelagians, (chap. 3.) he writes as follows: *If we do not what we would, but what we would not that we do; how say ye that man can be without sin, if he will? Behold! the Apostle and all believers are unable to fulfil that which they desire.* I ask, then, from the Romanists, what that is which the Apostle and all believers desire, and yet cannot fulfil? They cannot but admit, that the law of God is that perfect rule, to which they are unable to conform all their affections and actions. Therefore, they cannot fulfil the whole law.

Jerome, likewise, on Galat. iv. says: *No one can fulfil the law, and perform all things which are commanded.* He who does not what is commanded by the law, beyond all doubt is a sinner against the law.

2.—Ambrose, on Galat. iii. says: *If any one desires to be justified before God, so that it may turn to his advantage at the day of judgment, let him follow after faith. Otherwise, though indulging in security here, he will be liable to pu-*



*nishment hereafter.* He plainly intimates that all men are guilty of transgressing the law, and, consequently, do not completely fulfil the law, but are saved by faith.

Likewise, on Rom. ii.—*They are not righteous who hear the law, but they who believe in Christ, whom the law promised, and this is to perform the law.* Observe here, what kind of fulfilment of the law Ambrose concedes to the godly; namely, not a *formal* fulfilment (so to speak) which performs all things commanded in the law; but an *equivalent* fulfilment, which exercises faith in him who has fulfilled the law.

I adduce a third, and most express testimony, from the same Ambrose, on Rom. x. *He alone who believes in Christ attains the end or full accomplishment of the law. For since none have found justification through the law, because none ever fulfilled the law, excepting those who hoped in the promised Christ; faith was introduced, which believes the full accomplishment of the law; so that, all other things being set aside, faith might satisfy for the whole law and the prophets.\** We satisfy the law, then, not in keeping it, but by believing.

3.—Chrysostom on Rom. x., Hom. 17,† asks:—*What is the intention of the law? To make man righteous? But that it cannot do, since there is no one who has fulfilled it. And a few lines afterwards he adds:—It is not possible for any one to become righteous by the law, in any other way than by having wholly fulfilled it. But it has become impossible for any one to do this. Therefore that righteousness fails. But tell us, O Paul, of that other righteousness which is of grace, &c.* Chrysostom in this passage contends, that the saints themselves cannot be justified and saved by the fulfilment of the law, but by faith in the Mediator.

He has expressed himself similarly on Galat. iii. on those words, *THE JUST SHALL LIVE BY FAITH.* *This not only shews that justification is of faith, but that it is impossible for salvation to come through the law. After it was found,*

\* This quotation is from a spurious work ascribed to Ambrose, and is variously read in different editions; some, for instance, having *crederet perfectionem*, others *crederat perfectioni*: the latter, however, is obviously erroneous.

† [Tom. ix. p. 618. Edit. Paris. 1837.]



says he, *that there was no one who observed the law, but that on account of transgression all were exposed to its curse; a more easy way was devised through faith, which itself is the strongest argument, that no one can attain unto a justifying righteousness through the law.* A little onwards he adds these words also: *You see how clearly he has proved, that they who cleave to the law have, by so doing, seeing that it cannot be fulfilled, made themselves obnoxious to its curse.*

From these and many other points which Chrysostom has introduced in his discussion on the same passage, it is evident that he judged the fulfilment of the whole law by man, he having now become weakened through sin, to be a thing impossible.

4.—We now proceed to Augustine, who will supply us with two testimonies. The first is found in Epist. 200,\* which is addressed to Asellicus: *The law, by saying, THOU SHALT NOT COVET, has laid down, not that which we are capable of attaining while here on earth, but that to which we press forward by continual improvement.* Either then this command must be blotted out of the decalogue, or we must at once admit that there is no one who, while in this corruptible body, entirely fulfils the law.

The same author, when writing in reply to the two Epistles of the Pelagians, says, book 3, chap. 7:—*The righteous have in this world so performed the commands of God, as to cause us to recollect that those commands themselves have a bearing upon that prayer in which the holy children of promise daily say with sincerity, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS.* To maintain that the commandments are no otherwise fulfilled than by asking the daily pardon of our sins, undoubtedly implies the conviction that, what is due to the law is not fully yielded by any man; but that the debt of transgression is freely remitted to believers.

5.—Gregory the Great shall follow Augustine. Thus, then, he writes, Moral. lib. 8. cap. 23: *How much soever the elect may excel in holiness, even they have, by no means, sufficient for themselves to plead innocency, if they should be strictly examined in judgment.* If the righteousness of

[\* Now exxvi. §. 5. tom. ii. col. 732.]



the regenerate is insufficient to establish their innocence, then neither can it suffice for the fulfilment of the law; for that man is alone innocent who has not broken the law.

In another place (Moral. lib. 17. cap. 8.) Gregory remarks: *Some being strengthened by the gift of the Spirit, are enabled to resist the infirmity of the flesh;—yet there is no one who can pass through life faultless, so long as he bears about him a body of corruption.* Two things are to be observed here: one, that Gregory is not speaking of the unregenerate, who, by the power of free-will, endeavour to fulfil the law; but of the regenerate, who are assisted and strengthened by Divine grace; the other, that these regenerate persons themselves, being helped by Divine grace, nevertheless do not live here exempt from blameworthiness: they are, consequently, not altogether free from transgression; for it cannot even be thought or imagined that a blameworthy act is committed by him who fulfils the whole law.

But lest our opponents should say (as the Pelagians were heretofore wont to say) that it is true—*there is no man who actually lives without sin; but yet that many can do so if they will;* I shall subjoin another passage from the same author, which cuts off this means of escape: *The soul of the elect struggles to go forth into the freedom of righteousness, but it is still held back by the shackles of infirmity; it longs indeed completely to subdue everything blameworthy; but so long as it is fettered by the corruption of the flesh, it is bound by the chains of that corruption, even when it would not:* Moral. lib. 17, cap. 19. He who does not, and cannot perfectly subdue his faults, however earnestly he desires it, certainly cannot be said either to fulfil the law, or to be able to fulfil it, even though it be his greatest wish and desire to do so.

6.—Theophylact confirms our opinion in his comment on Galat. iii., where he says: *No one can do the things which are prescribed by the law; yet, he who does not do so, is cursed. Therefore, it is the province of faith to bless; nor have you any reason to fear lest you should become accursed in consequence of ceasing to cleave to the law. For if you have recourse to it, you will be more deeply under the curse, inasmuch as you are not able to fulfil it.* This is a case common to all mankind; for those who seek as from



a covenant, for justification and salvation through the works of the law, whether *ceremonial* or *moral*, are found to be exposed to its curse: for, as the Jews could not fulfil the ceremonial law, so neither can Christians nor Jews fully answer the demands of the moral law.

7.—Bernard, in his 50th Sermon on the Canticles, writes:—*God, in enjoining duties impossible to be fulfilled, does not make men transgressors, but humble; that EVERY MOUTH MAY BE STOPPED, AND ALL THE WORLD BECOME GUILTY BEFORE GOD; FOR BY THE DEEDS OF THE LAW SHALL NO FLESH LIVING BE JUSTIFIED IN HIS SIGHT: Rom. iii. 19, 20. Wherefore, receiving the command, and feeling our inability to comply fully, we shall cry to heaven, and God will pity us; and we shall know, in that day, that it IS NOT BY WORKS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS WHICH WE HAVE DONE, BUT ACCORDING TO HIS MERCY, THAT HE SAVES US; Tit. iii. 5.* Although Bernard expresses some degree of doubt, whether the law of God, given to men, be concerning the love of *affection*, or rather love in *action*; yet, he yields, what spoils entirely the cause of the Romanists, these two points: that the command concerning the love of affection cannot be wholly fulfilled in this life; and that it is not inconsistent or absurd to suppose that God may enjoin what no mortal can adequately fulfil.

8.—Aquinas, on Galat. iii. lect. 4, upon those words—*FOR IT IS WRITTEN, CURSED IS HE THAT CONTINUETH NOT IN ALL THINGS, &c.*, remarks, that *the Apostle proves the proposition, and this, according to the gloss, is made evident, that no one can keep the law in that manner which the law itself prescribed in Deut. xxviii. That every one who continues not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them, that is, who does not fulfil the whole law, is cursed. But to fulfil the whole law is impossible.* Here you see that God might enact even what it is impossible for man to comply with, his powers being now corrupted through sin; you see also, that the fulfilment of the whole law is acknowledged by Aquinas to be impossible.

9.—Cusa,\* in his Excitations, lib. 10. pag. 664, says, *No*

\* NICOLAS of CUSA, so called from the name of his birth-place, on the banks of the *Moselle*, in the Diocese of Treves. He was promoted by Nicolas V., in 1448, to the dignity of Cardinal, and made Bishop of Brixen in the



*one ever fulfilled the law, the substance of which is love. And yet God has bound us above all others to this law of love, seeing it is that on which all others rest.—He also says in the same place: That any one could exhibit so entire a love towards God and his neighbour, as the law enjoins, was not possible, except to the Son of God. He who comes short of a perfect obedience to the command, does not fulfil the law.*

10.—Isidore Clarius, Orat. 41, both records and approves of that saying of a certain very holy man, namely, that *all men are robbers, as daily robbing the Divine glory; but that they differ in this respect, that some, in the highest degree wicked, yet assume to themselves credit for righteousness; others carry themselves humbly, and surpass the rest in this one thing, that they confess their robbery, and daily implore the exercise of Divine mercy in forgiving them.* Hence, let blind Romanists learn not to boast so much about their acts of righteousness, and their wonderful works of supererogation, but rather to confess their acts of unrighteousness and of spiritual robbery.

11.—Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, discussing that precept, THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THY HEART, &c., has these words: *It is one thing to fulfil this precept, another not to break it. It is possible that the precept may not be violated, when yet it can be thoroughly obeyed by no one during this life.* Here we have the accused acknowledging the charge, and affirming that this great command of God cannot be thoroughly obeyed by any one in this life; but how a precept, which is not fulfilled, can be said not to be violated, when God gives the command that it be fulfilled, is what I am too dull to be able to comprehend.

12.—Let us come, in the last place, to Bellarmine himself, whose sentiments when engaged in disputation against us are quite different from what he puts forth when quietly

Tyrol. He died at Todi, in Italy, August 12, 1464, aged 63. His works were printed at Basil in 1565. The *Excitations*, divided into ten books, contain allegorical and mystical reflections on select passages of Holy Scripture. Dupin's *Eccles. Hist.* vol. xiii. p. 86. See also, *Scriptores Ordinis Predicatt.* tom. 1. p. 909; though Cusa is not admitted by the compilers as having belonged to the Dominican company.



meditating by himself; for upon those words of Psal. cxxix. IF THOU LORD SHOULDEST MARK INIQUITIES, WHO SHALL STAND? he thus writes:—*The meaning is—If iniquities, which are as it were our debts, be carefully registered in thy book of records, that thou mayest require satisfaction on account of them; no one of us will be able to answer thy demand; therefore, I pray that thou wouldest blot them out of thy book, and mercifully overlook them, since I am unable to discharge them.* Compare this true confession with those swelling notions of his about the fulfilment of the whole law and supererogation, and they will prove diametrically opposed. For he who has fulfilled the law, and has laid out, as it were, a stock of works beyond the requisition of the law, which are still more excellent and more holy than it, must be speaking falsely when he asserts that he has, after all, not satisfied God the lawgiver; must be asking ironically that his debts may be forgiven him, and must be fraudulently pretending that he cannot pay. Such a supplication suits us, who confess that we cannot fulfil the law. For Jesuits, however, and other Papists, who maintain that they can fulfil the law and supererogate, it would be more in character, certainly, to pray thus:—“I beseech thee, O Lord, to look into the book of remembrance, and enter into account with me; for thou wilt find, that I have not only satisfied thee by fulfilling thy law altogether, but have left thee in my debt by doing many works of supererogation: I demand, therefore, that thou expunge this thy debt, and give me not merely life eternal, which is the reward of fulfilling the law; but that, in this life eternal, thou wilt grant me some special glory, namely, the reward due to the supererogation performed.” Romanists either ought to avow such sentiments, or alter their opinion about their ability to fulfil the law, and, what is more, to supererogate.

Lastly, Bellarmine on Psal. cxlii., explaining those words, *Enter not into judgment with thy servant, &c.*, does himself most manifestly support our view: *Not I alone, but every one living would lose his cause, if he chose to contend with thee in judgment:—because those who are still sojourners on earth, even though they are righteous, inasmuch as no charges are brought against them, yet are conscious that they are sinners, because they are not free from daily sins.*



Hence I deduce, that no holy sojourner fulfils the whole law. For he who has fulfilled the law, if called into judgment by the lawgiver, would not fail in his cause, but would gain it; seeing that the doers of the whole law shall be justified by the decision of the lawgiver himself. Moreover, I infer also from hence, that there is no one who possesses that supererogatory righteousness, about which the Monks boast so much. For he who is to be considered righteous only because he has no *charges* or *accusations* brought against him, when in the meantime he abounds in *sins*, has not yet attained a righteousness equal to meet the claims of the law, much less, therefore, such as would surpass it.

In conclusion, I infer hence, that Bellarmine himself gives no credence to those visionary notions, which he endeavours to obtrude upon others, about the fulfilment of the law and supererogation.

---

The point of this chapter may not be inaptly placed in a practical light by the following summary:—

“God’s servants plead sincerity, though not sinlessness. Perfect righteousness, according to the covenant of works, they cannot plead; but sincere righteousness, according to the covenant of grace, they may, and do plead. ‘Remember, O Lord, I beseech thee, how I have walked before thee in truth, and with a perfect heart.’ Their graces and duties will endure the touchstone, but not the balance. They are of the right kind, though not full weight. There must be inherent righteousness, or you will never come to glory.”—Dr. Manton’s *Sermon on 2 Tim. i. 12*.

## CHAPTER L.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF OUR OPPONENTS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.

WE have drawn out our forces; now let our adversaries lead theirs into the field. There is no necessity to be greatly afraid of them, as they have been already routed and put to flight by the orthodox Fathers. For there is no testimony producible, no argument, no not even a cavil from the Scriptures, which has not been employed almost in



the same words by the Pelagians ; and explained, grappled with, and refuted by Catholics.

Bellarmino, in his treatise on Justification, Bk. 4, ch. 11, endeavours to shew from the Scriptures, that it is now possible for regenerate persons to keep the law of God.

1.—The first testimony is derived from Matt. xi. 30, *My yoke is easy, and my burden is light*. To which he adds a similar passage from 1 John v. 3, *His commands are not grievous*. From these passages Bellarmine supposes that it may be proved and concluded, that the law of God is not only possible, but easy to be observed by the regenerate.

I answer, that much the same meaning was attached to these and similar passages long ago, by the ancient Pelagians, as appears from Jerome's treatise against the Pelagians, book 1, chap. 1 ; and book 2, chap. 2 and 4 ; from Augustine, *on the perfection of righteousness*, against Celestius, page 1426 ; and, *on nature and grace*, against the Pelagians, chap. 69. These passages it is useful and expedient for me to point out to you, for you to consult, that you may understand to what source the Papists are indebted for their arguments. But we advance to our answer.

The first testimony quoted from Matthew is foreign to the question in hand. For the yoke of Christ, which is said to be *easy* and *light*, is not the yoke of *the Law*, which neither we nor our fathers could bear ; but the yoke of *the Gospel*, which requires from us, most especially, three things—true repentance for past sins ; firm faith in the Mediator, who takes away sins ; and sincere desire of obeying God, who has forgiven us all our sins : to which we may also add, a patient enduring of the cross, which possesses the virtue of a medicine in checking the unruliness of the flesh and indwelling sin. This yoke is not heavy to the regenerate ; because Christ enables them to bear it by the infusion of grace, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and a certain fellowship and *union* of himself with us. But as to the yoke of the commandments, of which the Apostle John speaks ; although God is not pleased to communicate so much grace to the regenerate, as is necessary for the fulfilment of the law ; yet it is truly said that these commandments are *not grievous* to them. For



in this passage *that* is said to be *grievous*, which is disagreeable, troublesome, and irksome to the bearer. Now the burden of the Divine commandments, although it is irksome and grievous to the flesh, yet to the regenerate, as regenerate, it becomes sweet and pleasant. Thus David speaks, Psalm cxix. 127,

*I love thy commandments above gold and precious stones ;*  
and again, Ps. xix. 10.

*They are sweeter also to me than honey and the honeycomb.* So says the Apostle, Rom. vii. 22, *I delight in the law of God after the inner man.* It does not however follow from this language that the regenerate can fulfil the whole law ; because that may be easy and light as to *the inclination* and *desire* of fulfilling it, which is not only grievous, but impossible as to the *actual* fulfilling of it. Accordingly Augustine writes,\* *The commandments of God are not grievous, because there may be an inclination of the heart, to which they are not grievous ;* and because, as Augustine elsewhere expresses it,† *All the commandments are accounted as done, when whatsoever has not been done is forgiven.*

2.—Bellarmine argues, secondly, from those testimonies which affirm, that the commands are kept by those who love. John xiv. 23. *He that loveth me keepeth my words.* Rom. xiii. 8, *He who loveth his neighbour hath fulfilled the law.* Gal. v. 14, *All the law is fulfilled in one word, THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOUR AS THYSELF.* But we can love God and our neighbour ; otherwise we are not the disciples and friends of Christ : therefore [he concludes] we can fulfil the law.

To which I answer, that love fulfils the law, provided it be itself perfect ; but whilst the love itself is imperfect, all our righteousness, or legal obedience, will be imperfect also.‡ It is one thing then to consider any quality in its own specific character ; another to consider it in a subject where it is blunted by an admixture of the contrary.§ Love,

\* De Nat. et Grat. cap. 69.

† Retract. lib. 1. cap. 19.

‡ Vide August. De Nat. et Grat. cap. 42.

§ The general bearing of this principle may be shewn by the following case:—  
“ A gentleman, desirous of illustrating in conversation the change effected in some persons’ views by the intervention of a particular object, placed on the table a piece of paper of the exact size of a sovereign, upon which the word ‘TRUTH’ was written, and then asked the other if he could read what was



if it is viewed simply according to its own nature, does work the fulfilment of the law ; but taken in connection with man as fallen, and in whom there exists at the same time an evil desire, it is so weakened and hindered by this enemy, that it is incapable of fulfilling the law wholly. We grant, therefore, that the regenerate love God and their neighbour ; but that they love imperfectly, and consequently fulfil the law but imperfectly. *For as love perfect is perfect righteousness ; so love inchoate is only inchoate righteousness ; as says Augustine.\** In one word, the regenerate are no otherwise said to fulfil the law, or keep the commandments while in this corruptible flesh, than because they labour to keep them, and ask pardon and obtain it, when they have not kept them. Thus says Augustine :†—*This desire of keeping the precepts the grace of God imparts ; which, if any thing is not kept in those precepts, pardons it.* This desire on our part and this forgiveness on the part of God, is evidence sufficient for being accounted and remaining, the disciples of Christ and friends of God himself.

3.—A third testimony is taken from Deut. xxx. 6, *The Lord shall circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord with all thine heart, and with all thy soul.* But he who loves God with all his heart, has attained to perfect love ; and consequently [argues Bellarmine] he perfectly fulfils the law.

I answer, that the consideration of the circumcision of *the flesh*, and that of *the heart*‡ is not the same. The foreskin of *the flesh* is taken away at one and the same time ; but the foreskin of *the heart* gradually and imperceptibly, according as infused love is able to lessen and extirpate evil desires. Therefore this circumcision of the heart tends to this end, and at length makes such advances, that the regenerate do love God with the whole heart ; that period, however, does not arrive *until* this mortal shall have put on im-

there ? which he very readily did. He then covered the paper with a sovereign, and asked him if he could read it then ? The answer was at once in the negative ; upon which the illustration was left to speak for itself." Poynder's *Literary Extracts*, vol. ii. p. 652.

\* De Nat. et Grat. cap. 70.

† Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 7.

‡ Our author here employs an apposition of terms—"circumcisio carnalis et (ut ita dicam) cordialis"—which it was needless to imitate in the translation.



mortality. To argue, therefore, as Bellarmine does, *that God circumcises the heart of the regenerate that he may be loved by them with the whole heart; that therefore as soon as he begins to circumcise they are able straightway to love God with the whole heart*—is but ill-connected reasoning. God will in the end effect this, but, according as his wisdom has ordained, not as Bellarmine shall dictate to him. *Righteousness will then be complete, when health is complete; health will then be complete, when love is complete; love will then be complete, when we shall see God as he is.\** Furthermore, I add, that this love of the regenerate is said to be imperfect in this life, not because it can become greater and be increased in heaven, but because it has evil desire attaching to it, and in the same individual; from which he is bound to be free, according to the law of his primeval creation, even through life.

4.—[Bellarmine proceeds] The Scripture teaches us that men are perfect in this life; and through this have true and perfect love, and fulfil the law. *Noah was a just man and perfect; Gen. vi. 9. Walk before me, and be thou perfect; Gen. xvii. 1. Be ye perfect; Matt. v. 48. If thou wilt be perfect; Matt. xix. 21:* and many similar passages might be added.

These are the very passages which were formerly objected by the Pelagians against Jerome and Augustine; as you may read in the first book of Jerome against the Pelagians, ch. 4.; in Augustine, *on the perfection of Righteousness*, (against Celestius, p. 1425). We shall borrow an answer to the Papists, therefore, from these Fathers, from their replies to the Pelagians. The regenerate, then, are said to be perfect, that they may know at what they ought to aim, not to indulge in fancies that they have already attained to it. They are sometimes called perfect because they desire and aim† at perfection, because of their humble acknowledgment of their imperfection, because through the forgiveness of their sins they stand before God as though they were in possession of perfect holiness. This is the interpretation which has been given to such passages by the Fathers, whose sentiments I shall now adduce. Jerome says: *This is the*

\* August. de perfect. Justitiæ, pag. 1420.

† [Longs perfection to inherit, and to triumph in the flesh. J. Conder.]



*true wisdom of man, to be conscious of his imperfection; and (so to speak) the perfection of all the just is imperfect, whilst they are in the body; Advers. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 5. They are perfect on the account of what they have done, imperfect on the account of that which they could not do; as he writes in the same work, in the 7th chapter.—Augustine observes, The object of the law in saying THOU SHALT NOT COVET, is, that discovering thereby our disease, we may seek after the medicine of grace, and may learn from that precept what we ought to aim at progressively attaining in this mortal state, and to what we may attain in that blessed immortality. For unless it could be ultimately attained, no such command would have been properly given;\** Ad Val. lib. 1. cap. 29. The same remark will apply equally well to those passages in which we are commanded to be perfect. But to quote instances yet further. *There is a kind of perfection [remarks Augustine] which belongs to the capability of this life; and this forms a part of it, that every man be well aware that he is not yet perfect; Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 5. The virtue at present existing in a just man, is so far pronounced perfect, that to this very perfection there is also united a true sense of its imperfection, and a sincere admission of it; ibid. cap. 7. (See more in the treatise respecting the perfection of righteousness, p. 1224.) In fine, there is that pre-eminent saying of Augustine: Our very righteousness, although it be true as regards the object of the true good to which it has reference, yet such is its condition in this life, that it rather consists in the forgiveness of sins, than in possessing a perfection of virtues; De Civit. Dei, lib. 19. cap. 27.—I abstain from citing more, it being evident from these remarks, how absurd is the conclusion that, because the regenerate are called perfect in holy Scripture, therefore, they have perfectly fulfilled the law of God. [But again, Bellarmine says,]*

5.—Scripture expressly states that some of the saints have kept the commandments, have loved God with the whole heart, have presented themselves just before the Divine presence, have kept the word of God, &c. And

\* An incorrect argument, but the meaning of the author; though inconsistent with his own sentiments elsewhere expressed.



here he enumerates the various eulogies in Scripture, on David, Josiah, Asa, Moses, Zechariah and his wife; from which he supposes it must be inferred, that it is possible for the regenerate man to fulfil the whole law, since it has been fulfilled, in fact, by so many of the saints.

I wonder at the thoughtlessness of Bellarmine in venturing to assert, that either David, or any one else of the just mentioned saints, fulfilled the law; seeing that the very Scriptures which record their praises, are not by any means silent as to their frequent offences.\* I wonder, also, at his temerity, in thus venturing to hurl against us the trite and worn out objections of the Pelagians; let us, however, retort on them the answers of the orthodox Fathers.

As respects those eulogies, then, of the saints, Jerome replies on this wise: *Then are we righteous, when we confess that we are sinners; Advers. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 3.* And (lib. 2. cap. 2.) *If a man be holy, why does he pray for the pardon of his iniquity? If he has iniquity, on what ground is he called a saint? It is in that way which is described in another passage, (Prov. xxiv. 16.)*

*A just man falleth seven times and riseth up again.*  
And (ibid. xviii. 17.)

*A righteous man condemneth himself.†*

And at last, after a long discussion with the Pelagians, he concludes in this manner, (chap. 3.) *I mention all these to shew that the law is not completely fulfilled by any man.*

But let us proceed to cite Augustine, who has explained all the passages alleged by Bellarmine with much clearness; and whose words, too, I make use of in preference to my own. *The Pelagians do not perceive that a man can be called righteous who has made some near approaches to a perfect righteousness; De perfect. Justit. It is through forgiveness they are reputed righteous; ibid. Zachariah and his wife are said to be righteous before God, because, whatever righteousness there was in them, was not feigned before*

\* "The sacred writers related the vicious as well as the virtuous actions of men; which had this moral effect, that it kept mankind from despair, into which, otherwise, they would naturally fall, were they not supported by the recollection that others had offended like themselves, and by penitence and amendment of life, had been restored to the favour of heaven."—Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, vol. iv. p. 53; 3rd Edit.

† See vol. i. p. 207, on this Translation of chap. xviii. 17 of Proverbs.



men; *De pecc. merit et remiss.* lib. 2. cap. 13. They so performed the commandments, as to make us recollect that the commandments themselves have a relation to the prayer in which it is said, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS; *Contra duas Epist. Pelag.* lib. 3. cap. 7. All the commandments are so far reckoned as done, when, whatsoever is not done, is forgiven; *Retract.* lib. 1. cap. 19. In one word, whatever statements are made concerning the perfect righteousness of the saints, they ought to be understood with reference to a certain laudable walk among men, with which no fault can reasonably be found, but not in such a sense as requires a more minute examination; as Augustine has taught in his treatise, *De Gratia Christi contra Pelag.* lib. 1. capp. 48, 49.

An entire fulfilling of the law, then, is not to be inferred as possible from any one of the passages of Scripture before-mentioned; inasmuch as they imply forgiveness of sins, and do not suppose a strict examination of the sinner; whereas, an entire fulfilling of the law admits no necessity of forgiveness of sins, and does not shrink from a strict examination. [But Bellarmine goes on.]

6.—The Apostle Paul, Rom. vii., when commenting on the words of the precept, THOU SHALT NOT COVET, says, *What I would not, I do: Now, if I do what I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.* Here (argues Bellarmine) he plainly shews that he is not guilty of sin, while he involuntarily experiences concupiscence, because it is not himself who commits that act; and consequently, he is keeping the law; since this lays its injunction on the will, namely, that there should be the will to experience concupiscence; and not on the sense, which is subject to the law. And the same Apostle (Bellarmine further observes) adds, *With the mind I myself serve the law of God.* But if he served the law of God with the mind, certainly he was not committing sin; for sin cannot exist unless in the mind, or with the consent of the mind. The Apostle, then, fulfilled the law, therefore the law is not impossible to be fulfilled.

I answer, that the Apostle divides himself, and, in fact, every regenerate man, as it were into two men; that is to say, the old and the new man. Now these two men denote a twofold disposition in the same mind and the same person;



the one, an inclination to sin through the corruption of nature; the other, a desire of obeying the Divine law through the renewal of grace. When, therefore, he denies concerning himself this operation of sin, it must not be understood as a *general* and unqualified assertion, but with *certain restrictions*, namely, with reference to this new man, or the man renewed by grace. Thus Augustine observes: \* *We make progress in renewal and righteousness of life, through the operation of that principle by which we are sons of God; and as to that principle, we cannot at all commit sin: and this progress continues to advance, until our entire nature, including even that principle by which we are still the children of this world, is changed into that better principle; for it is by the influence of this better principle, that we continue still capable of committing sin.* Bellarmine's inference, that *The Apostle sins not whilst he covets, because he himself did it not*, is, therefore, manifestly mistaken—arguing, as he does, *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. He commits not sin, as far as he is renewed, and is a son of God; but yet he does commit it, as far as he is still carnal, and a son of the world.

To allege, besides, as Bellarmine does, in confirmation of his argument, that *the law of God was given to the will, not to the sense; and, consequently, that he does not sin against the law who experiences concupiscence, while the will struggles against it*, is feeble and unsound reasoning in two respects:—

First, it is faulty because it supposes the law to be enacted for the obedience of this or that power; whereas, the law is given for the person, or the individual, and restricts him from allowing that any power of his mind or part of his body, be influenced, or exert itself in opposition to the law of God. A man sins, then, who allows his sensitive appetite to be affected contrary to the dictate of the law, seeing he is under obligation to restrain it. Secondly, it is liable to exception, because it supposes that inordinate desires affect the sense only; for this disorder infects the very reason and will, in that part in which the reason and the will are not yet wholly renewed. This did

\* De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 2. cap. 8.



not escape the most learned Augustine, whose words I will transcribe :\*—*It is a disease of the rational mind, when being delighted with inferior good, it desires partly things superior, and partly does not desire them. And so it is divided into two wills, and even though it is one, it is not entire ; and what is wanting to the one, is present to the other.* This rebellious inclination of evil concupiscence, therefore, hinders the regenerate themselves from being able to fulfil the whole law of God as much as they desire to do, although it does not condemn the regenerate who are able to cleave to Christ by faith.

Such, then, are the instances which Bellarmine has cited from the Scriptures, in order to prove that the regenerate can fulfil the whole law of God, and I think that they have been satisfactorily explained. The testimonies from the Fathers remain to be considered, and some arguments [as he imagines] in confirmation of his doctrine ;† let us proceed to pluck up these also.

## CHAPTER LI.

### TESTIMONIES FROM THE FATHERS ANSWERED.

BELLARMINE has collected opinions of the Fathers from every quarter, whom we shall, however, clearly shew to be but little in his favour in the present enquiry. First, he introduces the testimony of the second Council of Orange, *Can. ult.*, where we thus read: *We believe this, also, according to the Catholic faith, that after grace has been received by baptism,‡ all the baptised, by the assistance and co-operation of Christ, may, and ought, if they will strive faithfully, entirely to fulfil the things which pertain to*

\* Apud Prosp. in sent. sentent. 178.

† Vide chap. i. ii.

‡ The diligent enquirer after truth, may find the grand error here involved in the notion of Baptism, completely exploded in Bridge's *Sacramental Instruction*, and by many testimonies to the truth, among others, adduced from Davenant.



*salvation.\** They can, therefore, [infers Bellarmine] fulfil the law of God.

I answer, that by this quotation the error of the Papists is clearly refuted; for it is not solely a desire of keeping the commandments which bears upon the salvation of the regenerate, but a continual exercise of penitence, a daily seeking of the forgiveness of their sins, a humble acknowledgment of their own infirmity. Even, therefore, if we allow that they are able, by the assistance of grace, to fulfil everything which relates to their salvation, it cannot thence be correctly inferred, that they are able to fulfil the law of God; but, on the contrary, the inference is, that even though they do *not* fulfil the law, yet they can, by repenting and believing, attain to salvation. The grand mistake in the Papistic statement, lies in the ungrounded supposition that regenerate men can attain to salvation by the legal Covenant; and that God, on that account, always imparts to the regenerate such a measure of grace as renders them fit and competent for satisfying the whole law. This is, however, to put out of sight entirely the grace of God and the Gospel. For God gives all things which are necessary for obtaining salvation according to the Gospel Covenant, and yet does not impart a possibility of fulfilling the whole law in this life. Thus says Augustine:† *This is the reason why God is more slow in wholly sanctifying his own holy and believing people in some of their faults, so that, in regard to those faults, they experience less enjoyment in that which is good, than suffices to constitute a complete fulfilment of righteousness: namely, that so far as relates to the most perfect standard of his truth, no flesh living may be justified in his sight.*

2.—[Bellarmine proceeds,] Origen in Homily 9, upon Joshua, towards the end, expresses his opinion that those who say they cannot keep the commandments of God, should be compared to women.

\* Of this Council of Orange it may be observed, that it was “assembled in the year of our Lord 529; in which, sentence was given against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in general, that their opinions touching grace and free-will were not agreeable to the Rule of the Catholic faith.”—Archbishop Usher’s *Reply to a Jesuit*; p. 486, Edit. Cambridge 1835, where some extracts from the Canons are also given.

† De peccat. merit. et remiss. lib. 2 cap. 19.



I answer, that Origen on the last words of the eighth chapter of Joshua, where mention is made of the women and little ones, understands, in his allegorical manner, by *little ones* and *women*, Christians who are still imperfect; by *men*, those who, by the help of Christ's grace, have attained to some measure of perfection; and he then adds, that it manifests a degree of, as it were, woman-like imperfection for any one to plead that he is still unable to keep the commands of Christ. Now the inference which Bellarmine endeavours to deduce from this is, that they who are compared to men are able to fulfil the whole law. But, in the first place, arguments which are derived from allegorical expressions are very weak. In the next place, although it may be right to compare to idle women such persons as, under a pretext of impossibility, give themselves up to sloth and do not even attempt to fulfil the commands of Christ; yet it does not thence follow, that they who are likened to men, are able, let them labour ever so much, to fulfil the whole law of God. Moreover, Origen, through the whole of that homily, is speaking of the beginning, the desire, and the practice of the obedience which is performed by the regenerate, and which is accepted under the Evangelical Covenant; not of that strict and rigid observance of the law which is required according to the terms of the legal compact. Lastly, if Origen has said that certain perfect Christians can keep the law; that must be explained of the daily remission of sin, and the gracious acceptance of God, as Augustine always understood it; not of an exact and entire fulfilment of the whole law, as the Pelagians and Papists imagine.\*

3.—[Again, says Bellarmine,] St. Basil, in his Oration upon those words, *Attende tibi*, not far from the beginning, says: *It is wicked to say that it is impossible to keep the precepts of the Spirit.*

I answer, that the precepts of the Spirit are not impossible

\* On Origen's allegorical method of interpreting Scripture, see Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*; vol. i. p. 167. However valuable in many respects the writings of the Fathers, they must not be pushed into the Infallible Chair, if they are to *retain* the honours due to them. The Supplement (p. 117) to *Ancient Christianity* will, as usual, repay a reference; and *Letters on the Fathers of the two First Centuries*; by Misopapisticus, p. 240.



to man, whilst he remains such as the Spirit of God formed him. But to man, fallen and corrupt as he is, they are, by the force of circumstances, become impossible; yet by renewing grace they are so far rendered possible, as God has judged it proper that we should recover the power originally granted. He has not, however, ordained that we should, in this life, be possessed of a capability for entire and exact obedience, but one incipient and imperfect. But of this impossibility we shall have frequently to speak; I shall content myself, therefore, at this time with this brief answer.

4.—Chrysostom (Homil. 8. de pœnitentia, about the middle) says: *By no means accuse God; he commands nothing impossible: many even exceed the precepts themselves.* He has similar observations in Hom. 19, in Epist. ad Hebr.;\* Hom. 39. in Matth.;† Hom. 2. in Epist. ad Philipp. Chrysostom, therefore, [in Bellarmine's opinion] must have thought that the regenerate could fulfil the whole law of God.‡

My answer is as before, where we are treating about works of supererogation, that Chrysostom is speaking only of external actions commanded or forbidden in the Divine law. And we admit that it is possible for men, especially to the regenerate, to perform outward actions which are commanded in the law, and to abstain from such outward acts as are forbidden. What we deny, is, that this is to entirely fulfil the law of God. For the law is spiritual and regards chiefly the internal operations of the heart; and judging from these, there is no mortal since the fall who either has fulfilled, or could fulfil, the whole law of God. And this is the sense in which Chrysostom affirms that many have exceeded the commandments; not because they could internally transcend the perfection of the law by internal sanctity; but, because they could accomplish some external act not commanded by the law, or abstain from some external act not prohibited by the law; as Monks do, by renouncing a right to their own private possessions, and

\* [Tom. xii. pp. 262, 3, Edit. Paris. 1837.]

† [Tom. vii. p. 433.]

‡ Passages might be quoted from Chrysostom quite subversive of the notions Bellarmine would support by his testimony.



abstaining from marriage; who, nevertheless, grievously fail in rendering a perfect obedience to the law, and in many things through their whole life.

5.—Hilary, on Psalm cxviii.\* [who is next quoted by Bellarmine] explaining that passage—*THY COMMANDMENT IS EXCEEDING BROAD*, observes: *The commandment of God is broad, and extends to every point of our hope; so that it is not difficult, if there be a willing mind, to obey the precept of the Lord.*

To which I reply, that Hilary means nothing more than that the different duties comprehended within the range of the law are so numerous that any pious mind may easily find subjects on which to exercise itself. But he is so far from deducing from this extent of the law, the possibility of its complete fulfilment by the regenerate, that he plainly gathers from it just the contrary: *The law is broad* (says Hilary) *because it exceeds in an infinite degree the comprehension of human ignorance.*† If it surpass the powers of human comprehension, much more must it surpass man's power of fulfilling it. Pious men, therefore, are enabled to obey some command according to the measure of grace; but they cannot satisfy the demands of the whole law.

6.—Cyril (lib. 3 *contra Julianum*, about the middle) affirms, that that very precept, *Thou shalt not covet*, which is judged to be the most difficult of all, can be fulfilled by grace: Therefore, [infers Bellarmine] the law is not impossible to be fulfilled by the regenerate man.

I do not find anything of this kind in Cyril in the place alleged. Cyril says that the precept *not to covet* is a thing to which man cannot attain, and is, in a measure, above nature. And he adds, that the regenerate do in no other way fulfil the law than in Christ. But admitting that he has stated *in totidem verbis*, that that command can be fulfilled through

\* In litera Lamed, verse 69. [It is evident that Psal. cxix. must be here meant, Hilary following the numbering of the lxx. and the Vulgate; whereas, our translators follow the Hebrew.]

† Ibid. [Bishop Davenant has cited this passage with the reading "*excedit*" instead of *extendit*—an alteration made by Martinus Lypsius, and introduced into his edition of 1550, apparently without any manuscript authority, and to which the Benedictine Editor objects:—"Lipsius pro *extendit* temere substituit *excedit*, quod et editiones sequentes retinuerunt." *Hilarii Oper.*, Edit. Venet. 1749; tom. i. col. 272.]



grace, it would not have been any contradiction to us; seeing that we do not deny that God has the power to enable us by his grace to fulfil the whole law; what we deny, is, that it is either his custom, or that he is pleased to impart such a measure of grace to any regenerate man. And in this sense the Apostle Paul affirms that he himself was not able to fulfil the command *Thou shalt not covet*.

7.—St. Jerome (lib. 3. adversus Pelagianos, near the beginning\*) says, *God has enjoined things that are possible; there is no doubt about that*. And in his Commentaries on Matt. v., near the end, he observes—*Many, measuring the commands of God by their own imbecility, think that those things which are commanded are impossible to be done.†* And, *It should be understood that Christ does not command things impossible, but perfect things, such as David did, &c.*

In the former passage, he is considering the possibility of fulfilling the law according to the strength of nature, as first formed, and with endowments given by God. But this strength has been partly worn away, and partly lost; nor is an entire renovation effected for fallen man even by renewing grace, until this mortal shall have put on immortality. We, therefore, grant that God has commanded possibilities; and yet, at the same time deny, that any man now can thoroughly fulfil the whole of what is commanded. Moreover, in this very passage, Jerome asserts nothing else, than that it is possible that a man may live free from all sin, as God has commanded. And yet Bellarmine himself says that this question, *Whether man can live without sin?* must be answered negatively.‡ He is, consequently, at variance with Jerome, whose testimony he now alleges. Lastly, Jerome, however he may admit that the keeping of the commandments is possible, yet, immediately subjoins that no one can be pointed out, who has actually fulfilled all the demands of the law. Little does he accord, then,

\* [Tom. ii. p. 244. edit. Col. Agrip. 1616.]

† The passage, if quoted entire, will explain itself, and shew how little applicable it is to Bellarmine's argument:—"Multi—et dicunt sufficere virtutibus non odisse inimicos; cæterum diligere plus præcipi quam humana natura patitur:" in Matth. v. 44.

‡ De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 12. [adopting Augustine's language; tom. iv. col. 942.]



with the Papists, that there are very many to be found who fulfil the whole law, a considerable number who go beyond it.

To the latter passage from Jerome, I answer, that it affirms nothing more than that the command of loving our enemies is possible, and was, indeed, performed both by David and Stephen. Neither have we ever denied, that the regenerate, and those embued with the spirit of charity, are able to love even their enemies; that they are able also to perform the other acts which are commanded in the decalogue. But, in performing these works, they attain to that alone which Divines call the perfection of *parts*, not the perfection of *degrees*. Even in that perfection of parts, men very often fall short; as can be shewn from the example of David; who, although he manifested the perfection of love towards Saul while his enemy; yet, overcome of lust, exhibited the consequences of hatred towards Uriah, though his friend. From such a possibility as this, therefore, the possibility of fulfilling the whole law remains yet to be proved; a capability of performing the law, according to the measure of grace received, is all that can be deduced from it.

8.—St. Augustine, in his book *de natura et gratia*, cap. 43, remarks, *God, then, does not command impossibilities; but in commanding, admonishes both to do what you can, and to seek aid in what you can not do.* Where he teaches [says Bellarmine] that all the commands are possible; some being within our powers, others attainable by means of prayer.

To which I answer, that in this passage Augustine is treating of the perfect righteousness which fulfils all the commands of God, and perseveres without any sin at all; which is plainly to be inferred from the immediate context. But the Pelagians were accustomed to argue in this manner: *What God commands is not impossible: yet God commands us to live free from all sin; therefore, it is not impossible for man to live free from all sin in this life.* Augustine repeatedly admits the minor proposition: *De pec. mer. et rem.* lib. 2. cap. 16. *We do not mean to say that God has not enjoined the duty of our being so perfect in the performing of righteousness, as to be altogether free from sin. For whatever may be done will not be sin, unless there*



*exists some command from God that it should not be done.* And in his book, *on the perfection of righteousness*, Celestius objects, *That it has been commanded to man to be free from all sin.* Augustine answers that *the question is not whether that command has been given, which is very evident; but whether that which is thus acknowledged to have been commanded can be accomplished in the body of this death, &c.\** You perceive, then, that Augustine had no doubt at all concerning the truth of the minor of the above syllogism. As to the major proposition, namely, that *what God commands is not impossible*, Augustine answers,† *It is not impossible when we consider the power of Divine grace; and, when it shall have been diffused most abundantly in our hearts, so far as our nature when healed and purified is able to receive it, then will it entirely prevail, and administer strength for living free from all sin; but such a large measure of grace is not given, nor is this possibility found carried out into real action, while we are encompassed with the body of this death.* Augustine, therefore, admits that the commands of God are possible; but not to every regenerate person absolutely, nor at any time, as the Papists would maintain; but to the regenerate, when having attained a fulness of grace: which fulness of grace, as we have before shewn from Augustine, is not granted to any of the regenerate while in this life.

Let us now revert to the words of Augustine objected by our opponent: Augustine has said, that *God does not command impossibilities.* I acknowledge it; because the entire fulfilling of the commandments is possible to man through grace *consummated*, although it is not possible in this life through grace *begun*. Augustine has said that *God, in the act of commanding, admonishes us to do what we can, and to ask from him aid in what we cannot.* We therefore can, [argues Bellarmine] at least, by the intervention of prayer, fulfil the whole law. I answer, we ask for many things in this life, which nevertheless we cannot obtain in this life. We ask that we may be kept from all sin, in deed, in word, and in thought; yet it has not seemed

\* [Cap. 17, or 8.]

† De Nat. et Grat. cap. 42.; and de perfect. Justitiæ. p. 1423. [cap. 60. or 22. Edit. Benedict.]



fit to God to grant this petition, except so far as by daily forgiveness he releases us from the guilt of all sin.

We ask, then, from God, what we are yet not able to perform; that is, to live free from all sin, and to fulfil the whole law: but we do not obtain this excepting by the intervention of pardon, the effect of which is, that all the commandments are imputed to us as if fulfilled, when whatsoever has not been done properly is forgiven.

Thus much may suffice as a reply to the testimonies from the Fathers.

## CHAPTER LII.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE CONFUTED.

To testimonies from the Fathers Bellarmine adds the weight of arguments; such, however, as I shall make you to understand, are plainly of no weight at all.

1.—The first argument is thus stated: *A regenerate man can do more than God commands; much more, therefore, can he fulfil all that is commanded.* And in this place, that passage from Matthew xix. 21, is thrown back upon us: *If thou wilt be perfect, Go, sell all, &c.*; and also some testimonies of Chrysostom and Augustine, to which we have already given sufficient replies.

I answer, then, (as we have abundantly shewn in the controversy about supererogation) that the regenerate sometimes do some works which God does not command, but never accomplish every thing which he commands. They, therefore, *prætererogate*, or do something distinct from, and not included in the command; rather than *supererogate*, or do more than the command. Moreover, these uncommanded works which are done by them in order to the better fulfilment of what is enjoined, do not contain in themselves anything greater, better, or more extensive than the perfect works of the commandments; but sometimes contribute in some slight degree towards the more easy observance of them. Bellarmine's argument, consequently, is much the



same, as if he who was in debt a thousand talents of gold, and could with difficulty repay a thousand mites, should, nevertheless, boast that he is not only in a capacity to pay, but is, moreover, in a condition to add something of his own by way of *over* payment; and he would prove it, forsooth, by some such reasoning as the following:—I am able to repay more than I owe; for I can pay my creditor much lead and brass for which I am not indebted to him: much more, therefore, can I discharge my whole debt. Just as in this example, what is said to be *more*, is in truth *less*, and does not compensate for, nor is equal to, that part of the debt of gold which is owing: so the regenerate, by those works with which they are said to do *more* than was commanded, do, after all, perform something *less* than was contained in the precept itself, and do not return to God a full complement of obedience to his laws. I shall say nothing about the passage quoted from St. Matthew, and the testimonies adduced from Chrysostom and Augustine; since they have been already explained elsewhere.

2.—Bellarmine's second argument is, That if the precepts are impossible to be followed, no one could be under obligation to obey them; and on this account the precepts would cease to be precepts: For, that it is impossible to imagine how any one could incur guilt by that which he cannot avoid.

This was the main argument of the Pelagians; it shall, therefore, receive from us a careful discussion. First, that objection derived from the impossibility of obeying a command is constantly being urged by the Pelagians. In the dialogue of Jerome against the Pelagians, (Bk. 1. chap. 3.) the interlocutor, who represents the Pelagians, speaks thus:—I pray you answer me this: *Has God given commands that are possible or impossible?* (advers. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 3.) And more fully in the 8th chapter, *God has given commands that are either possible or impossible. If possible, it is in our power to obey them if we are willing. If impossible, we are not guilty, if we perform not what we are not able to fulfil. And in this way, whether God has given commands that are possible or impossible, man can live free from sin if he pleases.* And then, as if this subtle reasoning was supported by the Scriptures, the Pelagian challenges



the Orthodox in this fashion: *Prove to me, from the New Testament, that error, ignorance, and an impossibility of obeying the commands, is held to be a just cause of accusation*; lib. 2. cap. 1. In Augustine, Celestius concludes, that man can live here free from all sin, from this argument, that *duty is imposed to no purpose, where there is an impossibility of fulfilling it*.\* From all this, you will have no difficulty in recognising Papists of our day to be genuine disciples of the Pelagians. But, to proceed to the argument itself:—

I acknowledge it to be one among the chief conditions of the law that it be possible; but I assert that there is sufficient to render it obligatory, in the circumstance that it was possible, from the nature of the thing at the time the Lawgiver first issued it; although from accident, that is, through the fault of him on whom it was enjoined, it is now become impossible. All the Schoolmen agree in so stating the case. The Doctors admit that a man may properly be under obligation to fulfil, what, by reason of his own fault, is become impossible; and this, when the obligation precedes the impossibility. Aquinas (in quæst. disp. *de dæmonibus*, art. 5. in resp. ad 11.) observes: *As a drunken man is bound not to sin, not, indeed, taking him in his present condition, but in consideration of the voluntary cause of his drunkenness, according to which something of blame attaches to him: so also it may be understood, that the devil is bound to be converted to God, although this is impossible to him, viewed in his present condition; because he has fallen into this condition from a voluntary cause*. By a similar course of reasoning then we say, that every man is under obligation to fulfil the whole law, although, through the fall of Adam, to observe it perfectly is become impossible to him, seeing that fall is accounted voluntary to the whole human race. Augustine himself proves this. For to the objection of Celestius, that *If a man cannot exist without sin, it is no fault of his, since in this case, that is not which cannot possibly be*, Augustine answers: *That the fault of man, in not being altogether free from sin, lies in the circumstance, of its having originated in the will of man alone that he came into that sad*

\* De perfect. Justitiæ ratiocin. xi. [cap. 5. col. 171.]



*condition.\** Besides, this subtle reasoning about impossibility releasing from obligation, if it avail at all, is equally good for refuting Bellarmine himself also. For he confesses, that man cannot live free from all sin; and yet it is certain, that every man is under obligation to do this; as is constantly acknowledged by Augustine.

Let us now take into consideration the other part of the beforementioned objection, in which Bellarmine asserts, *that it cannot be imagined, how any one can sin by that which he cannot avoid.* Imagination is not necessary; for, to adopt the clear solution of Augustine: *There is sin* (says he) *when there is not that degree of love which there ought to be, whether the will can or cannot avoid it; because if it can, the will now present occasions the sin; but if it cannot, it was the will now past which occasioned it, &c.* The same may be said of fulfilling the law.

3.—A third objection is:—If the law were impossible to be obeyed, the consequence would be, that God is more cruel and foolish than any tyrant, seeing he would then exact, from even his very friends, a tribute which no one of them could pay, and would enact laws which he knew none of them could observe.

The Jesuit shews himself on this subject to be foolish (not to say a blasphemer), in thus impudently reviling the Most High. But, to give him a reply: In the first place, it is the character of tyrannical cruelty to impose laws upon subjects with which, from the nature of the thing, it is impossible to comply. Just as if some tyrant should command his citizens to fly in the air. But it is not an act of tyrannical cruelty to impose, and even under penalties to require, the fulfilling of a law to which, from the nature of the thing, it was possible to render obedience; though through the fault of the individual, so to act was now become an impossibility. As, if a king requires all his subjects to conduct themselves soberly and modestly, even drunkards will be under an obligation to obey this law, although while in their present state, it is impossible for them to discharge this law. Thus the most righteous God requires the fulfilment of the law from men, because it was possible to them from the

\* De perfect. Justit. ratiocin. 13. [cap. 6. §. 13.]



nature of the thing to pay obedience; although now, having become insensate through sin, they are unable to comply with its rules. Secondly, it is an act of tyrannical cruelty to prescribe laws that are impossible, that hence men may take occasion to plunder and harass their subjects. But if any king should enact laws which press too severely upon the weakened powers of his subjects, but with a totally different intention, namely, that hence his subjects, using their best endeavours at the highest attainments, should attain at least to mediocrity; this would be an act of prudence, not of cruelty. Now it is with this intention, altogether, that God still requires from the regenerate an exact observance of his law, not with the sanguinary and tyrannical desire of inflicting punishment. Thirdly, it is not to act the part of a tyrant for a sovereign to oblige to what is impossible, if, in the mean time, he is ready to put a favourable construction upon our actions, when we do seriously and faithfully desire to keep the law; although we cannot fulfil its whole demands: if, also, he is ready, on the other hand, to pardon all offences, and, after having forgiven sins, to bestow moreover a special reward upon all those who have striven to keep this law, impossible though it be, according to their ability. Now it is in this manner that God acts towards the regenerate: consequently, not as a tyrant, although we admit that his law is impossible [entirely to be fulfilled.] Fourthly, it is not cruel to exact from his friends a tribute, though no one of them can pay it when it is justly due, when, too, he himself provides a proxy, and security for discharging the debt in their name; and when from that very exaction, no inconvenience, but the greatest advantage possible, redounds to his friends. Now thus the matter stands between God and us. For by the right of our first creation we owe to God a perfect fulfilment of his law. But, because, in consequence of the fall, we are not now in a state to discharge the debt, he himself has presented to us Christ his own Son, to be our surety; who, on our behalf has blotted out the debt which was contracted through the law. Lastly, from this obligation to an impossible law, no condemnation, no loss, accrues to the regenerate; on the contrary, there accrues great benefits; for hence they are warned to flee to God through his Son the Mediator, to seek from God grace



to obey his precepts ; pardon, because they have not satisfactorily performed them ; and finally, to hope for glory from the free gift of God through Jesus Christ, who has completely fulfilled the law, and removed far away its curse from them.

4.—A fourth reason [with Bellarmine] is: Christ suffered death *that the righteousness\* of the law might be fulfilled in us* ; as it is said in Rom. viii. 4. Christ, likewise, has taught us to pray, *Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven* ; Matt. vi. 10., where we ask for grace to fulfil the commandments. In fine, *Christ became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him* ; Heb. v. 9. But if the law cannot be fulfilled, Christ has not obtained what he intended ; we pray daily in vain, and no one of all flesh can be saved. For if the law cannot be fulfilled, the righteousness† of the law is never fulfilled in us, nor is the will of God ever done on earth as in heaven ; nor do we ever truly obey Christ, and on this account he will be the author of eternal salvation to none of us.

On the first passage, I answer, that, although we do not fulfil the law, yet the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us who are planted into Christ. First, because Christ satisfied the law for all his members by enduring the death of the cross. Secondly, because he has exactly fulfilled the whole law on their account, even to the least tittle of it. Thirdly, because he qualifies them by the Spirit of grace to render a true and sincere obedience to the law, although it be only inchoate and imperfect. Yet this inchoate obedience, when forgiveness of sins is added also, avails just as much as an absolute fulfilment of the law, according to that saying of Augustine never to be enough commended: *All the commandments are then accounted as completely obeyed, when whatsoever has not been done is pardoned*. And that the law is fulfilled in us through Christ, with whom we are united in one person, the Romanists may learn from their own Aquinas: *Christ (says he‡) and his members are one mystical person, whence the works of the head are in some measure the works of the members also: And thus, when*

\* *Justificatio* according to the Romish version.

† *Justificatio* is the term here used by Bellarmine.

‡ Quæst. disp. de gratia Christi, art. 7. respons. ad 11.



*any thing is given us by God on account of the works of Christ, it is no contradiction to the declaration, Thou wilt render to every one according to his deeds.*

I proceed to consider the second passage, taken from the Lord's Prayer, from which Bellarmine infers, that because we pray by the direction of Christ, *Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven*; either we do attain this perfection in this life, or that the prayer is being constantly used by us to no purpose.

Now we answer, in the first place, that Christ has taught us, in the same prayer, to ask for the daily forgiveness of our sins; and the Fathers are unanimous in considering this petition to be necessary to be offered by all the saints. But they who do the will of God on earth as it is done in heaven have no need of forgiveness. Although, therefore, this object is sought for and desired by the saints, yet is it not obtained by any one while on earth. Secondly, although this petition, *Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven*, is explained by the Fathers in a threefold manner, there is not one of those three expositions which does not militate against the argument of Bellarmine. The first exposition is, LET IT BE DONE AS IN HEAVEN AND ON EARTH, that is, *as among the angels, so among men*.\* In this sense it is manifest that the regenerate will not obtain what they constantly ask, until they become *as angels*. The second exposition is,† AS IN HEAVEN, SO ALSO ON EARTH; that is, *as it is among the righteous, so also among sinners*. In this sense the fulfilment of the whole law is not included; because, all those who are called the righteous, are so far from completely fulfilling the law, that they most humbly acknowledge their transgressions of it. They are called the righteous, therefore, according to Augustine,‡ not because they have fulfilled the law, but because *they have made considerable approaches to this perfection of righteousness*. The righteous of this sort do not claim to themselves any such fulfilment of the law,§ rather *they condemn themselves by*

\* August. *de temp.* Serm. 182. [Append. tom. v. col. 117. edit. Benedic. Serm. 64.]

† Ibid. §. 7.

‡ De perfect. Justit. p. 1427. [cap. 11. or 23.]

§ Ibid. pag. 1428. [cap. 11. or 27.]



*acknowledging their offences.* The third exposition is,\* *THY WILL BE DONE, AS IN HEAVEN SO ALSO ON EARTH, that is, as the spirit assents, so may the flesh consent to thy will; that the flesh may not lust contrary to the spirit: but like as the good Spirit does not resist thee, so the body may not resist the Spirit.* This interpretation quite crushes the argument of Bellarmine; for although in the present life we aim at this perfect subjugation of the flesh to the spirit; yet we obtain it not before the departure from this life. Lastly, Bellarmine's statement, that *we are praying to no purpose that the will of God may be done as in heaven so also on earth, unless we obtain it whilst occupying the body, earthly and corruptible as it is,* is entirely mistaken and delusive. For that man does not pray in vain who offers a supplication in the time prescribed. Now, in this prayer, we daily ask for a more plentiful and enriching measure of grace, and approach nearer and nearer to the perfect fulfilment of the Divine will; and at length attain most perfect righteousness. As consequently we are not seeking in vain when praying that the kingdom of glory may come, and that we may be freed from all evil; although it is most certain that this cannot take place in this life: so we are not praying in vain, that we may practise the will of God, and fulfil the law perfectly, as the blessed angels do; although in this life not one of the saints attains to that eminence.

The last passage, that quoted from Heb. v. 9., remains, where Christ is said to be *the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him.* But unless they fulfil the law [according to Bellarmine] by legal obedience, they cannot be saved. The Apostle is speaking not of exact legal obedience, but of evangelical obedience, which consists chiefly in faith, and secondarily in newness of life. And they who yield this obedience—who believe in Christ the Mediator, and desire and strive after holiness, may be saved, and are saved,

\* Vide Ludolphum de Orat. Domin. pag. 57.—The author here referred to is probably "Ludolphus de Saxonia, who was made a Carthusian Prior at Strasburg, about 1330. He composed the *Life of Jesus Christ* out of the four Evangelists, and other Ecclesiastical authors, with Commentaries and prayers on every chapter; which was printed at Strasburg in 1483, at Paris in 1509, at Vienna in 1536, &c." Dupin, *Eccles. Hist.* cent. xiv., vol. xii. p. 66.—Some Romish Sectarians have charged Bishop Jeremy Taylor with having taken *his* Life of Christ from this author. See Heber's Life of that Prelate; p. cxxxix.



although the whole law neither is, nor can be fulfilled by them. He who denies, or is ignorant of this, may be a Jesuit, but he cannot be a Christian.

5.—The fifth reason [of Bellarmine] is: That all the truly justified have the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spirit produces his own appropriate fruits, which are enumerated in Galat. v. 22, 23.: *Love, joy, peace, patience, goodness, &c.* Now they [argues Bellarmine] in whom these fruits are found, are not accused by the law, inasmuch as they are not transgressors of it, but do fulfil it. For the law cannot fix upon any thing on which to ground any accusation against those who are endowed with love, patience, &c.; for the law is written in the heart; that is, the Holy Spirit shed abroad in the heart, by fulfilling the law, occasions that the law accuses no more: from first to last, therefore, he who is justified, fulfils the law altogether through the Spirit whom he has received; and if he does *not* fulfil it, he has neither received the Spirit, nor is he truly justified. [So argues our opponent.]

I answer, it must be granted that all the justified do possess the Holy Spirit, and also, those fruits of the Spirit which are recounted by the Apostle; yet so that each possesses these according to the measure of grace which the Holy Spirit vouchsafes to impart to them: not according to that perfection of righteousness which is enjoined in the Divine law. The proposition which Bellarmine appends to these premises, namely, that *they who have the Spirit, and the fruits of the Spirit, do fulfil the whole law*, must be entirely denied. For even these still carry about them the flesh and the fruits of the flesh, whereby an entire fulfilling of the law is impeded; as the Apostle himself testifies, Rom. vii. 14. *We know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin.* And in Galat. v. 17, *The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other, so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* And in Rom. vii. 18, *To will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I know not.*

But our opponent urges that such persons as do produce these fruits are not accused by the law, and, consequently, they fulfil the law. Bellarmine delusively substitutes for a



cause what is not the cause. For the fact that the regenerate are not accused by the law, is not the result of their having fulfilled the law in their own persons, but of their having been so engrafted into Christ by faith, as to have passed from the legal to the evangelical covenant. As says the Apostle, Rom. viii. 33, 34: *Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth, Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died; yea, rather that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us.* Paul did not say, *Who shall lay anything to the regenerate? They have fulfilled the law,* but, *It is God that justifieth.* Now God justifies the regenerate perfectly and absolutely by not imputing their sins, but forgiving them all transgressions through Christ, apprehended by faith. But he makes the regenerate righteous, imperfectly only, and inchoately, by infusing into them the Spirit of Christ in that measure which to his wisdom seems best for them. Augustine is constant in acknowledging that, even in the regenerate themselves, there may be found what, according to the rigour of the law, might deservedly form ground of accusation against them; but that they repel and weaken this charge, by reproaching and accusing themselves, and obtaining the continual forgiveness of their sins through faith. In his treatise *of the Deserts and Forgiveness of sins*, lib. 2, cap. 10., he says: *If the righteous man desires to contend with God, he will not be able to obey him; that is, if, when about to be judged, he attempt to shew that nothing can be found in him which God can condemn, he will not be able to obey him; for he loses that branch of obedience, by which alone he can obey him who enjoins the confession of sins.* And again, in his treatise *on the Perfection of Righteousness*, (page 1428) he thus speaks in the person of the regenerate: *Then it is our heart does not reproach us, in that state of life in which we live by faith, if the same faith whereby the heart believeth unto righteousness, does not neglect to reproach us with our sins.*

Useless, then, is it, for Bellarmine to attempt to infer, that, because we have been set free from the accusation and condemnation of the law, the fulfilment of it is within our reach while encompassed with sinful flesh. For we stop the



mouth of the law as an accuser, not by fulfilling the law, but by believing; by applying the merits of Christ to ourselves, and by the same means, washing away and abrogating the demerits of all our sins.

6.—The last reason adduced is: That all the justified are born of God; as is clear from very many passages of Holy Scripture. But *he who is born of God sinneth not, nor can he sin; because he is born of God*; 1 John iii. 9. Now he who does not sin [argues Bellarmine] fulfils the law. Consequently, every truly justified person fulfils the law; nor can it be, that he should remain justified, and not fulfil the law.

That all the justified are also the new-born sons of God is beyond dispute. But that the new-born sons of God cannot sin is asserted by the Apostle in one sense, as it is understood by Bellarmine in another. Bellarmine thinks that the sons of God cannot sin and violate the law by any irregular behaviour, so long as they remain sons of God; and hence he would infer, that they do fulfil the law. But this is a plain mistake. For they who call upon and invoke God the Father by a true faith, remain truly the children of God. And yet such daily pray to God, *Forgive us our sins*. The sons of God, then, commit sin, even whilst they remain sons of God. Moreover, the Apostle himself excludes this interpretation of Bellarmine, in chap. i., verse 8, 9: *If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness*. They who have fulfilled the law do not stand in need of forgiveness; let the Jesuits philosophise as they please (though in spite of the opposing voice of antiquity) concerning sins beside the law.\* But the sons of God need daily to confess, and to obtain forgiveness of their offences; consequently, they do not fulfil the whole law.

Having thus set aside Bellarmine's mistaken interpretation, let us enquire into the true one, which will supply a clear explanation of the before-cited argument.

We affirm, then, that they who are born of God, sin not; *first*, because, according to Augustine, as far as any one is a

[\* *De peccatis præterlegalibus*—See chap. xlviii. arg. 5. p. 20, and arg. 7. p. 23.]



child of God, so far he sinneth not; but, so far as he is a child of this world, he sins. In his treatise *de pec. mer. et rem.*, (lib. 2. cap. 8.) he explains the passage thus: *We make progress in renewal and righteousness of life, through the operation of that principle by which we are sons of God; and as to that principle we cannot at all commit sin: and this progress continues to advance until our entire nature, including even that principle by which we are still the children of this world, is changed into that better principle;—I say, even that by which we are children of this world: for, so far as relates to this principle, we are even yet capable of committing sin.* He adopts the same interpretation, in his book against the two Epistles of the Pelagians; lib. 3. cap. 3. *The sons of God, too, commit sin; but this arises from their being still the children of the world. But by the aid of that grace whereby they are the sons of God, they sin not; for every one who is born of God sinneth not.* In his book also, *on the perfection of righteousness* (cap. 18. or 39.) he meets the Pelagian objection in the same manner.

It may be answered, secondly, (and in my judgment a little more in accordance with the mind of the Apostle,) that, *He who is born of God sins not*; that is, he does not sin as to a certain special mode of sin, by which the children of the devil sin. Now this mode is, a total falling away or apostasy, from the love of God, and the faith of Christ. For he who is born of God may commit many particular acts (evil concupiscence, as it were, urging him into them,) which are repugnant to love and faith; but he does not so far deviate as to forsake the ways of God, as apostates depart from them. For though he may offend frequently, yet he ceases not entirely from persevering efforts, contending against sin. Augustine has himself hinted at this interpretation in the aforesaid passage.\* For he says that the sons of God sin not, that is, do not sin from infidelity; which is the sin to be understood as meant, when the kind of sin treated of is not expressed. And this he confirms by various testimonies from Scripture, (*Contra duas Epist. Pelag.* lib. 3. cap. 3.) where he, in conclusion of the subject, has these words:—*Those, therefore, in whom there exists not faith, are the chil-*

\* Vide de perfect. Just. [cap. 11. or in edit. Benedict. 27.]



*dren of the devil; because they do not possess in the inner man anything on which to ground a reason for being forgiven, whether either from infirmity, or ignorance, or from any evil disposition they may have offended. But they are the sons of God, who, in accordance with the faith which is peculiar to the sons of God, confess their sins, and are cleansed from all iniquity.*

The venerable Bede, when writing on the words just cited from the Apostle—*He who is born of God sinneth not*, explains them thus:—*The Apostle does not say this of all sin, but of the violation of love, which he who has the seed of God in him, cannot commit.* Now, by the violation of love, he does not understand every sin committed against the law; for in whatever way we sin, we do it against the law of God;†—but such sin as springs from hatred of God and of our neighbour: such as was the sin of Cain, which the Apostle instances in the 12th verse.

To sum up our reply: When the children of God are said not to sin, it is not meant absolutely, but of some certain and peculiar mode of sinning. Bellarmine, who infers thence that they fulfil the whole law, argues sophistically, as heretofore—*a dicto secundum quid quasi ad dictum simpliciter*; so that, by this force of argument, he fails to deduce any just conclusion.

## CHAPTER LIII.

THE NATURE OF THE FOURTH QUESTION STATED, NAMELY,  
CONCERNING THE *MERIT* OF GOOD WORKS.

### ON THE USE OF THE WORD *MERIT*.

WE have now gone through three points in the controversy respecting good works; the first of which had reference to the *necessity* of good works, the second, to their *reality*, the third, to their *perfection*: there remains the last, in

\* Page 739.

† Ibid. page 738.



which the point concerning the merit, on the score of condignity in good works, is to be discussed.

And here there will be no necessity either for many or for new arguments; for, if the positions which we have already laid down concerning the imperfection, both of habitual and of actual righteousness, and of the impossibility of fulfilling the law, remain unshaken; all boasting of our merits, be it ever so little, before God, is entirely overturned and abolished. But we will successively shew what opinion is entertained on this subject by our opponents; and then, what opinion ought to be entertained, according to the actual law of truth, we propose next to consider.

Seeing, however, that the authority of the holy Fathers is generally put forward by both sides in this controversy, it may be as well to premise a few remarks, as to what is to be met with in their writings, whether in favour of the cause of our opponents, or our own.

In the first place, then, it must be granted that the words *meritum* and *mereri* are continually made use of by the Fathers of the Latin Church. Hence the Papists, finding as they do, these terms in frequent use in the writings of the Fathers, eagerly assert that they are all opposed to the sentiments of Protestants on this point. It is, however, ridiculous, in a question respecting a most weighty doctrine of the faith, to make the whole case dependent upon one little word; and that, too, most shamefully wrested to a sense different from, nay, contrary to, the meaning of all the Fathers. For the phrase *to merit*, in the writings of the Fathers, denotes no more than the fact of receiving or retaining some benefit from God, through the medium of a good work; and by the term *merit*, there is intended nothing else with them, than a good work ordained by God to receive a remuneration. To merit eternal life, then, is to do those works, which, according to the appointment of God, are the means of arriving at it. If any one should, in this sense, term the good works of the regenerate *merits*; because, that is, they are ordained of God to receive a reward, and should say that the regenerate merit eternal life because, walking in the way of the Divine commandments, they do, at last, being rewarded by God, attain to the crown of eternal glory: he agrees with the Fathers in



their mode of speaking, and with us, in respect of the thing itself; but he differs in both from the Romanists.

That the Fathers,\* under the term *meritum*, understood a good work *simply ordained* to receive a reward, and not possessing any *condignity*, or *intrinsic worthiness* of reward; and that, under the term *mereri*, they intimated that eternal life is only *to be bestowed*, as a gift, on those who perform good works, but is not *due*, in compensation to their good works, will be made evident in two ways:—

First, because they make use of the word *meriting*, very often, in reference to such actions as have in them no condignity or worthiness adequate to the benefit which is obtained by means of those actions. Thus Augustine says: *Let no sinner despair of himself, since Paul obtained [meruit, literally merited] forgiveness; Serm. 49. de tempore.*† The worshippers of demons, are said, by Augustine, *de Civitate Dei*, lib. 5. cap. 24., to obtain [*mereri*] some temporal consolations. In these places, *mereri* signifies actually to obtain and receive something, without implying any condignity or worthiness in the receiver. I will add one other testimony, which will make it sufficiently plain, that this word *mereri*, as used by the Fathers, does not include condignity or equality on the score of justice, in reference to the benefit which we are said to *merit*. It is the common sentiment of the whole school, and of all the Papists, and is approved even by the Council of Trent, that no one can, on the ground of condignity, merit his own justification; but that every one is justified freely:‡ And yet Augustine is not afraid to say,§ that the Publican, by his humble confession, [*meruisse*] *merited*, or *obtained justification*.—But what need of testimonies in a matter so clear? Vasquez

\* See Daille's *Use of the Fathers*, book i. chap. 5.; and Buddei *Isagoge historico-theologica* ad Theologiam; p. 533. It should ever be borne in mind, when resorting to this quarter, that “the hoary *errors* of superstition are none the better for their age.”—*Poynder's Literary Extracts*.

[† In the Benedictine Edition this Sermon is reckoned clxx.; tom. v. col. 819.]

‡ The language of the Council referred to (sess. 6. cap. 8.) is this:—“*Gratis* autem justificari ideò dicamur, quia nihil eorum, quæ justificationem præcedunt, sive fides, sive opera, ipsam justificationis gratiam promeretur:” that is, “we are said to be justified freely, because nothing which precedes justification, whether faith or works, can deserve the grace thereof.”—Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*; p. 88. edit. 1839.

§ Tract 44. in Joan.



confesses\* that, with the holy Fathers, *to merit anything with God* is the same as *to obtain anything from him by a good work*. And who but must acknowledge, that we obtain many things from the Father of mercies by certain acts of ours, yet without any worthiness on the part of our works themselves?

Secondly, it is still more clear, that the aforesaid Fathers, under the term *mereri*, did not attribute any condignity, worthiness, or debt, on the ground of justice, even to the good works of the regenerate; because they expressly deny any debt of justice on the part of God, who confers the reward of eternal life; and on the part of man, who receives it, they equally deny all condignity or worthiness of works; although they occasionally dignify these works with the appellation of *merits*. That God is not a debtor to us on the score of justice, Augustine asserts: *The Lord makes himself our debtor, not by receiving, but by promising*; Enarratt. in Psal. lxxxiii., near the end; and in his Confessions, (lib. 1. cap. 4.) *Thou repayest debts, though thou owest not to any man*. Hence, also, St. Bernard: *The deservings of men are not of such a character, as that, on their account, life eternal should be owing to them as a matter of right*: Serm. 1. de annunciat. When, therefore, God bestows the reward of eternal life upon the merits of the godly, he bestows it as owing, not on the score of *justice*, but of *faithfulness*.

But this is proved still more clearly, in that the same Fathers who assign the term *merit* to good works, yet set aside entirely the term *condignity*—*worthiness*, from the same works. Athanasius, in the Life of St. Antony,† remarks, *Even if we renounce the whole world, we are yet unable to present anything as an equivalent for the celestial habitations*. Eusebius,‡ Bishop of Emesa, (Hom. 3. ad

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 11. art. 3. cap. 9.

† Some writers have doubted whether the compiling of this Life ought to be attributed to Athanasius. See Dupin, vol. ii. (English) p. 35, who thinks the objector's "reasons are not wholly convincing;" and, if any wish is excited to examine the matter more closely, Natalis Alexander *Hist. Eccles. sæc. iv.*; p. 221. vol. vii., edit. in 4to. 1787; and *Ancient Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 82, note; vol. i. p. 200.

‡ EUSEBIUS of Emesa; reckoned as a favourer of Arian views, died about A.D. 360: See Murdock's edition of *Mosheim*, vol. i. p. 332, edit. London,



Monachos,) observes: *Toil, as we may, with all the labour both of mind and body; exert, as we may, all our power in the practice of obedience; yet should we be unable to offer anything worthy, on the score of merit, of the blessings of heaven.* In short, Anselm, *de mensurat. crucis*, says: *If a man should serve God, though with the utmost fervency, for a thousand years, he would not deserve, on the plea of condignity, to live even half a day in the kingdom of heaven.* These passages may, for the present, suffice:—the few which I have quoted from the Fathers it seemed proper to give, lest the mere word *meritum*, which occurs in their writings, may be supposed to be unfavourable to us, or to support our opponents. I add this one remark (which is not unworthy of observation) that Bellarmine, and the rest of the Romanists, when they endeavour to establish a merit, without saying what is to be exactly understood thereby, thrust upon us testimonies from the Fathers even to satiety; but when it is their object to prove Popish *merit*, that is, merit of condignity, they are quite at a loss for apposite citations; and hence, contenting themselves with some frivolous and petty reasoning, abstain, wisely enough, from citing testimonies (seeing there are none to produce) from the Fathers; as is plain from Bellarmine's treatise *de Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 17.

Now, if, leaving the Fathers, we come down to the earlier Schoolmen, who were sounder in the faith, we shall find even among them, that this term *merit*, denotes merely works pleasing and acceptable to God; but that it does not include the notion, either of any condignity or intrinsic worthiness of the reward of eternal life, on the part of the works; or of any debt, properly so called, according to justice, on the part of God. William, Archbishop of Paris, in his treatise *de meritis*, p. 300, thus writes: *As for the common observation, that certain works are meritorious of life eternal, and that, by every work done from love, a man becomes deserving of eternal life; it appears by no means correct, that any man can, by the intrinsic desert or condignity of*

1841. The existing Homilies are attributed to him incorrectly, and belong to some early writer, though the learned have doubted to whose pen they should be in preference assigned: See Nat. Alexander's *Hist. Eccles.* tom. vii. p. 202, who remarks—"ut sit, Eusebii Emisseni, qui Græce scripsit, esse non possunt, quum stylus Latinum, non Græcum referat auctorem."



*any works whatever, merit eternal life.* Aquinas, likewise, although, so far as regards the word, admitting a merit of condignity, (1. 2. quæst. 114. art 3.) does, yet, in reality, deny it; since he excludes any equality, on the score of justice, as attaching to this merit. For thus he philosophises, (ibid. art. 1.): *Justice is a kind of equality; and, therefore, absolute justice obtains only among those between whom there is an absolute equality.—But in those in whom there is merely a relative, and not an absolute justice, there does not exist any absolute principle of merit.—Now it is manifest, that between God and man there is the greatest inequality:—and, therefore, there cannot be any merit on the part of man before God, except so far as the appointment of God is recognised; that is, so that a man attains from God, by his performance of good works, as a reward, that, for which God has previously imparted to him the power of performing them.* From which words, I gather, that Aquinas did not intend, even by the expression *merit of condignity*, anything more than, a work ordained by the good pleasure of God to receive a reward; without any equality of value, on the part of the action, to the reward; and without any debt of justice, on the part of God, requiring the bestowment of the reward. Hence, at the end of the article,\* in answer to the third argument, he says, *that no idea of merit can attach to our actions, unless on the pre-supposition of the Divine ordination; and that God does not, strictly speaking, make himself a debtor to us, but to his own self; inasmuch as he has laid himself under obligation to fulfil his own determination.* Durandus,† by a *meritorious act*, understands nothing more than, an act which may be ordained to receive reward; and he distinctly denies that there can, strictly speaking, exist any merit of condignity on the part of man towards God. To these may be added Scotus, Gregory, Occam, Gabriel [Biel], Alfonsus, and very many others of the better class of writers among the Romanists, who avowedly maintain that, the works of the righteous, wrought by the assistance of grace, do not, on that account, acquire any intrinsic worthiness for life eter-

\* Page 200. [256 edit. Paris, 1639.]

† Lib. 1. dist. 17. quæst. 2., et lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 3.



nal; but that, as regards this reward, it depends entirely upon the gracious acceptance and promise of God. We shall, consequently, have no dispute with the Fathers, nor with the more sound of these Romanists, as respects the mere term *merit*, (although it is far better and safer to abstain from making use of the term;) but the controversy will lie with later Papists,\* who uphold such a view of merit, as places God himself, on account of those works which they call *merits*, a debtor to men, on the ground of mere justice; and who hold that, there exists a condignity or equality between these merits of men and the reward of eternal glory.

Let us proceed, then, to consider the arguments of our opponents; who, in establishing this merit of condignity, are just as much at variance among themselves, as they differ from us. And, in the first place, we must enquire, what is to be understood as meant by *merit of condignity*? Thus, then, says Bonaventure†: *Merit, then, acquires value, ex condigno, when the proper character of merit is found there fully and perfectly, so that the work is in some degree commensurate, and adequate, to the reward.* Nor does Durandus differ from him, who thus describes this merit of condignity:‡ *It is an action by which there accrues, to him who performs it, something due from the quality of the work; that is, on the ground of an equality between the work and the reward, according to a just estimate.* And again§: *Merit, arising from condignity, strictly and properly taken, is a voluntary act, on account of which an individual can claim a reward on the score of justice; so that, if recompense is not made, he whose business it is to make it acts unjustly [in withholding it.]* With this, Cajetan coincides, who lays it down|| that merit of condignity appertains to that which is

\* We have in this, and many similar cases, a luculent instance of the little *unity* existing in the Church of Rome, upon even the most important subjects; and of the ease with which, as in legal matters, any case can be *cited* just to suit the present emergency, either for or against the real doctrines of the Tridentine Church. In fact, the *Variations* of Romanism are of a character so extensive, as in *Protestant* countries to countenance and admit the temporary dropping of any doctrine whatever, to secure a *present* purpose, excepting, N.B. *Supremacy*,—in some shape or other this anchor is never let go.—See the Count Montalembert's *Letter to the Rev. J. M. Neale*.

† Sent. lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 2.

‡ Lib. 1. dist. 17. quæst. 2.

§ Lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 2.

|| In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3.



*absolutely just*; that is, to that justice, properly so called, in which there is an equality between the thing given and the thing received. If our opponents shall be able to prove that there does exist such a commensurateness, or equality, between the works of the regenerate and the kingdom of heaven, we shall readily admit a merit arising from condignity.

But it may be, that the more modern writers do not admit of these definitions of their predecessors. Well, then, let us see what the merit of condignity is, as contended for by them. Suarez (in tertiam Thomæ, tom. 1. quæst. 2. disp. 10. sect. 6.) says, *Merit of condignity is, in its own nature, adapted to a reward; to which it bears a natural proportion.* And in section 7., he says, *The work which lays a party under obligation on the score of justice, and which bears a proportion of equality with the reward, is merit of condignity; but, if these are wanting, it will be only merit of congruity, if there be any merit at all in it.* In fine, (in disp. 41. sect. 3.) he confidently asserts that, *It is not to be denied, that our merits are truly merits, so that the works of the regenerate, proceeding from grace, have, of themselves, an intrinsic proportion, and a worth equal to the reward.* Vasquez, in 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 5., disp. 218. cap. 4., makes the distinction between merit of congruity and of condignity to be, *that between the merit of condignity and the reward claimed, there is an equality of worthiness; between the merit of congruity and the recompense made, there is not this equality; but the recompense is greater than the actual worthiness of that meritorious work.*

You perceive what merit of condignity the Jesuits are desirous to establish, namely, a merit sufficient to claim the reward of eternal glory, equal or commensurate, binding God, from a debt of justice, or at least from a debt of gratitude, to pay this reward of eternal life to those who perform such services. So far, then, they accord well enough in ascribing a merit of condignity to good works; but, when they are urged to explain whence this condignity arises, grievous are their internal squabbles about it, nor is there any fixed point in which they can agree. For the patrons themselves, even the most strenuous, of the merit of condignity, are not settled whence this condignity arises.



The groundlessness of the notion is, however, discernible hence, that any of them, with scarcely any difficulty, overthrows the opinion of the other; though not one solidly establishes his own. What Vasquez has raised up, Suarez throws down; what Suarez has built up, Vasquez overturns; and so with all the rest.\* But let us listen to their discordant opinions.

The first, that good works possess a worthiness and principle of merit for receiving life eternal; but that this merit is derived from the ordination or acceptance of God, not to any intrinsic value in the works themselves. This is the opinion of Scotus, and the Nominalists, and, among the more modern, of Andreas Vegas.† With all these, merit is regarded as a title without the thing itself; and they admit of a merit, merely in their style of speaking, not in reality.

The second, that the principle of the merit of condignity consists in two things, namely, the intrinsic worthiness of the work, and the superadded promise of God; so that the work, as performed by the agent, has a sufficient proportion and value in regard to the reward; yet requires the promise of God to superinduce that obligation, on the score of justice, from which the reward becomes due to it. Thus Suarez, in 3. Thomæ, tom. 1. quæst. 19. art. 3. disp. 39. So Bellarmine, *de Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 17.

The third opinion, is that of those who say that our works are meritorious from the intrinsic value which they derive from grace, from the promise of God, and from the merits of Christ, wherewith they are, as it were, adorned and sprinkled. Gregory of Valentia seems to embrace this opinion;‡ and to this that trite saying of the Romanists has reference, that

\* The *variations* of the Church of Rome are endless—yet *unity* is one of the choice benefits, hung out to induce aliens to join her company! *Holden*, who was put forward at the examination before Houses of Parliament in 1825, 6, as a good Catholic and accepted author, wrote his book to allay the enormous rows in his Church, if so be he might—every man calling, he says, (*Fidei Analysis* mon. p. xiv.) his adversary a heretic! glorious unity in the Infallible Church! And the chief pastor himself, entitled Benedict XIV., had the utmost trouble to keep the flock in any order, alluding in his *Constitutio* (*Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, Romæ 1786, p. xxxv.) to the Catholics being at drawn swords one with another, and tearing one another's eyes out—Catholicis digladiantibus et mutuo se lacerantibus!

† See Translator's *Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. ii. p. 546.

‡ De div. gratia, part. 3. cap. 6.



our works, so far as they are sprinkled with the blood of Christ, are deserving of life eternal. In this opinion Tapper,\* Lindanus, Hosius, coincided; with others, whose names are recited by Vasquez, in 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3., disp. 214. cap. 2.

The fourth opinion totally sets aside the three others, and confidently determines that the value and worthiness for obtaining life eternal is to be ascribed to works done by grace, irrespective of any stipulation or favour on the part of God; and, consequently, that neither the merits of Christ, nor the promise of God, nor any other contract or favour, have any share, or form any ground of merit. This opinion Vasquez defended most resolutely, in 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 214. cap. 4. In favour of this opinion, Cajetan, also Dominic à Soto, Capreolus, Clichtoveus, and some others are usually alleged.†

So manifestly discordant are the notions of Papists! to all of which we shall oppose the opinions of Protestants, as the one and alone true doctrine.

\* RUARDUS TAPPER, of *Enchuysen*, in *Holland*, for 39 years Chancellor of the University of Louvain. He was sent by an express order to the Council of Trent, and at his return, being called by Philip II. to Brussels upon very important matters, he died there, March 2, 1559, aged 71.—Dupin's *Ecclesiast. Hist.* of the xvi. Cent. book v. p. 27.

† Vide Bellarm. *de Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 17.

CAPREOLUS (JOHN) was a French Dominican Monk, of Languedoc, Professor of Theology at Toulouse; flourished A.D. 1415, and is said to have attended the Council of Basil. He wrote Commentaries on Lombard's *Four Books of Sentences*; published at Venice 1484, 1514, 1583, fol.—Soame's *Mosheim*.

CLICTOVÆUS—Jodocus Clichtovæus, [Jose Cliquedowe] born at Nieuport, in Flanders,—one of the earliest opponents of Luther—was a leading man in the Council of Sens in 1528; and died at Chartres in 1543. He composed many books, of which his *Anti-Luther* is one of the principal, at Paris, in 1524: See more in Dupin's *Ecclesiast. Hist.* Cent. xvi. book 3. pp. 430—33; and Fretag's *Apparatus Literarius*; Lipsiæ, 1752, tom i. p. 530.

---

The following passage, from an eminent Lutheran Divine, on the points of discussion in the preceding chapter, may not be unacceptable to the learned reader.

Cæterum ut adversariorum quæ sit de meritis opinio, manifestus adpareat, primum ex Scholasticis, deinde ex Scriptoribus Pontificiis quædam huc referemus. Meriti nomine utuntur alias de ipsis bonis operibus, alias de operum præmiis. Meritum pro operibus acceptum definit Summa Angelici, tit. de merito *quod sit actio quæ fit ut ei, qui agit, sit justum aliquid dari*. Tale meritum plerique statuunt duplex; *de congruo et condigno*. Sed Bonaventura i. sent.



## CHAPTER LIV.

## THE OPINION OF OUR THEOLOGIAN SET FORTH.

LET us proceed now to shew what the opinion of our Divines is : in the setting forth of which, in the first place, observe, that although our Divines now abstain from the use of the word *merit*, which the Fathers frequently employ ; yet they do it, not because their sentiments differ from those of the Fathers, but lest they should be assenting to Papists, who seize upon that term ; and though all antiquity cry out against them, forcibly distort it to a meaning both pernicious and heretical. For what the Fathers understood under the term *merit*, namely, the work of a believer and regenerate person, endued with supernatural goodness, pleasing and acceptable to God in a supernatural order, and destined to receive the gracious rewards, as well of this life as of that

dist. 419. 1 ; et iii. sent. dist. 4. art. 2. 9. 2. triplex agnoscit. Primum est *meritum congrui*, quando quis ex actione non habet debitum recipiendi, sed tamen illi cui fit, decet dare : sic ut cum homo adteritur de peccato suo, licet non mereatur gratiam tamen convenit Deo, ut facienti, quod in se est, ex sua bonitate det. Secundum est *meritum digni*, quando justus rogat pro aliqua persona, quæ est in peccato, dignum quippe est, quod justus exaudiatur. Tertium est *meritum condigni*, quando agens habet debitum recipiendi ; vel brevius : *Meritum congrui* est, quando peccator facit. quid in se est et pro se. *Meritum digni*, quando justus operatur pro alio. *Meritum condigni*, quando justus operatur pro seipso. Reliqui vero *meritum digni* referant ad *meritum congrui*, sic enim scribit Biel ii. sent. dist. 27, 9, 11, art. 3. *Nemo potest aliis directe beatitudinem mereri, hæc enim respondet propriis operibus ; potest tamen alteri mereri primam gratiam de congruo.* Ex quo adparet, quænam inter *meritum de congruo*, et *meritum de condigno* differentia ab illis constituatur : illud est opus bonum ante gratiam ; hoc vero est opus bonum consequens gratiam ; illud procedit ex virtute liberi arbitrii ; hoc vero ex vi notionis divinæ : illud valet ad impetrandam primam gratiam ; hoc vero ad augmentum gratiæ et justitiæ, adeoque ipsam vitam eternam : illud nititur liberalitate acceptantis ; hoc vero in debito præmiantis, utroque vero commune esse statuitur, quod sit actus libere elicited, quod ad retributionem præmii acceptetur, et quod inter laborem et præmium quædam sit æqualitas. Quando autem quæritur, an vitam æternam quis possit mereri de *congruo* vel de *condigno*, quidam modestiores respondent *de congruo* ; plerique vero *de condigno* vitam æternam nos promereri posse respondent.—The statement is then supported from Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Biel, &c.—*Gerhardi Loci Theologici* xviii. cap. 8. ; tom. viii. pp. 121, 2, edit. Tubingæ, 1768.



which is to come, from the promise of a God most bountiful ; this, all our Divines have always entirely conceded : as has been shewn, when treating professedly of the works really good. We are not, then, opposing the mere term *merit*, which was formerly in common use among the Fathers, in a harmless sense ; but the proud and false opinion of a merit of condignity, introduced of late into the Church of God by the Romanists. Hear the ingenuous confession of our Divines respecting this matter. Thus, then, Bucer speaks :<sup>\*</sup> *The only point in dispute in the question concerning the reward of good works, is, whether there is any merit in the good works of the regenerate, intrinsically deserving the reward which God bestows upon them ; for that life eternal is granted to believers for well doing, and by way of a crown, and of reward, we have always admitted.* Chemnitz expresses just the same sentiment in Examen. Conc. Tridentini :<sup>†</sup> *Good works in the reconciled are pleasing to God for the sake of the Mediator, and receive rewards, bodily and spiritual, as well in this life as after : all owing, however, to the free promise of God ; not because He has become indebted to us on account of the perfection and worth of our works. And taken in this sense, our Divines make no difficulty in using the word merit, as it has been employed by the Fathers. Lastly, Calvin himself does not deny a recompence, but worthiness in the works of believers. I admit (says he<sup>‡</sup>) of a recompence to the works of believers, which the Lord has promised in his law to those who practise righteousness and holiness. But in this recompence, the cause which procures favour for the works is always to be considered. The first is, that God embraces his servants in Christ, and reconciles them to himself, through the medium of faith alone, without the assistance of works. The second is, that by his paternal benignity, he so far honours the works, as to hold them in some estimation. The third, that he accepts even these with indulgence, not imputing their imperfection.*

The point in debate, therefore, is not whether the reward of eternal life is given to good works ; but, whether it is given

<sup>\*</sup> Bucer. in Colloq. Ratisb. pag. 567, &c.

<sup>†</sup> Page 185. in 4. quæst. *de bonis operibus*. [§. i. p. 261. edit. Francof. 1707.]

<sup>‡</sup> Instit. lib. 3. cap. 17. sect. 3.



on account of that proportion and equality which the works themselves possess, answerable to so great a reward; or, whether it is owing to the liberality of God, who has assigned to the works of believers a reward far more excellent than the works themselves; and also from the mercy of God, who will not requite their evil works with the punishment of death eternal; and, in short, from the faithfulness of God, who, to those who believe, repent, and walk in newness of life, according to their measure of grace, has promised, for the sake of the Mediator, and freely bestows life eternal in the appointed time.

We attribute this recompence of life eternal, as springing from the liberality of God so decreeing it, to the mercy of God remitting the daily sins of believers; and, in short, to the faithfulness of God, who confers the remuneration on account of the merits of Christ, rewarding the servants of Christ, who are zealous of good works, according to promise, beyond the merit and worthiness of their doings; the Papists refer it to the intrinsic goodness itself, and the worthiness of the works, to which they assert that such a reward is due. Against them, therefore, we shall lay down these two propositions; and, in establishing them, all the aforesaid opinions of the Papists will come to the ground.

1.—That the good works of the regenerate, flowing from the grace of the Holy Spirit, are not meritorious of eternal life *ex condigno*, neither do they make this reward for works to be due on the score of just dealing.

This proposition we direct against those who think that so great a degree of worthiness accrues to good works from the grace of the sanctifying Spirit, that thence they derive a value fully equivalent to the crown.

2.—The good works of the regenerate, which, considered in themselves, are not meritoriously worthy of life eternal, cannot, from any covenant or promise of God, or from any application of the blood of Christ, be thus made worthy on the plea of condignity, and commensurate, in mere justice, to that reward.

This proposition is opposed to the opinion of such as imagine that from an engagement, or the promise of God, good works become meritorious *ex condigno*, and that the reward of eternal life is due to them for justice sake; although,



viewed apart from any such agreement, they would neither be worthy, nor would the reward be due to them on the ground of just dealing.

But let us come to the arguments for the first proposition, which may be brought under four heads. The first class, derived from the condition of the person working, the second, from the quality of the work, the third, from a consideration of the person recompensing, the last, from a consideration of the reward itself; will shew, and clearly prove, that the very works themselves of the regenerate are not meritorious of life eternal on the plea of condignity; and that God is not under any obligation to bestow life eternal, in return for such works, on those who perform them, either on the ground of *justice*, as Bellarmine and Suarez will have it, or, on the ground of *gratitude*, according to the philosophising notions of Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 213. cap. 5.

## CHAPTER LV.

### ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE MERIT OF CONDIGNITY, DERIVED FROM THE CONDITION OF THE AGENT.

WE do not deny that the good works of believers are destined by God to obtain the reward of life eternal; but this we utterly deny—that they are commensurate, as it were, and on the claim of condignity, adequate to this infinite reward; and, that the reward itself is due for the sake of these works, and on the plea of justice, to those who perform them. Our opinion is proved, *first*, from the condition of the agent, by these arguments:—

1.—All they who are presumed to merit life eternal on the principle of condignity, and to bind God to bestow this reward upon them from justice or gratitude, are his servants;\* and are bound, by this title, to services and duties

\* The word *servants* is in this argument employed in the sense of the Latin *servus*, and the Greek *δούλος*, as denoting one under the absolute power and authority of his master; a slave or bondsman.—See *Davenant on Colossians*, iii. 22., or Allport's Translation, vol. ii. p. 197.



both greater and more numerous than they either do or can perform. Now, when a servant does merely those things to which he is absolutely bound, he does not make his master a debtor to him on the principle of justice, neither can he claim to himself, on the principle of condignity, any reward whatsoever.

That we are the servants of God is beyond dispute. Let us, therefore, now examine whether God bestows on his servants the reward of eternal life, on the principle of justice, for the sake of the merits of their works; or, of mere favour and faithfulness to his promises for the sake of the Mediator. Christ himself confirms our opinion in Luke xvii. 7., &c. *Which of you having a servant ploughing, &c.—Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. So, likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things that were commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do.* Hence, we plainly gather, that a servant who is absolutely appropriated and subject to any master, cannot require the reward of his labour from him, as on the score of *justice* due to him; nay, nor on the score of *gratitude*; because, it is neither customary for a master to return, nor for a servant to expect, thanks for his labour. For whatsoever a servant has, or is, is the entire property of his master; and whatsoever he acquires, he acquires for his master: hence, man cannot, by any performance whatever, raise a claim of debt on the justice of God, he being his absolute Lord. The Philosopher acknowledges this, Ethic. 5. cap. 6. *A man cannot, strictly speaking, commit injustice against that which is his own.* And Politic. 1. cap. 4. *A servant is not merely a servant to his master, but is even altogether his property.* Hence, Medina, the Papal writer,\* admits that, *If God should cast all the blessed down from glory he would not inflict an act of injustice on any one; and,*

\* BARTHOLOMÆUS DE MEDINA, born in old Castile, was a member of the Dominican Order. He published a Commentary on the 1. 2. of Aquinas, at Salamanca, 1577, of which there are also several subsequent editions; he died in 1580. Antonio Bibliotheca Hispania nova; tom. i. p. 198., edit. Matriti 1783; and Scriptores Ord. Prædicatt. tom. 2. p. 256. He is considered by some writers as the author or inventor of Probabilism: See Pascal's *Provincial Letters*, Lond. 1816, p. 80.



*If he should not confer reward on any man, yet he could not be said to be unjust: in 1. 2. quæst. 114 art. 3.*

But let us attend to what our opponents say in reply to this argument. Thus Aquinas speaks: \* *In proportion as a man, of his own good will, does what he ought, he merits with God; otherwise, to pay a debt would not be meritorious.* Such an answer as this is of no avail. For man, as the servant of God, owes him not only the external works of obedience, but internal obedience also, and a ready willingness in his obedience. Therefore, even though he should choose to be rebellious or indolent, he would not be able to withhold the performance of the commands of God, which he is under obligation to perform; yet, when he does those things willingly, he does not thereby constitute God his debtor, but merely repays what he owes to God. Vasquez, convinced by this argument, allows† that the servants of God, in paying the obedience due to him, cannot merit any thing with him on the score of justice: but says, *that in performing the debt of service, although not in point of justice, yet in respect of honour, they do merit a reward; namely, their measure of glory and commendation, in proportion to the virtue of the works.* But this defence does not sustain the claim of merit on the score of *condignity*, which is established by Papists; since, to deserve commendation is an entirely distinct thing from deserving life eternal, and that, from a sense of condignity, and an equalising of the reward to the work; as our opponents are accustomed to speak. There is, consequently, no necessary connexion between a servant's performing his duty, and thereby meriting commendation; and his meriting the enjoyment of the everlasting kingdom on the plea of condignity.

2.—They who are the adopted children of God, and freely chosen and set apart in Christ for eternal life, do not attain life eternal from the worthiness of their works, but from the grace and mercy of him who elects and adopts them. But such are all they who either have attained, or shall hereafter attain life eternal: Consequently, they all attain it through grace, not from the meritoriousness of their works. That the elect alone, and the adopted in Christ, gain eternal life

\* In 1. 2. qu. 114. art 1. resp. ad primum.

† In 1. 2. qu. 114. disp. 213. cap. 8.



is beyond dispute. The Scripture everywhere testifies it. John viii. 35. *The servant abideth not in the house for ever, but the son abideth ever.* And Rom. viii. 17. *If children, then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ.* And Galat. iv. 7. *Thou art no more a servant, but a son; but if a son, then an heir of God through Christ.* Now the Papists themselves willingly admit, that unless gratuitous adoption have preceded, human works neither can nor do avail anything towards the attainment of life eternal. Thus Bellarmine:\* *He who is a servant only, could not obtain eternal life by any merits; for the inheritance is not the reward given to servants, but the portion of sons.* In like manner Vasquez also:† *It is in the very act of the sanctification and adoption of a man, that the good works of the regenerate receive a worthiness of eternal life, which, without the adoption and sanctification of the doer, they could not possess.* And, it is the common opinion of the Romanists, that the grace of sonship imparts to works all that proportionateness and worthiness which they possess for receiving the reward of eternal life. Observe, then, that this cannot be denied by our opponents—that works have no worthiness so as to lay claim to a heavenly recompence, except those which are performed by the children of God; who, before they work, have the right gratuitously bestowed for receiving the same reward.

But this privilege of adoption being admitted, their inference is,—*They who perform good works have been already adopted among the children; therefore, all their works which flow from this grace of adoption, are, on the claim of condignity, meritorious of life eternal.* We, on the contrary, conclude, that *the doers are already adopted among the children, and mercifully accepted unto life eternal; their works, therefore, do not merit for them, ex condigno, this life eternal.* For, first, all merit has reference to something not yet in possession or obtained;‡ but that very right to life eternal comes into possession, and is obtained, in the act of adoption itself. We do not merit it, then, by subsequent works, as *causes*, but we proceed to the possession of it as by the *appointed roads*. This is what Bernard intimated, when he wrote,§ *Good works are the way to the kingdom,*

\* De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 12.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 214. cap. 13.

‡ Cajet. opusc. tom. 3. tract 11. cap. 12.

§ De grat. et lib. arbit.



*not the cause of reigning*; as Christ himself also did, when he said, *Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world: For I was an hungred, &c.* Where he makes good works the means by which the children enter upon the inheritance destined and prepared for them, by the gracious benevolence of their Father, before the world was. Secondly, adoption itself, when considered as an act of Divine love, embracing us in Christ, is a work originating in pure mercy; in this proceeding of God, then, there does not exist any merit on man's part, neither when viewed as to the character of the heavenly Parent, which it stamps on man, that is, habitual holiness; for (according to the Schoolmen themselves) we do not merit by the reception of habits, but by the practice of good deeds. Thirdly, not even by the works themselves, so far as they flow from this grace of adoption, do we claim life eternal as deserved by merit. Vasquez, indeed, asserts,\* that *all the works of a child and a friend, done in obedience to God, are worthy of the remuneration of a son and a friend; and, that the suitable remuneration of a child, on the part of God, is life eternal.* But, on the other hand, the grace which is infused into the children of God, is itself a created quality, and, in consequence of the recipient of it being corrupted through sin, it is always imperfect in us; actions, therefore, flowing from the grace of adoption, do not, on the ground of condignity, deserve that most perfect reward. Besides, it is ridiculous to infer the condign worthiness of the work from the state of sonship. For, if the adopted son of an earthly king should pick up a straw from the ground, in obedience to his Father's command, the grace of adoption would not confer, in consequence of that act, a meritorious claim to the kingdom. Yet *all the obedience which we yield to God is incomparably less worthy of eternal reward, than the picking up of a straw is worthy of any castle or earthly kingdom*; as the Bishop of Paris has truly stated.†

To conclude this argument: Children of God, so far as they are so, have a right to the kingdom of God, but they have no meritorious right; because their adoption among

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 114., disp. 217. cap. 7.

† De Meritis.



the children is owing to pure mercy. The works of children, so far as they are so, find acceptance unto life eternal, but they do not possess worthiness; because, between them and the reward given, there is the greatest disproportion observable, notwithstanding their sonship, or the grace infused into them as sons: about which disproportion more shall be said hereafter.

3.—The freely adopted sons of God merit nothing on the score of justice with God, *ex condigno*; because the title of sonship is rather an impediment, than any assistance, to preferring a claim on the score of justice. For there cannot be justice, in the strict sense of the word, on the part of a son towards his father, because he is the property of his father;\* as also, because no one can render to his father an equivalent for benefits received, much less place him under an obligation of justice to bestow new ones. And, although a son might claim rewards from an earthly parent on the score of justice, yet he cannot do so with his heavenly Father: since a son, who is no longer under his Father's control, may have some independent property of his own, by means of which he can render his father some favour; but the sons of God possess no good which they can properly call their own. The Fathers of Trent seem to admit this, when they say,† that *eternal life is to be set before those who do good works, as a favour, mercifully promised to the children of God, through Christ; and, as a reward, to be faithfully rendered to their merits, according to the Divine engagement.*‡ Here they acknowledge the mercy of him who makes the promise, and his faithfulness in making it good; but that there is any worthiness of merits, for receiving what they term the wages (*mercedem*), they do not venture to affirm, even as respects the very works of the children themselves.

\* Vide Aristot. *Ethic.* lib. 8. cap. ult.

† Sess. 6. cap. ult.

‡ We have in this passage, from the Decrees of the Council of Trent, an instance of the approach to Protestant sentiment; which the circumstances of the times, the debates of the Fathers themselves, and a desire to conciliate parties, tended to bring about—though at the expense, it should be observed, of the Church of Rome's more consistent teaching. It should be always borne in mind, that the Trent Canons and Decrees give a *polished* view of Roman Catholicism.—See Cramp's *Text-Book of Popery*, pp. 93, 4, edit. 1841.



4.—The grace itself which is infused into the adopted, lays no obligation upon God on the principle of justice, to give them glory, as though having any merit of condignity; much less do good works therefore, which are the fruits of grace, carry any such obligation. The antecedent is proved, because, although by means of one gift the recipient may be brought into a fit state and disposition to receive another, yet, a donor cannot, by one gift, be laid under obligation to confer another on any plea of justice, but only on the ground of faithfulness, if any promise has been given. The consequent is established by the same train of reasoning. For, as we receive the habit of grace, God bestowing it upon us; so, also, we bring the act or fruit of grace to maturity, the same God calling it forth by his own Spirit. Whether, therefore, the habit of grace be regarded, or the acts flowing from it, *we* are under obligation to God in respect of the same, not God to us. Hence, the Scriptures not only attribute it to the free grace of God, that we are adopted, and are rendered capable of bringing forth good works; but moreover, that we make any advance in well-doing; and that, walking therein, we attain unto life eternal. Rom. vi. 23; *The gift of God is eternal life.* Ephes. ii. 8; *By grace are ye saved, through faith.* Now, to receive life eternal as a free gift, and to merit it on the plea of condignity, are propositions diametrically opposed to each other.

The Papists are accustomed to answer that life eternal is attributed to Divine grace, because it is procured by the merit of good works, which owe their origin to grace; not because it is not due to those works on the claim of condignity. But the force of the argument is not turned aside by such an answer. For these good works not only owe their origin to the gratuitous gift of grace infused, but are, separately considered, new gifts of God, *concurring and bestowing particular grace for each distinct act*; as is laid down by the Council at Orange. Moreover, when life eternal is in the Scripture attributed to Divine grace, it is not meant to denote that habitual grace which constitutes the principle of all good works; but that grace, which consists in forgiveness of sins, and acceptance unto life in Christ the Mediator; which grace excludes even the works



of the regenerate from being any cause of salvation. To explain, therefore, such passages as attribute eternal life to grace, as meaning by that expression, that it is to be attributed to those works which spring from grace, is by no means a correct interpretation. For what is conceded to grace, is denied to the works of believers themselves in the same passages. As, therefore, habitual grace itself is a *disposition*, not a *merit*, as regards future glorification; so the works of grace, wrought by the children of God, are *means*, not *merits*; *pre-requisites*, not *causes*, of the reward received. Thus Peter de Alliaco:\* *A meritorious action is termed a cause, with respect to reward, improperly; because it is not by its own excellence, nor from the nature of the thing, but from the mere will of another, namely, God, that a reward is the consequence of such an act.*

5.—A sinner cannot merit the kingdom of heaven on the plea of condignity or actual worthiness; but even the most excellent of those who are sojourners on earth are sinners, while they bear about this corruptible flesh: consequently, they do not deserve celestial glory on the plea of condignity. That the minor proposition is placed beyond all risk of being

\* Pet. Alliac. in 4. quæst. 1.—[PETER DE AILLY, or DE ALLIACO, was born of slender parentage, at Compeigno, on the *Oise*, A.D. 1350. After a good previous education, he was admitted a Bursar in the College of Navarre, Paris, 1372; began to lecture on the sentences, and to preach in public, in 1375; was created D.D. in 1380, and head of his College in 1384; pleaded the cause of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, before the Pope at Avignon, in 1387; became Chancellor of the University, and Confessor to the King, in 1389; Treasurer of the Royal Chapel, and Royal Envoy to the Pope, in 1394; was appointed Bishop of La Puy in 1395, and of Cambray, in 1396; attended the Council of Pisa in 1409; was made Cardinal in 1411, and Papal Legate to Germany, in 1414; at the close of which year he repaired to the Council of Constance, presided in the 3rd Session, and was very active during the three years of the sitting of that Council, and often preached in it to the Fathers. He died at Cambray, A.D. 1425. He was called *the Eagle of France*, and *the Maul of Errorists*. He was of the class of Theologians denominated Nominalists, and out of his school came *John Gerson*, *Nicholas Clemangis*, and *Giles of Champs*; the most celebrated Theologians of this period. His writings were very voluminous; publishing many works during his life, and leaving many in M.S., which are enumerated by Dupin; but his most considerable work, says that historian, is his *Treatise of the Reformation of the Church*; the contents of which, as recited by Dupin, exhibit many curious items and heads of discussion. He was strenuous for condemning John Huss, and also for restraining the power of the Popes.—See Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. ii. p. 687; Dupin, vol. xiii. p. 59: also, Oudin *Comment. de Scripp. Eccles.* tom. iii. col. 2293, and L'Enfant's *Council of Constance*, vol. 1.



disputed, no one can doubt, unless he who doubts of the truth of Scripture; Thus, in Job. xv. 14:—

*What is man that he should be clean?*

*And he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?*

And Psal. cxliii. 2:—

*Enter not into judgment with thy servant;*

*For in thy sight shall no man living be justified.*

Hence, St. Jerome, *advers. Pelag. ad Ctesiph.* remarks: *They who seem holy to men, are by no means holy in the view and knowledge of God. For man looks on the outward appearance, God into the heart. But if in the sight of God no one is perfectly righteous, how should those be abashed who say, that man can live without sin if he will?* It is clear, then, that every regenerate person continues a sinner, whether we regard the remains of inbred corruption, or his actual transgressions.

Now let us consider the major proposition, namely, whether man, who from the circumstance of his nature being corrupted is constantly offending, can put in a claim by the condignity of works to the kingdom of glory? To this, is, in the first place, opposed the fact, that he deserves exclusion on the ground of those internal stains by which the soul of every regenerate person is defiled; which stands in contradictory opposition to any meritorious claim of glorification. For, to deserve exclusion from heaven, and glorification in heaven, cannot co-exist in the same subject. But every believing soul, inasmuch as it is stained by sin, deserves, by the strict rule of justice, to be excluded from heaven. For *nothing that is defiled by sin shall enter into that holy city of God*; Revel. xxi. 27. Therefore, that any such soul is appointed to the enjoyment of the heavenly kingdom, is owing to Divine mercy: that at length all its defilements are washed away, in order to its being made meet for entering into that city, is also a work of Divine mercy and power, not of human merit. Hence, Burgensis,\* in his additions to

\* PAUL OF BURGOS was a convert from Judaism, by name Solomon de Levi. He was a native of Burgos, and is said to have embraced Christianity from reading the works of Thomas Aquinas. At his baptism he took the name of Paulus de Sancta Maria, or Paul of Burgos. After the death of his wife he embraced the Ecclesiastical state, and besides being Preceptor to John II.,



Lyra, has admirably said, on Psal. xxxv., *Mercy shines pre-eminently resplendent in heaven, where the blessed obtain fully the mercy of God; for no man can merit the glories of heaven on the ground of actual worthiness, or condignity, according to the general law of God.*†

But to dwell no longer on habitual and inherent defilements, which are an obstacle to any merit arising from condignity, let us come to actual sins; whence man, strictly speaking, acquires the name of *sinner*. It is clear, then, that those who never perform all the good things which they ought, and commit many evil things which they ought not; and by whom, even the good deeds which they do, are not done as they ought to be done, cannot claim for themselves the glory of heaven on the ground of any merit of worthiness. But all who come under the name of *sinner*s, are deficient in all these things. Since, then, the regenerate themselves are still *sinner*s, they have no power or competency to acquire eternal glory on the ground of condignity. Hence that saying of the Psalmist, (ciii. 4.) which is continually brought forward by Augustine,

*Who crowneth thee with loving kindness and tender mercies;*

and that, also, of the Apostle James, ii. 13.,

*He shall have judgment without mercy, who hath shewed no mercy.*

From which it is plain, that the crown itself is placed upon the heads of believers, not because of the worthiness of their merits, but from the mercy of God; who is propitious to sinners, notwithstanding their demerits, for the sake of the Mediator. For, they who obtain eternal life, only through their many demerits being freely and mercifully forgiven, cannot boast that they obtained it from any worthiness arising from their merits; since forgiveness, which relies on mercy, is incompatible with the merit of condignity, which relies on justice.

King of Castile, was successively Archdeacon of Trevigno, Bishop of Carthage, and then of Burgos, where he died, August 29, 1445, aged 82. He wrote, 1. *Scrutinium Scripturarum*; 2. *Additiones ad Postillam Magistri Nicolai de Lyra super Biblias*, generally printed with the *Postils of De Lyra*. Townley's *Illustrations*, vol. ii.

† The reference here to Psal. xxxv., is made according to the Septuagint and Vulgate: with us, as following the Hebrew, it would have been Ps. xxxvi. 5.



The answer which the Papists make to this, is, that the celestial crown is attributed to mercy, not because the regenerate are not deserving of it on the plea of condignity; but, because these merits owe their being to the mercy of God going before. But this interpretation is contradicted by the passages of Scripture already cited; which are evidently spoken in relation to the mercy of God, which is bestowed on believers at the very time of conferring the crown; not to that mercy which imparted grace to them, that they might be enabled to live faithfully and godly. Augustine, when commenting on those words of Psal. ciii., *Who crowneth thee with mercy and loving kindness*,\* is also opposed to this opinion.

And thus you perceive that the doctrine of merit of condignity is shattered and overthrown, by arguments drawn from the very condition of the agent; (1.) because he is the servant of God, and is therefore bound under obligation, to discharge all those duties lying within his power; (2.) because he is a child of God, mercifully adopted, and on this account is destined to glory in heaven, without any reference to merit of condignity; lastly, because he is a sinner, and therefore is in himself, and in consequence of his present condition, always standing in need of mercy, and unworthy of glory.

---

[After the study of such a chapter as this, how appropriate the acknowledgment, and how suitable the prayer of our Church (Thirteenth Sunday after Trinity; and first Sunday after the Epiphany). May writer and reader make the one, and employ each in sincerity, and with becoming fervour !

*Almighty and merciful God, of whose only gift it cometh, that thy faithful people do unto thee true and laudable service ;—grant that they may both perceive and know what things they ought to do, and also, may have grace and power faithfully to fulfil the same, through Jesus Christ, our Lord, Amen.]*

\* Vide lib. de spirit. et lit. cap. 32.



## CHAPTER LVI.

## ARGUMENTS FROM THE QUALITY OF THE WORKS.

FROM considering the condition of the agent, let us pass on to that of the works themselves; for even from this, also, it will be evident that no works are, on the ground of condignity or intrinsic value, meritorious of life eternal. Our first argument shall be thus stated:—

1.—Works which are by actual worthiness meritorious of life eternal, have an equality or proportionateness to such a reward; as a fair price has to the thing purchased. But no works of the regenerate have any such equality or proportionateness, in relation to the glory of heaven; they are not, therefore, meritorious of so great a reward on the plea of condignity.

The Papists acknowledge the truth of the major proposition. For Aquinas admits,\* *that there is not any merit, strictly speaking, where there is not an absolute equality.* And Cajetan:† *The establishment of a claim to merit, and the payment of reward, are acts answering the one to the other, on the principle of an equality between the one and the other.* Hence, Altissiodorensis;‡ *Merit has the same reference to reward, as the price to the thing purchased.* The same sentiment is maintained by the Jesuits and modern Papists. Thus Suarez says,§ *So far as God, in repaying this debt of life eternal, maintains an equality of one thing to the other, it takes the form of commutative justice.* A little after: *God confers upon each man a reward equal, according to arithmetical proportion, and thence results, in all, a geometrical proportion.* Vasquez agrees in this, and says, *that heaven is held out to us for purchase, inasmuch, as it may be obtained by suitable*

\* 1. 2. quæst. 114.

† Lib. 3. tract. 12.

‡ Ibid.

§ In 3. Thomæ, tom. 1. quæst. 1. art. 2. disp. 4. sect. 5.



*merits, as with a price answerable to its value.\** In a matter so little doubtful, however, more testimonies will not be necessary, especially when common sense points out that there is no worthiness in the work comparable to the reward; in a case where the worth and value of the work sinks far below the worth and value of the reward. Let us pass, then, to the minor proposition.

Scripture affirms that the works are not worthy of the reward. *The sufferings of this life are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall follow; Rom. viii. 18.* But the sufferings of the saints, endured for Christ's sake, are their best and most holy actions. Bellarmine's answer, is,† that they are not worthy as to the substance of the works, but carry a worthiness on account of the root of love or of grace whence they proceed. On the other hand, we argue, that, although the gift of grace or of love, according to the appointment of God, prepares or adapts for glory; yet, it is quite a mistake to conclude hence, that each particular work, which flows from grace, possesses an actual worthiness or condignity for that glory. For they who possess grace, possess, likewise, innate evil concupiscence: in their works, consequently, it is not the mere power of grace which alone is in exercise; there is intermixed with it, also, the very poison of concupiscence. The consequence is, that in all our works there is a falling short and degenerating more or less from the excellency of this heavenly root, owing to their being sprinkled, as it were, with the bitter juice of another vitiated root. Moreover, the root itself of good works, namely, infused grace or love, seeing that it is planted in a heart not yet wholly renewed and thoroughly purged, always remains languid and imperfect. Considered therefore, in itself, it has only a *pre-appointment*; not a *condignity* for glory. Valentia has shewn himself somewhat more modest than other Jesuits in his treatment of this subject. I conclude this first argument, then, with a testimony from him:‡—*Where the subject of discussion is the acquisition for deserving of eternal life, it is appropriate to speak of distributive justice only, and not of commu-*

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3. disp. 215 cap. 2.

† De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 3.

‡ Tract. de Divin. grat. part. 4. cap. 6.



tative justice, which consists of mutual equality.\* For eternal blessedness will surpass in perfection and value all works whatsoever, even though they proceed from grace. If blessedness surpasses in value even the works which flow from grace, then those works are not meritoriously worthy of the blessedness; for to be surpassed in worth by anything, and to be worthy of the same, are contradictories; no less than to be conquered by, and to overcome the same individual.

2.—Works, which so far as they are good, are not our own, but the mere gifts of God himself; so far as they are our own, are impure and spotted with stains; do not constitute us deserving of life eternal *ex condigno*; nor lay any obligation upon God, as though he were bound to confer a reward, either on the ground of *justice*, as is the common opinion of Papists; or, of *gratitude*, according to the philosophising notions of Vasquez. Yet such is the nature and condition of all good works which are called *merits*. I confirm the major statement from that saying of the Apostle, Rom. xi. 35; *Who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again?* as though he would say—God cannot be bound to recompense, unless he has first received from us some good thing which was our own. To illustrate the case by a simile:—If a king should present an indigent person with a thousand pounds, with the intention, on their being returned back to himself, of presenting him, in addition, with a city and lands of the value of one hundred thousand pounds—who but must recognise in the whole proceeding, on the king's part, mercy and bountifulness; and that, on the poor man's side, there exists no ground or claim on the score of justice; especially if the poor man has, by any fault of his own, deteriorated that money, which when he received it, was pure and genuine? The mercy of the king is manifest in this proceeding in three ways: first, in the free gift of a thousand pounds; secondly, in that he determines to make a city and lands attainable at so low a price; and lastly, in that he does not reject and refuse the coin, though somewhat deteriorated. On the part of this poor man, however, there

\* The reader, if he thinks good, may consult *Aristotle's Ethics*, lib. 5. capp. 3. 4.



is no ground of merit on the score of condignity discernible. It could not be from his being provided with a thousand pounds at the commencement; for, to accept a free gift from another, better accords with the character of a *mendicant*, than of one putting forwards his *merits*; not on the ground of his receiving something a hundred-fold greater and better, after returning to the king what he had previously been presented with; for where there is not a mutual equality, there is not a condignity of merit between the work offered and the reward returned; where, moreover, the thing itself which is offered is not the property of the person offering, but his to whom it is offered; there he is not, so far as justice is concerned, bound to any new recompence. From these considerations, the truth of the major proposition seems conspicuously evident: we now turn to the minor.

In the first place, then, I assert, that what are called *merits* are not our own, so far as they are good, but are the mere gifts of God; as the Apostle shews, 1 Cor. iv. 7. *What hast thou which thou hast not received?* From which it is evident that all our good things are the gift of God. And Philip. ii. 13. *It is God who worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.* None then, not even the least portion of goodness which can be called our own, is to be found in any work of ours. Hence Augustine said,\* *God does not crown thy merits, as though they were thy merits, but as being his own gifts.* Nor can the Schoolmen deny this, if they will be consistent with themselves. For a good work is said to be ours on this principle, that, when acted upon by God, we also act by our own free-will. But that works, so far as they spring from our will, carry not in them a worthiness so as to claim reward, is acknowledged by the School. So says Aquinas:† *A work is not meritorious as proceeding from free-will.* And William, Bishop of Paris, reasons in the same manner. *Every good work* (says he‡) *in proportion as it springs from free will, partakes of our nature; on which account it is not meritorious; but so far as it originates in grace, it is not ours, but of God.*

But I proceed, and shew farther, that good works, so far as they are ours, that is, so far as we are engaged in bring-

\* De grat. et lib. arbit. cap. 7.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3.

‡ De meritis.



ing them forth, are infected and vitiated; and therefore full of demerit, rather than possessing any merit of condignity. To this case that saying of the prophet, Isaiah lxiv. 6, has respect:—

*We are all as an unclean thing,*

*And all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags.*

For although the gift of grace infused into the human heart is something pure and heavenly, yet, the heart into which it is poured contains in it, also, something carnal and earthly. Hence the acts of grace and righteousness, emanating from a heart in a measure impure, always contract some impurity, as clear water, which passes through a muddy channel. Augustine, on Psalm cxlii.,\* writes: *Suppose not that thou thyself performest anything, except so far as thou art evil.* Our co-operation, therefore, cannot be meritorious, since it imparts nothing but its own evil to the good works which proceed from the grace of God, as from the main agent. And this is what St. Bernard most humbly and truly confesses: *All our very righteousnesses, (says he†) when viewed in the light of truth, are found as filthy rags; what estimate, then, will be made of our unrighteous acts?* In short, the argument may be summed up thus: Good works, so far as they flow from the grace of God, are not ours; so far as they spring from free will, they are ours, and contaminated: consequently, in no way are we rightly said to merit life eternal, on the plea of condignity, by good works.

3.—The things which merit life eternal, on the plea of condignity, are exactly answerable to the Divine law. For, if they do not fully satisfy the law, they do not deserve the reward promised to the doers of the law. This is plain from the covenant of the law, which runs thus: *He that doeth those things shall live by them: Gal. iii. 12. Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them; verse 10.* And on this account the Tridentine Fathers, when they would establish the merit of good works, lay it down as their foundation, that these good works of the regenerate do satisfy the Divine

\* Psalm cxliii. 5. in the Anglican version.

† Serm. 5. *in dedicat. Eccles.* [Bernardi Opera, tom. iii. edit. Venetiis 1765; or, tom. i. col. 2285. §. 3. edit. Paris. 1839.]



law.\* Since, however, it has been abundantly proved, that the works of the regenerate do not satisfy the perfect rule of the law, if considered *conjointly*, because many evil works intermingle themselves, and interrupt that continuous web of obedience which the law demands; nor yet, if we consider *separately* this or that good work, because there is none but has some stain [of sin] sprinkled upon it; it follows that believers themselves do not merit eternal life on the score of their works; but, that God being merciful, and their sins being forgiven, they receive life eternal according to the promise. Thus Augustine says,† *The mercy of the Lord endureth for ever towards the saints; and the truth of the Lord endureth for ever; because he both succours them in judgment, and thus mercy is not absent; and in forgiving, he makes good what he had promised. lest his truthfulness should fail.*

4.—Good works do not deserve, on the plea of condignity, what is less than eternal glory, and necessarily inferior to the attainment of eternal glory; consequently, they do not deserve eternal glory itself on the score of condignity. The soundness of the conclusion rests upon the axiom, that *That which is able to effect the greater, is able also to effect the less*, especially when that greater or less are of the same nature. The antecedent is proved from hence, that no works of believers can, on the plea of condignity, merit a perpetuity of grace; that is, final perseverance in grace, which is much less than a perpetuity of glory; that is, the eternal fruition of life. That final perseverance does not result from any worthiness in merit, but depends upon the mere good pleasure of God, is the common opinion of the Schoolmen. Thus Aquinas says, *Perseverance in the way does not result from merit; but God freely bestows the gift of perseverance on whomsoever he does bestow it; 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 9.*—a statement which he owed to Augustine,‡ who continually teaches from the Scriptures, that this final perseverance is a special gift given to the elect alone in Christ.

\* Sessio 6. cap. 16. [The words are—Illa opera, “quæ in Deo sunt facta, Divinæ Legi pro hujus vitæ statu satisfecisse, et vitam æternam suo etiam tempore, si tamen in gratia decesserint, consequendam, vere promeruisse censeantur.”]

† In Psal. cxvii.

‡ De corrept. et grat. cap. 6.



But then, that this gift is necessarily subordinate to the obtaining of eternal life, is plain from the Scriptures. *He that endureth unto the end shall be saved*; Matt. xxiv. 13. *Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life*; Revel. ii. 10. Hence Augustine, in the place just alluded to, says, *Who could be destined to receive eternal life, unless by the gift of perseverance? Since he who shall have persevered unto the end shall be saved.* Since, then, no works of ours can deservedly merit this gift of perseverance, that is, a perpetuity of heavenly grace; much less can they merit a perpetuity of heavenly glory.

5.—Those works do not possess, in themselves, a merit worthy of a reward, the remuneration of which wholly depends upon the friendship, appointment, and gracious acceptance on the part of the rewarder. The reason is clear; because, merit arising from worthiness, according to the sentiment of one class of writers, establishes a debt of *justice*; or, at least, according to others, a debt of *gratitude*. Supposing, therefore, the existence of such merit, it would be *unjust*, or at least *ungrateful*, not to return a reward commensurate with the worthiness of the merit, however unknown, or however even hostile, the individual might be; and, even although no previous purpose, no promise should have preceded. Nay, if we consider the subject carefully, the claims of merit are increased rather than lessened, when he who does anything in favour of another, is under none of the obligations of friendship or necessity to do it; nor is incited so to act by any promise or decree, but voluntarily performs what is generally gratifying to another. For instance, if any traveller or foreigner should diligently serve a sovereign not his own, this would be more deserving of reward, in the estimation of a grateful king, than if any one of his own guards had been the doer.

The major proposition having been proved, I come to the minor; and I affirm, that all our works are dependent for their remuneration upon the friendship, the appointment, and gratuitous favour of God, who accepts them; and are, therefore, not of condignity meritorious in themselves. *If a man should keep the whole natural law, and should not be a child of God, certainly he would not merit life eternal*, says Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 216. cap. 1.



It is not any worthiness, then, which attaches to the work itself, but the love of God towards his child; that is the reason why, to a work by no means worthy in itself, an infinite reward is apportioned. Bellarmine also recurs to this gratuitous acceptance, and says: *The merit of life eternal depends so entirely upon the Divine appointment, that those works alone can be properly meritorious of life eternal, which God is pleased to accept for life eternal*; de Justif. lib. 5, cap. 15. The more ancient Schoolmen did not look out for a condignity (as is now done) on the equality of a work to its reward; but readily admitted the gracious appointment of God to be the cause why a reward was assigned to our works so much more excellent than those works. Thus Aquinas: *There is no ground of merit in our action, unless on the pre-supposition of the Divine appointment; and therefore God does not become a debtor to us, but to himself, inasmuch as it is due that his own appointment should be fulfilled*; (1. 2. quæst. 114, art. 1.) Durandus for this very reason (lib. 2, dist. 27, quæst. 2,) denies all merit of condignity, properly and strictly speaking. Scotus also frankly maintains, *What is called merit in a pilgrim is not a qualification arising from condignity, but only from congruity, inasmuch as it is accepted by God*; (report. supra 4, sentent. distinct. 46, quæst. 1.) Hence many of the Romanists teach, that the merit of man depends so completely upon the gracious acceptance, and the appointment of God, that if he had ordained works done by the powers of nature to receive life eternal, even they would have been fully deserving of life eternal. Thus Scotus, Occam, Gabriel [Biel], Medina, and others. From all which we may correctly infer, that there is not any intrinsic condignity or equality between our works and life eternal, since it is the free and gracious appointment of God alone which effects their being accepted to receive so great a reward, which Divine appointment might have either accepted others of less value, or refused acceptance to these very works, and even to better than these.

But that there may be some ground found for condignity in the works themselves of the regenerate, for receiving the reward of life eternal, our opponents attempt, by a threefold device, to meet the arguments just adduced, and to attach



to the good works of men some worthiness which may be equivalent to eternal life: let us then consider their fine reasoning.

Some answer, that the works of the regenerate are not worthy, considered as to the substance of the works, and according as they flow from our own will; but yet that they are worthy as flowing from the root of grace.

This answer we have briefly considered already, and shall give it copious refutation when we come to the objections of our opponents; it may be sufficient at present to suggest, that the most learned of the Papists no less disapprove of this notion, than do Protestants themselves. For Scotus, Gregory, Occam, Gabriel [Biel], Alfonsus, and other authors of no little celebrity, teach\* that the works of the righteous, holiness of soul being admitted to exist, do not, even so far as they proceed from grace, possess a merit worthy of life eternal. And reason accords thereto; since grace is a quality but commenced in a pilgrim, and is always, owing to the quality of the subject, imperfect; and by consequence it is, as to its relation to perfect and consummate glory, a *mere preparation and tendency* towards it, not a *merit worthy of it*—a view of the case which extorted from Bellarmine this ingenuous confession: *It cannot be denied, but the blessedness far surpasses any meritoriousness in the action.* And a little after: *When we speak of glory being due to the works of grace ex condigno, we mean that it is fitting, that a work begun and arranged by God should ultimately be completed and perfected:* de Justif. lib. 5. cap. 18. But this is in fact to set aside condignity.

Others have recourse to the worthiness of the originator, and say that works derive their worthiness for the glory of heaven, from their being done by the primary instigation of the Holy Spirit; or by Christ, through his Spirit. But they cannot escape even by this outlet. For no one begins to believe and repent, unless by the Spirit of Christ influencing him; and yet the Romanists themselves deny that faith or repentance merit justification on the plea of condignity. And they are right in doing so; for a very different estimate is to be formed of the works which Christ himself has effected

\* Vasquez in 1. 2. disp. 214. cap. 1.



for us, and of those which by his Spirit he effects in us. The former are of infinite worth and merit; these latter are limited in worth, and differ according to the different measures of grace. Durandus gives this reason :\* *Because the value of an act does not arise from the promoter, unless on the ground of something formerly existing in the act;—for an agent does not accomplish that in which he is passive as to himself, but owes his acting to some outward cause.* Since, then, the impresses of the Holy Spirit neither implant a disposition so perfect, nor operate so efficaciously as to remove every degree of evil and infirmity, either from the minds or the actions of the regenerate; a complete worthiness of works adequate and equal to claim eternal life, which is a reward perfect and infinite, is not a consequence of operations of the Spirit. Let us, in the last place, quote the testimony of Vasquez, who asserts,† that *works acquire their value and dignity from the person from whom they immediately proceed; but not from the person from whom the grace comes, and the assistance which is granted to produce them.* In that case, an infinite dignity does not accrue to the works of the regenerate from the infinite dignity of the originator.

The third and last refuge to which our opponents have recourse is of this kind: The works of the regenerate, considered in themselves, have not, it is true, a worthiness sufficient to claim the reward of eternal glory; but when viewed as dyed in the blood of Christ, or as bedewed and united with the merits of Christ, they have. Thus Hosius says, in the Confession of the Synod of Piotrkow, cap. 73;‡

\* Lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 2.

† In 1. 2. disp. 214. cap. 8.

‡ *Confessio Cath. Fidei Christianæ—a patribus facta, quæ in Synodo provinciali quæ habita est Petricoviæ anno 1551; fol. Moguntiae, 1557.* This Convocation resolved on the extirpation of heresy, which was beginning to infect the Clergy itself.

HOSIUS (or in the national language STANISLAW HOSEN) was born in 1504, at Cracow, from a German family, which had acquired considerable wealth by trade. He was educated partly at Vilna and partly at Cracow, but he completed his studies at Padua, where he contracted an intimate friendship with Cardinal Pole. Having returned to his country, he was recommended by the Bishop of Cracow to Queen Bona, who took him under her patronage and ensured his rapid preferment. The King entrusted him with the affairs of Prussia, nominated him Canon of Cracow, and he was soon afterwards created Bishop of Culm, and then translated to Warmia, which placed him at the head



and Cajetan tom. 3. opusc. cap. 9., and some others. But we overturn this opinion by the argument of Durandus, who has correctly stated,\* that *Although a reward may be given to an individual more than he could look for from his own merits, on account of the merit of another; yet the merit of one person cannot become the merit of another, as the practice of one cannot be regarded as the working of another.* God may, then, when looking upon the merits of Christ, recompense us beyond the worthiness of our own merits; but our merits do not acquire any other intrinsic worthiness from this merit of Christ than they possess from their own origin. The notions accordingly, of our merits being bedewed or mixed up with the merits of Christ, are but empty and silly words, to which no certain meaning can be annexed. That life eternal, which surpasses in value all human merits, is granted us from regard to the merits of Christ, is the true and open doctrine of Protestantism; but that our works acquire a worthiness for life eternal from these merits of Christ, is a new, and false, and obscure opinion of certain Papists. For that which does not change an action by adding to it something intrinsic and inherent, by means of which its goodness may be increased, cannot augment its intrinsic value: but our opponents have not hitherto been able to devise what it is which the merits of Christ infuse into, or impress upon our works.

And thus it is proved from the very nature of good works that they are not meritorious, in the way of condignity, of life eternal; nor are they endued with such condignity, either from the inclination given by grace, or from the motion of the Holy Spirit; or, in fine, from any sprinkling or conjunction with the merits of Christ.

of the Church of Polish Prussia. He obtained a deplorable celebrity by his inveterate hostility to the Reformers, and advocated the most violent measures against them. He did not scruple repeatedly to advise, that faith should not be kept with heretics; and that it was necessary to confute them not by arguments, but by the authority of the magistrates. He wrote the Cardinal of Guise a letter of congratulation on the murder of Coligny, and said the news filled his soul with incredible joy and comfort; and he thanked the Almighty for the great boon conferred on France by the slaughter of St. Bartholomew's day; imploring him that he might shew equal mercy to Poland. Pope Pius IV. nominated him a Cardinal in 1561, and appointed him President of the Council of Trent.—See Krasinski's *Reformation in Poland*, vol. i. p. 172., and 400—5; and the *Zurich Letters*, published by the Parker Society, letter xlix., p. 113.

\* Lib. 3. dist. 48. quæst. 3.



## CHAPTER LVII.

ARGUMENTS DERIVED FROM A CONSIDERATION OF THE  
REWARDER.

WE are now to proceed to the consideration of God as the rewarder. And if we attentively reflect upon his supreme Majesty, it will clearly appear that between him and us there cannot in any way exist any mutual ground of merit of condignity. The Papists seem, in the whole of this subject of merits and rewards, to adopt that opinion of Euthyphron which Socrates has exposed in Plato's dialogues. For Euthyphron defined holiness to be *a species of mercantile traffic, which the gods and men exercise one with another*.\* Thus the Papists think that between Divine rewards and human works a kind of barter, regulated by the claims of justice, is observed;† that whilst God is receiving from us works properly worthy, we receive from him a crown of life eternal, as a reward equal and commensurate to the works done. But the supreme Majesty of God disdains such a trading as this; as we proceed to make evident by the following arguments:—

1.—They who merit eternal life from God, on the principle of condignity or actual worthiness, place the Almighty under obligation as a debtor to grant this reward; and that even from mere justice.‡ Now it is impossible for God to become a debtor to us as regards justice; therefore, we do not merit anything from him on the ground of condignity.

As to the major proposition, it is certain that merit of condignity on one side implies a debt, on the ground of *justice* on the other, as Suarez has it; or on the score of

\* In Euthyphron pag. 14; [or Vālpý's *Bekker's Platonis Opera* tom. ii. §. 18. p. 161. Euthyphron is one of the Interlocutors in the Dialogue of Plato so termed.]

† Suar. Opusc. de just. Dei, sect. 2., num. 27.

‡ Vide Cajetanum, in 1. 2. qu. 114. art. 3.



*gratitude*, as Vasquez holds. I come then to the minor, and shew that God cannot be made a debtor to us either from *justice* or from *gratitude*; and that we, therefore, cannot merit anything from him on the plea of condignity. For to be a debtor on the ground of *justice*, is quite inconsistent with the supreme and universal dominion of God, which he maintains over all creatures and all their actions. To be placed under obligation as a debtor on the score of *justice* or of *gratitude*, is quite repugnant to his Majesty as supreme; for a debtor, inasmuch as he is a debtor, is inferior to him to whom he owes anything. For this reason, the Schoolmen themselves do not admit the existence of a debt of *justice* on God's part, by which he is under obligation to us; but a debt of *faithfulness*, by which he is bound, as it were, to his own word, and the declaration of his own will, to adhere to his promises. But this debt is not founded in the worthiness of our righteousness, but in the gift of the Divine mercy gratuitously exercised. Hence says Aquinas,\* *God is not become, strictly speaking, a debtor to us, but to himself; inasmuch as he is under engagement to fulfil his own determination.* And Durandus:† *Whatsoever we receive from God, when any good work of ours has preceded, originates more in his liberality than in any obligation arising from our work.*

Since, then, God cannot either be, or be said to be a debtor to us on the score of justice, but merely in reference to the determination of his will, or to the exigency of our necessity, (in the same sense in which alms are said to be due to a beggar, or wings to an eagle); it is plain that we do not merit eternal life *of condignity*, but that God so regulating it, and our good so requiring, we receive eternal life from him as a free gift.

2.—A recompense due on the ground of the worthiness of merits, supposes that God, seeing he is bound to recompense, has received a benefit from him who is supposed to merit at his hands. But God is not capable of receiving any benefit from man; he cannot, therefore, be under any obligation, arising from the worthiness of his merits, to bestow on man the recompense of eternal life. The major is well known

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art 1.

† Lib. 2. disp. 27, quæst. 2.



even from the principles of moral philosophy, which teaches\* that the justice whereby a recompense is made to the doer, always establishes an equality between that which has been given, and that which has been received. He then, who cannot receive or gain anything from our works, is not bound, for justice sake, to give anything in return for them. First, then, God receives nothing from us, because we and all ours belong to God. Secondly, because even if it were granted that we may be in possession of some good, which is not absolutely subject to the dominion of God, yet no advantage can redound to God from our goods, according to that saying of Eliphaz in Job xxii. 3,

*Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous?*

*Or is it gain to him that thou makest thy way perfect?*

And of Elihu xxxv. 7.,

*If thou be righteous, what givest thou to him?*

*Or what receiveth he of thine hand?*

But so long as one action does not affect the interests of another, it is impossible there can exist any commutative justice between them. God, then, does not pay life eternal to those who live piously, on the ground of a debt of justice arising from condignity; but from the gracious decree of his munificence. And hence it is that divines are unanimous in making good works, so far as they refer to God, spring from the principle of religion, which renders to God the obedience due to him; not from the principle of commutative justice, which enters (as it were) into a bargain with God, on the score of a just proportion between the thing given and the thing received. Vasquez, convinced by this argument, acknowledges that this commutative justice does not exist between God and us; and that God does not give life eternal, in return for our good works, as a debt justly owing; yet, in order to retain the notion of merit of condignity, he has devised this new scheme:—He asserts,† *that an obligation on the score of justice has nothing whatever to do with merit*; nay, on the contrary, he affirms, *that where the right to claim compensation, on the score of justice, has been made good, there then exists, properly speaking, no*

\* [Aristot.] Ethic. lib. 5. cap. 2.

† In 1. 2. disp. 213. cap. 5.



*merit at all.* The ground for meriting, therefore, on the score of condignity, in his opinion, is the quality attaching to a good action, which demands the reward of life eternal, to be conferred by God, as an equal favour; although not to satisfy any claim of justice, yet upon the score of gratitude towards him who does well. Yet he cannot escape by this crevice; for as God owes us nothing on the ground of *justice*, since he has received nothing from us; so neither does he on the ground of *gratitude*. For a debt of *gratitude* much more clearly involves a benefit received, than does a debt of *justice*; for *gratitude* is the virtue which repays a favour to a benefactor for benefits received. If then, God is, on the score of gratitude, bound to give life eternal to the godly and believing, we are driven to assert that God has received some benefit from them; and more than this, a benefit so great, that if he should give anything in return less than the fruition of eternal life, he must be thought either ungrateful or niggardly in repaying the favour. All such notions are absurd: God, therefore, does not give eternal life in return for the condignity of merits.—[We pass to the next argument, that]

3.—No additional benefit can be claimed, as having been merited on the ground of condignity, by any one out of whose power it lies to make even one return equivalent to favours already received. But we can never make any equivalent return to God for the things received; therefore, we cannot merit anything from him on the score of condignity. The truth of the major proposition is manifest; because, he who still remains involved in debt to his benefactor cannot, either on the score of *justice*, or of *gratitude*, claim to himself new benefits, as owing for the deserts of his merits. Any one who proffers such a plea must shew, that he has not only compensated the benefits received of God, but has done more than he was called upon to do; and that, in order to reduce these inequalities to an equality, it is consequently incumbent upon God, if he would shew himself just, or at least grateful, to clear off his debt, as it were. Now no one can make to God any return equivalent to the benefits received in this life. This was the opinion of all the saints. Thus the Patriarch Jacob says, Gen. xxxii. 10: *I am not worthy of the least of all the mercies, and of all*



*the truth, which thou hast shewed unto thy servant.* Thus the Royal Psalmist, cxvi. 12.,

*What shall I render unto the Lord*

*For all his benefits toward me?*

Even the Philosopher himself recognised the inability of man to make any equivalent return to God; as appears *Ethic.* 8.

But our opponents will perhaps answer, that, although we cannot render to God himself any equivalent, yet our works may possess some condignity and proportion, so as to merit the reward of life eternal; for life eternal does not more surpass the works of pious men in dignity and excellence, than God himself does his creation. It is, therefore, right on the principle of condignity, that where men exhibit to God the best of their powers, God should make return to them in rewards proportionate to his Majesty.

But this answer does not meet the case; for the question is not in the least about some *geometrical* proportion, which may be imagined to exist between an infinite God and miserable man, and between an infinite reward of God and the defective duty of man; but as to the *arithmetical* proportion of one thing to another: as the proportion of a fair price to the house which has been bought. And in this sense we deny that our works can claim eternal life from God, on the ground of worthiness or condignity; because we have not yet made a meritorious compensation for the smaller benefits by our works. Although, therefore, it may be in accordance with the munificence and goodness of God, to make the return of life eternal to those who have not yet matched, by any adequate merits, his lesser benefits; yet from this congruous munificence, in accordance with the Divine majesty, there does not attach any value to human works, in consequence, of a meritorious character. [Again.]

4.—Where it appertains to an individual's nature and disposition to recompense the services of his clients beyond their worth, and to punish delinquents even less than they deserve; in such a case no man receives a reward for works as if owing meritoriously. This, even common sense teaches; for where the reward exceeds the merit, there no interchange of meriting can exist.\* For let us assume that some muni-

\* Vide Cajetanum in 1. 2. qu. 114. art. 3.



ficent king is pleased to present all his servants either with a castle, or a city and large estates, for some small service performed by them ; it is plain that a recompence would, in this case, be made beyond the worth of the service done, and consequently that, between the work and the reward, there would be no equality or condignity discoverable. If God, then, always acts in this munificent manner towards his servants, it is plain that their works have no intrinsic worthiness equal to the Divine rewards. Vasquez, who is a most strenuous champion for the condignity of merit, admits this at once ; his words are as follow : \* *If, for a small service or labour, any one should promise and give a thing of great worth, far beyond the value of the service itself,—in this case there would be a faithful fulfilling of promise and gratitude manifested, with reference to the service ; yet there would be no equality in value between the service and the reward.*

Let us now add the minor ; namely, that it is a constant practice with God to recompense his servants beyond the value of their services. And first, it is a common saying among the Schoolmen, *God rewards beyond worth*†—a maxim by which the merit of condignity is entirely overthrown. Nor is what is given beyond our worthiness by the all-bountiful God, some trifling matter, but a grant large and infinite. Thus speaks William, Bishop of Paris : ‡ *The good things of glory, are beyond all proportion, better than the good things of grace.* And a little after : *Infinitely greater are the rewards hoped for, to be bestowed from the bountifulness of God upon his beloved children, than their meritings can be.* But secondly, these statements can be confirmed from the Scriptures. For they never speak of the reward of glory as of a reward equalised to our works, but superabundant and overflowing. Matt. v. 12. : *Rejoice and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward in heaven.* Luke vi. 38. : *Good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom.* Either then the Papists must assert, that it is not the character of God

\* In 1. 2. qu. 114., disp. 214. art 3. cap. 5.

† Ludolph. pag. 4. [For a detailed account of this extraordinary scholar see Townley's *Illustrations of Biblical Literature*, vol. iii. p. 412.]

‡ Part. de univers. part. 2. cap. 70., p. 862.



to recompense the services of his worshippers above their worth; or, they must deny that their works are equal, and worthy to claim the reward; for both propositions cannot be alike true. Cajetan replies,\* that *the circumstance of God granting beyond the value of service done, is no bar to the meritoriousness of good works for life eternal; because God, when to a good work deserving of glory, he repays glory in the proportion of two to one, does not deprive the aforesaid work thereby from having, in strict justice, merited glory considered singly.* Bellarmine meets this argument in much the same way;† namely, that *the circumstance of God rewarding beyond worth, is not to be taken as though good works were not [in themselves] worthy of the reward of life eternal; but that, beyond the reward itself of life, which is due ex condigno to good merits, God, in mere bountifulness, always unites something additional.* But this answer cannot maintain its ground an instant. For the Scriptures, when they deny the meritoriousness of works for receiving reward, have not in view any measures, whatever they may be, of superadded glory; but that very essential reward, that is, the glory itself. So says the Apostle, Rom. viii. 18: *The sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which is to be, &c.* He said not that these sufferings are not worthy to be compared to that weight or accumulation of glory, which God of his munificence will impart over and above; but to *that glory itself.* Moreover, if what is given beyond the meritoriousness of our works, is not in the proportion of two to one, according to Cajetan's philosophical mode of statement; nor is, as Bellarmine seems to intimate, something very small; but is a gift infinitely greater and better than our works, as Parisiensis correctly remarks; then it cannot be, but that a recompence, being above any deserts, and which surpasses beyond all proportion any value of good works, must annihilate, as plainly as a thing can do, the meritoriousness of such works. The holy Fathers, moreover, when they refuse to works worthiness or equality which can claim the reward of life eternal, have reference to the thing itself, or life eternal in itself; not to any degrees of glory super-

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3.

† De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 18.



added. Thus Basil on Psalm cxiv.: *There remaineth an everlasting rest to those who have contended lawfully in this life, ὡς κατὰ ὀφείλημα τῶν ἔργων ἀποδιδόμενη, ἀλλὰ κατὰ χάριν τοῦ μεγαλοδώρου Θεῷ, not bestowed as a debt for works done, but according to the exceeding riches of God's grace.*

Where he denies not that these or those degrees of glory, but that the glory, or the very eternal rest itself, is given as payment for works. And Hilary :\* *Although the life of the righteous may, from the performance of righteousness, be worthy of approbation; yet he acquires through the mercy of God a greater degree of merit: for from this life he advances towards life eternal.* What can be more plain, than that, in Hilary's opinion, life eternal is itself owing to the mercy of God, and therefore, not to any meritoriousness of works? for these are ἀσύστατα—inconsistent.

In short, that you may perceive how gross is the inconsistency of the Papists, I will add; that the opinion of those who maintain that life eternal itself, or the first degree of life eternal, is entirely unconnected with meriting, is not without many supporters among the Romanists; but that the other superadded degrees are a recompence for the condignity of merits, is far from being out of repute. This is, however, in diametrical opposition to the opinion of Bellarmine,† Cajetan, and the rest; who hold that life eternal is itself acquired by the worthiness of merits; though the more eminent degrees of it are superadded from the mere bountifulness of God.

Let us therefore, conclude, that the recompence made by God, considered in whatever light you please, is always worthy of God the most munificent; that is, beyond any meritorious deserving on the score of works.

† Enarrat. in Psal. li., near the end; [§ 23. tom. i., col. 72. edit. Venit. 1749.]

† Vide Bellarminum de Justif. lib. v. cap. 20.



## CHAPTER LVIII.

## ARGUMENTS DERIVED FROM THE NATURE OF THE REWARD ITSELF.

It has been shewn from the character of the works, of the agent, and of the recompenser Himself, that there is no place for any merit of condignity ; it remains to demonstrate the same to be the case, from the consideration or nature of the reward itself.

We need not hesitate to use the word *reward*, which is assigned to life eternal ; inasmuch as when all their toils are over, believers doing well attain it : not that by these labours or works they obtain it for meritorious deservings, or acquire it by any appropriate price. Hence, Ambrose admits of a kind of reward,\* which is to be imputed, however, to liberality and grace ; and the Master of the house in the Gospel, when he distributes a reward among the labourers, does it, not by apportioning the reward to the worthiness or equality, on the part of the services performed ; but, according to his promise and his own good pleasure.† For in the participation of the reward he makes those equal who, in the work and labour, were unequal. What, therefore, is called the reward of works, was in reality a gift of grace ; as Prosper rightly infers from this parable.‡ But dismissing the word *reward*, let us proceed to consider the arguments which are derived from the nature of the reward itself.

1.—Life eternal, which is called the reward of good works, is the eternal vision and fruition of God himself ; nay, it is God himself united and joined to us by means of this vision and fruition. *I am thy exceeding great reward* ; Gen. xv. 1. But no works of men can merit such a reward on the score of condignity ; because a finite work bears no proportion to an infinite reward. This argument has appeared of such

\* Epist. lib. 1. epist. 1.

† Lib. 1. de vocat. Gentium, cap. xvii.

‡ Matt. xx.



weight to some Romanists,\* that they have denied that this uncreated reward can find a place within even the meritorious work of Christ himself. This is a subject on which we shall not enter; but we confidently assert, that as concerns all other men, they are unable, by any works that they can do, meritoriously to acquire an uncreated thing; that is, to merit that God should be united and joined to them in the vision and fruition beatific eternally. For, in the first place, although God has graciously promised so large a reward to the works of men, puny as they are, yet whilst the works remain disproportionate to the reward, they continue also to be anything but meritorious; and the conferring of so superabounding a reward will be altogether owing to free bounty; as Suarez has rightly observed in his work on *the Liberty of the Divine Will*, disp. 2. sect. 2. Secondly, that the best works of mortals are disproportionate to the reward, and utterly unworthy to claim a reward so large, even they who yet endeavour to uphold the condignity of works, are compelled to admit. Thus William, Bishop of Autun, observes:† *Good works have no claim to reward as meritorious; that is, to be rewarded in proportion; yet they are worthy to be rewarded simply; where observe the distinction between meriting simply and proportionally.* He assigns a degree of merit to good works *simply*, that is, such as are pleasing and acceptable to God, and freely bestowed;—qualities which we are just as ready to recognise in every good work: but he denies that there is any such thing as meriting *proportionally*, that is, equally, commensurately, and in intrinsic value, adequately to the reward itself;—an opinion which we also join in repudiating. Nay, even the Jesuits themselves, in some of their unaccountable gyrations, concede that this inequality, between the merit and the reward, does exist; and yet adhere most resolutely to the notion of a condignity of merit for receiving the reward.‡ Thus says Bellarmine: *It cannot be denied but that the*

\* Vasquez. in 3. Thomæ, tom. 1. disp. 6. cap. 4.

† Lib. 3. tract. 16., de merit. virtutum., quæst. 2.

‡ See *Mosheim*, as edited by Soames, vol. iv. pp. 121—134, for an account of some of the disputes in the Church of Rome on these subjects;—but to think, as some Jansenists did, to procure the settlement of the matter by trotting off to Rome! They had much better have spent their money at home, and have got some return.



*blessedness far excels the meritorious act*; De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 18. And again more plainly, cap. 14: *It is altogether owing to mercy, that good works, although so disproportionate to the greatness of the reward, receive a promise of life eternal.* If, in themselves, our holiest actions are insufficient for reward, how can they be meritoriously worthy? For the Papists thus distinguish merit of *condignity* from that of *impetration*;\* namely, that is called *merit of impetration* to which, on the ground of propriety or congruity, something is given beyond the value of the work; that is called merit of *condignity*, which of its own nature demands an equivalent reward as a suitable return, in proportion to a just valuation between the work and its reward. I link all these together. The reward of eternal life is disproportioned, and infinitely surpasses the worth and the goodness of our works; therefore, our works are not, meritoriously, to claim this reward. Again,

2.—The reward of life eternal is freely bestowed; therefore, it is not given for the merit arising from condignity. That the inference is correct is manifest from that irreconcilability in terms, which is discernible between a gift bestowed of grace, and a merit of condignity derived from works; for, on the authority of the Apostle himself, Rom. iv. 4., the same thing is not obtained both from grace and of debt. And Rom. xi. 6., *If by grace, then it is no more of works, otherwise grace is no more grace.* The Papists themselves cannot deny the existence of contrariety between a free gift and merit of condignity. *When this freeness of a gift is considered, says Aquinas, it is manifest that all meriting is opposed to grace.*† Nor do the more modern writers deny this. *Debt and grace seem to stand in mutual opposition; so that in proportion as debt intervenes, so far is grace diminished.* Suarez Opusc.‡ And in the same place: *Debt, founded on a meritorious work, on the supposition of a contract under such work, excludes every notion of grace.* If, therefore, any meriting is admitted into our works in reference to life eternal, be it much or little, in the same proportion is the freedom of the gift of God diminished. But if

\* Vasquez in 1. 2. disp. 213., cap. 5.

† Aquin. 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 5.

‡ De lib. Divinæ volunt. disp. 2. sect. 2.



equality, or meritorious condignity, be attributed to them in reference to life eternal itself, then, in the disposing of this reward, there is no place at all left for Divine grace.

The real dependence of the conclusion on the premise being thus established, it remains to be proved that life eternal is *Χάρισμα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, that is, *the free gift of God in Christ Jesus*. Now this is, in the first place, asserted in so many words by the Apostle, Rom. vi. 23. And with this passage agrees that other in the Epistle of Jude; verse 21: *Keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life*. Where he both commends the works of love to believers, and, at the same time teaches them, that where these have been fulfilled, life eternal is to be hoped for from the mercy of Christ the Judge, not from our own merits. Nay, does not the Saviour himself term, not only the grace to do well, but the life eternal also, which is finally bestowed upon those who do well, *his own gift*? Luke xii. 32.; *It hath pleased the Father to give you the kingdom*. John x. 28.; *I GIVE unto them eternal life*: and many more such passages might be quoted. Secondly, to these testimonies we can add arguments, whereby it may be made evident, that life eternal is, indeed, the free gift of God. For, that it is given to infants, irrespective of merits, is manifest upon Bellarmine's own shewing, *de Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 17; seeing he acknowledges, that they obtain life eternal, not by merit in the *working*, but of the *person*. Moreover, it is bestowed in such a way, as to cut off every occasion of boasting; Rom. iii. 27.; iv. 2.; and 1 Cor. i. 31. But if infants were justified without any merits of congruity, and were saved without any merits arising from condignity, and yet adults could possess merits of this kind; they would have, then, a peculiar ground for boasting. Besides, although the path in which the righteous are led to the possession of life eternal, is in the prosecution of good works, yet it is plain that, this reward is a free gift; because a title to heaven is given them from the mercy of God, before they themselves either engaged in the Christian warfare, or acquired any merit; and that in virtue of election, redemption, adoption, and promise. Lastly, Bellarmine himself acknowledges,\* that

\* *De Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 17.



*good works are not required for attaining life eternal as an heritage ; but, lest a son should forfeit his adoption, and justly deserve to be disinherited.* They are, then, indispensable causes and means, rather than merits, by which life eternal is obtained ; which is in its own nature altogether the free gift of God : and, consequently, not due to any one for any worthiness discernible in their works. [Again,]

3.—If life eternal were not the free gift of God, then, to hope for or expect it, without suitable merits, would be dangerous, rash, nay, heretical ; seeing it would involve the false notion, viz., that any one might be saved without the meritorious claims arising from his own works : But it is allowable to hope for, and to expect and obtain, life eternal without these meritorious works ; and therefore, life eternal has the nature of a free gift, and our works do not possess any worthiness so as to claim it ; which comes to the same thing. The correct dependence of the consequent on the antecedent in the major premise, Vasquez will himself confirm by his own clear testimony. For, on the hypothesis that the Papistic doctrine respecting the merit of good works is sound, he observes :\* *If we speak of trust and expectation of obtaining the kingdom of heaven, we ought not to place our hope in the goodness of God merely, as though life eternal were to be bestowed upon us as a gift, on that ground alone, without any reference to merits.—For, since the Catholic faith teaches, that no adult will be blessed through the mercy of God alone, if unaccompanied by any merits of his own ; no man can rightly so hope for blessedness, from the goodness of God alone, as to place his trust in that only for obtaining life eternal, without reference to merits. And in truth, to exercise confidence according to the opposite method, would be to believe something contrary to the Catholic faith ; namely, that he might obtain blessedness by the mere goodness of God alone, without regarding merits ; such as, in fact, is the foolish confidence of the heretics of our time.* Thus much Vasquez.† And although

\* In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 213. cap. 7.

† Whether Vasquez would have regarded our Hooker as one of those heretics, or not, every one who has learned the true Catholic faith from God's word alone, will prefer his statement of the matter:—"Although, in ourselves, we be altogether sinful and unrighteous, yet even the man which is impious in himself, full of iniquity, full of sin,—him being found in Christ through faith,



his remarks concerning merits take an indefinite shape, yet it is plain that we must restrict them to the merit of condignity; seeing that the Roman Church teaches her followers to expect the grace of justification from the merits of congruity, and the reward of glorification solely from the merits of condignity. Add to these considerations that definition of hope common among the Romanists, viz. that *Hope is the certain expectation of future blessedness, springing from the grace of God and our own merits.\** It must, moreover, be added at the same time, that when the Papists forbid us to hope for life eternal, if unaccompanied by merits, they do not intend merely to signify, that life eternal cannot be justly hoped for by any one, without an inchoate obedience and an aim at newness of life, as indeed, we also affirm;—*for he who soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he who soweth to the Spirit, shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting; Gal. vi. 8.*—but they maintain, moreover, that these works, whence eternal life is to be expected, must be perfect; be sufficient to fulfil the Divine law, and to merit the reward of glory from their own intrinsic worthiness, upon the just and equal proportion in value of one thing to another. Our assertion is, that life eternal may be hoped for, and obtained, by all believers, though unaccompanied by merits such as these; which was the position laid down in the minor proposition of our argument. And it is confirmed, *first*, by the opinion of the more ancient Church,—even the Roman. For in the Canon after the Consecration, we find this language employed: *We pray Thee admit us among the blessed, not as the valuer of our merits, but as the dispenser of pardon.†* They were in hope, therefore, and

and having his sin remitted through repentance,—him God beholdeth with a gracious eye; putteth away his sin by not imputing it; taketh quite away the punishment due thereunto by pardoning it, and accepteth him, in Jesus Christ, as perfectly righteous as if he had fulfilled all that was commanded him in the law;—for ‘*He hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.*’”—Hooker’s *Sermon on Justification*, §. 6.

\* Compend. Theol. 5. 22.

† Apud Walden. *de Oratione et ejus ritibus*, tit. 1. cap. 7. fol. 31. This author is Thomas Netter, called *Waldensis*, because born at Walden, in Essex;—an English Carmelite Monk of London, who was educated at Oxford; Confessor to Henry IV., and his Envoy to the Council of Pisa; provincial Prior of his Order in 1414; a strenuous opposer of the *Wickliffites*; sent by the King



believed, that there was admission among the blessed, even for those who were not possessed of merits, which, taken at a proper valuation, would be equal to, or deserving, the reward of eternal glory. The Roman Church, also, on the fourth day of the Passion, thus addresses God—*We pray that we, who trust not in the quality of our merits, may be thought worthy to obtain not thy judgment, but thy mercy.* The ancient Roman Church, then, entertained hope that believers might obtain life eternal from the mercy of God, irrespectively of any worthiness of merits.\* I pass by Anselm, Bernard, Gerson and others,† who wholly renounce their own merits, and rest upon mercy alone;—a course which they never would have adopted, had it been either false or heretical to assert, that believers may obtain the crown of glory, though unprovided with claims of merit. Let Bellarmine bring up the rear of a Romish host, asserting, as he does, *that looking upon the insecurity of our own righteousness, and the danger of vain glory, it is the safest way to place our hopes solely in the*

to the Council of Constance in 1415; and to the Court of Poland in 1419. He attended Henry V. in his French war, A.D. 1423, and Henry VI. in 1430; and died at Rouen, November 3, 1430. He wrote much: the only work, however, of his printed, is his *Doctrinale Antiquitatum Fidei Ecclesiæ Catholicæ*, which seems to be referred to above,—a very prolix work against the followers of Wickliffe and Huss; Venice, 1751, fol. and elsewhere.—*Soames's Mosheim.*

\* “This is *our* comfort and our wisdom: we care for no knowledge in the world but this,—that man hath sinned and God hath suffered; that God hath made himself the Son of Man, and that men are made the righteousness of God.”—Hooker, *ibid.*

† The Translator may here quote a portion of one of Hooker's Sermons:—

“And Anselm, ‘*I adore thee, I bless thee, Lord God of heaven, and Redeemer of the world, with all the power, ability, and strength of my heart and soul, for thy goodness so unmeasurably extended; not in regard of my merits, whereunto only torments were due, but of thy mere unprocured benignity.*’ If these Fathers should be raised again from the dust, and have the books laid open before them wherein such sentences are found as this:—‘*Works no other than the value, desert, price, and worth of the joys of the kingdom of heaven; heaven, in relation to our works, as the very stipend which the hired labourer covenanteth to have of him whose work he doth, as a thing equally and justly answering unto the time and weight of his travails, rather than to a voluntary or bountiful gift:*’ (Annot. Rhem. in 1 Cor. iii. 8.)—if, I say, those reverend, afore-rehearsed Fathers, whose books are so full of sentences witnessing their Christian humility, should be raised from the dead, and behold with their eyes such things written; would they not plainly pronounce of the authors of such writs, that they were fuller of *Lucifer* than of Christ;—that they were proud-hearted men, and carried more swelling minds than sincerely and feelingly-known Christianity can tolerate?”—HOOKER'S WORKS, Lond. fol. 1676, *Sermon on Pride*, p. 520.



*mercy of God.\** But if life eternal was not a free gift, but to be obtained in consequence of the worthiness or merit of works, to make our hopes rest on the sole mercy of God for obtaining blessedness would be not merely hazardous, but absolutely rash.

Lastly, Christians believe and hope in the same manner in which Abraham, the father of the faithful, believed, that is, *in hope against hope*; Rom. iv. 18. But to believe that you will at last receive the reward of life eternal, if you shall have deserved it as a suitable reward for meritorious services, is not to believe in hope against hope; but to believe with a natural hope, such as Socrates, Scipio, or any Pagan might exercise. But when, in contradistinction to these notions, you acknowledge yourself a miserable sinner, overwhelmed in sin on every side, and most justly liable, through the demerits of your life, to the curse of eternal damnation; and yet have a hope that God will, for Christ the Mediator's sake, be propitious to you, and regard all your sins as if never committed; will recompense your good works, small in fact, though they be and imperfect, with the reward of eternal life, through his goodness and clemency,—this is, indeed, to believe in hope against hope, and, if you look to yourself merely, in a case most deplorable; yet after all to have a hope in the sole mercy of God, to be exhibited in your behalf for the sake of another, even of Christ the Mediator. You perceive the point of the argument: Believers hope that they shall obtain, and in fact, do obtain life eternal as a gift, without any reference to their deservings: their works, therefore, are not commensurate to so great a reward.

4.—The last argument we shall employ shall be drawn from that proportion which exists between faith and repentance for obtaining justification, and the works which follow the justified person for obtaining glorification; and it may be thus laid out: If faith and repentance do not of themselves merit justification, the forgiveness of sin, or the reception of the sinner into the grace and favour of God; then the good works which are done afterwards by believers, do not merit glorification. I prove the consequence, first, from the

\* De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 7.



nature of the Divine promise. For, if there be any efficacy on the part of a Divine engagement or promise, which could establish a principle of merit, God has as truly promised grace to those who believe and repent, as he has promised glory to those who do well. Bellarmine's objection to this,\*—namely, *that those promises of God, in which, throughout the holy Scriptures, the forgiveness of sins and the Divine favour are offered to penitent sinners, do not involve in them an engagement, properly so called; but the assertion of a thing that shall certainly take place*—is frivolous; since either way, work is required; and upon the condition of the work being done the benefit is granted: an engagement, therefore, is understood in neither, or in both cases. Secondly, the thing may be proved also from the author of each work being the same. For if the good works of the regenerate deserve glory, because they are done by the aid of the Holy Spirit as the mover, then also the faith and repentance of the sinner will merit forgiveness; forasmuch as no one believes or repents unless through the Holy Spirit as the promoter and author. Lastly, the same is manifest from a comparison of the works themselves and of the benefits resulting from them. For the acts of repenting and believing are not inferior in proportion and commensurateness for obtaining pardon or the grace of justification, than the acts of love, after a state of justification has been gained, are for obtaining the reward of eternal glory and happiness. If, then, merit for the obtaining of justification is not to be ascribed to faith and repentance, then, by a parity of reasoning, the good works which follow faith are not to have the merit of glorification assigned to them. But the Papists themselves do not venture to ascribe merit for justification to faith or repentance; but confess that, the sinner is justified freely through the mercy of God, not from any meritoriousness in his works, such as, for instance, of believing or repenting. Thus Thomas Aquinas writes, 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 5.: *Man is justified by faith, not because he merits justification by believing, but because, whilst he is justified, he believes.* And Gregory of Valentia, in his book on Divine grace, part 4. cap. 6., near the end, says, *We do*

\* De Justif. lib. 1. cap. 21.



*not approve of their opinion, who, though not ex condigno, yet ex congruo, say, that we merit grace by those acts whereby we ultimately prepare ourselves for it. Thus Suarez also,\* Notwithstanding the promise of the forgiveness of sin is made to sinners upon this condition, namely, if they truly repent; yet it is most certain, that forgiveness of sin is absolutely a free gift. If those statements are most true, as they are, why should not we also come to the conclusion, that—Notwithstanding the promise of life eternal made to the regenerate, on condition of living a holy life, yet it is most certain, that life eternal is absolutely the free gift of God?*

One work of Divine grace, therefore, furnishes impetratory ground for obtaining another, in accordance with the determinations of the most blessed and wise God; the work, for instance, of faith and repentance for obtaining justification; and the work of righteousness and holiness for obtaining glorification; but neither does the one obtain justification, nor the other glorification, from any meritorious worthiness or equality in the proportion of the one to the other, but from the mercy of God who so ordains it.

And thus you have presented before you our opinion, confirmed by various kinds of arguments; we shall proceed in the next place to fortify it by sentiments in its favour from the Fathers.

## CHAPTER LIX.

### MERIT OF CONDIGNITY REFUTED BY THE OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS.

ALTHOUGH the term *merit* is very often to be met with in the writings of the ancient Fathers and the Schoolmen, yet that that merit, as understood in a Papistic sense, was always rejected and exploded by nearly all of these, we have shewn by the testimonies already cited: we proceed now to make

\* In opus. relect. de div. libert. disp. 2. sect. 2. num. 45.



the same good by additional, and (if possible) yet more unequivocal declarations.

1.—Origen, upon those words,\* Rom. iv. 16., THEREFORE IT IS OF FAITH THAT IT MAY BE BY GRACE, &c., writes,—*Just as, from the circumstance of our existence, it cannot be meant that we exist as a reward for our work, but it is plain that to the gift of God and the favour of that Creator whose pleasure it was to will us into being, we are indebted for existence; so, even admitting that we obtain an inheritance in the promises of God, it is the result of Divine grace, not as payment of any debt for work.* Here Origen plainly denies, that life eternal is due or is given, to the works of believers, as a return proportioned to their services, or as merited by them.

2.—Hilary, on Psal. li., near the end [§. 22,] observes, *Not even will the works of righteousness themselves be sufficient for claiming the reward of perfect blessedness, unless the mercy of God forbear to impute the deviations and movements of human infirmity, which co-exist even with the desire of righteousness.*—Our hope then, is in the mercy of God, for ever and ever. But deny that our righteousness can obtain the reward, considered apart from mercy and unaccompanied by forgiveness of sin, he is doubtless conscious, that it is insufficient to lay claim to any reward in itself.

3.—Jerome, lib. 14, in Ezek. cap. xlvi. says: *It is clear that every man, and every creature, although it has arrived at perfection, yet stands in need of the mercy of God; and is put into possession of the fulness of perfection from grace, not from merit.* It was consequently Jerome's opinion, that what we call perfection during our earthly pilgrimage is indeed imperfect; and that none can arrive at true perfection from meritorious deservings, flowing from this righteousness; but that it is owing to the grace and mercy of God, who has infused this incipient righteousness into us.

4.—Augustine, on Psal. xciv. remarks,—*If God should deal with us according to our deserts, he would meet with no one who would not incur his condemnation.* Where, I ask, are those merits worthy to claim glory, when there are

\* [Tom. iv. p. 528. edit. Paris 1759. This Comment exists only in the version of Rufinus.—See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. i. p. 166.]



found in all persons merits rather deserving of condemnation ?

The same Father, de Prædest. et Grat. cap. 10, says,—*The blessedness of the future life is not tendered to any man as a reward for his merits ; but is freely bestowed from the bountiful grace of God the giver.* If this happiness itself be the gift of grace, then it is not a debt to be paid in mere justice for the value of our works.

5.—Cassian, Collat. 23, cap. 17, observes :—*The saints are so sensible that the righteousness of man is weak, and that it is always in need of the mercy of God, that one of these, whose iniquities God had purged away by a live coal from the altar of his word, nevertheless says,—*WOE IS ME BECAUSE I AM A MAN OF UNCLEAN LIPS ; Isa. vi. 5. And a little after, speaking of the same prophet, he says :—*The prophet, taking into view not one, but all our righteousnesses, and looking all around for what is considered either unclean or abominable, seeing that nothing could be found, among human concerns, more base or impure, has seen fit to compare it to a menstruous cloth* A righteousness of works which is adjudged to be thus feeble, and always standing in need of mercy, and which is also rightly compared to a menstruous cloth, cannot be either regarded or pretended to be of such a character, as meritoriously to deserve celestial glory. That individuals, whose personal righteousness is thus imperfect and polluted, should be destined, and, for the sake of the Mediator, admitted to life eternal, must, consequently, be attributed to the unspeakable grace and condescension of God.

6.—Fulgentius (lib. 1. ad Monimum\*) cap. 10, observes :—*Life eternal is properly called grace, not only because God bestows his own gifts in recompence for his own gifts previously bestowed ; but because even there the grace of the Divine recompence so greatly abounds, as to exceed, in an incomparable and unutterable degree, all the merit of human will and action, however good, and even though resulting*

\* MONIMUS was a friend of FULGENTIUS', Bishop of Ruspa, who flourished in the sixth century, renowned for piety, learning, and every Christian virtue. *Monimus* had requested his opinion on three points, to which Fulgentius answered in three books.—Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 281. See, also, the *Translation of Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. i. p. 411.



*from the gift of God.* By this testimony the Jesuits are plainly refuted, who are accustomed to say, that life eternal is called grace, because it is acquired from those merits which have their origin from grace, and not because these merits, after they have been bestowed upon us, do not deserve life eternal *ex condigno*. Fulgentius, however, teaches, that even the very merits, which flow from the grace of God, are both incomparably too worthless. and too small, to claim the reward of life eternal.

7.—Gregory, Moral. lib. 9, cap. 14, asserts :—*Even though I may have grown up to the performance of virtue, yet my capability for enjoying life is derived, not from my merits, but from pardon.* If there is not a sufficiency of merits available for obtaining life eternal, they possess not meritorious worthiness : they would be valid of themselves, without needing the mercy of an indulgent God, if they possessed a meritorious worthiness.

The same writer, in explaining the seven penitential Psalms, observes :—*But if the happiness of the saints is the gift of mercy, and is not acquired by merits, what becomes of that saying, AND THOU WILT RENDER TO EVERY MAN ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS ? (Prov. xxiv. 12.) If it is bestowed according to works, how (it may be asked) can it be deemed a gift of mercy ? It is, however, one thing to render according to works, and another thing to render for the works themselves. For in that it is said, according to the works, the quality itself of the works must be understood to be meant; that on him whose good works have been made manifest, a glorious recompence may also be conferred. For no labour can be proportionate, no works can be compared, with that life of blessedness, in which man lives with God and from God.* Such expressions as these leave nothing to be desired for a full refutation of merit supposed to arise from good works. In the first place, the happiness of the saints is ascribed to Divine mercy ; consequently, it is not owing to human merit. Secondly, it is withdrawn from all connexion with those merits, by the manifest act of justification. Thirdly, an objection, which seems to favour the merit of condignity, because God confers rewards *according to works*, is set aside. The reply to that is, that this recompence is made with reference to the *quality*, not the *meritorious-*



worthiness of the works. Good is returned to those who do well, but not on the ground that their works bear a value proportionate. This testimony is enough to stop the mouths of all Jesuits. [Again.]

8.—Rupert,\* on Ezek. lib. 2. cap. 11. remarks, *Who among either angels or men could obtain an entrance into the rest of the Lord by his own merits alone, unless he had been raised up to receive it by grace? Or, are the works of any of us of such a character, that we should expect to enter into the same rest with God, simply on the score of justice?* He here asserts that merits, that is, good and holy works, do not avail for acquiring life eternal, unless the grace of God afford assistance; nor even where there is the assistance of grace, do they acquire such a character, as that a reward should be conferred on them as a mere debt of justice; consequently, by establishing that the reward is of grace, he denies that these works have a worthiness sufficient to claim the reward. [Then]

9.—Remigius, on Rom. viii., says: *If any man could have fulfilled all the precepts of the Old and New Testament, and have undergone all kinds of torture, he would not render himself in any way worthy of future glory, of which the elect will be partakers.* Remigius acknowledges, that even if we could do and suffer much more for the glory of God, than any mortal does or suffers, yet we should not become thereby worthy of life eternal. How much less, therefore, when what we do accomplish in obedience to God, is so trifling, while sins against God himself occur, great and manifold, daily?

10.—Bernard, serm. 1. in annunciat. B. Mariæ, says: *It is necessary first of all to believe; because, you cannot obtain the forgiveness of sins unless by the favour of God; in the next place, because you cannot possess any good work whatever, unless he himself have bestowed it also; lastly, because it is quite out of your power to merit eternal life by works, unless it also be freely granted.* In the same sermon, a little after these remarks, there follows also: *Nor*

\* ABBOT OF DUYTS, near Cologne. A.D. 1111; composed, among other things, Commentaries on Scripture: See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 656; and the Translation of *Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. i. p. 336.



*are the merits of men of such a character, that eternal life is on their account justly claimable.* What more clear than that in Bernard's opinion, not even merits, as they are called, can be possessed, unless freely imparted to us; and that eternal life, even after they have been given, is not attainable thereby, on the score of any worthiness in them?

The same Father, upon the Canticles, Serm. 68,\* observes: *It is sufficient, as far as merit is concerned, to be aware that merits are insufficient. — Take care, however, to possess merits; possessing them, be sensible that they are a grant; then enjoy the fruit thereof in the mercy of God, and thou hast escaped all danger, &c.* Bernard says, we must labour diligently to obtain merits, that is, pious and holy works; but he adds, that we should be sensible that no merits of ours are sufficient for obtaining life eternal, unless it is freely bestowed from the mercy of God, unworthy as we are of receiving such a gift. The Papists approve of Bernard's opinion in one of these points, they reject him in the other: in both respects do we embrace the opinion of this holy man.

11.—Anselm, on Rom. viii., says: *If any one should suffer all the punishments that could be endured during the present life, such sufferings would not, even taken altogether, create a merit deserving to secure the attainment of future glory.* He is speaking of the sufferings which the saints are accustomed to undergo, for the cause of Christ and for righteousness' sake; all which put together, convey no meritorious claim for the prize of eternal glory: there exists not any good action, therefore, which is meritorious of life eternal, and that, *ex condigno*, according to the Jesuits' and other modern Papists' philosophising notions.

But passing by those Fathers (whom I do not reckon among the Papists) let us come to the scholastic authors and modern Romanists; and we shall shew that they even have rejected the merit of condignity.

12.—William, Bishop of Paris, in his treatise *De meritis*, maintains that, *With reference to the common notion, that there are works meritorious of life eternal, and that by every work done from love, man merits life eternal, it appears to be by no means the fact, that any man can merit eternal life,*

\* [Tom. 1. col. 3086, edit. Paris, 1839, §. 6.]



*by the condign worthiness of any action whatever.* You perceive that this most learned man rejects the Papistic dogma which is laid down as a foundation for the merit of condignity.

The same Divine, in the same tract, asks—*On what plea of right or justice can any of the saints expect the recompence of eternal happiness, as a return for the meritoriousness of their obedience, to which their merits, be their excellence what it may, can bear no comparison, either in goodness or in worth?* In these words he wholly denies condignity, that is, the value of merits, as equivalent to claim the reward.

13.—Durandus, lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 2., says, *God shews mercy in crowning the good, who have no meritoriousness to offer. — The merit of man before God, cannot be merit absolutely on the ground of condignity or worthiness.* More testimonies occur in the same writer, in the same place, and lib. 1. distinct. 17. quæst. 2. Nor is this to be wondered at, since he avowedly opposes the notion of merit of condignity, which some Schoolmen, even at that day, were fond of upholding, and which the Jesuits are now-a-days endeavouring to revive.

14.—Scotus, in report. super 2. sentent. dist. 7. quæst. 3., maintains: *Merit, during the Christian pilgrimage, is not a pre-requisite of life leading to any claim de condigno, but only de congruo, so far as it is accepted by God.* And elsewhere: *Merit is, with reference to reward, a necessary pre-requisite according to the appointment of God, and yet in nothing does it come up to the reward.*

15.—Peter d'Ailay. in 4. quæst. 1. art. 1. says: *It is an abuse of terms to say, that a meritorious act is the cause of reward; for although the reward follows upon its performance, yet this proceeds, not from its intrinsic goodness, nor from the nature of the thing, but from the good pleasure of God alone.*

16.—Thomas Bradwardine, in his work against the Pelagians, maintains at great length, that *merit is not the cause of the eternal reward; as quoted by Cassander, in his 19th Epistle addressed to Du Moulin.* In denying the existence of this origination, beyond doubt he rejected a worthiness in good works for claiming life eternal.

17.—Gerson, part. 4. tractat. *De signis bonis et malis,*



maintains, that *all our righteousnesses, however beautiful they may be, as flowing from the Divine bounty, contract notwithstanding, a measure of defilement, from the continued flow of sin and deficiencies, at least venial sins ; [as well as] through the wounds and diseases of the mind, and the desires arising from the infection of original sin, and actual injury thereby.* In the same place, he says: *An evil symptom is it, to offer to God his own works or graces, as though they had acquired some measure of worthiness from him who has performed them ; and are not rather defiled as a menstruous cloth, or as a leprous garment, which is rendered unclean by the constant running disease.* If in works of men, which even originate in grace, there is no value derived from the person of the doer ; but all are, on the contrary, rather defiled and corrupt, who that is endowed with common sense would assert that, an individual's working merited eternal glory *ex condigno*, by doings to which he has communicated nothing, if it be not his own pollution ?

But that our opponents may not make it any objection, that these authors, although they were Romanists, yet savoured somewhat of heresy ; let us hear those also, who, to all appearance, are anxious to defend the merit arising from condignity ; for these, too, in reality, vote on our side of the question.

William, Bishop of Auxerre, lib. 3. tract. 16. quæst. 2. ad octav., observes, *that as respects what the Gloss states, that the sufferings of this present time are not deserving of reward, we answer, That indeed they are not worthy, so as to merit it, that is, as being of value in proportion ; yet they are worthy for meriting it simply, viewed as acts of obedience to God.* By distinctions such as these, the case argued for by Rome is plainly abandoned, seeing the author retains the mere name of merit, and sets aside any notion of a proportion, as existing between the reward and the merit itself.

19.—Bonaventure, lib. 2. dist. 27. art. 2. quæst. 3., observes: *If it should be objected, that there cannot exist a merit of condignity, because there is no proportion in the work to meet the reward, we have to say, that although there is not a proportion in all respects equal, yet there is some corresponding proportion ; just as the fruit is correctly said to be correspondent to the seed.* But this is mere shuf-



fling: for condignity intimates an equality of value, such as there ought to exist between the price and a thing bought; not a relative value, such as subsists between a seed and the tree which springs from it; which will be evident thus: Suppose some one to have received, as a gift from a gardener, the seed of some fruit-bearing plant, and soon after to bring back the same seed, and entreat that he would give him even the tree itself, laden with fruit; for that he had brought a price sufficient to purchase it, namely, the very seed which virtually contained in itself a tree of that description: who would not but smile at such a buyer as that, and at his notions of an equivalent? Yet thus it is that the Romanists are treating with God. They have received from him the seed of grace; and because they make a return of this to him, their notion is, that the tree itself, laden with all the fruits of happiness and glory, is due to them as a proper reward for their merit. But yet this illustration fails altogether in shewing the great difference in the two cases. For the seed of one plant produces another plant by natural power and from natural causes; but the seed of grace, such as is found in sinners, would never, by virtue of any intrinsic goodness, of itself bring us to glory; but produces this effect, through a special Divine ordination, and the merciful assistance of God himself. Bonaventure, therefore, in admitting that there is not an equal proportion between the works and the reward, but merely a kind of corresponding proportion, such as may obtain between the greatest things and the least, does, so far as words go, accord with the Romanists; but in the main point in debate coincides with us.

20.—Aquinas, quæst. disp. *de virtutibus in communi*, art. 1, thus argues: *To merit, properly understood, amounts to the performing some act, whence a man may justly acquire for himself some reward; if taken generally, then whatever puts a man into a situation which makes him worthy, as to any kind of worthiness, is called merit.* Now to this quotation let us add a second: \*—*Between God and man there is the greatest inequality;—hence there can no justice intervene as regards an absolute equality, but only in reference to a*

\* 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 1.



*certain proportion, in so far as each works according to his own measure.—Man therefore cannot place himself in a position of merit with God, unless on the pre-supposition of its having been so arranged by God; namely, that man should attain that from God, in virtue of his own exertions, which God had imparted to him the power of performing to perfection.* Let us throw this into a syllogistic form, that the meaning of Aquinas may appear clearly. He who in the proper sense merits, acquires thereby for himself a reward, to be dispensed on terms of a just equality: But men are not in a position to acquire anything for themselves before God, if it is to be meted out according to the measure of justice; therefore, properly speaking, they have no merit before him. Hence it is clear, that good works done by grace are certain conditional duties, which God requires from all on whom he intends to bestow life eternal; but not meritorious services, for the value of which we acquire life eternal, as an equivalent return.

It remains that to these more ancient Romanists we add the opinions of the moderns also, whom the unconquerable force of truth has compelled, sorely against their will, to join the camp of Protestantism; and let us begin with the confession of Councils.\*

\* If any examination is made into Romish authors, or the writings of persons claimed as adherents of that Church, we are constantly being reminded of the vain boast of *Unity* in that Babel communion, excepting in the point of supremacy, and making money. As the Rev. S. Frost observes in his *Narrative on the Rule of Faith*:—

“The Church of Rome boasts much of the unity which arises from *her* Rule of Faith; but are the Lay Members of her Communion aware of the sects and divisions which exist within her bosom? Are they aware of the different opinions held by the Scotists and Thomists, the Dominicans and Franciscans? Are they aware of the controversy between the Transalpine Divines (as they are called) and the Gallicians, regarding no less important a point than the *official* infallibility of the Roman Pontiff; the former asserting, and the latter denying it? Are they aware that Popes have anathematized the principles and decrees of their predecessors? Of such matters, I affirm, they are profoundly ignorant. There may be, and there is, an *external and artificial uniformity* amongst the members of the Church of Rome in general, resulting from the use of the same ritual and ceremonies, and from a blind and slavish submission to one common authority; but this is not to be confounded with that “*unity of Spirit*,” which can only exist as the result of *inquiry and conviction*. The boasted Unity of the Church of Rome is nothing more than a wholesale and negligent acquiescence in the assumed authority of that Church, which is yielded by her members from accident, prejudice, custom, or fear; which de-



21.—The Council of Sens, which was held in the year 1528, under Antonio à Prato, Archbishop of Sens, and a Cardinal of the Roman Church,\* thus decreed :†—*All mercy shall make a place for every one, according to the merit of his works,‡ not by absolute condignity, indeed, but rather by gratuitous and free grace.* You perceive that the term *merit* is retained by these Romanists, but that a meritorious condignity is denied ; and that the excellence of the reward is referred, not to the sufficiency of the work to claim, but to the gratuitous promise of Him who vouchsafes to reward. Now such expressions as these cut the very sinews of the doctrine of merit of condignity, on the very admission of the Jesuits themselves, as you shall presently hear from Vasquez.

22.—The Canons of Cologne, in the manual which they added to the Council of Cologne, held in the year 1536, under the title *De Justificatione*, thus write :—*The Scripture is not afraid to call life eternal the reward of good works ; not that we should suppose our good deeds to be worthy of life eternal, or that life eternal is due to them in consequence of the worthiness of the works themselves ; for who is so stupid as to entertain such notions ? But rather because to our faith, which by these works he set in exercise within us, it is that God has freely promised life eternal.§* Here we find such persons as venture to maintain the meritoriousness of

mands the total suppression of their private judgments, and which is, in fact, an *uniformity of ignorance*, and not a *unity of opinions*.”—See *Achill Herald* for November, 1844, p. 131.

[ \* Vide Dupin, Cent. xvi. p. 197.]

† Decret. xvi. [The proceedings and decrees of this Council were published separately :—Decreta Provinc. Concilii Senonensis celeb. sub Rev. Domino Antonio à Prato, &c. folio, Lutet. Paris. 1529.

Testimonies, however, quoted from such a source as this Council, are of little or no deciding value. All the errors of the Church of Rome might be supported from the pages of this same Council. The heading of §. xviii. (folio 21. recto) is, *Ad principes Christianos exhortatio, ut elaborent pro hæreticis exterminandis*. A few specimens of the notions entertained, and meant to be defended, by the concocters of the Council, may be easily seen in Taylor's *Ancient Christianity*, vol. ii. pp. 449., 50. See also, Evans's *Statutes of Lateran*, p. 58.

‡ Referring to Ecclesiasticus xvi. 15.

§ Apud Vasquem l. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3. disp. 214. cap. 1. [See also, the Translation of *Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. i. p. 53., and p. 547. Dupin, *Eccles. Hist. Cent. xvi.*, book 2. chap. 32., includes a long abstract of the proceedings of this Council.



works ranked as stupid; whilst those who, on the contrary, acknowledge life eternal to be the free gift of God, are decided to be Catholic.

23.—Clingius\* in his *Common-places*, lib. 1, cap. 14, remarks:—*Because what is finite bears no proportion to the infinite, and seeing that all our works are finite, but grace, and justification, and life eternal are infinite; therefore, God owes nothing in return for our works, but always gives freely.*

24.—Hosius† in *Confess.* cap. 73, affirms:—*No act originating in love, and carried on in love, however good it may be, is worthy of life eternal from anything intrinsic; it becomes worthy of life eternal solely in consequence of meeting with acceptance from God.* He quotes these words from one Stephen Brulifer‡ but he himself approves of them, and embraces the same opinion. The whole chapter is well deserving of being read through, containing, as it does, numerous testimonies derived from noted authors, against a merit of condignity as is now maintained by Papists.

25.—Alfonsus, in his work against heresies, lib. 10., under the word *Merit*, writes: *Although our works are, of themselves, unworthy of glory, and we can acquire no right thereby*

\* CONRAD CLINGIUS, a Minorite, and Warden of Erfurt, in Germany. He wrote *Catechismus Catholicus—item Summa Theologica, seu Compend. Doctrinæ Christianæ*; Coloniae 1582. “De Justificatione caute legendus est,” is the observation Molanus thinks necessary in reference to his writings, in *Miræi Scriptores*; sæc. xvi. p. 176., as re-edited in the *Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica* of Fabricius, Hamburgi 1718. And Wadding, the annalist of his Order, remarks:—“alia scripsit, quæ vel exuberantis ingenii vitio, vel hæreticorum fraude corrupta correctione indigent; unde donec expurgentur, in Indice Romano omnia ejus opera indicantur suspensa.” *Scriptores Ord. Minorum*; p. 93., Romæ 1650. And this is one way in which Rome manages to *fabricate* her unity, by suspending everything she does not like! This produces unity of one description to be sure—they all *hang* together!

† UPON HOSIUS, Bishop of Varmia, the restorer of Rome’s nearly lost empire in Poland—regained, be it remembered, in a great measure, by incessant Jesuitic intrigue, aided by Protestant dissension *among themselves*,—see Krasinski’s *History of the Reformation in Poland*, vol i., a very instructive work on these two heads. See also note, p. 98. *supra*.

‡ STEPHEN BRULIFER:—A doctor of Paris, of the Order of Friars Minors, who taught Theology at Mayence and at Metz, towards the end of the Sixteenth Century. See more in Dupin’s *Eccles. Hist.* Cent. xv. chap. iv. p. 100, vol. xiii. —“Opuscula ejus prodierunt Parisiis an 1499, et ibidem apud Jo. Parvum an 1500. Obiit autem ipse in Conventu Bernonis provinciæ Britanniæ.” Wadding *Scripp. Ord. Min.* (ut *supra*) p. 320.



*to receive eternal glory; yet because a merciful God has promised to the man who keeps his commandments, that he will give him life eternal, God has put himself, as it were, in debt, not to repay our works, but to his own benign will.*

Not to be tedious, however, I must pass by Pighius, Ferus,\* Isidore Clarius, and others, who attribute the obtaining at last of the crown of life eternal, not to any intrinsic value in man's works, but to the extrinsic acceptance of God himself. Nay, Vasquez even will bear testimony in our favour, and acknowledge, that all those writers whom we have cited, and many others, accord with the Protestants as to the main point. Thus, says he:† *It may happen, that if we do not assign the true cause and principle of merit, while differing in words only from the Protestants, we may, in reality, be agreeing with them, and whether we like it or not, may be compelled to come into their opinion; and that this has been the case with some Catholics, who have engaged in this controversy, will appear plain enough a little onward.‡* For, while upholding the real principle of merit in the works of the righteous, they have lessened their value to such a degree as to seem almost absolutely to deny it. The writers, who have thus extenuated the value of merit, have been neither few, nor men of the lowest cast; as is evident from Vasquez himself, who mentions their names, and gives the opinions entertained by them; and to me it seems probable, that, owing to the great weight of their authority, the Fathers of Trent, who are continually

\* JOHN FERUS, or *Wild*, a Franciscan Monk, and Preacher at Mentz, in the Sixteenth Century; had so much Catholic feeling about him, that the Church of Rome, in order to make a Sectarian of him, has actually done what its writers *falsely* charged the Protestants with doing,—has altered and corrupted his Commentaries on St. Matthew and St. John to make them speak in accordance with strict Papal Orthodoxy. “*Commemorandum est fatum, quod Commentarius Feri in Matthæum expertus est; hic enim an. 1559 die 16 Junii in censura Facultatis Theologiæ ut plenus Hæresium et errorum damnatus, et Indici Librorum Prohibitorum annumeratus est. Comparent etiam in Indice Expurgatorio Hispanico et Romano edit. Mædrit. 1667, Comment. Feri in Johan. Evang. et Epist. 1. Ejusque exegesis in Epist. ad Rom., necnon Examen Ordinandorum, nisi fuerint ex impressis ab 1577.*” *Dissert. Historica de Joh. Fero teste veritatis Evang.*; 4to, Ulm. 1723, p. 11. Crashaw's *Roman Flasifications* gives numerous instances of Popish juggling with his writings.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 3. disp. 214. cap. 1.

‡ Vide cap. 5.



chattering about merits, did not venture to pass any definition respecting the meritorious worthiness of men's doings.

In what has preceded you have had a confirmation of our doctrine; let us now bring forward the arguments of our opponents.

## CHAPTER LX.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ROMANISTS IN FAVOUR OF MERIT OF CONDIGNITY.

IN the preceding chapter we gave at length our opinion and arguments against the justness of any claim for merit of condignity; now let us hear what the Romanists have to say in defence of the doctrine.

But, in the first place, you will observe what is the character of this merit of condignity, which is contended for by the Romanists; namely, such a merit as bears an intrinsic proportion in value to the reward; or, in which there is a commensurateness and adequacy between the work and the reward, when taken at the just valuation. Hence, that common definition in Coster:\* *Merit is a free act, to which a reward is due on the score of justice.* And Vasquez to the same effect:† *Merit of condignity is that which, of its own nature, demands such a reward as an equivalent remuneration, and a legitimate compensation; according to a correct valuation of the service and the recompence.* If in this sense the works of the regenerate are proved to be meritorious of eternal glory, let our opponents gain their cause; if, on the contrary, they are unable to effect that, to oppose to us the mere name of *merit* as a convincing argument, is idle and ridiculous.

\* In Enchirid. *de merit. bonorum operum.* [The Enchiridion Controversiarum of Coster, a Belgic Jesuit, appeared first at Cologne, in 1585, and excited a controversy. Alegambe, in a long article, represents Coster as a very accomplished person—Vide *Biblioth. Soc. Jesu*, p. 221., Edit. Romæ, 1676: See also, Allport's *Sall's Church of England*, p. 37. note.]

† In 1. 2. disp. 213. cap. 5.



Bellarmino has treated the subject of this controversy at great length in his fifth book on Justification, in which he asserts, that it is the opinion commonly entertained by Papists, that *the good works of the righteous are truly and properly what merit (merita) life eternal* (cap. 1). And afterwards, in the 16th chapter, he adds that, they are meritorious of life eternal *ex condigno*. But it was by no means necessary to divide this point into two questions; for if good works are *truly* and *properly* meritorious of life eternal, they are also meritorious *ex condigno*. For a merit of congruity, or *impetratory* merit, so frequently mentioned by the Schoolmen, is an imperfect kind of merit, improperly so termed, in name only, not in reality; for merit, in its strict sense includes, in its own nature, an equality or worthiness for receiving the reward, of which it is said to be meritorious. For in this respect the argumentation of Vasquez is correct enough, when he writes, that *the true notion of merit consists in this, that the work be worthy of glory, on the score of equality of condignity*.\*

With these observations premised, let us discuss the arguments of Bellarmine. And first, seeing that the word itself is not particularly liked among our Divines, he says,† that *the term merit is itself evidently contained in the Scriptures, or at least is very deducible from them*.

1.—The first testimony which he brings forward is taken from Ecclesiasticus, xvi. 15., *All mercy shall make a place for every man, according to the merit of his works*. Here is [says he] the very word merit!

I answer that, in the first place, when we deny either that the term merit, or the thing, is to be found in Scripture, we intend the Canonical Scriptures, not the Apocryphal. Secondly, if our opponents make their references to the apocryphal writings, it is but right that they should argue from the originals themselves, not from the errors of the Latin version. And the text in the Greek stands thus:—Πάση ἐλεημοσύνη ποίησον τόπον\* ἕκαστος κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ εὕρησει. *Make a way for every work of mercy to all; for every one shall find according to his works*. The Latin translator has consequently introduced the word *merit* on his own authority,

\* In 1. 2. disp. 213. cap. 6.

† Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 5. cap. 2.



since it nowhere appears in the text. But Bellarmine, Vasquez, and others affirm, that it matters not whether we say, *God shall render to every man according to his works*, or, *God shall render to every man according to the merit of his works*. Nay, it matters much; For, to render according to the merit of works in the Papistic sense, is to make a return in value proportioned to the claim which such works have for receiving a reward; but to render according to the works, in the true and pious sense, means nothing more, than to render according to the quality of the works, that is, that the reward be good, when the works shall be good; bad and miserable, when the works are bad. Gregory the Great speaks excellently to this effect: \*—*If the happiness of the saints is the gift of mercy, and is not acquired by merits; what is to be understood by* (Prov. xxiv. 12) *THOU WILT RENDER TO EVERY MAN ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS? If it is bestowed according to works how can it be deemed a gift of mercy? But to render according to the works is one thing, and to render what is claimed as an equivalent for the works themselves is another. In the expression, according to the works, the quality itself of the works must be understood to be meant; that whose works soever shall be manifestly good, his shall also be the glorious recompence. For no labour can be proportionate, no works can be compared, with that life of blessedness, in which man lives with God and from God. Nay Vasquez himself,† who thinks that from this form of speech, according to his works, the doctrine of the merit of works may be established; forgetting himself, replies in another passage,‡ that, ACCORDING TO does not, in St. Paul's writings, mean an equality between merit and the recompence made, but the quality of the recompence answering to the quality of the works; namely, that glory and honour is to be rendered to good works, but punishment and shame to bad ones. In this sense we are willing to acknowledge that God will render to every man according to his works.*

2.—Heb. xiii. 16: *Do not forget to do good, and to im-*

\* In explan. septimi Psalmi pœnit.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 213. cap. 2.

‡ Disp. 215. cap. 4.



*part, for by such sacrifices God's favour is obtained.\** Although the Greek word is *ἑυαρεστέῖται*—*is delighted, or well pleased*; yet (says Bellarmine) it may very correctly be rendered, *favour is obtained (promeretur)*, for we say, and with the utmost propriety, that an individual deserves well of another, when he does that which is pleasing to and delights him. Add to this, that by the word *ἑυαρεστέῖται* (*well pleased*) being joined with the word *hostiarum* (*sacrifices*)—it is meant, not only that God is pleased with good works, but is even conciliated and induced to do good to those who work well. And what else [asks Bellarmine] does this mean, than that good works are meritorious?

I answer that, to give to the verb *promereri* a passive signification is barbarous, so far as concerns the use of the Latin language; and that, if we regard the teaching of Scripture, the interpretation of Bellarmine is mistaken. For the circumstance, that a man does something which is pleasing to God and delights Him, does not render him forthwith deserving of that favour with which God, in regarding such an action, rewards it. When the ungodly repents, it is pleasing to God, and this his repentance is delightful to God; yea, moreover, in regarding it, God bestows upon him the blessing of forgiveness; yet the sounder Schoolmen themselves deny that any one can merit the forgiveness of his sins, or justification. These two things then: *To do an action pleasing to God*, and, *to merit with God*, are not of the same import. Besides, Bellarmine's addition, that *God is not only delighted, but is appeased by works of beneficence*, is quite erroneous. For such works are not pleasing to God, unless they are done by those towards whom he has become

\* In the English version of the New Testament, published at the College at Rheims, the words run in the early editions—"And beneficence and communication do not forget, for with such hostes God is promerited." (Vide Fulke's *Refutation of the Rhemish Testament*.) In later editions the words have been altered; the above rendering is according to what is now termed the *Douay Bible*: on which the *Dublin Review* for 1837, p. 476, makes the following remarks:—"To call it any longer the *Douay* or *Rhemish Version* is an abuse of terms. It has been altered and modified till scarce any verse remains as it was originally published; and so far as simplicity and energy of style are concerned, the changes are in general for the worse." So that there are "errata" elsewhere than in the English authorised version it seems! Occasion may well be taken here to direct the reader's attention to Fulke's *Defence of our Translations of the Bible*, published by the Parker Society.



reconciled in Christ the Mediator. When they are done by these, they are sacrifices, not *expiatory*, but *eucharistic*; and they induce God to shew favour to the doers themselves; not for the sake of the *condignity*, or *merit of their works*, but because of *the faithfulness of the Divine promise*, and because of *the paternal love* with which God embraces his children in Christ Jesus, and bountifully rewards all their services, however imperfect.

3.—Bellarmino, in order to prove the doctrine of merit, adduces the passages in which believers are called *worthy* of such and such a reward. For what we call *to merit*, the Greeks call ἀξία, that is, *to be worthy*; and *merit* they call ἀξίαν. And such words frequently occur in the Scriptures. Thus, 2 Thess. i. 5—*That ye may be accounted worthy of the kingdom of God*. Rev. iii. 4, *They shall walk with me in white, for they are worthy*; and xvi. 6, *Thou hast given them blood to drink, for they are worthy*. In all these passages, and many others, *to be worthy* [argues Bellarmine] means nothing less than *to merit*.

I answer that, in the Holy Scriptures, the saints are said to be *worthy* for this or that thing, not because they have intrinsic merits commensurate for claiming and obtaining whatever may be given; but because they are so attempered, that, according to the Divine determination, they are fit persons to whom, by God's favour, such a reward should be imparted. The term *worthy*, then, does not prove that there is any merit, in the strict sense of the word, in him who is pronounced worthy of the kingdom of heaven; it proves merely, that he has that disposition or fitness, which God requires to be previously existent in those upon whom he bestows the heavenly kingdom. For as the truly penitent is said to be worthy of pardon, not because the penitence itself has merited pardon as a payment, but because it contains that disposition to which God has resolved to grant pardon: so the believer, cultivating holiness, is said to be worthy of the kingdom of heaven, not because our faith or holiness merits heaven deservedly, but because it contains in it that becoming disposition to which the kingdom of heaven is promised by God the Father of mercies. Hence, the Latin interpreter takes *dignum esse*, and *idoneum esse* as equivalent terms. As in Coloss. i. 12., *Giving thanks to*



*the Father, who hath made us worthy; in the Greek, τὸ ἱκανάσαντι ἡμᾶς, who hath made us meet. Hence, the Schoolmen themselves take worthiness for mere fitness, by excluding the worthiness of merit for that of which any one is considered worthy. William of Paris says:\* The merit of congruity consists in the dignity or meetness (idoneitatem) whereby any one is worthy or meet to have any thing done to, or conferred upon him. Albertus says† that the merit of worth intimates a meetness (idoneitatem) in the doer for obtaining that which he deserves, not an equality of merit [exactly proportioned] to the reward. From the term worthiness, consequently, Bellarmine should have inferred, not merit properly so understood, but (as the Schoolmen speak) a merit of congruity, that is, a state of mind adapted and fitted for receiving something. Lastly, should we admit that the saints are worthy of the kingdom of God and the heavenly glory, and that, too, by merit strictly and properly understood; still it remains to be proved that this merit arises from our works. For our reply will be, that this is a borrowed merit, which all the members of Christ derive from their Head, who superabounds in merits, agreeably to what Bernard says:‡ I confess I am not worthy, nor can I obtain the kingdom of heaven by any merits of my own; but my Lord obtaining that by a double right, namely, by inheritance from the Father, and by the merit of his passion, he being himself contented with the one, bestows the other upon me; and being thus presented, I claim it for myself by right, and I am not confounded. As many, then, as are engrafted into Christ, are indebted for their worthiness to his person, which is altogether worthy of the glory of heaven; they receive fulness of merits from that most fruitful fountain, namely, his merits.—[But Bellarmine goes on,]*

4.—Numerous are the passages in Scripture which contain in plain terms the word *reward*. As Gen. xv. 1., *I am thy shield, and thy exceeding great reward*. Matt. v. 12., *Great is your reward in heaven*. Revel. xxii. 12., *I come quickly, and my reward is with me*; with very many others. But *reward* and *merit* are correlative terms. For reward

\* Tractatu de Meritis, pag. 298.

† Compend. 5. 11.

‡ In vita Bernardi, lib. 1. cap. 12.



(*merces*) is bestowed in return for merits (*meritis*) as grace is given gratuitously. When, therefore, the *reward* for works is so often and so perspicuously termed a recompence, how can it be doubted, but that the works themselves, according to the manner of speech used in the Scriptures, are, with the greatest propriety and justice, entitled *merits*?

This is the primary argument of the Papists; we must therefore, discuss it the more carefully. First, then, it should be understood that by *reward* there is intended to be meant, just that advantage which any one receives from another as the price of his labour. Secondly, we must also add, that this advantage, which we call *reward*, is sometimes (according to the principle of a mutual compact or agreement, sometimes according to the disposition of him for whom this laborious service is yielded,) either more or less than the value of the work performed; at other times, it is equal, co-extensive, and commensurate with the work itself. For example: workmen, who let themselves out for labour to mean or avaricious men, receive a reward from them, but sparing and niggardly, and one which does not yield a sufficient compensation for the labour of the workmen. In this case, the worth and value of labour surpasses the worth and value of the reward. On the other hand, they who serve masters more liberal and generous, receive a reward in return for their labour, and that plenteous, abundant; and one which, if exactly weighed, is far more than an equivalent for the labour expended. In this case the value of the recompence exceeds the worth and merit of the work. Lastly, it may happen, that the reward, on a fair valuation, exactly corresponds with the labour of the workman. And it is this kind of reward alone, which pre-supposes that merit of condignity, or actual desert, which we are now discussing. In the last place, let us add what Suarez acknowledges to be perfectly true\*—*That the promise of a benefit to be bestowed, on condition of some worth required, and which is then given in regard to a certain fitness or suitability, and not because there is found in the work itself a value which can adequately claim a reward, is no hindrance to the fact, that the bestowal of the promised gift, even after*

\* Opusc. relect. de lib. divina, disp. 2. num. 44.



*the fulfilment of such a condition, is simply an act of liberality; so that the gift is gratuitous: because a work of this character does not suffice to establish a claim of justice, and, therefore, does not exclude free favour.*

With these remarks premised, I answer that, life eternal is properly enough called a recompence for good works, in consequence of the form and order which God observes in apportioning this reward. For he does not offer it except to those who are diligent, and after their toil is finished, and in accordance with the form of the agreement or promise which he had made with them. I, however, deny that a meritoriousness can be made out, as the consequence of such a reward being given; both on the ground of the imperfection of our works, and of the infinite munificence of the Divine nature, and the excellency of the reward. For God rewards not in proportion to the value of our doings, but according to the tenor of his own promises. Now it has pleased him to promise a reward infinitely more worthy and better than all our labours; therefore, it has also pleased him to bestow such a reward. Reward, therefore, does not always pre-suppose merit as its correlative; but that some labour or act has preceded, which, according to the principle of the engagement and the inclination of him who has to bestow the reward, is sometimes greater, both in quantity and quality, than the recompence made for it; sometimes is equal to it, and, in some cases, infinitely inferior and worthless, compared with the reward. And such are all human services as regards the Divine reward; hence, even this very reward is termed χάρισμα, or a free gift; since no work of ours has had in itself any commensurate value, when compared with this Divine recompence. Prosper has a very good remark to this effect (lib. 1. *de vocatione Gentium*, cap. 17.) where he says, *That they who were sent into the vineyard at the eleventh hour, were made equal to those who had been labouring during the whole day,—that they who had been toiling the most laboriously might understand, that they, too, were receiving a gift of free bounty, not a reward for their works.* It is, therefore, useless for Bellarmine to endeavour, from the mere occurrence of the word reward, to establish the Papistic merit: seeing that the reward promised may so far surpass the value of the work done, as



to bear the character of a gift entirely free. [Yet he proceeds:]

5.—The celestial prize is given to men in proportion to the measure and degree of the work and labour. For thus the Scriptures speak: Prov. xxiv. 12: *Thou shalt render to every man according to his works.* 1 Cor. iii. 8: *Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour.* Life eternal is a reward, then, [argues Bellarmine] which is given in proportion to the degree and measure of the works done.

Now, to this it has been already replied, that we receive a reward, not according to an equal worthiness or value of our works, but according to their quality; that is, they who are steadily engaged in performing good works, receive a good reward, viz., eternal life; they whose practice has been bad, an ill reward, namely, eternal death: and this is *to render to every one according to his works.* There is, consequently, *a resemblance in kind* between the works and the rewards assigned, but not *an equality in proportion.* The circumstance, moreover, that the Scriptures also intimate, that every one shall receive a reward, not only according to the quality of the works, but also according to the degree of labour, directly proves, that different degrees of glory are assigned to the saints, in proportion to the different degrees of grace exercised; but does not prove that those works of grace, by whatever saint they are performed, are themselves meritorious, that is, equal in their value to even the lowest degree of glory in the life eternal. Let us illustrate this by a simile. Suppose three husbandmen to have laboured in tilling the field of some prince, one of whom laboured for only one day, another for three, and the third for six days. Now, if the prince, in his munificence, should present to one of these a thousand talents, to the other three thousand, to the third six thousand, it is manifest, that the reward assigned to each of these is measured not in proportion to the different degrees of labour; yet it would be foolish for any one, hence, to make the inference, that the six days' labour spent in the cultivation of the field, had meritoriously deserved the six talents. We must judge in a similar manner concerning the Divine remuneration. For, although we admit that God metes out to each a different



degree of glory, in proportion to the different measure of his labours; yet it does not hence follow, that an equality of proportion has been maintained between the work and the reward of one and the same individual; but as respects the different works, and the different rewards of the various individuals, there has been maintained an equality of proportion. If, then, the service of each man be compared with his reward, namely, life eternal, an infinite inequality may be perceived; but if the works of different men, and the rewards of different men, be compared, as respects the degrees of eminence in this life eternal, an accurate proportion is discernible. And this is *to render to every one according to his labour*.

6.—A sixth argument is derived [by Bellarmine] from those passages which testify life eternal to be the recompence rendered to good works, in such a way as to represent the good works to be the very reason why life eternal is given. Matt. xxv. 34, 35.: *Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you. For I was an hungred, and ye gave me to eat, &c.* Likewise, verse 21.: *Because thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things: Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord.* And Revel. vii. 14, 15.: *These are they who have come out of great tribulation, &c. Therefore are they before the throne of God.* In which passages the particles *for*, *because*, and *therefore*, are all particles causal; works are, therefore, [argues Bellarmine] causes meritorious of life eternal.

I answer, that even conceding all the points which are laid down in the premises, there is nothing else deducible, than that good works are causes, not of our right to life eternal, but of an introduction into life eternal; nor are they *meritorious* causes, but only causes *inducing*, according to the sovereign appointment and gracious promise of God himself. For a right to the heavenly kingdom is given to the elect on their adoption: but the mode of attaining to that kingdom consists in faith, and the practice of holiness. When, therefore, they have walked in the manner prescribed, in faith and holiness, God at length says to them, *Enter ye into the heavenly kingdom, for I was an hungred, &c.* These works, therefore, do not deserve heaven, which was



prepared for the elect from the beginning of the world, and freely bestowed upon the adopted, for Christ's sake; they are merely certain inducements, to which God is wont to have a regard, when he admits them into the possession of heaven; and that, not on account of the meritorious worthiness of these works, but as having respect to his own benign and liberal promise. Just as if some earthly king should adopt a poor man for his son, and should promise that he would give him a share in his kingdom, upon condition that he would faithfully and earnestly wage war against his enemies; he might, after a desperate battle, thus address him: *Take, if thou wilt, the sceptre and the crown; for thou hast contended bravely against mine enemies*; yet this particle *for* would never go to prove, that to the battle it was owing that he had justly merited the kingdom. So, when God has adopted us graciously among his children, and has munificently promised us life eternal, if we fight a good fight of faith, and lead a life of holiness; he may, after a life piously and faithfully spent, say, *Inherit the kingdom, for thou hast done the things which I commanded thee*: and yet it would not, as a matter of course, follow, that those works were the meritorious cause of this kingdom being acquired, but that they were the means or conditions of arriving at it.

Nevertheless, Bellarmine objects: Supposing it was Christ's intention to shew that works of mercy are the true cause why the reward of eternal life is given to righteous men; what language, pray, could he have employed, better adapted to set it forth than this, INHERIT THE KINGDOM, FOR I WAS AN HUNGRED, AND YE GAVE ME MEAT, &c. ?—To which I answer, that he might have said, *Receive the kingdom due to you; for your works have been sufficiently worthy to claim this heavenly glory*. For, that this particle *for* proves the efficacy of a meritorious cause, no grammarian, no logician, except Bellarmine alone, ever imagined. But in the last place he urges, also, that by the particle *for* in those latter words—*Go, ye cursed, into everlasting fire; for I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat, &c.*—there is indicated the operation of a meritorious cause; and that, therefore, the case is the same in the former. To which I reply, that that is no valid consequence; since it is not



from the nature of the particle, but from the nature of the thing, that evil works are shewn to be deserving of death eternal. Nor is it correctly inferred, that because evil deeds deserve eternal death, good works, consequently, merit life eternal. For (as Bonaventura remarks\*), *There is a far greater display of glory in recompensing what is good, than in punishing what is evil.* Add to this, that in evil and ungodly works there is an absolute violation of the law of God; while good works fulfil it but imperfectly.

7.—A seventh argument is deduced by Bellarmine from those passages where it is said, that a reward is to be rendered to good works on the ground of justice; 2 Tim. iv. 8., *There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just Judge, will render to me in that day.* And Hebrews vi. 10., *God is not unjust, that he should forget your works.*† Since, then, [he argues] *to acquire merit of condignity*, is the same thing as *so to act, that such a reward shall be due to oneself on the score of justice*; it follows, that *good works do possess merit of condignity*; because they make the reward of eternal life due to the worker, and that for justice' sake.

If Bellarmine means justice, properly so called, he must maintain that life eternal is due to good works on account of the equality of the one thing to the other. For the recompence which is made to a man on the score of justice, is, as a matter of course, paid to him to preserve strict equality. And so, indeed, our rigid sticklers for good works argue, who assert that eternal life is just as much acquired to good works, as some estate or country seat is bought by the payment of the fair value. *Heaven is set before us as saleable*, say the Jesuits of Cologne, *to be secured by condign merits as an equivalent price.* They, therefore, who affirm that this reward is due, on the score of justice, properly called, ought to maintain an equality of worthiness, or value, between the works of the regenerate and the kingdom of heaven. But this equality we have already refuted. I answer, then, that God is said to be just in the distribution of this reward, and is assumed (the thing itself being impossible) to be unjust, if he should not

\* Lib. 2. sent. dist. 27. art. 2. quæst. 2.

† Douay version.



give life eternal as a recompence to believers acting well ; not on the ground of justice, properly speaking, seeing that would imply a merit of condignity, (for it pre-supposes an equality between the work done, or the labour expended, and the reward apportioned as a recompence for the labour) ; but on the score of justice, as ordinarily understood : from which the existence of merit cannot be inferred. Aquinas makes this point very clear in these words :—*The rule of the wisdom of God is, as the law of his justice, namely, that which is agreeable to his upright and just will. Hence, what God does according to his own will, he does justly ; even, also, as in what we do in accordance with law, we act justly. —For God is a law to himself.* From which words our reply is, that God acts justly, when he confers eternal life upon those who live righteously ; not because, in so doing, he has any reference to the worthiness or the merit of our works, but because he acts thus in accordance with the pre-ordination of his own good will. On the other hand, (assuming again the impossible supposition) he would be acting unjustly, if he did not make a proper recompence to good works ; because he would be acting against the most just rule of his own will ; not because he would be withholding from us something properly due to those works on the ground of justice, strictly speaking, which consists in an equality being maintained between what is given and what is received. It is, moreover, very well known, that faithfulness to promises is a *potential* part of justice, as the Schoolmen say, not a *subjective* part of it ; and hence it comes to pass, that God is said to act in obedience to the claims of justice, when he bestows the reward of life eternal upon good works ; not because he observes any equality between the worthiness of the works and the rewards ; but because he maintains faithfulness in the performance of his promises. Merit cannot, then, be proved from this meaning of the term justice.

8.—An eighth argument is raised by Bellarmine on such passages as teach that life eternal is promised to good works : *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments ;* Matt. xix. 17. *Every one that leaveth house, or father, &c., shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life ;* ibid, verse 29. *Godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come ;*



1 Tim. iv. 8. *He shall receive the crown of life which God hath promised to them that love him*; Jas. i. 12. Now a promise (he says) which is made in connection with a condition of something to be done, not only turns the promise into a debt, but leads to the conclusion, that he who has fulfilled the work may be said to have deserved the thing promised, and be a claimant for a reward as due to him of right.

I answer, that since the Divine promise is but a declaration of the Divine purpose to confer a kindness upon some one, either absolutely, or upon some superadded condition; there is no ground to infer, either from an absolute or a conditional promise, the existence either of a debt of *justice* on the part of *God*, or of *meritorious deserving* on the part of *man*. Not from an absolute promise, because its character is *annunciatory*, rather than *obligatory*. As Bonaventura observes,\* *The Divine promise does not involve any obligation, but intimates merely an arrangement of the Divine liberality*. With this statement Durandus accords, and so do very many others; who affix no other interpretation to the expression—the promise of God—than, the infallible announcement of the purpose of God. The promise, therefore, does not occasion the thing promised to be due as a debt of *justice*, but only as a debt of *faithfulness*; neither does it argue *merit* on the part of the *recipient*, but mere *liberality* on the part of the *giver*.

But our opponents will urge, that, although an unconditional or absolute promise does not imply a debt of justice on the part of God, or merit on the part of man; yet a conditional or stipulatory promise (such as are the promises of God to bestow life eternal under stipulation of obedience) does, on the condition being fulfilled, bring God into a situation rightly to be considered our debtor, on the principle of justice; and we are rightly said to merit what is promised by God.

We do not admit, however, even this. For, in the first place, although there is a promise of life eternal in two ways, under a covenant of works, yet by neither is there any thing to establish the proof of merit. Life eternal is promised to

\* Lib. 2. sent. dist. 27, art 2. quæst. 3.



those who act well, according to the *legal* covenant ; that is, if they shall perform the whole law, and violate no one point of it through the whole course of their life. Now, there is no one who fully complies with this condition ; hence, it is evident, that all who work, instead of acquiring *merit*, incur a *curse*. Again, life eternal is promised to believers who do well, according to the *evangelical* covenant ; in this case, however, as the covenant pre-supposes man to be first accepted to life eternal in Christ the Mediator, and as it supposes, also, the forgiveness of daily sins obtained through faith ; it is founded on favour, not on strict justice ; neither does it prove the existence of merit on the part of man, but of munificence and mercy in God.

Secondly, though a conditional and stipulatory promise, which is set before us, is also fulfilled by us, yet that will not prove that God is indebted to us on the score of justice, or that we have merited the blessings promised, unless the conditions imposed had reference to the performance of some act not previously required as a duty. An example will make this plain. God promises forgiveness and justification to the repentant sinner ; yet, on this required condition being fulfilled, the individual will not be considered as *having merited* justification, but to have *obtained it freely*, and this, too, the Romanists themselves being judges.

Lastly, supposing the condition fulfilled, that will not render obligatory the payment of the benefit promised, either on the score of justice, or from the meritoriousness of the worthiness thereof ; unless the engagement had been made for work proportioned to the reward itself, as respects equality in worth or value. If an individual promise his servant a thousand pounds for four or five days' diligent service, seeing there would, even after the service had been performed, be no adequate proportion between the duty and the reward, there would be no ground for boasting of his merit ; on the contrary, he must praise the munificence of his master. In like manner, when God promises eternal life as a return for our miserable works, inasmuch as they are so disproportionate, they are not meritoriously deserving of the reward promised. But concerning the influence or effect of the promise of God, we shall have more to say when we come to consider the second proposition.



9.—The last argument adduced by Bellarmine is derived from those passages in which God is said to be a just Judge, and no respecter of persons. Rom. ii. 11. : *There is no respect of persons with God.* Gal. ii. 6. : *God accepteth no man's person.* Acts x. 34. ; *Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons.* 1 Pet. i. 17 : *If ye call on the Father, who judgeth without respect of persons, &c.* But to have respect of persons is the fault opposed to distributive justice ; that is to say, when a judge gives a reward apart from a consideration of merits, or a greater reward to inferior merits. God, then, in making a recompence of rewards, has a view to the merits of men, and assigns the mansions of life eternal according to the difference of those merits. Hence Augustine says,\* *If there are not merits, how shall God judge this world?* Protestants, therefore, [concludes Bellarmine] who set aside merits, set aside an article of the faith concerning the future judgment.

I reply: This argumentation is unsound in every part. In the first place, respect of persons, so far as it is faulty and opposed to justice, cannot attach to God, in whatever mode he may distribute his rewards. The reason is, because he does not dispense these rewards from the property of another, or from the common stock, as human judges do ; but from his own, and without their being due to us. Whether, therefore, he gives equal rewards to unequal services, or unequal rewards to equal services, he is not transgressing against the rules of distributive justice, properly so called, inasmuch as he can always plead, *May I not do what I will with mine own?* Matt. xx. 15. The term, however, *προσωποληψία*—*respect of persons*, from which God is declared in Holy Scripture to be exempt, is employed *figuratively*, and not in its *formal* or primary sense. For as among men, the umpires of the public games, formally, and in the strict sense of the word, fall into that fault of *respect of persons* which is opposed to distributive justice, when rewards which, according to the laws of the constitution, are due to the brave or learned, are by them conferred upon their relations or the opulent ; so God would incur some resemblance of unjust respect of persons, if the spirit-



ual rewards, which, in accordance with the Divine arrangements are set before men of faith, of holiness and piety, were given by him to men of rank or wealth ; or to any other persons, without any regard to their faith and holiness.

In the next place, even though we should grant that God, following out his free and gracious determination after the manner of an impartial judge, dispenses unequal rewards, proportioned to the inequality of grace and of the good works by which they were distinguished in this life ; yet no argument for any worthiness of merit is thence deducible. For the merit of condignity supposes an equality of one thing to another, and appertains to commutative justice, in which an arithmetical proportion obtains between the work and the reward ; but a geometrical proportion may be the rule observed between different persons, in cases where an arithmetical proportion did not hold between the works of each, and the rewards allotted to each. Let us suppose, that, in the army of an earthly king, some particular soldiers, who had signalized themselves, were elevated to the peerage ; so that some should be created Barons, some Earls, some Dukes, according to the different degrees of valour manifested ; it is clear, that howsoever a kind of geometrical proportion were maintained between the valour and the reward of one, and the valour and reward of another, yet between the valour of the individuals and the reward, arithmetical proportion was not maintained.\* For the reward of nobility exceeds in value the exploits of any soldier ; for which, the honour of knighthood, or a less, perhaps, would have been an adequate reward. To adapt the comparison, then, to the present case—When God, the Supreme Ruler of heaven and earth, bestows an eternal life of happiness upon each of the soldiers of Christ who maintain their conflict bravely ; yet, in that eternal life of happiness, bestows on some of them a different and pre-eminent measure of glory, in proportion to the different measure of grace which they have pre-eminently improved, he avoids that *respect of persons* which the Scriptures put far away from God, and maintains a proportion between the works and the rewards of different individuals :† and yet this is no proof that the

\* [ Might not 1 Cor. vii. 7., have been referred to ? ]

† Vide Aquinatum, in 2. ad Rom, pag. 10. lit. B.



valour of any, even the most distinguished soldier, is fully equivalent to the reward of a life of blessedness, or to the rank which he holds in that life, if the equality of the one to the other were regarded. God does not make his recompences, then, in proportion to any meritorious value in the works, seeing that each man's reward exceeds the value of his works; but with reference to the quality of the works, for to good works he recompenses a good reward; having a view, also, to a certain proportion in the service accomplished, inasmuch, as the larger and more holy the services, the more abundant and conspicuous are the rewards.

Lastly, our opponents' citation from Augustine, that *in taking away merit we set aside the future judgment*, is both puerile and nugatory. If we should deny merit in the sense in which Augustine intends, we should, indeed, be setting aside the article concerning the future judgment. But with Augustine and the whole body of the Fathers, by *merit* was understood nothing more, than a good work springing from the grace of God, and destined for glory. The existence of such works we willingly recognise; but that these works are so free from pollution whilst we remain in this body of sin, or are performed by us with so constant, and as intermitting steadiness as to merit life eternal *ex condigno*, this we deny; neither has Augustine ever affirmed it. There will be, therefore, a judgment according to the quality of the works; but there are no rewards assignable as intimating a claim in the worthiness of works.

Thus far have we replied to those arguments of Bellarmine which are contained in his fifth book on Justification, chapters 2 and 3: others, also, which are put forward in the 17th chapter, must now receive our attention.



## CHAPTER LXI.

## OTHER ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE DISCUSSED.

THE main object of the arguments of Bellarmine, which have been already enumerated, was an endeavour to shew, that the works of the regenerate are truly and properly deserving of eternal life itself: He then adds some other arguments, by which his aim is to prove, that they are not merely really, and in strict language merits, but moreover, merits possessed of condignity. I think, myself, that it is silly to make any distinction between these two questions; for what is not meritorious *ex condigno*, is neither truly nor properly meritoriously worthy to receive the reward given, but is only impetratory. But let us proceed to sift Bellarmine's reasonings.

He endeavours, then, to prove that these works of the regenerate are proportionate and equal to the reward of eternal glory, and that they are, consequently, meritorious *ex condigno* of the same reward, and that, even independently of any engagement; although God would not be bound to recompense them with so great a reward, if an engagement had not intervened.

1.—Life eternal is *grace for grace*, as it is said in John 1. 16; that is, [Bellarmine argues] the grace of *reward* for the grace of *merits*, as it is explained by St. Augustine, Epist. 105., and de rat. et lib. arbit. cap. 9. Now between grace and grace the similarity and proportion is great.

I answer, that as respects the sense of the passage, when it is said that we all receive out of Christ's fulness, and *grace for grace*, the meaning is, that we receive daily from Christ one grace added to another in succession; the particle *'αυτ'* being put for *'επι*. Beza says, he never met with this particle so used by any classical author; but I remember that



our most learned Downes\* has noticed this use of this preposition 'αντι in Theognis, in these lines,†

Τεθναίην δ', 'ει μή τι κακῶν ἄμπαυμα μεριμνῶν  
'Ευροίμην, δόσης τ' 'αντ' 'ανιῶν ἀνίας.

*But may I die, if I may not experience some respite  
from oppressive anxieties,*

*And if thou wilt still give sorrows upon sorrows.*

It is, consequently, very absurd to argue, one grace upon another is poured out from the fulness of Christ on all believers, therefore works are meritoriously deserving. But he would support this argument, tame as it is, by the interpretation of Augustine. He explains χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος as *the grace of life eternal in return for the grace of good works or merits*. True, Augustine does say that life eternal is called *grace*, or a *free gift*, because we produce those works to which the recompence of the crown of life eternal is made, by the aid of Divine grace; and that such works are by Augustine called *merits* (Epist. 105). I assert, however, that this merit of Augustine is nothing more than merit *impetratory*; just as faith is said by the same Father to *merit* the forgiveness of sins, because it *sues for* (*impetrat*) that blessing. Bellarmine's closing argument that, *between the grace of the merit, and the grace of the reward, there is a certain measure of proportion*, is of no weight, unless he could prove at the same time that there is a degree of commensurateness and equality in value: There is, forsooth, some kind of proportion between an ox and a mouse, and yet, if a man were to give a mouse, and solicit an ox in return, he would be deservedly regarded as acting ridiculously.

2.—Bellarmine argues that life eternal is *the river making glad the city of God*, Psalm xlv. 5.‡ And the grace of doing well is *a fountain of water springing up into eternal*

\* ANDREW DOWNES, Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge, and one of the Translators of the Apocrypha, appended formerly to the present authorised English Version of the Scriptures. He was accounted one of the best scholars of his time, and was one of the learned men whose notes accompany Sir Henry Saville's famous edition of Chrysostom's works. He died in 1625. Townley's *Illustrations of Biblical Literature*, vol. iii., p. 303: See, also, Wood's *Athensæ Oxoniensis*; edit. by Bliss; vol. ii. col. 314., and Fuller's *History of the University of Cambridge*, p. 228., edit. Lond. 1840.

† Part of a prayer addressed to Jupiter.

‡ Psal. xlv. 4. in the English version.



*life*; John iv. 14. Now a fountain bears some proportion to a river, yea, contains this whole river virtually. Besides, water ascends as high as it descends in depth; but the grace of the Spirit descends from heaven, and therefore, in a due proportion it springs up unto life eternal.

I answer, that metaphorical expressions such as these are unsuitable for establishing theological doctrines. *It is not correct to employ metaphors in argument*, says the Philosopher, in his latter Analytics, lib. 2. In the next place, the river of which the Psalmist is speaking denotes a real river, even that which washed Jerusalem. If any one of the Fathers took eternal life to be denoted allegorically by this river, it will not forthwith follow, that whatsoever corresponds to a river in nature, is also applicable to eternal life. Moreover, it is not the quality itself of grace, or the works originated in it, which is the fountain of water springing up into life eternal, but the Spirit of grace which Christ pours into the hearts of the godly. The gifts of grace are as streams flowing from this fountain. Admitting, then, that the fountain may itself contain within itself life eternal, yet it follows not that every drop of water will forthwith acquire a proportion of merit commensurate and equal to the life eternal. Lastly, Bellarmine ought not so to wrest his philosophical observations about the equal ascent and descent of water, as to infer that, whatever portion of grace descends from heaven has a meritorious power of bringing us in safety to the same heaven. It is enough if it has an *appointed tendency* towards the attainment of the kingdom of heaven, although it does not possess an intrinsic *worthiness*. For the gifts of tongues, of miracles, of healing, of prophecy, all descended from heaven; yet they did not, by any merit of condignity, convey those who were endued with them to heaven.

3.—Life eternal [says Bellarmine] is the penny a day given to labourers in the vineyard, Matt. xx. Now a penny a day is proper payment for a day's labour. For the penny a day is so called because it was ordinarily used in common reckoning for the payment of a day's labour. Works, therefore, do [he argues] *ex condigno* merit life eternal, just as a day's labour earns its penny a day.

I answer, that the scope of the parable is to shew, that there is no cause why men should murmur against God, or



envy others, who have the advantage over them as to time, seeing that God is able, of his own good pleasure, to make the latter equal to the former. And it is quite irrelevant to be picking from particular parts of the parable arguments and doctrines, in opposition to the general scope of it. I may add, also, with reference to the penny a day, that if it be emblematic of eternal life, it is to be considered as the recompence of the day's labour, solely on the ground of the munificence of the promise of God ; and not from any value in the services, which could claim as due an equivalent return. For what is there to hinder God from promising a reward of such a description to the labourers in his vineyard, as infinitely to exceed the toils of the workmen ? — [Bellarmine proceeds.]

4.—Grace is the seed of glory, according to that saying, 1 John iii. 9., *The seed of God remaineth in him*. Now the seed is not, indeed, equal to the thing of which it is the seed, as to bulk ; but yet is it virtually equal. For as the seed, (in the proper application of the word, namely, to animal or vegetable seed) in a physical manner virtually contains the entire tree or animal, so grace shed abroad in the heart, in a moral and meritorious sense virtually contains glory itself. The works of grace are, therefore, [he thinks] meritorious of glory *ex condigno*.

We answer, first, that the Apostle John intends by *seed*, according to some interpreters, *the word* of God ; according to others, *the Spirit of God Himself* ; who, they say, is so called, inasmuch as by his efficiency, as by a kind of seed, we become new creatures. If we admit these explanations, Bellarmine's argument derived from the metaphorical application of the word seed, falls to the ground. But let that pass : let *seed* in this passage signify the quality itself, of that grace of sanctification, of which man is made the recipient, and which characterises him in his new birth ; it remains with us, in the second place, to reply, that the seed of no tree or living creature is of the same value, or possesses the same worth, as the tree itself, or the animal itself. If any one should offer the seed of a tree to a gardener, and should say that he wished to purchase the tree itself at the same price, as an equivalent, he would verily become the laughing-stock of all. For admitting that such a power does



exist within the seed, that it becomes at length a full grown tree ; yet potentiality cannot be drawn out into action by the influence of the seed, but by that of the sun. Moreover, it is not said that, in consequence of this potentiality, the seed exactly corresponds with the full grown tree, as to the measure of its value ; but that, in reference to its matter, it is instrumental to the development of the tree which is involved in it. In the same way the act which is termed *meritorious*,\* does, we admit, by the implantation of grace, and by the Divine appointment, tend to the bringing forth of the fruit of glory ; but that appointment is in the way of *means*, not as if competent to claim the reward of glory in the way of *meriting*. Thirdly, should we admit that the seed of a tree or of an animal does contain in itself something equivalent physically to the tree itself, or to the animal which springs from it ; yet, that this quality of incipient grace resembles in this respect the seed of a tree, or of a brute animal, we must deny : we affirm, on the contrary, that it far more resembles the human seed ; which does not virtually contain that which constitutes the formal characteristic of man, namely, the heavenly mind, but only certain arrangements for the reception of such a mind. Durandus, in fact, seems to me to have intimated as much, when he says,† that grace is called *the nursery of glory* ; merely *metaphorically*, not *properly* ; because from seed, properly so called, a tree, or an animal, is raised by the natural powers appertaining to the creature ; but glory follows not from grace by any such natural power, but in consequence of the gracious appointment of God. Lastly, even if this quality of infused grace did, in a moral and meritorious sense, virtually contain glory also, and were equivalent to it, false as this most certainly is ; yet it would not hence be proved, that any work whatever which flows from this grace, is, on the principle of condignity, meritorious of that glory. We have already noticed the reason of this ; namely, that it is not the influence of pure grace alone which exerts itself in our actions ; the poison of concupiscence also acts its part in them. Good works, therefore, cannot derive from

\* Vide Cajetanum in 1. 2. quæst. 114. art. 7.

† Lib. 2. dist. 27. quæst. 2.



the seed of grace any claim of worthiness for the reward of glory.

5.—Bellarmino further argues that eternal life is a certain act which is supernatural as to its object, and as to both its efficient and its formal principle: But a good or meritorious work which consists in love, is also an act supernatural as to its object, and as to both its efficient and its formal principle. They, therefore, bear a mutual proportion, and the one leads the other straight, as it were, to its proper destination.

I answer, the conclusion here drawn is not the question under discussion. For we grant that good works are *the way to the kingdom*, to use Bernard's words; but we deny that they are *the meritorious causes of reigning*.\* We admit, also, a degree of proportion which may be conceived to exist between things utterly unequal; but we deny that there is any proportion or worthiness in any good work whatever, equivalent to the purchase of celestial glory, and *that* is what we are now discussing. Lastly, although a work of love is supernatural in its object and principle, as is also the beatific vision; yet all supernatural things are not equal in value one with another; neither is the imperfect love which in this life we exercise, meritoriously deserving to receive the enjoyment of the beatific vision which we shall obtain in the life above.

6.—[But Bellarmine again remarks.] It is God who has decreed that the elect shall be at length brought by their merits to life eternal as the crown of righteousness; without doubt, then, he bestows upon them merits of such a character, that by them they do truly and properly, and therefore, *ex condigno*, attain to the possession of the crown of life. For it is impossible that there should be any want

\* See page 81, above. It may be observed in this case, that Grotius very consistently (shall we say?) acts with Rome, almost as usual:—

“Nunc addit [Grotius] causam esse bona opera, *non viam tantum ad regnum, quanquam non primariam*. In quo ex adverso se opponit Bernardo, cujus verba adduxeram, *via ad regnum, non causa regnandi*. Nec veram *et* propriam esse causam consequentiæ denotat, non causam rei, et rationem antecedentium et consequentium, in quibus non est relatio causæ ad effectum, sed ejus quod in executione præcedit ad id quod consequitur ex Dei ordinatione.

“Non est enim eadem ratio peccati et bonorum operum in genere causæ mortis vel vitæ. Rom. vi. 13: *Stipendia peccati mors, gratia autem Dei vita æterna in Christo Jesu Domino nostro.*” *Riveti Opera tom. II. p. 1072*



either of wisdom or power on God's part for the accomplishment of such an object.

I answer, that this argument is grievously faulty, assuming, as it does, the very matter in debate. We assert that God has decreed to bring believers in safety to life eternal by the merits of Christ, and by the free gift of God himself in Christ; not by a meritorious condignity arising from their works. The use of the word *crown*, does not imply, as a matter of course, the presence of the merits of condignity in him who is crowned; it intimates merely, that God, when he crowns believers, does so with their pious labours and excellent works in view; and the crown of infinite value which he places upon their heads, is the product of his own munificence and promise, not a return for the worthiness of the pitiful works which they may have performed in this life. Life eternal is, therefore, a crown of righteousness—a crown of such value and dignity as God of his good pleasure is able to bestow, but such as we never could have merited *ex condigno*. Thus says Fulgentius, lib. 1., ad Monimum, cap. 10.

7.—[Bellarmino adds further.] Our merits depend upon the merits of Christ; as well because he merited for us the capability of meriting, as because we merit as being living members of Christ, and by the influences received from him as from our head: To consider, therefore, our merits to be so imperfect as to be meritorious not *ex condigno*, but merely on the principle of the Divine acceptance, is to detract from the glory of Christ.

I answer,—We acknowledge that those things which are called our merits, that is, pious works, and such as are destined for obtaining reward, do depend upon the merits of Christ, and that in a two-fold respect: First, because Christ himself merited for us this power of well-doing; secondly, because the merit of Christ is the cause why a person, though still infected by sin, is yet accepted of God as though he were quite free from it; it is, also, the reason why the works of the same person, although they are defiled by sin, are, notwithstanding, even pleasing to God, and ordained to attain the celestial reward. And with reference to Bellarmine's addition, that *the members merit through the influence of the head*; if by *merit* he means nothing more than that



he performs works which are ordained for the reward of eternal life, he has our concurrence ; but if he intends besides, that those works which are done by the members of Christ are worthy of, or commensurate, or equal to this reward, we shrink with our whole soul from this proud error. Lastly, when he urges that our view detracts from the glory of Christ, seeing we affirm that all our good works are imperfect and impure, and therefore, are not *ex condigno* meritorious of eternal glory ; we answer, that this our opinion, true, as indeed it is, tends rather to increase the glory of Christ, than to diminish it in any way. For, just as it forms part of the glory of Christ, that believers, weak in themselves, and in their present state not entirely cleansed from the defilement of sin, are yet accounted holy and justified in Christ ; so it makes for his glory, that the works of believers, stained as they are by much defilement, and unable as they are to come up to the exact rule of the law, are, nevertheless, accepted on account of the same Christ, just as if they were in every way complete ; and they obtain the reward promised to observers of the law, just as readily as if they had satisfied the Divine law in every particular. The glory of our salvation, therefore, which they divide between Christ, inherent grace, and our own works, we claim for Christ alone, whole and undiminished. To have merited life eternal for his members, and that *ex condigno*, is the province of Christ alone ; to have received this life eternal for the sake of these merits of Christ, is matter of glory enough for all the pious, even the most perfect.—And thus have we met the arguments of our opponents.

Bellarmino could not find any of the Fathers advocates for the merit of *condignity* ; he has quoted several as favouring merit, *vaguely so termed* : *De Justif.* lib. 5. cap. 4., but he has lost his labour, since these words *to merit* and *merit*, denote nothing else among the ancients than to seek or obtain a reward, by means of a good work destined to receive such a reward from the mercy and promise of God.

But those good Fathers, not only did not approve of this doctrine of *condignity*, but rejected it in express and clear terms, as we made evident at the very beginning of this discussion ; and also, at somewhat greater length, when we brought forward testimonies from them for the confirmation



of our own views. I am unwilling, therefore, to trouble you with an examination of the opinions of the Fathers which are cited by Bellarmine. Let this one answer be sufficient for all. That kind of merit which is put forward by the Fathers, is not a work equivalent to, or *ex condigno* meritorious of eternal life; but the pious work of a believer, acceptable to God, and which will meet its reward in life eternal, according to promise.\*

Thus far have we established the former proposition which we laid down in the beginning, and have vindicated it from the objections of our adversaries: let us now pass on to the latter.

\* On the use of the word *meritum* and *mereor* in the writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers, it may not prove unuseful to adduce the following passage from Archbishop Usher:—

“For the better understanding of the meaning of the Fathers in this point, we may observe, that *merits* in their writings do ordinarily signify nothing but works (as in the alleged place of Bernard): and *to merit*, simply *to procure*, or *to attain*, without any relation at all to the dignity, either of the person or the work; as both in the last words of Ambrose is plainly to be seen, and in that passage of Bernard concerning children promoted to the prelacy, that they were *more glad they had escaped the rod, than that they had merited* (that is *obtained*) *the preferment*. And therefore, as Tacitus writes of Agricola, that by his *virtues he merited* (that is to say, *incurred*) *the anger of Caius Cæsar*; so St. Augustine saith, that he and his fellows for their good doings at the hands of the *Donatists*, instead of thanks, *merited* (that is *incurred*) *the flames of hatred*. On the other side, the same Father affirmeth, that *St. Paul, for his persecutions and blasphemies, merited* (that is, *found the grace* to be named a *vessel of election*; having reference to 1 Tim. i. 13.—*Who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious; but I obtained mercy*; where, instead of ἡλεήθην, which the vulgar Latin translates *Misericordiam consecutus sum*, St. Cyprian reads *Misericordiam merui, I merited mercy*. Whereunto we may add that saying which is found, also, among the works of Augustine: *That no sinner should despair of himself, seeing Paul had merited pardon*; and that of Gregory: *Paul, when he went about to extinguish the name of our Redeemer upon earth, merited to hear his words from heaven*; as, also, that other strain of his concerning the sin of Adam, which is sung in the Church of Rome at the blessing of the taper: *O, happy sin, that merited* (that is, *found the favour*) *to have such and so great a Redeemer*. Howsoever, therefore, the ancient Doctors may seem to those who are not well acquainted with their language, to speak of merits as the Romanists do; yet have they nothing common with them but the bare word: in the thing itself they differ as much from them every way as our Church doth.” —Usher’s *Answer to a Jesuit*, chap. xii. ; or, Cambridge edit. 1835, p. 478.



## CHAPTER LXII.

STATEMENT OF THE SECOND PROPOSITION CONCERNING THE  
MERIT OF GOOD WORKS.

HAVING made good the former thesis against the doctrine of Papistic merit, we will now proceed to a consideration of the latter. In the former we have been engaged against the opinion, that the good works of the regenerate are in themselves meritorious *ex condigno* of life eternal,\* and that God is, either in justice or gratitude, placed under obligation through them, to make such a return to the workers of them. But since the more perspicacious among the Romanists perceived, that God cannot in this way be laid under obligation by any works of men, and that no such condignity attaches to any of the works, which themselves owe their origin to regenerating grace, they were compelled to have recourse to other expedients, which I will first present to you in extracts from the authors themselves; after which I will establish my own proposition, in opposition to them, and refute the contrary arguments of our opponents.

There are, then, among the Romanists, those who do admit that good works, even considered as flowing from sanctifying grace, are not binding, so as to place the Almighty under obligation to make a recompence of eternal glory, on the score of mere justice; and that they have not, in themselves, a perfect and complete worthiness for claiming such a reward; but holding as they still do to the notion, that merit of condignity must yet be retained, they assert that, in consequence of the Divine promise or covenant intervening, God is bound, not only for *fidelity's sake*, but in the rigour of *commutative justice*, to make the recompence promised; and that, by virtue of this covenant, there accrues to these works themselves a kind of equality, or full proportion of

\* Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 214. cap. 4., &c.



merit of condignity. On these points, however, they do not exactly agree among themselves. Alfonsus de Castro lays it down, that it is not to any peculiar or extrinsic value, as regards the works themselves, when produced by the regenerate, that this meritorious worthiness is owing; but that it must be referred to the Divine ordination. And to this the following words refer :\*—*In order to contribute a perfect ground of meritorious worth, it is not necessary that the reward be claimable as owing to the quality of the work itself, it is sufficient that it be due from the conditions. For a condition can render equal what is in its own nature unequal :—and hence it comes to pass, if that promise were set aside, things become equal, which, on any other supposition, would have remained unequal.*† And not much after : *The promise having been made and an agreement entered into with us, the good works of man do, with the assistance of Divine grace, become worthy of life eternal, and those things an equivalent for it, which, without that promise on God's part, would have been altogether unworthy of so large a reward. And in this appears the greatness of the mercy of God, upon which our merits entirely depend, that he has been pleased to put that inestimable reward of life eternal,—a reward in its own nature surpassing all our merit—at the price of our works done by grace, and to promise it as a remuneration for our services.*

To this writer we may add Gregory of Valentia, who philosophises in much the same style about the condignity of merits. For he ascribes two effects to the Divine promise:‡ One is, that God is thereby bound in justice to confer the reward promised; the other, that in consequence the works which were not before in themselves considered equal to claim the reward, do, by virtue of the promise, become thenceforth sufficient. I wish you to observe, that although Alfonsus as well as Gregory is desirous to retain the notion of the merit of condignity, yet both of them concede, that

\* Alfonsus, advers. hæres. lib. xi., under the word *opera*, about the middle.

† The translator has been unable to find this passage in the editions of De Castro's works printed at Lyons in 1546, or in that at Antwerp 1543. The first edition at Paris, in 1534, contains passages omitted in subsequent editions: See Joh. Voght Catalogus historico-criticus librorum variorum; edit. 1793, p. 231.

‡ Controvers. tom. 2. disp. 8, quæst. 6.



the works of the regenerate, even produced by the aid of grace, are not from their own intrinsic dignity an equivalent for the celestial reward ; but that they acquire a character for meritorious worth, in consequence of the promise or independent ordinance of God, which they would not have possessed apart from this promise. And hence Gregory charges Melancthon and Chemnitz, and other of our Divines, with want of information, who were, he says, totally unacquainted with the grounds on which merit rests ;\* inasmuch as they admit that the merit of good works springs from the Divine promise,† and yet are unwilling to allow a worthiness or merit in the works for receiving that recompence.

On the other hand, however, Bellarmine and Suarez, although they have recourse for solution to the Divine promise, with the purpose of defending the merit of condignity by virtue of the promise ; yet their object in this is rather to shew, that God is bound, on the score of just dealing, to make the promised return ; than with an intention of proving, that the works themselves acquire some new and greater value as connected with a promise. But let us hear what they have to say themselves. *The question is, (says Bellarmine‡) whether good works are meritorious ex condigno, on the principle of an engagement merely ; or, on the principle of the work merely ; or, on the principle of both, unitedly : — To us, the more probable opinion seems to be that which teaches, that the good works of the righteous are meritorious of life eternal ex condigno, on the ground of the covenant, and of the work taken together ; not but that a good work, apart from any compact, bears a value proportionate to life eternal ; but because God is not under any obligation to accept the good work for the bestowment of that reward, unless some agreement has been entered into. Thus far Bellarmine. Suarez agrees with him : I think*

\* Opusc. de div. grat. part 14. cap. 6.

† “ Etsi fateamur Deum promissis suis teneri, quia verax est et fidelis, cum tamen promiserit sub conditione, quod fatetur Jesuita [Bellarminus] si mandata ipsius servemus, cum nemo sit qui ea perfecte impleat, quod supra probavimus, sequitur Deum nulli homini teneri, quia nullus conditionem implevit perfecti. Si ergo remunerat Deus opera imperfecta, id gratuito facit non quod teneatur, nequidem ex pacto, jure stricto.” Riveti Catholicus orthodoxus ; tract. iv. quæst. 17. §. 5.

‡ De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 17.



(says he\*,) *that it constitutes the perfection of merit, that the very work, considered of itself, or regarded morally as it comes from the hands of its author, bears a sufficient proportion and a condign value, in regard to that reward, for the reception of which it is ordained; for in any other view, that equality would not be adhered to which justice requires.* — *And, besides this proportionate value of the work, I think that the promise of God is also necessary. For merit is an act to which a reward is due ex justitia. Hence, it is not enough that the act have a condignity and proportionateness to the reward; but it is also necessary, that it have the power of imposing an obligation on the principle of justice, on the ground on which the reward is due to it. Now no act can have such a power with God, unless it be founded on his own promise or engagement.*

See into what difficulties the defenders of the merit of condignity are thrown, and how impossible it is that they, who are at variance with the truth, should have any agreement among themselves. Alfonsus and Valentia were not slow at perceiving, that the works of grace do not possess an equality or proportionateness to the reward of eternal glory; and were, consequently, reduced to the necessity of asserting that this equality owes its birth to the covenant itself, and that a new value accrues to the works, by means of which they acquire the condignity of merit. On the other hand, Bellarmine and Suarez perceived that it was quite absurd to imagine, that a work should be indebted for its value to the munificence of a promise; and, therefore, came to the decision that good works are of themselves worthy and proportionate to the reward; but yet they assert that a promise or covenant is required; because merit implies the course of proceeding for the attainment of the reward on the plea of a debt of justice; but no debt of justice can be binding on God to recompense our works, however worthy, unless an engagement on his part is in existence; but when an engagement has been made, then the works become properly meritorious, and God is bound, in justice, to make a payment of the reward. So say they. We affirm that they are both mistaken, and against both we lay down this second proposition:—

\* Suarez in 3. qu. 19. art. 3., disp. 39. sect. 1.



2.—The good works of the regenerate which are not, in themselves, considered worthy of life eternal, and do not bind God to the payment of so large a reward on the plea of justice, cannot, from any engagement or promise of God, acquire either meritorious condignity, or the power of obliging God to make recompence, according to justice, properly so called.

We shall not dwell long on the subject of this second position, because almost all the former arguments which militated against an unqualified merit on the score of condignity, are just as applicable for subverting also this merit of condignity, grounded on the supposition of the existence of an engagement. But proceed we to the arguments.

### CHAPTER LXIII.

PROOF THAT WORKS DO NOT ACQUIRE CONDIGNITY THEMSELVES, AND THAT NO RIGHT TO LIFE ETERNAL, IN STRICT JUSTICE, ACCRUES TO THE WORKERS, IN CONSEQUENCE OF A DIVINE PROMISE.

FIRST, then, let us proceed against Alfonsus, Valentia, and others who support the same opinion, and admit that good works are not an equivalent for, or worthy the reward of, life eternal, considered apart from the promise; but yet, on a promise being added, maintain that they acquire an equality and condignity by virtue of the same.

We argue against these reasoners in manner following:—

1.—The condignity or condition of any work as sufficient to claim a reward, arises from the equality in degrees of excellency which are found to exist in both. For, if in the reward there is excellence or worth greater than in the work, it is clear that there is not that equality or parity of worth which we call *condignity*. Now the Divine promise, since it is something extrinsic, does not add or attach any new worth or value to the work, which it did not possess antecedently to the promise. Since, then, the works of the regenerate possess not, as our opponents themselves admit, an



equality or worthiness for eternal glory apart from the promise; neither can they acquire it after the promise has been added. For what springs independently from some cause, as, for instance, from the internal excellence of a thing, does not increase whilst the excellence remains in one and the same state.

But some are accustomed to answer that, Although the bare acceptance of God, which has reference to an act, as an object which it assumes as existing, can neither physically nor morally make any change in the same act; yet the conditional promise which precedes the work itself, founded as it is, in some measure, on such promise, contributes much towards increasing the moral value of the work.

But, on the other hand, in the first place, the whole school of Theologians protests against this notion; for when enumerating certain circumstances, through which the evil and the good quality of actions is either diminished or increased, it has never reckoned a preceding promise among the contingencies which increase the goodness of an action. Next, since a promise is but a declaration of the Divine will with regard to the acceptance of certain actions for certain rewards; they who admit that the acceptance of God does not increase the value or worth of a work, ought also (if they desire to speak consistently) to admit, that a promise can neither change nor increase the same. In fine, to assert that *the promise precedes the work itself, that acceptance follows it; and that, therefore, the former can affect the value of the work, the latter can not*, is a false and imaginary distinction. For a conditional promise of reward, either pre-supposes, or includes the Divine acceptance also of such a work, if performed, to such a reward. While a work is remaining yet incomplete, both the promise and the acceptance has preceded it; but in each case, conditional or hypothetical; the work, however, being accomplished, both at once become absolute. Since, therefore, the Divine acceptance does not increase the value of the work, neither will a Divine promise increase it.

2.—A second argument shall be derived from the contrary position. The *demerit* of *evil* works is not increased by the threatenings denounced; therefore, the merit or worth of good works is not increased from the promise. The reasoning



is the same on both sides. Nor are our opponents able to make out, why the circumstance of a promise preceding should increase and enhance good actions to such a degree, that thence they should become equal and commensurate to claim the reward, to which, while the promise was withheld, they had not been equal; and yet the circumstance of threatening preceding, should not, in the same proportion, increase [the guilt of] evil works, so that they should become commensurate to the punishment, which, without such threatening attached, they would not deserve. To talk in this way, however, is absurd, as may be shewn in reference to justice, Divine, as well as human. For instance, if God should threaten him, who admitted even an irregular thought into his mind, although he should not in the least consent, with eternal punishment; in the common opinion of the Papists, a sin of that character would, notwithstanding, remain in its own nature venial, and worthy of temporal punishment merely, not of eternal. And God, in inflicting eternal punishment, would be acting as the Lord of life and death of his own absolute power; but the circumstance of such eternal punishment being threatened, would not render it on that ground suited for, or exactly answering to, the fault specified. So, also, if an earthly king should threaten his subjects with the penalty of death for some light offences, every such fault would not be rendered capital from its own desert by the threatening. By parity of reasoning, therefore, when God promises a recompence to our good works, larger and more excellent than they deserve from their own intrinsic goodness and worth, they will not, thence, acquire a new worthiness, nor become commensurate to so great a reward.

3.—If the value of our works should receive increase from the promise of God, then, the more enlarged the promise, the more would it increase: hence, it follows, that from the measure of the Divine promise the proportion of human merit may be properly estimated. But this is erroneous, nay, it is ridiculous; and many are the perplexities in which this dreamy notion of some writers of the Church of Rome would involve them. For, in the first place, it would hence follow, that the mercy and liberality of God in giving the promise, would have the effect of shutting out, or at least



of diminishing his mercy and liberality in the fulfilment of the promise. For mercy is exercised when it gives a reward to the unworthy ;—liberality, when it gives a reward exceeding the worth of the works done. But if, in consequence of the promise, however munificent, there is forthwith produced an equality and condignity of the work for receiving the promised reward, God, when he pays what he promised, always requites like for like, and cannot, therefore, in such a case, exercise an act of liberality. Secondly, if God, by promising such a reward, should cause the work performed to be accounted equivalent to the same, the consequence would be, that the least and easiest works might surpass in worth, or at least equal, the greatest and most difficult. For if God, of his own most free will, promises the same reward to him who suffers death for the sake of Christ, as to him who, for his sake, bestows a cup of cold water upon a poor man—each of these works, according to their doctrine, at once becomes equal to this reward ; but those things which are equal to some third thing, must be also equal to one another. Thirdly, if this be the effect of the Divine promise, that from thence works become equal to the reward promised, which, if there were no promise, would not be equal ; then, if God had promised life eternal to moral works done from the power of man's free will alone, these natural works would become meritorious of glory, and that *ex condigno*. This notion, however, runs counter to the general opinion of the Schoolmen, who have decided that, among the circumstances necessarily requisite to constitute merit of condignity, the seed of grace is one, without which the works of man can bear no value at all proportionate to the fruit of glory. In fine, if the promise of God should increase the value of our works, and should raise the same to an equality with the reward promised, works which are in themselves considered indifferent, would become proportionate to the celestial reward, if God be assumed to have given to them any such promise. For (as the Logicians rightly lay it down, that) *that which may be predicated of any thing, so far as it possesses a certain quality, may be also predicated of every thing which possesses the same quality* : If, therefore, the possession of a full worthiness for the reward is predicated of works, on the ground of their



having the promise of God concerning the bestowment of such a reward ; then, this equality or meritorious worthiness may be also predicated of any work whatever, which has such a promise attached to it. But this is so contrary to reason that it needs no refutation.

4.—It may be shewn from human contracts, how false and absurd this opinion is. For, if in such contracts, an agreement which is entered into for granting some remarkable reward for a little labour, or for selling some rich estate for a few pence, does not so change or increase either the quality of the labour, or the value of the pence, that they should become an exact equivalent for the reward, or for the estate aforesaid ; so neither does an engagement on God's part, of dispensing the reward of eternal glory, in return for our little and insignificant services, either increase their worth, or change their condition, so that they should immediately become proportionate and equivalent to this infinite reward. But when transactions of this kind occur among men, there is no one so stupid as not to understand it, so ungrateful as not to acknowledge it. For if an individual should purchase, at the low price of a few pence, estates by no means dear at many pounds, he would never assert that the value of his little money was increased by virtue of the agreement, and made equal and proportionate to the thing bought. Nay, he would acknowledge rather the great liberality on the part of the vender, who had turned over to him a thing of such value at so trifling a price. In the same way are we to regard the engagement on God's part,—the singular liberality of God in his promises is to be acknowledged, not the worthiness of human works to be founded in, or built upon, those promises.

5.—We prove by examples, that a worthiness or equality in a work answerable to the benefit promised, is not an immediate consequence of the Divine promise.\* God (as we

\* “Referemus mercedem hanc, quam Dominus dat, non ad meritum hominis accipientis, sed ad bonitatem vel liberalitatem, et veritatem Dei promittentis atque dantis, qui cum nihil debeat cuiquam, promisit tamen se suis cultoribus fidelibus mercedem daturum ; qui interim dat eis etiam, ut ipsum colant. Sunt multa præterea indigna Deo, et imperfecta plurima inveniuntur in operibus etiam sanctorum ; quia vero Deus recipit in gratiam et complectitur propter Christum operantes, mercedem eis promissam persolvit.”—*Confess. Helvetica post.*, in *Collectio Confessionum in Eccles. Reform. publicatarum* ; Lip. 1840, p. 498.



have already repeatedly remarked) promises remission of sins to the penitent, and yet Gregory de Valentia does not venture to affirm that penitence is meritorious *de condigno* of the first grace. A Divine promise, then, made on the condition of some work to be effected, does not confer an equality or worthiness sufficient for the reward promised. Moreover, it is an opinion commonly entertained among Papists, that many spiritual benefits are promised to good works which precede justification and the infusion of habitual grace; yet they do not become worthily meritorious of such benefits by virtue of this promise, even by their own confessions. For they lay it down, that the remission of sins is promised to almsgiving, to forgiveness of injuries, to prayer made in a state of mortal sin;—which works, however, do not by virtue of the promise, become worthy of such a recompence.

Our adversaries are accustomed to meet this argument by saying, that this promise of grace which is made to the sinner under the condition—*If he repent; if he forgive injuries to his brethren, &c.*—is not a proper promise or covenant, but a declaration only of a thing which will certainly occur, in order that the individual may feel assured of obtaining the benefit, if the duty enjoined shall be performed. But this is to trifle with words, not really to meet the argument. For a Divine promise is nothing more than a declaration of some benefit to be conferred on any one, either absolutely, or on the condition of some work to be performed by him. There is no difference, then, discernible in the quality of the promise, either when God promises forgiveness of sins to the penitent, or, when he promises the kingdom of heaven to those who live piously. For in both cases God announces and declares his fixed determination and unwavering purpose of recompensing a particular work by the bestowal of a certain benefit. Since, then, the Divine promise does not make the act of repentance worthy of the offered pardon; neither does his promise render their act of maintaining a pious life, worthy of glorification.

6.—If works which, as unconnected with any promise, would not have been worthy to claim the reward of eternal glory, do, by virtue of the promise, become straightway sufficiently worthy and equal for it; I ask, whence it is that



the promise secures for itself this intrinsic efficacy for elevating and dignifying our works. Here they must needs have recourse to the favourable acceptance of God for Christ's sake, in whom all the promises of God are *Yea, and Amen*. For, that all the favour which God vouchsafes, either to ourselves or to our works, beyond the inherent goodness which is found either in us or in our works, must be referred to the imputed merits of Christ, is quite clear, and is generally admitted. In holding this opinion, however, our adversaries are committed to a maintenance of the imputed righteousness of Christ—a doctrine which they so much deride when urged by us, although we do it much more consistently and appropriately. Vasquez, in his acuteness, was not slow at perceiving how the case stood, and plainly affirms: *If our works were not worthy of themselves before the promise, and after the promise become worthy; it would follow, that to bring about that worthiness which arises from the promises, the merits of Christ had been applied and imputed to them; wherefore, Christ ought to intercede, and to offer the works of his own doing, now rendered good, to his Father in this manner: FATHER, although the works of my righteous ones, though produced by my assistance, even, are not worthy the reward of life eternal; yet regarding my merits, which are most worthy in thy sight, honour them with this rich reward.* Thus says he.\* If, then, it is the promise of God which gives a worthiness to the works of men, it does not effect that by changing the quality itself, or the condition of the works, but by turning the eyes of God upon Christ their Mediator; in whom all the promises are confirmed, and through whom he designs to recompense us and our works, just as if we, and they, also, were altogether deserving of heavenly glory. But a making worthy, or a dignifying of this kind, betrays a previous unworthiness, rather than a meritorious worthiness, on the part of the thing accepted.

7.—Lastly, it is allowed by the common sense and opinion of all men, that even in contracts and covenants, there is yet an opening for a free gift or for dishonesty—a case which would be impossible if it was the invariable consequence, owing to the nature and virtue of the contract, to produce a

\* In 1. 2, quæst. 114., art. 3. disp. 214., cap. 6.



parity or equality of things, such as our opponents falsely represent. If, therefore, any one knowingly and voluntarily sells a house or a field to a friend for less money by half than it might in justice have been estimated at, suppose for four thousand pounds, when it is worth eight; what more usual than for the vender to say, that he, by this sale, had presented his friend with four thousand pounds? What more usual than for the purchaser to acknowledge that so much had been given him? By parity of reasoning, when God promises us a thing of infinite value, namely, celestial glory in return for our little works, by whatever amount the value of the thing promised exceeds the value of that which is given by us, that same amount we must confess that we receive from the free gift of God. But it exceeds in an infinite degree: the free gift of God is, consequently, infinite and pure, and (as the Scripture terms it) mere *favour* through Christ, notwithstanding the previously announced promise or agreement on the part of God. Now, on the other hand, if an agreement or promise had so much power as to effect an equality between things unequal, there would be no opportunity for fraudulent dealing between the parties contracting. For, suppose that a spurious gem had been sold to an individual for a great sum of money, the mere bargain and the contract would itself have made it equal in value, on this supposition, to the price given; and consequently, the purchaser could not in justice have complained that he had been overreached.

If, therefore, God had promised merely the rewards of this temporal life in return for even the best and most perfect works performed through grace, the effect would have been, that these temporal benefits would have become wholly equalised and proportionated to those spiritual works, by virtue of the promise alone, if Alfonsus and Gregory are correct in their philosophising speculations.

But let us dismiss these.



## CHAPTER LXIV.

THE OPINION OF SUAREZ, BELLARMINE, AND OTHERS, WHO THINK THAT GOD IS UNDER OBLIGATION FROM HIS PROMISE TO GRANT THE REWARD OF ETERNAL LIFE, AND THAT AS A DEBT TO JUSTICE PROPERLY SO CALLED, REFUTED.

HITHERTO we have been contending against the opinion of those who, though acknowledging that the works of the godly are not in themselves proportionate or equal to claim the reward of eternal glory, maintain, nevertheless, that a promise or agreement intervening, they do, under benefit of that promise, become equivalent and properly worthy of receiving the promised reward. You have seen how foolish and plainly impossible such a notion is. We now proceed to treat the argument of such as teach that the works of grace are in themselves proportionate and fully worthy of receiving the reward of glory; and that the effect of the promise is to oblige God in strict justice to make this return, who, had he been unwilling to promise, would not have been under obligation in justice to pay this reward, however worthy of such a reward the works of the pious might be. Let them speak for themselves:—*A work, however excellent and equal to the reward, cannot, from the principles of commutative justice, bind another, unless there has been a previous agreement and covenant to that effect.\** And on this point Bellarmine has expressed himself pretty correctly; but I desire to know, whether, on a promise having been made, God is under obligation, on the principle of commutative justice, to make the return promised. This is what he, though with some hesitation and obscurity, frequently puts forward thus:†—*A promise made on condition of some work being done, not only renders what was promised a matter of obligation, but produces, also, this effect:*

\* Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 5. cap. 14.

† De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 3.



*namely, that he who has fulfilled the work has merited the promised gift, and may be said to be able to demand the same, on the ground of mere justice, as his due compensation.* If we enquire, again, whether it is the natural consequence of the promise, that the individual thus meriting the thing promised, can be said to do so on the ordinary principle of debtor and creditor, here Bellarmine is aground and perplexed. In chap. 17, he asserts that good works of the righteous are *meritorious of life eternal ex condigno, not only on the ground of a compact, but for mere works' sake,—so that, in a work which proceeds from grace, there is a certain proportion and equality for claiming the reward of life eternal.* Here, as you see, he introduces proportion as well as equality. But in chap. 18, he says, *that for meriting ex condigno there is no necessity for an absolute equality between merit and reward—a proportionate one is sufficient.* But such a proportional equality as this, co-existing, as it may, with the greatest inequality, is a mere retreat in which such writers are compelled to take refuge, while they are endeavouring, at all events, to maintain that doctrine of condignity which is, notwithstanding, most evidently confuted by the disparity existing between the work and the reward. Bellarmine's doctrine, therefore, clearly enough, and in express terms is, that the promise of God involves an obligation which must be fulfilled on the principle of justice;\* but how works of grace, apart from any promise, are properly worthy of, and equal to claim the reward, according to commutative justice, he has some difficulty to make out. Suarez treats the subject more clearly: *When the promise is made, (says he†) with the condition of work proportionate being accomplished, the work having in itself a worthiness and value, the individual thus acquires a right to the thing promised.* Here, in order to establish a claim on the ground of justice, he takes for granted two points; one, that the works of the saints have in themselves a worthiness and value equivalent to the reward; the other, that God, by virtue of his promise, is bound and obliged on the principle of justice to make the promised payment good. And elsewhere, when going over the conditions which are required

\* De Justif. lib. 5. cap. 16.

† Relect. de lib. Divin. disp. 2. sect. 2. numb. 53.



for establishing a merit of condignity, among others, he mentions these two :\*—*For an action to be meritorious, it is necessary that it be proportionate to the reward, and consequently, that it have a value worthy of it, and in some degree equal to it; because the notion of merit has relation to the principle of justice. — It is also necessary that the promise of God should intervene, to form, as it were, a foundation for this merit, and for the obligation on justice which arises from it.* You perceive from these passages, that these Jesuits not only teach, that the works of the godly are equal to the reward of eternal glory; but that it is one of their positions, that, owing to the Divine promise, God is laid under obligation to pay the reward of eternal life for those works, not for *faithfulness*' sake alone, (for we acknowledge that); but on the principle of *strict justice*, and properly so called. This we shall refute by the following arguments.

1.—The false and supposititious effect attributed to the Divine promise, namely, that it places God under an obligation to the creature on the principle of mere justice, we refute, firstly, by setting forth its proper and true effect. The proper effect of the Divine promise then, is, (as the Apostle intimates, Heb. vi. 17., 18.) that it makes that immutably true and certain to us, concerning which we could not ascertain, from the nature of the thing, that it would certainly and immutably take place; because, by virtue of it, God, inasmuch as he is supremely true and faithful, is bound to make good in deed, what he promised to us in word; seeing that, as the Apostle speaks in 2 Tim. ii. 13., *he cannot deny himself.* And this debt of faithfulness is not inconsistent with the Divine nature or majesty, nay, it is nothing else than as if we should say, that God ought to act according to his natural rectitude, or, ought to work according to the determination of his own will. The Fathers agree in thinking that such a debt is consequent upon the promise. Augustine, on Psalm lxxxiii. says, *The Lord himself has made himself a debtor, not by receiving, but by promising. To Him, it is not said, Make a return for what thou hast received; but, Fulfil what thou hast pro-*

\* In 3. Aquin. tom. 1. quæst. 19. disp. 39. sect 1.



*mised.* And Fulgentius, lib. 1. ad Monimum:—*He has been pleased to make himself a debtor by his own liberality.* But that men acquire from the promise of God a claim of justice, properly so called, on the things promised, is a new scheme of some Jesuits, against which the Fathers and the sounder\* Schoolmen do well protest. To this effect Augustine, Confess. lib. 1. cap. 4., speaks—*Thou who art in debt to none, yet repayest; thou dispensest gifts as if due, yet lovest nothing.* But if in virtue of the promise we acquired a claim to its fulfilment, as a matter of justice, God would then be brought into obligations to men, and that, too, according to the laws of proper and strict justice. Aquinas, also, denies that God, after a promise has been made, and the condition has been fulfilled by us, does become thereby a debtor to us on the principle of strict justice. *Justice cannot be required by man from God, with reference to absolute equality in his doings, but as to a certain proportion; 1. 2. quæst. 114. art 1.* And a little after: *God does not become, strictly speaking, our debtor, but a debtor to himself, inasmuch as it is obligatory on him to fulfil his own determinations.* The position upheld by certain Jesuits is, consequently false, namely, that God in virtue of his promise is in justice bound to make good the reward promised; and that man acquires a right in justice to claim the same.

2.—But secondly, admitting that a promise has been made on the part of God, and that it has been fulfilled on the part of man, we prove, notwithstanding, that there is no principle of justice binding God to its fulfilment. For the notion of justice pre-supposes these two things: a debt on the part of one who is under obligation to pay it, and an equality in the thing which is given or paid, to that which has been received in return. In neither case is there any ground for a claim of justice, either from the works performed, or, from the recompence of rewards which subsists between God promising and man performing. For the debt which is supposed to exist on the part of God, is the consequence of *mere congruency* or *faithfulness*, and furnishes, therefore, no sufficient ground for the operation of justice, which ought to rest upon a *strict* and *legal* debt. The work,

\* See Archbishop Usher's *Answer to a Jesuit*, chap. 12., pp. 497—500, Cambridge, 1835.



moreover, which has been performed on the part of man, (as was before proved, and need not now be brought forward again) has not any intrinsic equality to the promised reward. Even, therefore, after the promise has been given, and the work has been accomplished, the reward is to be expected, not from the *justice*, but from the *veracity* of God.

3.—That the promise of God does not involve any obligation on the ground of justice, can be shewn from the nature of the promise formally considered. For a promise, as a promise, is nothing more than some law or regulation which the person who makes it imposes upon himself; consequently, its obligations reach no farther, either in degree or manner, than the individual intended to bind himself thereby. I ask, then, when God promises life eternal to believers, whose object it is to live piously, in what way, and how far he intends by this his promise to bind himself to us? Doubtless, as a father, who promises some reward to his dear boy, if he applies himself to learning, and conducts himself properly; or, as a kind master, who promises his servant a reward to which he has no claim, if he is careful to discharge with alacrity the due and necessary duties of his situation. But neither of these parties intended to bind himself, by virtue of his promise, to do more than the laws of fidelity or truth imposed on him; neither of these intended to transfer to his own son or servant the power of making a claim on his justice for the reward promised. Just, therefore, as the son or the servant cannot summon his father or his master into court, if he should not abide by his promise, but can only charge him with a want of constancy or faithfulness; so neither could we accuse God of injustice, properly so called, if, after a course of pious toil, he should refuse to make a recompence of eternal glory to us; but only of a violation of his faithfulness. The promises of God, then, do not involve any claims on justice, properly speaking; but place him under obligation to observe that just dealing which fidelity calls for; and this is termed *justice* improperly, because it is a virtue which bears reference to others, and added to justice, as is to be inferred from what Aquinas says, 2. 2. quæst. 80. art 1.

4.—You are aware, from the usual doctrine of the School-



men, that the parts of justice are either called *subjective*, or *potential*; the true and proper notion of justice is found in the *subjectives*; but in the *potential* there is only a certain similitude or affinity to justice, not its true and proper character. Now all that justice which subsists between God and man belongs to the latter class, in which there is a resemblance not to the former, which is called justice with a reference to its real nature. For although it may be called *justice* sometimes, when man acts holily and piously, in submission to the commandments of God; yet these pious works, as they have relation to God, are properly acts of *religion*, or of *other virtues*, not of *justice*. And thus, although it is called *justice*, when God, according to the tenor of his promise, gives to those who live piously the reward of glory; yet this performance of the Divine promise is properly the act of *faithfulness*, not of *justice*. They therefore, who, relying upon the bare term *justice*, endeavour to prove that God is, by virtue of his promise, bound to men on the principles of proper *justice*, induce confusion in the subjective and potential parts of justice, between which the Schoolmen are careful to distinguish;\* and they fraudulently obtrude that for formal justice, which is only so by a kind of similarity, and does not, in reality, come up to the character of justice, properly so called. [Again]

5.—We ought not in any way to attribute that to God which argues imperfection; and yet they who, on the promise having been made, maintain that God straightway is laid under an obligation to recompense men in obedience to the claims of justice, provided they fulfil the condition annexed to the promise, attribute that to God which, in its characteristic nature, includes imperfection,† which I shew thus:—The formal object of justice is an equality between the thing given and received; and the formal act of justice, properly so termed, is to constitute an equality between what is accepted and what is given in return. Now if any one should assert that, after a promise has been made and the work performed, God is bound, on the principle of justice, to give to men any reward or benefit whatsoever;

\* Vide Aquinat. 2. 2. quæst. 80. art. 1.

† Or, perhaps,—which in its very nature includes the characteristic quality of imperfection:—“Quod imperfectionem in ipsa ratione sua formali includit.”



he supposes God to be as it were in debt to man, and that something is wanting on the part of God which may restore the equality in accepting and repaying between him and man. Who does not see that this is utterly inconsistent with the perfection of the Divine nature, that God himself should be supposed not only to have received something from a poor worm, but to have received a benefit; and therefore, that he ought, if he would be just in his dealings, to make the proper return to man, in order that the accounts between what is given and received may be kept straight?

If works, upon the promise having intervened, bind God on the principle of justice to establish an equality between what has been given and received, by the way of recompence or reward, they would have the same effect even apart from a promise; which our opponents themselves dare not assert. The consequence is proved from the circumstance, that the promise has no effect, so as to alter the nature of the transaction in this mutual interchange. For God receives nothing more from the person who offers good works to him, after the promise has been made, than from any one who might offer the same good works, even if no promise intervened. Let them explain, then, how it is that a recompence is necessary on the part of God, in order to bring about an equality between what is given and what is received, *after* a promise, and is not necessary unless there had been a promise; since the thing given or offered to God by us is altogether the same.

But some answer\*—that even though the thing done be the same in both cases, yet no one can be bound, on the score of commutative justice, to recompense the work of another with an equivalent recompence, unless there has been an agreement to that effect; and this they are wont to explain by an example of this kind:—If any individual has been working, in fulfilment of a compact, in another man's vineyard, the master of the vineyard is bound to make the labourer a return equivalent to his labour; but if a person uninvited should have occupied himself in another man's vineyard, without any previous agreement or any promise preceding; although the same labour be worthy, in itself

\* Suarez Opusc. disput. de just. Dei, sect. 2. p. 760.



considered, of a similar reward, yet the master of the vineyard is not in justice bound to pay this reward; because there is no obligation attaching to another on the principle of commutative justice, unless his own consent has been previously obtained.

Such an answer as this, however, eludes not the grasp of the preceding argument. For, in the first place, if the reward promised exceed in worth and value the work of the individual to whom the promise has been made, there is no occasion for the exercise of commutative justice, notwithstanding the promise; because there is no equality between that which is given and that which is received. Since, then, the work is, in itself considered, not at all worthy to claim a reward, whether any agreement shall have preceded or not, it is an act of Divine *grace* and *munificence* which is put in exercise, equally in promising as in paying such a reward, rather than any interchange on the score of *commutative justice*. Secondly, if we should assume with our opponents, that there did not exist a worthiness in the work suitable for the reward; it would follow, that God, without a promise, is bound to recompense on the principle of *justice*, no less than when he has made a promise. For the only obligation which can be founded on a promise is that of *faithfulness*; whereas, the obligation on the ground of *commutative justice* must always be founded on the plea, that the labour, or the property of one man, has been employed for the benefit or honour of another. Since, then, the good works of believers do not tend more to God's honour or benefit by virtue of his promise, than if they had produced the same without the inducement of a promise; it is plain that, there is no obligation consequent, as a matter of course, on the promise of God, according to the rule of commutative justice. Lastly, as respects the example proposed, that fails in two points. First, because when any one occupies himself in tilling the field of another, without any previous agreement, the master of the field can allege that he was unconscious and ignorant of this being done; and therefore, although the exertion of another should have been turned to his own advantage, yet that he could not in justice be bound, without his own consent and will, to make him any return. But between God and man the matter



stands otherwise ; for God, although he should enter into no engagement with us about making any return, yet always sees those who are occupied, recognises them where so engaged, and acknowledges that their labours redound to his advantage, in the way in which the occupation of the godly may be made to turn to advantage for their Master in heaven. Secondly, there is a great difference in this respect also ; that although any one may perceive another person labouring in his field without having made any agreement with him to do so, and may consent to receive him among other workmen, yet he may plead that he has certainly taken the benefit of his labour, thus voluntarily offered, but that he took it as a benefit and a free gift ; and that he would not have accepted it had it not been freely offered to him. But God can never urge that he would not have received the pious labours of believers, if they had looked for any remuneration from him.

The sum of the argument is this :—The works of the godly would not lay an obligation to recompense on God, according to the rule of commutative justice, if no promise of his had intervened ; they do not, therefore, oblige him, according to that rule, when there has been a promise intervening ; since to do anything with a promise, or without a promise of reward, makes no change in the quantity of the thing given and received, the equality between which it is the business of commutative justice to effect.

7.—That there is no obligation on the behalf of justice deducible from a Divine promise is plain, because, if God after his promise should refuse life eternal to those who have lived holily, he would be transgressing his own decree, and thus would be contravening Divine immutability ; he would not stand to his promise, and thus he would be doing what is contrary to the Divine faithfulness. But yet there is no man who can assert that he has given more to God than he had received from him. He would, therefore, be doing nothing contrary to special justice, which directs an equality to be preserved between what is given and what is received. *For who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again ?* as the Apostle says, Rom. xi. 35. On this account some of the most learned Schoolmen have laid it down that God could not, strictly speaking, be said to be



guilty of an act of injustice, even should he exclude all the saints from heaven. For although he who has made a promise is bound to give as much as he has promised; yet, in case the promise originates in grace and munificence, and where the thing promised far exceeds the value of the work required, the promise itself must be looked upon *as an act of favour*, not a yielding to the claims of *justice*; and the performance of it as imposed by the obligation of adherence to *fidelity*, not as an exaction to be paid for *equity's* sake.

Thus much may suffice for the refutation of our opponents, we will now see what their arguments are worth.

## CHAPTER LXV.

THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD ESTABLISH THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONDIGNITY OF HUMAN WORKS UPON THE PROMISE OF GOD, PROPOUNDED AND REFUTED.

WE will now proceed to discuss the arguments of our opponents, and will, in the first place, ascertain what they here allege, who hold that good works are not (it is allowed) in themselves, equal to the reward of eternal glory; but are, nevertheless, rendered equal to, and worthy of it, by virtue of the Divine promise.

1.—The law of nature teaches that every promise is a debt, and that as much as is promised is due; and consequently, when a promise has been given, that things become equal which would not have been equal in the absence of the promise. The Divine promise, then, imparts a worthiness to our works. This is the line of argument employed by Alfonso, *advers. hæres. lib. 11.* under the word *Opera*.

I answer, that there is no force, nay, not even a semblance of consecutiveness in this argument. For, admitting that a promise, after the condition has been fulfilled, assumes the character of a debt; yet a promise does not generate a parity between things which are in their own natural condition



dissimilar and unequal. An equality is, it is true, to be expected in virtue of a promise, between the word of the person who makes it and the act of the same person, when performing what he has promised; that is, he is bound to bestow as much as he saw fit to promise: but there is no equality brought about, by virtue of the promise, between the reward promised and the work assigned. The liberality, therefore, of God in giving his promises, and his fidelity in making them good, is to be acknowledged, both in the promise itself, and in the fulfilment of it; but an equality or worthiness of our works for obtaining the reward of glory promised, neither is, nor can be inferred therefrom. [But, say they,]

2.—That work is meritorious of life eternal *ex condigno*, which binds God to make such a compensation: Now God, by virtue of the promise, gives life eternal, being obliged to do so, as a compensation for good works. By virtue of the promise, therefore, the works are meritorious *ex condigno*. This argument is used by Gregory de Valentia, in his treatise on Divine Grace, (part. 6. cap. 6.) where he expresses his wonder at the simplicity of our Divines, who admit that good works are compensated by the reward of life eternal, in consequence of the Divine promise; and yet are unwilling to concede that they are meritorious of this reward *ex condigno*, by virtue of the same promise.

This reasoning of Gregory cannot be admitted, on many accounts. In the first place, it is not every work which may claim a compensation, that is, as a matter of course, meritorious of a reward. Suppose some one has promised to present me a thousand pounds, to be paid on the condition that on a certain day I pay him a visit, and on entering, fall upon my knees and request the sum from him; when I have performed the task required, he is bound to the fulfilment of his promise: yet no one in his senses would say that the act itself became, by virtue of the promise, properly meritorious of so large a reward. In the next place, we are free to deny that any work of ours does oblige God to make compensation. For the entire force of obligation, as the term is applicable to God, arises from the most free will of God himself, and from his immutable veracity; not from any human performances whatever. It is necessary,



indeed, that the work enjoined be done, not as a cause obliging God, but as a condition by means of which the promise of God, which was hypothetical, then becomes absolute. Moreover, it is false, that God, by virtue of his promise or covenant, is bound to give us the reward of life eternal, if it is meant to be understood of the *legal* covenant, which is made strictly under the condition of works. The reason is manifest, in that there is no one who fulfils this covenant: for it requires perfect and uninterrupted obedience to the Divine law, without the least sin whatever; such as Christ alone exhibited. Lastly, if it is to be understood to refer to the *Evangelical* covenant, which promises life eternal to the penitent and believing, I deny, that, from compensation being made according to the tenor of its promises, any inference is to be drawn in favour of meriting on our part; seeing that, either to promise, or to grant life eternal to those who believe, repent, and aim to live piously, although they do not entirely fulfil the law, is a work of free bounty and mercy, which is quite alien\* to the notion of meriting; even admitting the existence of a gracious promise or agreement from God.

3.—They employ similitudes drawn from the power of earthly kings, from which they endeavour to shew that the king of heaven can much more, by his own arrangement, secure for our works a worthiness and equality which, from their own nature, they could not have possessed in the least, unless there had existed such an agreement. Alfonso de Castro would make the subject clear by the following comparison:† Like as at a tournament,‡ if a king should promise the knight who hurled his lance with the best effect in two encounters, a gem, in value six thousand guineas; the successful competitor in this case, would doubtless be said to have merited the gem: so, when God promises that gem of life eternal, altogether inestimable, to those who do

\* The expression of our author here is very strong—“*formaliter repugnat.*” It strictly denotes that the opposition between *grace* and *merit* does not depend on any subordinate or accidental qualities; but on the distinguishing and essential quality, the leading characteristic which Logicians call “the difference:”—which is the completest kind of opposition.

† Advers. hæres. lib. 10, in verbo *Meritum*. [fol. 160., edit. Coloniae, 1543.]

‡ See Du Cange and Carpentier’s *Glossarium Latinitat. mediæ ævi.*, under the word *Hastiludium*.



well; he who practises good works must be said to have merited it. And just as in the former case, the obligation did not arise from the nature of the matter, but from the engagement of the king; in the same light must our works be regarded. For when an agreement has been entered into, the work will, then, become equivalent to that reward to which before it could not be said to be equal; and, in a similar way, a work may be said to be owing to him that worketh, which otherwise would not have been due. [So they.]

I answer, that an engagement entered into by an earthly king, does not change the nature of a work, neither can it add any worth or excellence to it, which in itself, and from itself, it possesses not previously. When, therefore, he promises to those who exhibited their superior dexterity in jousting, a reward both greater and more excellent than is called for, when the nature of the thing is considered, there is, it may be truly said, an exhibition of his own royal munificence; but no peculiar merit for claiming a reward attaches thereby to the tilting. And hence it is clear, that they who receive the gem before mentioned by way of reward, cannot be said to have merited it in any other sense, than, as having obtained the same according to the king's appointment. We do not mean to assert, that those who live holily do not, in this sense, merit life eternal; that is, obtain it, in consequence of the gratuitous appointment of God. But as in the one case, there was not any peculiar merit attaching to the successful lance, for obtaining a gem of a value so great, so neither, in the other case, does any merit attach to our deeds for securing life eternal. A Castro is, consequently, amusing himself with a delusive fancy, in supposing that the determination of an earthly or an heavenly king can invest, without more ado, with all the desirable equality or worthiness, such works and the reward assigned to them, as before were, in this respect, wide as the poles asunder. And here we may not unsuitably subjoin the words of the same author, in which he is considered by the Jesuits to lean too much towards Luther's opinion, in this controversy about merits. Thus, then, in the work quoted above, he says: *If Luther, when he asserts that man possesses no merit for claiming glory, understands by*



*merit, such a work as from its own nature, and in itself, is equal to the reward, certainly his opinion is not to be noted down as erroneous, since there is not any work of ours which is, in itself, of such a character, that it is to be reckoned equivalent to eternal glory; but merit does not [always\*] bear this meaning, so as to convey the notion of an equality of this kind; but another kind of equality, which does not arise from the nature of the things, but is the consequence of some agreement, which, when made, renders a work equal which before was not said to be equal. Thus far Alfonsus; from which you may perceive that our opinion, who deny a merit of condignity, is not disapproved by even our more sound opponents themselves; and that their statements about the merit of condignity are maintained merely, so far as the word itself is concerned, not really and truly. [Again]*

4.—Some make use of another similitude, but it is equally invalid for establishing a meritorious worthiness in works. Thus, then, they would fain argue. If a king, by his own regulation alone, assigns a value to money which it had not before; if he can employ an inferior metal (namely, iron or brass) in coining money, and make it in value equivalent to good money; why should we hesitate to say that God does, by his engagement and promise, render and cause the works of the pious to be worthy of celestial glory, and equal, in value, to this reward, although in other respects they are not, in themselves, either equal to, or worthy of it, but far, far below it? Isidore Clarius, in reference to this opinion, observes, (Orat. 40.): *God himself has been pleased to assign a value to things which possess no intrinsic value. But if it is allowable for mortals to affix a value on coin, to pass for so much as they shall have determined on, shall not God enjoy the same liberty in regard to our doings?* Because God, then, has assigned to good works the reward of life eternal, these people imagine, that, in consequence of this appointment, the value and worthiness of our works is increased to such a degree as to be commensurate with the reward assigned, viz., that which is promised and destined by God for such as live obediently.

\* "*Non semper sic capitur,*" in A. Castro.



I answer, that the analogy between money and good works does not hold good ; for the value put on money, as it is the rule of permutation or a medium of exchange, as the Philosopher speaks, is uncertain, mutable, and depends entirely upon the will of the people or of the sovereign, and is, in consequence, increased or diminished at their pleasure ; its intrinsic goodness or natural worth remaining all the while exactly the same. Hence Aristotle said, also, *Money becomes, by legal appointment, of all importance to all persons ; yet intrinsically it is of no worth.* And yet those persons who endeavour to establish a merit in works, assert that they do possess an innate, natural, and ascertained value, which they consider to be so far elevated and multiplied, in consequence of the Divine determination, as immediately to be invested with an innate and moral value of their own, fully sufficient to claim the kingdom of glory. But as the intrinsic value of coin is not increased, when, in accordance with the pleasure or orders of a king, a greater value is put upon it than it is worth, although the effect may be, that, in the customary practice of exchange, that may come to be bought for ten shillings which had cost eleven ; so the result from the promise of God, as regards the moral value of our works, is not that they hence begin to acquire an equivalence in value, or a moral worthiness for receiving the rewards promised ; the only effect is, that works of that character, how inferior soever they may be, and unworthy of the reward, may yet, God so willing and arranging it, succeed in obtaining the recompence. Secondly, we have this, also, to offer, that when a king, by his decree, increases the value of money, (if, for instance, he orders that what is now in value a penny shall pass for tenpence,) no change takes place in the coin itself, nor does it acquire any new intrinsic value ; but only in the use and intention of his subjects, who are bound to let the money pass, and to accept the same according to the royal estimate put upon it : So, when God, through promising, has determined that our good works, which deserve not even the blessings that follow them in this life, shall be compensated by the reward of eternal life ; he does not change our works by this decision, neither does he impart to them a new moral worthiness for receiving that infinite reward ; but, by a decree of that



kind, obliges himself to accept and recompense the works in accordance with his own decision. What we have said concerning coin will be shewn to be perfectly true, if any one, after the royal decree, should export those monies into another country; for he would immediately discover that the value of the coin, in itself, remained the same, whatever alteration might have been introduced among the subjects of the king aforesaid. Lastly, when any king puts the value of approved money on brass or iron coin, the effect of his decree is not to make brass or iron equal to gold or silver, as concerns the nature of the thing itself; but by reason of some urgent necessity, he decrees that henceforth it shall be of the same value, as regards the use and purpose of such goods as are usually purchased by gold and silver: so, when God assigns to our works, which are in themselves but trifling and impure, such honours as to repute them available for acquiring the kingdom of glory, he does not stamp those works as being intrinsically worthy of this celestial glory; but, having a regard to our necessity and indigence, he deigns to accept them as if they were cleansed, and pure, and equal to claim this infinite reward. We, therefore, retort this simile upon our opponents: For, as a king does not, by his decisions, render iron really equal to gold, or of equal worth as to intrinsic value; so God does not, by his promise, make our works equal to the celestial reward, considered in reference to their own innate worth.

See Appendix to this Treatise.

## CHAPTER LXVI.

ARGUMENTS REFUTED, BY WHICH SUAREZ ENDEAVOURS TO PROVE, THAT, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE, GOD IS, BY VIRTUE OF HIS PROMISE, BOUND TO RENDER A REWARD OF LIFE ETERNAL IN RETURN FOR OUR WORKS.

WE have only now, in the last place, to offer a brief reply to the arguments of such as suppose some moral equality or worthiness to exist in good works equivalent to demand the



reward of life eternal ; though adding that, at the same time, God himself is nevertheless not under an obligation to confer this reward, excepting by virtue of his promise ; but on the supposition that such a promise has been made, they teach that God, according to the principles of the equality of commutative justice, is bound to make good the payment of the reward.

Three points are to be noticed here : First, the position assumed ; namely, that our works, setting aside even any promise, are sufficient to claim the reward itself. This notion is most false, and we have very fully refuted it. We shall not therefore travel over the same ground afresh. Secondly, what they grant must be carefully noted, namely, That good works, apart from the promise, do not bind God, on the principles of mere justice, to make the recompence of life eternal to the doers of them. For Suarez speaks thus, expressly :\* *Although our merit were equivalent to claim the reward, yet he who merits cannot place another, on the principles of commutative justice, under obligation to make compensation, — — unless the existence of an agreement be pre-supposed.* Our opponent's statement, thus voluntarily allowed, we readily accept ; namely, That no works, however good, are such as can place God under obligation to give the reward of life eternal to the doers, unless with a free promise from God. Thirdly, the position which they busy themselves no little to establish, namely, that when God has made a promise, he is bound to the fulfilment of it, and in very deed to recompense those who act well, on the principle of commutative justice, with eternal life,—is to be considered. This is what we have refuted above by many arguments : We will now consider the arguments with which our opponents endeavour to establish it.

1.—They frame their arguments on a distinction to be made in the Divine promises, in manner following :—There is a certain promise which is called *simple*, and rests wholly upon mercy ; such is that made concerning the forgiveness of sins to the penitent ; and this does not set aside the notion of its being a free gift. But there is another kind of promise, which does not admit the notion of mere favour,—

\* Opusc. disput. de just. Dei, sect. 2. numb. 54.



this is called an *onerous* promise ; and to this class belongs the Divine promise of rendering the reward of eternal life to those who act well. However necessary, then, it may be for forming a ground of merit, that a free promise should precede, yet, on the supposition of such a promise having been made on God's part, and that the *onerous* condition has been fulfilled on ours, the recompence follows, in accordance with the principles of *justice*, and not on those of mere *grace* or *mercy*. And that such a difference in the Divine promises does exist they prove from hence, that the Scripture, when speaking of the former kind of promises, shews that they are founded in mere grace and mercy, and this is assigned as the proper ground for bestowing the thing promised ; as when God forgives the sins of the penitent according to promise, it is given as the reason ; viz., Because God is *gracious and merciful*, (Joel ii. 13.) Thus, when he listens to the prayer of the sinner crying unto him, the reason is given, viz., Because he is a *Father*, and *gracious*. But, on the other hand, when the Scripture speaks of the latter kind of promises, and of their fulfilment, any idea of mere grace, or of a free gift, is quite set aside ; the reference in this case is to a stipulation made on the principle of equal justice. Thus Rom. iv. 4., *But to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned of grace, but of debt*. After a promise, then, the reward [it is inferred] is due to our good works on the score of adherence to the rules of commutative justice.

I answer, that the difference [supposed to exist] in the Divine promises is mistaken and imaginary. For, in the first place, the promise of the forgiveness of sins on the condition of repentance, is no less *onerous* than that other, of making good the promise of reward in life eternal, on the condition of new obedience or a holy life : nay, it seems more *onerous* and difficult to one who is still a sinner, and not yet established in a state of grace, to fulfil the requirement of a just and genuine repentance, than it is for an individual justified and placed in a state of adoption, to perform the condition of a new obedience. Add to this, that a justified man is, from the duties necessarily incumbent upon him, no less under obligation to perform good works, than the sinner to be justified is to repent. The position,



then, which they would maintain, is idle and erroneous, that the promise is in the one instance *simple*, and in the other *onerous*. Secondly, it is quite a mistake to pretend, that there is any such difference observable in the Scriptures, so that, in a promise of the former kind, the actual imparting of the thing promised is assigned to mere grace or mercy; in the other case to justice. For the imparting of eternal life to those who live piously, in some cases is frequently attributed to the free gift and mere mercy of God. Life eternal is *χάρισμα*, that is, *the free gift of God in Christ Jesus*; Rom. vi. 23. *It hath pleased the Father to GIVE you the kingdom*, Luke xii. 32; not *to sell* it, as if on the principle of commutative justice. To the same effect is that passage repeatedly quoted by Augustine, *Who crowneth thee with mercy and lovingkindness*; Psalm ciii. 4. But if there are instances in which the recompence of the celestial crown is said to be owing to the just dealing of God, it must not be understood of that commutative justice, which assumes a parity between the duty accomplished and the reward received in return, according to the incorrect notions of Suarez; but of that kind of justice which is exercised in the fulfilment of promises made, and is properly termed *fidelity*. Lastly, as respects the inference which Suarez would deduce from the words of the Apostle, that life eternal is given to those who act well, on the ground of paying the debt of commutative justice; he is altogether in error. For when the Apostle says (Rom. iv. 4.) *To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned of grace, but of debt*, he is endeavouring to shew, that to Abraham himself, and consequently to all other believers, the reward was imputed according to grace, and not of debt. The Jesuit, therefore, makes rather too free in introducing such a passage as this, for establishing a debt on the principles of justice, which the Apostle has alleged for the purpose of setting aside any such claim.\* What is meant to be conveyed in the words just quoted, is—That *to him that worketh*, that is, who works according to the legal engagement, so as to fulfil the whole law, *the reward is not reckoned of grace*;—that is, life eternal is

\* This is an instance of that practice which Mr. POPE has so well exhibited in his *Roman Misquotation*, (1 vol. 8vo.); a work with which every one who has to deal with Romish disputants should be well acquainted.



assigned not according to the rule of evangelical grace, or the compact of the new covenant, which says, BELIEVE, AND THOU SHALT LIVE—but *of debt*; that is, according to the terms of the engagement made by God, THE MAN WHO DOETH THOSE THINGS SHALL LIVE BY THEM: which promise God would be bound to make good, apart from any reference to evangelical grace, if any one could fulfil the conditions laid down. This passage, therefore, does not help our opponent; because there is no one who fulfils the conditions, or is able to do so; and even if he could, yet this debt of which the Apostle speaks, is not, so far as God is concerned, an obligation on the score of *commutative justice*; but an obligation of *faithfulness*, arising from the legal covenant, not from the grace of the Gospel. [But they proceed,]

2.—In the act of recompensing good works (after a promise has been made to us by God) all the conditions appertaining to commutative justice are discernible; God, therefore, supposing he has so engaged himself, makes recompence according to the principles of commutative justice. The antecedent is [they imagine] confirmed by going over the conditions of commutative justice one by one.

The first is *mutual equality*; and this [they assert] subsists between the merit and its reward. For although the works of grace are not, *in themselves merely considered*, at all equivalent to meet the reward of glory, yet as regards their *moral value* they are equivalent.

I answer, that no works of the regenerate, either as respects their *mere being*, or as to *moral parity in value*, or in any other way whatsoever, are equal to the reward of glory. From this qualification alone, then, it abundantly and clearly appears, that between God making recompence and man working, there is no interchange in commutative justice, even allowing the existence of a promise or covenant on the part of God.

The second condition is, that an interchange takes place, of such a character, as assumes a reciprocal giving and receiving between both parties. Now, between God and man, such an interchange does take place; for God receives our works, and gives us in return his own rewards; we, on



the other hand, take these rewards, and give God our works.

I answer, that God does not, properly speaking, receive anything from us, but gives us all things; for these very good works are what God gives to us, rather than we to him. For in all good actions God gives us both *to will* and *to do*. Moreover, even admitting that in some sense we may be said to give our works to God; yet must it not be understood that we are presenting our works before him as a price equivalent to the reward, so as to lay claim to the reward *in the way of commutation*; but that we are offering to him these works as our bounden and rational service, under *the obligations of Religion*. Lastly, it is not every kind of giving and accepting which constitutes an act of commutative justice between two parties, but that alone, in which a *repassion*\* (to adopt a philosopher's barbarous term) is found, and in which, also, there is a mutual benefit accruing on both sides. But how can such conditions apply in the present case? For, when God gives to us, he does not surrender his own right over what he has given; when he receives, he does not derive any advantage from our good deeds. It is, consequently, foolish to imagine that God, in dispensing rewards, is exercising an act of commutative justice; since neither in the act of giving can he alienate anything from himself, nor, in receiving, does he attach anything to himself which was not his own, or from which he can himself derive any emolument. [The Romanist proceeds]

A third condition is, that a debt and obligation, on the ground of justice on the part of the recompenser, be incurred from the act of acceptance, by virtue of the right acquired by another, through the work offered and given to him. Now with God there does exist such a debt, and an obligation in justice to make a proper recompence, springing from the work itself, so far as the work itself is founded on a promise, or a previous engagement on God's part.

I answer, the very thing is taken for granted in this place which forms the main point controverted between us. For

\* *Repassum*, meaning reciprocity of experience, or mutuality in receiving (either good or evil); as the equally barbarous correlative word *reactio* denotes reciprocity of action, or mutuality in conferring either good or evil.



by virtue of the promise, we admit that God is bound to bestow upon the person performing good works the reward promised; but this is an obligation on his *faithfulness*, which God owes to his word and determination; not an obligation arising from the claim of *commutative justice*, springing from our works, as though they demand such compensation, on the score of the claims of commutative justice, so as to effect an equality between what is given and received. And from this you perceive, that no conditions appertaining to commutative justice, between human works and divine rewards, are in any respect to be found. [But again say they]

3.—A promise transfers to him who has fulfilled the condition, a right to the thing promised, equivalent to a claim on what has been promised, at least *morally*.\* And when he who has made a promise fulfils it and makes the offer good, he extinguishes the claim, and as it were receives it back; and thus an equality between the thing given and received is, although not formally, yet virtually brought about, between God discharging what he had promised, and man foregoing, as it were, the right which he had acquired on the ground of the promise, and no longer laying claim to it. This is, then, [say they] an act of commutative justice.

Suarez, however, in this speculation of his, quite misses the very point in dispute. For, whereas he ought to have proved, that there is a mutual equality between our works and the Divine rewards, he shews that there is a kind of equality between the reward itself, and that right of reward which God, by virtue of his promise, has transferred to man. But the question is not, whether the claim to the reward of life eternal, which ensues from the Divine promise to every man who lives piously, is something morally equivalent to the reward itself; but whether that work, which God requires from us, is itself equal in value to the same reward. Besides, should we admit that the claim to the thing, when the time for discharging it arrives, is some sort of an equivalent to the thing bestowed, yet, inasmuch as we become possessed of this right, not *in the way of commutation*, (for there exists nothing on the score of which any such interchange can be

\* Suarez Opusc. disput. de Justit. Dei, sect 2., num. 20.



established between God and us), but in the shape of a *free grant*, it is silly to infer from this right, which God has conferred upon us, that the bestowment of the promised blessing is an act of commutative justice. Lastly, as at the outset, to make a sinner the promise of infinite reward, upon the condition of accomplishing a work so trifling, was an act of a *pitying*, not of a *commuting* God; so, actually to bestow it, after the work has been performed by us, is a proceeding originating in the same *mercy* and *faithfulness*, not done on the principle of *commutative justice* or *sale*.

[Again they urge that]

4.—Every excellence is found to exist in perfection in God. Now this commutative justice is a perfection; for, considered in its essential quality,\* it denotes nothing else than a willingness to assign to each one his own peculiar right. Since, then, there exists such a willingness in God, we must needs assume the existence of such justice in him; evidence of which he nowhere more illustriously manifests, than when he gives to those who live piously, the rewards to which they have a claim, as founded on his having so promised. Therefore, the reward of eternal life [it is argued] is given, on the principle of *commutative justice*, to those who perform good works.

I answer, that when Suarez assumes commutative justice to exist in God, he is abandoning the common opinion of the Schoolmen. Aquinas denies this expressly, 1 parte quæst. 21. art. 1. *Commutative justice, or that kind of justice which consists in the regulation of interchange, is unsuitable to the character of God.* And Bonaventura affirms, that justice, so far as it implies the nature of *debt*, cannot appertain to God, but only as it implies *the out-pouring of his own benevolence*.† Now commutative justice (as we are aware) involves a debt of something given, as bearing some equality to that which has been received. Scotus also, and Durandus, and all the rest whom I have consulted, are agreed in the same opinion. But without

\* "*Formaliter sumpta*"—Meaning that primary quality or distinguishing characteristic which constitutes an integral part of the essence, and, at the same time, distinguishes it from other collateral things belonging to the same general class: it is what Logicians call *the difference*.

† Lib. 4. dist. 46., art. 2. quæst. 1.



appealing to authorities, let us consider the thing itself. I say, then, that commutative justice, considered in its essence, carries with it the idea of much imperfection, such as it is plainly wicked to attribute to God. In the first place, when any one exercises commutative justice with another, he makes it evident by the very act, that he can receive something from another; but this is quite inconsistent with the perfection of God, whose prerogative is, that he provides all things for all his own creatures, and receives nothing from them in return. In the next place, in the practice of commutative justice between two persons, there is the existence of a mutual utility always understood; that as what one man has received from another turns out to the benefit of the former, so, what the latter receives from the former turns to his advantage. Where there is no room for mutual benefit, there there cannot exist commutation. This again casts a reproach upon God, if we say that our actions may issue in his being benefitted thereby. In fine, he who commutes deprives himself of his right over that which he assigns to another, for the sake of effecting an equality, on the ground of some other benefit, which he has previously received from the other. Now this also would argue imperfection in God; if it be assumed, either that we have so entire a possession in any thing under our own power, so that we are able to present it to God in a way of permutation; or, that God can so far relinquish his authority over any thing, that we can receive it from him in the way of exchange. In consequence of these imperfections, then, which cannot but attach to him who practises commutative justice with another, we remove it from God, who is most perfect, and we deny that God, when he presents the promised rewards to those who live well, is acting on any principle of commutative justice.

Now, with reference to that definition just given, in which commutative justice is said to be nothing else than *a constant and perpetual willingness of assigning to every one his own proper right*; from which they infer, that, as the consequence of such a will existing in God, he acts towards men, in his bestowal of the rewards promised, according to the rules of this commutative justice: I answer, that justice in God is the Divine will determining itself, under consideration of the first rule, to do according as shall seem befitting to



his mere goodness.\* The justice of God, therefore, is not, like human justice, an excellence or quality bearing upon another, but rather bearing on himself, with some resemblance of the relation to another;† and when God gives eternal life to Peter or Paul, the Divine will does not discharge a debt to the creature, but to Himself. The above-mentioned reasoning, then, is fallacious; seeing it pre-supposes a right in man to life eternal, very different from what any sound divine would admit. Believers who live well, have, it is true, a right to life eternal; but not such a right of their own as commutative justice supposes. For we must not fancy that holy men have first given to God some works in the way of mutual exchange, whence they have acquired, as by an agreement a just claim to the rewards; and that hence the Divine goodness, in order to keep the account on either side justly balanced, afterwards makes a payment of these same rewards, to which a right has been acquired, on the score of commutation. We ought, on the contrary, to acknowledge, that the whole of this claim, which we are said to have to life eternal, consists in this; that God becomes a debtor, as it were, to himself, to act conformably both to that which is befitting his goodness, and to the faithfulness of his promise. But our works are required by God, and are produced by us, not as ground for an equitable commutation, such as is equivalent to the reward; but as an exercise of that due obedience which is pleasing to God.

To the winds, therefore, with that proud notion about a commutative justice as existing between God and men. Let every soul press onward towards heaven by the appointed way of holiness and good works; but let no one presume that he can obtain heaven by a scheme of commutative justice, or of the meritorious worthiness of any works.

And thus, at last, (by the help of God) has this discussion concerning habitual and actual righteousness been brought to a conclusion, though it has detained me much longer than I had imagined it would do when first commenced. We must next think of undertaking some new work.

\* Vide Scotum in lib. 4. dist. 46., quæst. 1.

† Non tam ad alterum est—quam ad seipsum, quasi ad alterum. Davenant alludes here to the expression used at the end of arg. 3., above, chap. lxiv. p. 173., borrowed from Aquinas, and which Aquinas has taken from Aristotle, *Ethic.* 5. 2.







## APPENDIX.

The following extract from a series of Lectures delivered at Tavistock-street Chapel, London, in the Autumn of 1827, *on Points in Controversy between Romanists and Protestants*, may not inaptly be added here, with more especial reference to the point under discussion in the three or four concluding chapters.

“ I have found a definition of *merit* which tends to throw much light upon this subject, in a Sermon of Dr. South. With his general views of the Gospel I can by no means accord, but to his delineation of *merit* I feel much indebted. ‘The conditions,’ he observes, ‘necessary to render an action meritorious, are these four:—

‘1.—*That an action be not due*—that is to say, *it must not be such as a man stands obliged to the doing of, but such as he is free either to do or not to do, without being chargeable with the guilt of any sinful omission in case he does it not.* For if that which is *due* may merit, then, by paying what I owe, I may make my creditors my debtors; and every payment would not only *clear*, but also, *transfer* the debt.

‘2.—*That the action should really add to, and better the state of the person of whom it is to merit.* The reason of which is, because all merit consists properly in a right to receive some benefit, on account of some benefit first imparted.

‘3.—The third condition required to render an action meritorious is, *that there be an equal proportion of value between the action and the reward.* This is evident from the foundation already laid, *that the nature of merit consists properly in exchange.*

‘4.—The last condition is, *that he who does a work whereby he would merit of another, do it solely by his own strength, and not by the strength or power of him from whom he is to merit.* The reason is, that otherwise, the work would not be entirely his own; and where there is no *property*, there can be no *exchange*.

‘These four are the *essential ingredients*, and indispensable conditions of merit.’\*

“ Now, in the first place, the application of this definition will forbid the use of the term *merit*, even to innocent and angelic beings: it will restrict it to the intercourse of equals; and will accord with the just delineation of humility, manifested in the worship of higher beings to Jehovah of Hosts. I may instance Isaiah vi. 1: ‘I saw,’ says the Prophet, ‘the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the Seraphims: each one had *six wings*; with twain *he covered his face*, and with twain *he*

\* Vide *South's Sermon's*, vol. iii. serm. 1.



*covered his feet, and with twain he did fly.*' The highest created intelligences can claim nothing but from the Divine goodness. Every emotion of love, every service of gratitude, every act of obedience, is but the fair and proportionate exercise of faculties originally received, as a gratuitous bounty, from the creative power of God. The utmost *use* of those faculties is *duty*; the *neglect* of those faculties would be *sin*. Under a sense of this bounty, and conscious of continued dependence upon its unfettered exercise, no voice is heard among innocent and happy spirits, but the voice of humility, gratitude, and praise. While active in duty, they *cover* their feet; while filled with joy, they *cover* their face. 'In God alone they live, and move, and have their being.'

"How much more, then, is the application of *this definition* to the lapsed, the criminal, the depraved, *destructive of every claim to merit*! If an angel cannot merit, what shall a sinner claim from God? 'Not one of these aforesaid conditions,' observes the aforesaid writer, '*agrees* to the very best of human actions, with respect to God. Nevertheless, in despite of all these deplorable impotencies, we see what a *towering* principle of pride works in the *hearts* of men; and how mightily it makes them affect to be their own Saviours, and, even while they *live* upon God, to *depend* upon themselves. To be *poor* and *proud*, is the true character of man, ever since the pride of our first parents threw us into our forlorn condition.'

"In reference to God, if the *perfect* performance of a good action can only fulfil a duty, what must be the real value of an *imperfect act*, which cannot escape even the imputation of sin? And can the action of any human being bear a character higher than this, that it is an imperfect act, and therefore, stained with sin? It has not been too strongly said by the good HOOKER, 'It may seem somewhat extreme which I will speak; therefore, let every one judge of it even as his own heart shall tell him, and no otherwise. I will only make a demand: If God should yield unto *us*—not, as unto Abraham, if fifty, forty, thirty, yea, even ten good persons could be found in a city, for their sakes the city should not be destroyed; but and if he should make us an offer *thus* large,—Search all the generations of men since the fall of our Father Adam, and find *one* man that hath done *one* action which hath passed from him *pure*, without *any* stain or blemish at all, and for that *one* man's only action, neither man nor angel shall feel the torments which are prepared for both: do you think that this ransom to deliver men and angels could be found to be among the sons of men?'"

"Upon what possible ground of reason, then, can any human being speak of merit in the sight of a holy God? If an innocent being, with all his lofty endowments, shrinks abashed from the blaze of uncreated excellence, and seeks repose behind the shadow of his two-fold wing of humility and dependence, what ought to be the sensations of one whose actions purity condemns, and for whose transgressions justice demands satisfaction?

"And if the question of human merit be rested upon the *wise* use of imparted grace, can anything be more contradictory to reason than to say that the good *use* of *one* gratuitous benefit can absolutely *merit* the acquisition of a second? Is there anything more unreasonable than grace deserved, as it is called, of congruity? 'If we do well, and employ our talents aright, this is God's work, and not ours; or not *so* ours, as that we may challenge any reward *due* unto us. No man can do well except he be enabled first by God; and the more he be enabled, the more he is bound to God.' The least *increase* of grace after the *first grace*, surely exceeds the greatest measure of our service and thankfulness;

\* Vide Hooker's Works, vol. iii. p. 440.



so that the more grace we receive from God, or, which is the same thing, the better our works are, the more, still, are we indebted to Him who thus enables us to work : and as our debt to him increases, so our title to merit anything at his hands must unquestionably decrease. Can we, then, deny the truth of this syllogism :—

‘ *That which creates a debt to God from us, cannot possibly be the ground of merits :*

‘ *But grace, not the first grace only, but all increase of grace, still creates a new debt :*

‘ *Therefore, neither the first grace, nor any increase of grace, can be any foundation of merit, in the sight of a holy God.*’

“ Rather, seeing merits imply a debt due from us to God, he that most abounds in grace, which is the free gift of God, ought to be the most ready to disclaim all merits. The manner of the Apostle’s interrogation, ‘ *Who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again ?*’ surely includes an *universal negation* : No man *hath* given ought to God ; no man *can* give ought to him : and if no man *can give* ought to him, then no man *can receive* any thing from him by way of merit, but of mere mercy and free bounty.\*”

“ Thus it appears, upon the principles of reason, that the doctrine of merit is absurd, inasmuch as it is contradictory to the nature and relation of things.”

—Sermon by the Hon. and Rev. G. T. Noel, in the *Tavistock Lectures*.

\* Dr. Jackson’s Works, vol. iii. p. 597.







THE  
DETERMINATIONES.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

GENERAL INVESTIGATION OF THE

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FOR THE YEAR 1900

BY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

AND THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FOR THE YEAR 1900

AND THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FOR THE YEAR 1900



THE  
DETERMINATIONES;  
OR  
RESOLUTIONS  
OF  
CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS,  
PUBLICLY DISCUSSED  
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE:

BY  
THE RIGHT REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.,  
BISHOP OF SALISBURY,  
FORMERLY LADY MARGARET'S PROFESSOR.

FIRST PUBLISHED A.D., 1634,  
AND NOW  
TRANSLATED FROM THE CORRECTED AND ENLARGED EDITION OF 1639;

BY  
THE REV. JOSIAH ALLPORT,  
P. C. OF ST. JAMES'S, BIRMINGHAM.

~~~~~  
*The real is to be separated from the apparent truth, by comprehensive
insight and masterly reasoning.*

CLEMENS ALEXANDR. *Strom. lib. 7.*

1846.

DETERMINATIONS

THE ALIEN'S RIGHTS TO THE SCHOOL EVIDENCE

CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance.

THE RIGHT OF THE ALIEN TO THE SCHOOL EVIDENCE

I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance.

THE RIGHT OF THE ALIEN TO THE SCHOOL EVIDENCE

I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance.

THE RIGHT OF THE ALIEN TO THE SCHOOL EVIDENCE

I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance.

THE RIGHT OF THE ALIEN TO THE SCHOOL EVIDENCE

I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance. I have been of the opinion, since I have been in the United States, that the rights of the alien to the school evidence is a question of the highest importance.

THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

PROFESSORS of Theology, at the close of disputations, are accustomed to pass their sentence on the questions agitated before them. In the discharge of this office at Cambridge, I had to treat, with more or less copiousness, many theses, on various occasions. I was usually compelled to do this in rather an off-handed manner; so that any one will look in vain for either exactness of method, or accuracy of diction, in these my treatises. In each of them I have deemed it enough to have laid the foundation for a correct judgment, and to have shewn the weakness of the principal reasons of the adversary. I neither value them so much, as to desire to impose them on the public; nor so little, as to shame my friends who urged me to do so. If this imperfect work should serve, in a small degree, to form the judgment of the student, I am more than satisfied. For this purpose they were all originally drawn up, and for this they are now designed. This, good reader, is my only Preface. In Christ Jesus I bid you farewell, and beg you to commend me in prayer to the same Lord.

The following observations may be admitted here, as specially applicable to the subsequent discussions, and equally suited to shew the object of the republication of them in the present form.

“ We must ever maintain, and hope fully to prove, that the direct tendency of the Roman Catholic system is to render void the law of God,—is to substitute other sacrifices and intercessors in the room of that one propitiation, and that one Mediator between God and man, the Lord Jesus Christ—is to produce a narrow and scanty system of morals in the place of that love to God and that love to our neighbour which true Christianity requires. In this corrupt system—in this defective faith and practice, Roman Catholics are kept, by the practically withholding from them the word of God, and by the vain and sophistical reasonings with which the obvious declarations of that word are explained away. If once the Roman Catholic can be roused to think—to enquire into the character of his own system—into the authority on which that system is founded—into the plain and obvious meaning of the sacred Scriptures, we are fully persuaded that a most important point is gained, and a great advance made toward his moral, social, and religious improvement. And we would, therefore, earnestly endeavour, by every legitimate means, to excite his attention, and to assist him in the fair and full examination of those topics, on which we, as Protestants, cannot but apprehend that he is grievously mistaken.”—*Tavistock Lectures*; Lect. i. p. 11. by the Rev. THOMAS WEBSTER, London, 1836.

INDEX TO THE QUESTIONS.

	PAGE.
QUEST. I.	
Concupiscence in the Regenerate is Sin	209
QUEST. II.	
The Prayers of the Papists for the Dead are vain	218
QUEST. III.	
True Believers can be sure of their own Salvation	226
QUEST. IV.	
There is no temporal power of the Pope over Kings in order to their spiritual benefit	234
QUEST. V.	
An infallible determination of the Faith is not annexed to the Papal Chair	241
QUEST. VI.	
The blind obedience of the Jesuits unlawful	248
QUEST. VII.	
Protestants cannot with a safe conscience attend the Mass	257
QUEST. VIII.	
Works of Penance are not satisfactions to Divine Justice	262
QUEST. IX.	
Free-will is not granted to the unregenerate for their spiritual good	265
QUEST. X.	
The works of the Regenerate are defiled with the pollution of sin	271
QUEST. XI.	
Civil jurisdiction is rightly conceded to Ecclesiastical persons	275
QUEST. XII.	
The people may not attempt a Reformation in the Church against the consent of the Magistrate	279
QUEST. XIII.	
The Popish Mass is not a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead	283
QUEST. XIV.	
The Ancient Fathers did not merit the Incarnation of Christ, nor any of its circumstances	290
QUEST. XV.	
The power of the Priesthood is wholly spiritual	294
QUEST. XVI.	
A proneness to evil does not flow from the principles of uncorrupt nature	301

	PAGE.
QUEST. XVII.	
The Papal Jesuits cannot be good subjects	307
QUEST. XVIII.	
The Religious Worship of the Creature is Idolatry	312
QUEST. XIX.	
A King in his own kingdom is inferior to God alone	326
QUEST. XX.	
The English Church is fully competent to bind to the observance of Ceremonies	330
QUEST. XXI.	
The Church of Rome is an Apostate Church	334
QUEST. XXII.	
God's Decree does not take away man's freedom	337
QUEST. XXIII.	
The Sacraments do not confer grace by the mere external act, or <i>ex opere operato</i>	340
QUEST. XXIV.	
In the Divine Essence there is neither diversity of parts, nor any thing contingent or adventitious	344
QUEST. XXV.	
The Divine foreknowledge was not the cause of the Fall of Man . . .	350
QUEST. XXVI.	
Man fallen is the subject of Divine Predestination	354
QUEST. XXVII.	
Papists ought not to absent themselves from Protestant forms of wor- ship	359
QUEST. XXVIII.	
The Jurisdiction of the Pope is not universal	365
QUEST. XXIX.	
Implicit Faith is not saving Faith	370
QUEST. XXX.	
Temporal Dominion is not founded in grace	375
QUEST. XXXI.	
All sin is in its own nature deadly	382
QUEST. XXXII.	
Evangelical Counsels, as they are called, sometimes have the force of a precept	386
QUEST. XXXIII.	
When guilt is remitted, its punishment is remitted	391
QUEST. XXXIV.	
No one can of congruity merit in the first instance Divine favour	393
QUEST. XXXV.	
The Invisible Church is not a Platonic Idea	400
QUEST. XXXVI.	
The sacrifice made by Christ is alone truly expiatory	404

	PAGE.
QUEST. XXXVII.	
Justifying Faith is confidence in Christ as Mediator	408
QUEST. XXXVIII.	
Justifying Faith cannot be disunited from Charity	415
QUEST. XXXIX.	
The Laity are not to be restrained from reading the Holy Scriptures	421
QUEST. XL.	
Pride was the first sin of Angels	429
QUEST. XLI.	
The public Exercises of Religion are to be performed in the language understood by the common people	432
QUEST. XLII.	
Diversity of Degrees in the Ministers of the Gospel is not repugnant to the Word of God	437
QUEST. XLIII.	
Celibacy is not necessarily connected with Holy Orders	448
QUEST. XLIV.	
Saints are not to be invocated	456
QUEST. XLV.	
Ignorance does not excuse Sin	469
QUEST. XLVI.	
The Holy Catholic Church which we believe consists of the Elect alone	474
QUEST. XLVII.	
Neither Peter, nor the Pope of Rome, was constituted by Christ supreme Head of the whole Church	479
QUEST. XLVIII.	
Ecclesiastical Censures do not set aside the obligations of duty in civil life	487
QUEST. XLIX.	
Sufficient assistance for Salvation is not given to all	501
QUEST. L.*	
The Roman Church has unjustly taken away the Cup from the Laity	508

* This question is found in the Edition of 1639 only.—See note to the Determination, p. 508.

DETERMINATIONES.

QUESTION I.

CONCUPISCENCE IN THE REGENERATE IS SIN.*

IN order to make the truth of this statement clear, there are three points to be made good: First, to shew what it is that we intend to express by the word *Concupiscence*; secondly, to prove by arguments that it is truly and properly sin; lastly, to rebut the objections of opponents.

I.—As to the first point: When we say that concupiscence is sin, we are not to be understood as speaking of the power itself, or the mere acting of concupiscence in itself, and simply considered; but the irregularity of this faculty, and the unrestrained or rebellious act which flows from the same. The irregularity of the faculty consists in a certain habitual proneness to evil, and is called *indwelling concupiscence*: the irregularity of the act is a tendency to that which is forbidden, and is called *actual concupiscence*. We recognise the taint of sin in both; and we affirm that both of them are seated, not in the sensual power alone, but in the whole soul, and especially in the will itself. I am aware that it is the opinion of some of the Schoolmen, that concupiscence is but the *material* or generic part of inbred sin; while the aversion of the will from God is the *formal* quality of that sin: but the sounder of them reject this notion. For under the term *Concupiscence*, they comprehend not merely the uncontrolled tendency of the sensual part, but (so to speak) the base lust of the will. So William, Bishop of Auxerre (lib. 3, fol. 330. b.), *The unruly will or desire, through which the soul is incited to commit fornication with the creature, is called concupiscence*. So Aquinas (quæst. disput. de vitiis capitalibus), *A certain general desire, which is an unregulated appetite for self-interest, is the principle of all sins*. Nor does

* Vide Art. ix., of the Anglican Church.

Bellarmino himself deny that, *Our will is crushed and prostrated by this disease*, (*De amiss. grat., lib. 6. cap. 10, ; et 5., 15.*) It is, therefore, useless to urge, as they do, that concupiscence is the bare material or generic part of original sin, as if it were confined to the brute portion of the mind; seeing it has pervaded even the superior part of the soul, and has taken up its seat in the will itself. Moreover, it is impossible to understand, how the undue tendency of the concupiscible faculty towards the creature can be the material part of sin; and the aversion of the will from the Creator, be the formal quality of it; since these two are *in reality* the same, are to be found in the same subject, and differ only in *relation*. For (as we are taught in physical science) *It is all one motion, and from the same commencement by which a moveable thing recedes from one point, and approaches the opposite to it*: So also, by one and the same perverse motion it is, that the will recedes from the Creator, and approaches to, or turns itself with a base love to the creature. Be it then a fixed and settled matter, that this inordinate concupiscence, concerning which we are treating, is a fault or disease cleaving not to the *sensual* part merely, but also to the *rational*; and that, too, in the regenerate themselves. Whence Augustine, as quoted by Bede, on Gal. v.* remarks: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit; that is the soul, in so far as it has been weakened by the influence of the flesh, maintains a conflict against itself.*† And on the same passage he adds: *It is a diseased state of the rational soul, when, being gratified with inferior good, it partly desires and partly does not desire, higher blessings; and is, consequently, divided into two wills.*‡ But why dwell farther on this point? Let every regenerate person consult either Scripture or his own conscience, and he will readily find out that his own will is affected by the disease of perverse concupiscence.

II.—We proceed now, as we proposed, in the second place, to shew, that this concupiscence, which is inherent in the regenerate, and all the irregular affections flowing from it, have the nature of sin;§ if we attach to the word the force and meaning which the

* BEDE'S Comment on the *Epistle to the Galatians*, and some other Epistles, consists of selections from all the works of Augustine, of such passages as tend to illustrate the various portions of the Epistle.

† August. *De Conscientia*, ch. 7. or ch. 18.

‡ This passage occurs, as to substance, in Augustine's *Confessions*, Bk. 8. ch. 9. [or 21.]; and verbatim in the place to which Bede refers, namely, the *Liber Sententiarum Augustini*, collected by Prosper, and published at the end of Augustine's works.

§ Vide Art. xiii. of the Anglican Church.

use and sense of the Scriptures denote, not that which grammarians and philosophers supply.

1. 1.—With reference, then, to indwelling concupiscence, the most learned of the Apostles, where he treats this matter professedly, (Rom. vi. vii. viii.) not once only, but fourteen times, has designated concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, *sin*. Who can suppose that the Apostle would, designedly, thus repeatedly adopt a loose phraseology; and that the Church of Rome, which affirms that this concupiscence is not sin, expresses herself correctly and more precisely? [But again]

2.—That man is contaminated with sin, who either possesses not what he ought to have, or has what he ought not to have; if such deficiency or disease attaches to a subject capable of contracting guilt. Now, there is nothing more certain, than that we ought not to have this unbridled concupiscence in our minds; nothing more manifest, than that this disease exists in the rational soul, which is liable to be infected with sin.* By what subtilty, then, will the Papists be able to rescue this concupiscence from the taint of sin? Augustine has not defended it, but ingenuously confessed,† *That an evil of such a character and such magnitude, would, from its mere existence within, hold us in death, and drag us down to death eternal, unless its chain were snapt in Baptism.* The Angelic Doctor, moreover, is so far from denying that the concupiscence cleaving to the will has the nature of sin, that he freely grants† that, *that very concupiscence by which the power of desire is prone to be drawn aside to sensual pleasures, in opposition to the rule of right reason, is alien from the nature of man, so far as he is man, and thus forms a part of original sin.* We admit that in the regenerate it is released from guilt; but from this very circumstance we prove that it is sin. For that must have the nature of sin, which, unless it be remitted, is capable of entailing guilt upon the soul.

3.—It may be added, also, that the old man, with all his members, helps to constitute the mass of original sin; and thus forms that body of sin, which must daily be crucified, and more and more mortified by us. But who can doubt that the concupiscence dwelling in the regenerate, either is altogether the same with the old Adam, or is a main part of it? To deny, therefore, that it does carry with it the nature of sin will, of course, in the same way lead to the denial that the new man is established in an habitual

* Vide Aquin. *de peccat. origin.* art. 2.

† Quæst. disput. *de peccat. orig.* art. 2.

righteousness and holiness. But the Apostle accords with us in both cases. Concerning the old man he speaks thus: Rom. vi. 6. *Our old man is crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin, &c.* And in verse 12: *Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body, &c.* Concerning the new man, the same Apostle testifies, that he has been created in a certain supernatural *righteousness* and *holiness*; Eph. iv. 24. If, then, in proportion to the new man that is planted within us, we acknowledge an equal degree to exist of infused and inherent righteousness; so, on the other hand, it must be admitted that, in proportion as the old man remains in us, to the same extent does innate unrighteousness and indwelling sin remain in us.

4.—Lastly, however numerous, unpleasant, and troublesome, are the casualties of human life, as pains and diseases of the body; yet nothing can be properly termed hateful to regenerate men, and to God himself, except what has the actual nature of sin. But God hates this concupiscence, even in the regenerate, although the hatred does not by any means extend to the person; as he makes it evident, whilst by the power of his Spirit he opposes the same concupiscence, and at last overcomes it, and entirely eradicates it from the minds of the regenerate. The regenerate themselves likewise hate it, as the Apostle testifies in Rom. vii. Belarmine has given no satisfactory reply to this argument in saying, that concupiscence is hated by God and by good men, not as sin, strictly so called, but as a disease. I add, if with Grammarians or Philosophers he restricts the term sin to the unlawful act alone, he does but trifle; if he acknowledges that the term sin may be used of tendency to evil, then he must inform us in what respects the disease implanted and infixed in the mind, differs from implanted and indwelling sin. This disease of concupiscence is not only *penal*, as diseases of the body are; but it is deserving of *condemnation*, unless the heavenly Physician vouchsafes to expiate its guilt by his blood. Whether you term concupiscence a disease of the mind, or sin, is all one; provided it be admitted that it is an ailment of such a character as, by its own nature, to involve a person diseased therewith in condemning guilt. Listen to Augustine, whose views are more philosophic concerning these maladies of the mind:—*Evils*, says he,* *such as these, cannot look for physicians of the body, but are healed by means of the grace of Christ; first, that they may not hold the individual under the*

* *Contra Julian. lib. 5. cap. 5.*

guilt of them, then, that they may not succeed in prevailing in any conflicts, and lastly, that they may be wholly cleared away. Beyond all doubt, that which by its own nature induces guilt, and which, after the expiation of its guilt, nevertheless maintains a conflict with the spirit, has the nature of sin.

II.—Hitherto, we have treated of the habit, or indwelling concupiscence; now let us consider its first motions, whether they are properly to be termed sins or not.

I.—That these first motions of inordinate concupiscence are by no means free from sin, may be made plain from hence, that they are forbidden by the Divine law. For what else is actual sin, than a word, or deed, or desire, contrary to the law of God? Tertullian says well,* *The law of not coveting condemns the beginnings of sin, that is, unruly desires and wishes, no less than overt acts.* No one has desires after anything but what is gratifying to his own mind; but any complacency, or delight, in things unlawful, however short and fading, and although repulsed and restrained from breaking out into the overt act, yet, by the very motion itself, has contracted the defilement of internal sin by the mere imagination. And hence Augustine, following the doctrine of St. Paul, affirms,† that the evil desire of the flesh, against which the good Spirit strives, is sin, *because there exists in it disobedience to the law of the mind.* He might have said, also,—Because there is in it disobedience to the written law; for *a transgression of the law is sin.* 1 John iii. 4.

2.—He sins who has evil desires, although he may not follow up such desires, although he may not deliberate with himself how to fulfil them by any overt act; because such motions are not merely of a passive nature, but involve corresponding derelictions of duty. For every one is bound to the most exact and diligent custody of his heart (Prov. iv. 23.); reason is bound to be vigilant in restraining evil desires; and this, indeed, has not been unnoticed among the Schoolmen themselves, who on this account hesitate not to designate the first buddings of concupiscence by the name of *sin*. That Prince of the Schoolmen, HALEs,‡ writes thus:

* *De Pudicitia.*

† *Contra Julian.* lib. 5. cap. 3.

‡ Part. 2. quæst. 108., memb. 2.—HALES, *Alexander*, or *De Hales*, was a native of Gloucestershire. He was sent at an early age to Paris, entered the order of Franciscans, and became so celebrated in the science of Scholastic Theology and Canon Law, as to be called the *Irrefragalle Doctor*. He flourished in the early part of the 13th Century, dying at Paris August 27, 1245. His works, says Soames, as published separately, consist of *Commentaries upon the Scriptures; on certain books of Aristotle, and on the Sentences of Lombard; a System of Theology*, and a few *Tracts*.—Vide Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. iii., p. 588; and Allport's *Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. i. p. 221.

*The irregular gratification, which proceeds from the sensual part of the mind, inasmuch as it is corrupt, is sin; because it ought to have been subject to reason, and moves in an undue manner contrary to reason, and is, in some measure, affected by reason; not actively, but permissively, and by not crushing its root. The same is the opinion of William, Bishop of Auxerre:** *The movement of desire in man is a voluntary act, and it is sin, even when it moves before the reason has had time to exercise its judgment. And it is called sin, because its tendency is to what is unlawful.* I add, in conclusion, the testimony of a very solid and learned Theologian, viz., John Gerson, who in his *Moral Rules* thus writes: *All the first motions, since they are intended to follow reason, and to be regulated by it, may, if they should anticipate it, be called sins, even in infants and idiots, because they contravene the order of nature as at first created.*

III.—It only remains now to reply to the chief objections of our adversaries.

I.—They are accustomed to bring forward such passages from the Scriptures, as teach that the regenerate are absolved by the death of Christ, and purged from their sins by the Spirit of Christ; the consequence they take to be, that concupiscence remaining in the regenerate does not retain the nature of sin. They are of this kind—*There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; Rom. viii. 1. Christ hath offered himself once in the end of the world to put away sins; Heb. ix. 26. Ye are washed, ye are sanctified, ye are justified, &c.; 1 Cor. vi. 11. I omit the rest.*

To this I answer, that the same Apostle who affirms that no condemnation is to be feared by those who are in Christ Jesus, has, nevertheless, taught that much of the old man remains in them; he has taught that those remains which we designate by the name of *Concupiscence*, are the remains of indwelling sin: in one word, he has not stated that this concupiscence is not indwelling sin, but that, in its condemning power the regenerate are released from it. Augustine has repeatedly maintained that the *guilt* of original sin may be taken away, while it still continues to *act*.† *Concupiscence, as the law of sin, is freed from entailing guilt in baptised infants, it is left to struggle within them; it does not entail any condemnation in those who die before the conflict.* He is much more full and clear, *De Nupt. et Conc.* lib. 1. cap. 26., which place see. Such is the force of so clear a truth,

* Lib. 2. Tract. 28.

† *De Peccat. mer. et rem.* 2. 4. [tom. x. col. 41. edit. Benedict.]

that it extorted from the Jesuit Vasquez this confession,*—*We confess candidly that original sin may be remitted by God, without any change of the sinner*,—a statement which is much more harsh than that which we maintain. And as regards that *'αθέτησις*, or abolition of sin, to which they particularly direct attention in the Epistle to the Hebrews, we admit that all the sins of all those who shall be saved will be abolished by the death of Christ, and altogether removed; but in that manner and order in which Christ intended that they should be abolished. Now his design was, that original sin, so far as regards its power of *condemning* and of *domineering*, should be abrogated immediately upon the application of the virtue of his death; but as regards the act of *indwelling*, and the power of *polluting*, he would have that to be consumed by degrees, and not to be utterly exhausted, till this *mortal* shall have *put on immortality*, (1 Cor. xv. 54). Finally, the washing, the sanctification, the justification, which are mentioned by the Apostle, do not prove that every thing which has the nature of sin is removed in the justified; but that they are delivered from the guilt of all past sins: *If we shall say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us*; 1 John i. 8. *For God, by his grace, is effecting this in us,—the destruction of sin, the deliverance of man. But when, you will ask, is it entirely consumed? If diminished, why is it not utterly consumed? That is being diminished in the life of those who are advancing towards perfection, which is entirely consumed in the life of those made perfect*, as Augustine has truly remarked in his exposition of the Gospel of St. John, Tract. 41. [However]

II.—The Papists not only employ testimonies from the Scriptures, but attempt to prove, by some insufficient arguments, that this concupiscence which dwells in the regenerate has not the nature of sin. Out of these we shall sift a few.

1.—They argue thus:† Original sin is the true death of the soul, and constitutes man an enemy to God: but concupiscence remaining in the regenerate is by no means fatal, nor does it place them in a state of enmity with God; therefore, it has not the nature of sin.

I answer, original sin does not lead to spiritual death, excepting so far as it is viewed as connected with guilt; but remission having been obtained in baptism, the guilt is taken away. Neither does it render an individual a subject of wrath, any longer than as he is considered in the old Adam: and whensoever any one of us is

* Vasquez, in 1. 2. disp. 206. cap. 4.

† Suarez, in 3. quæst. 69. art. 4.

placed in the number of the regenerate, he is regarded as being in the new Adam, that is, in Christ.

2.—Again they say, Baptism releases from all sin; but it does not free from concupiscence; therefore, concupiscence has not the nature of sin.

I answer, it releases the person from the guilt of all sins, it does not exempt the nature altogether from the corruption of original sin. Aquinas speaks learnedly: * *The Sacraments are applied to the benefit of the persons. Therefore, baptism takes away that from man, which falls upon the person from the corruption of nature; and on this account, the very infection of sin, so far as it affects the person, and that penalty which detracts from the act of the person, namely, the deprivation of the Divine vision, these baptism removes; but it does not remove actual infection, so far as it affects the nature.* Thus says he. [But they continue.]

3.—If concupiscence is sin, then has Christ not *truly*, but *imputatively* only redeemed us from sin; and the devil is more powerful than Christ; inasmuch as he has truly *defiled* us, while Christ has not truly *washed* us.†

To this I answer, Christ has truly and efficaciously redeemed us from the guilt of sins, the anger of God, and death eternal; although whilst we live in this body he has not fully and perfectly delivered us from the pollution of original sin. For the imputation of the merits of Christ procures for us not an *imputative*, that is (as Bellarmine understands it) a fictitious and imaginary, but a *true* and *solid* remission of sins. As for his objection in reference to the devil, it is frivolous; for it is a work of greater power to make man free from one sin, than to pollute him with a thousand. Neither is it to be attributed to inability, but to Divine wisdom, that he does not at once pluck up concupiscence root and branch.

4.—Again they say, Concupiscence is the penalty of original sin; therefore, it is not itself original sin: for nothing is the effect of itself.

I answer that, under the term *original sin*, two ideas are generally conveyed—the voluntary transgression of Adam imputed to all his posterity, so far as he represented the human race; and the hereditary contagion propagated to his posterity by generation. Concupiscence is the effect or the punishment consequent upon original sin, understood in the former meaning; but it is that very original sin itself in the second acceptation. Nor ought this to seem new or strange to the Papists, seeing that the Master of the

* In 4. Sentent. dist. 4. quæst. 2.

† Bellarm. *de amiss. grat.* lib. 5. cap. 9.

Sentences has himself delivered it in plain terms, that original sin is the fault of concupiscence, lib. 2. dist. 32. And before him, Hugo de St. Victor remarked,* *If it is asked what the original sin which is in us is, we mean thereby, that corruption or fault which we contract in birth, through ignorance in the mind and concupiscence in the flesh.* Augustine, moreover, in his treatise against Julian, has clearly demonstrated that *this concupiscence is sin, the penalty of sin, and the cause of sin*: lib. 5. cap. 3. [They go on]

5.—There is no need to pray for remission of the first motions which proceed from indwelling concupiscence, if the will does not consent to them. They are not, therefore, sins; for all sin needs remission. But if concupiscence in operation is not accounted for sin, then, much less is habitual concupiscence so accounted. They cite, in support of this opinion, testimonies from Augustine, lib. 1. *ad Bonifac.* cap. 13., and *De perfecta Justitia*, near the end.

To which, I reply, We must admit that it was Augustine's opinion that the regenerate, when they say in the Lord's prayer, *Forgive us our debts*, do so not with reference to indwelling concupiscence, but to sins committed after Baptism. Yet he did not intend thereby to assert, that concupiscence has not, in itself, the nature of original sin; but that its guilt put away once for all in regeneration, needs not daily remission. The opinion, also, which he expressed, though doubtingly, in reference to the first motions of sin,† *that there is no need (unless I am deceived) that we should say, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS, if we do not in any measure consent to sinful desires*, he puts forward on the same ground, namely, the notion he entertained that, together with the guilt of original sin, all its involuntary motions, inasmuch as they flow from the old Adam alone, that is, corrupt nature, are not imputed to those who are engrafted into the family of the new Adam. Bellarmine, therefore, does not succeed in establishing his point, when he endeavours from the principle, that after forgiveness or non-imputation there is no need for renewed pardon, to prove the inference, that these spontaneous, and unintentional motions of concupiscence, and the source from which they proceed, have not, when considered in and of themselves, the nature of sin.

* *De Sacram.* lib. 1. pag. 7., cap. 28. pag. 249.

† *De perfect. Justit.*

QUESTION II.

THE PRAYERS OF THE PAPISTS FOR THE DEAD ARE VAIN.*

IN this subject, those prayers are comprehended which are offered either for the liberation of believers from the pains of purgatory, or for the mitigation, or milder torment, of the damned in hell. As to what relates to the damned, it cannot be denied that some of the more ancient Fathers had an idea, that even they might possibly be helped by the prayers of the living. Hence that distribution by Augustine of the dead into three classes;† the *good*, for whom he says that the prayers of the Church are nothing else than *thanksgivings*; the *not very bad*, for whom he admits that they are *propitiatory*; and the *very bad*, for whom he does not deny that [the prayers of the Church] are so far profitable *as to render their damnation more tolerable*. Yea, some have improved upon this error, and dreamed that the dead may be delivered from hell itself by the prayers of the living. Damascenus (*Serm. de Defunctis*) follows this opinion, which he endeavours to establish by some most silly tales. But because the Papists themselves do not venture to defend this error, it may suffice to have briefly glanced at it. I come to the prayers of the Papists for the dead, and (as they surmise) suffering in purgatory; which, it is certain, is not only destitute of the least Scriptural foundation for support, but can be refuted as vain (I will not say impious), by arguments derived from the Scriptures.

1.—They who maintained that the dead may be helped by these

* The translation of this Determination was inserted in the March number of the *Protestant Journal* for 1834, in consequence of the following announcement in the *Roman Catholic Magazine* for December, 1833:—

“On the 13th of November was commemorated, at the Chapel of Cossey Hall, the mournful anniversary of the late lamented Lady Stafford. Her Ladyship died on the 14th, but the day was anticipated on account of the feast of St. Erconwald, a double, falling on the actual anniversary day.

“The Office for the Dead was solemnly recited, and a Requiem sung, which were attended by a full Chapel of the Congregation, who were dressed in mourning, and evinced the deepest and most respectful sense of their irreparable loss.”

† Vide Ench. cap. 110. Et de Civ. lib. 21. cap. 24.

prayers, did themselves confess that, they did it from the suggestion of their own minds, rather than by any command of the sacred Scriptures; in which, if they be examined from beginning to end, no command, no example, no promise, will be found, by which this custom is sanctioned. No weight is due to that act of Maccabeus, (2 Macc. xii.) which he ventured upon from a perverse reasoning of his own, and not from any express instruction out of the law; and which no one afterwards (that we know of) imitated, in the Jewish Church. The holy Fathers, who do not disapprove of these prayers, yet derive them from custom, and not from the Word of God. Tertullian (*de corona militis*) reckons oblations for the dead (and there is the same reason for prayers,) among those things which are not defended upon the testimony of any Scripture, but the pretence of tradition alone, and from thence claim the support of custom. Augustine, although he admitted the prayers of the Church for the dead not to be altogether vain,* yet never allowed it as a doctrine of the faith, that any believer should undergo punishment after death, from which he might be delivered by the benefit of these prayers: but he only speaks of the thing as doubtful, *Ench. cap. 67, That any such thing should take place after this life is not incredible; whether it is so is a point worth inquiry, &c.* And, *De Civ. 21, 26. I dispute it not; perhaps it is so.* He who would speak thus concerning a doctrine of faith, founded on the Scriptures, should be deservedly reckoned an unbeliever on account of his wavering.

2.—Prayers of this kind are not only destitute of the authority of the Scriptures, but are manifestly vain and useless on clear grounds. For, after this life, only two states of the dead are mentioned in the Scriptures; the one of the blessed with Christ, the other of the damned with the devil. The blessed do not need prayers that they may be delivered from punishment; the damned are not helped by prayers, inasmuch as they never are to be delivered from punishment. The state of believers after death is every where described in the Apocalypse; from whence let the Papists (if they can) produce even one syllable which slightly intimates that any one of *this* number is tormented in hell. We know that *rest from their labours*, (Rev. xiv. 13.) *an eternal house*, (2 Cor. v. 1.) and *mansions*, are *prepared* by Christ (John xiv. 2.) for all the godly dying in Christ; to all the ungodly and unbelievers *a worm* and *fire eternal* is threatened; (Mark ix. 44.) What advantage, therefore, is there of prayers for the dead; who, either being fixed in celestial mansions, enjoy happiness; or, condemned

* *De octo Dulcitt. Questio. quæ. 2.*

to torments, are never free from them? Whatever the doubting Fathers imagined about a third place or state, yet as often as they define the matter dogmatically, they plainly agree with us. Augustine says,* *The souls of the godly are at rest, separated from the body; but those of the ungodly suffer punishments, until the bodies of those shall be raised to eternal life, but of these to eternal death.* The distribution of the faithful members of Christ in the Church *militant on earth* and *triumphant in heaven*, is also the most received and approved in the account of sound theologians; but that third condition of the pious dead, namely, *in the flames of fire and woe*, Poets, Platonists, and Papists, alone acknowledge for a certain truth.

3.—Moreover, it is clear, that the prayers of these Papists are vain, from the fact that they themselves confess, that they pray only for those who are either implicated in some venial faults, on account of which they are condemned to the pains of purgatory; or those, who on account of the commission of mortal sins, after the guilt was remitted, and a commutation of eternal punishment into temporal, die; full satisfaction being not yet made to God. As to (what they call) venial sins, they presume falsely, that any believer remains after death either defiled, or bound by such. For true faith and repentance always obtain peace with God, and the undoubted remission of sins; and no one of the children of God and members of Christ dies, without contrition and faith in Christ. The Schoolmen themselves remind us,† that these venial sins are extinguished by final grace, at the very moment of the departure of the soul, together with the fuel of concupiscence; and that the punishment (if any remained to be endured) is set aside by contrition. Concerning the sin of defilement, the author of the Compendium (lib. 3. cap. 13.) which is attributed to Albertus, from the common-place opinion of the School, thus determines, *Among the saved, all venial sin is washed out by final grace, so far as relates to the guilt.* Now, as to what relates to the punishment, that grave Divine, Gerson of Paris, confidently asserts, (*Serm. in die circumcis. p. 51.*) *Whoever in the very article of death seeks to be punished here in the court of grace, shall be delivered from future punishment, and will go free to heaven.* But who among the faithful is found, who does not earnestly with his whole heart ask it from God, especially when death is imminent? The godly, therefore, die free from venial sins and punishments; even though they cannot be free from sin in this mortal life. So says Augustine (*in Natal. Salvat.*), *None are here*

* *De Civ. lib. 13. cap. 8.*

† Vide Alens. lib. 4. quæst. 15. memb. 3. p. 274.

without sin, but we shall depart hence without sin. And Nazianzen, *By death we get rid of sin, and punishment becomes mercy.* To what end, therefore, are offerings or prayers poured out for their deliverance, whom, if we believe them to be dead in Christ, we ought by the Catholic faith to believe to be with Christ, delivered from punishments and pains? For the Papal dream, that God remits to believers and penitents the guilt of mortal sins, yet requires temporal punishment to be endured either here, or in the life to come, is supported by no reason. What else (I ask) is it to remit sin, than to be unwilling to impute it for punishment?* They therefore contradict themselves, who affirm, in one and the same breath, that the sin is remitted, and the punishment exacted; they imagine vain things, who busy themselves with their prayers to free those from the punishments inflicted, whom they profess to be delivered from all sin by the blood of Christ. Besides, *it is plainly repugnant to Divine justice, that any one be obnoxious to punishment who is not guilty*, as Aquinas truly says.† Nor does the Jesuit Vasquez attempt to refute it; nay, he ingenuously acknowledges, *that the guilt being removed, no punishment, that hath the real nature of punishment, can be deservedly inflicted.*‡ He, therefore, wrongs God, who asks him to remove the punishment from those upon whom such punishment could not deservedly be inflicted. Finally, I add also, although after remission in this life and the blotting out of guilt, the Divine justice should exact punishment in another, yet there is no place left for those prayers and oblations which Papists celebrate for the dead. For however the sentences pronounced against sinners whilst they live here may be changed, yet sentences which after this life are pronounced, upon the souls of the dead appearing before the Divine tribunal, are unalterable. Suppose God, therefore, to have decreed justly to require such and such punishment from this or that dead man; who will hope that he may infringe this decree either by prayers or masses? On the contrary, (to speak with Augustine§), *The very incommutability of the Divine sentence, does not permit that help should be afforded, after this life of mercy, to those who are condemned to just punishments; but they must pay even to the last farthing.* For is it likely that Christ our advocate is either unwilling, or unable, to free the souls of believers by his intercession and death, from punishments to be endured after death;

* Vide Durand. lib. 2. dist. 32. quæst. 1.

† In 2. sent. Dist. 30. quæst. 2.

‡ In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 131. cap. 4.

§ Quæst. Evan. lib. 2. cap. 28.

but that petty priestlings (that is to say, more merciful ones than Christ) are willing to labour for that, and can obtain it from God? But concerning these points, we shall find a more fit place for discussion when we shall refute the comment from the institution of purgatory.

We would now dissipate some few objections of our adversaries.

1.—The Universal Church hath frequent prayers for the dead;* but that cannot be vain or superfluous, which has been the custom of the Universal Church: it must therefore be conceded, that the souls of the dead are relieved by these prayers, and delivered from the pains of purgatory. This argument, derived from the tradition of the Catholic Church, Dulcitius and Paulinus aforetime used in their questions sent to Augustine. And Augustine himself, chiefly moved by this argument, (not as a doctrine of faith, as it is esteemed by the Papists, but as an opinion not altogether improbable) admitted, that these prayers profit some dead persons, namely, those not very good, nor very bad, whom he suspected to be adjudged to certain temporal punishments after death.

I answer. We do not impugn anything which the Universal Church ever held or did, but what this or that person has falsely inferred from the practice of the Catholic Church. We do not reject the commemoration or honourable mention of the dead saints, nor an annual thanksgiving for those who have departed in the faith of Christ: besides, we have acknowledged that we may pray for a blessed resurrection, for a public absolution in the day of judgment and the perfect happiness of deceased believers, without any superstition. Hence that solemn Prayer in our English Church, when the dead are conveyed to the tomb: *Almighty God, we give thee hearty thanks, for that it hath pleased thee to deliver this our brother out of the miseries of this sinful world; beseeching thee, that it may please thee of thy gracious goodness, shortly to accomplish the number of thine elect, and to hasten thy kingdom; that we, with all those who are departed in the true faith of thy holy name, may have our perfect consummation and bliss, both in body and soul, in thy eternal and everlasting glory, &c.* Lastly, we add, that the ancient Church, on interring the dead, regarded the recently deceased as on a long journey, or on the way to the gate of bliss; and on this account was wont to follow them with pious vows, and, as it were, good presages. The ceremony of burying the dead is described by the Areopagite (Dion. *de Eccles. Hierarch.* cap. 7.) in which place he records the solemn, but congratulatory

* Vide August. *de Dulcitii* Quæstion. quæst. 2.; *De Cura pro Mort.* cap. 1.

prayer, with which they thanked God for their brother departed in the hope of a blessed resurrection ; in which the deceased himself is spoken of as a companion and partner of the saints. But perhaps the Papists will lay hold of that which Dionysius subjoins,* *That the Priest was accustomed to ask of God, that all his sins which were committed through human frailty, might be remitted to him who was departed this life, and that he would conduct him to light and the land of the living.* These are the things which (as is just said) respect the soul recently departed, and considered as in motion, or on the way to the land of the living; not as in the suffering of torments. The praying of the Papists, therefore, for the delivery of souls from purgatory has nothing in common with the prayers of the Catholic Church, which asked *that the deceased might be conducted forthwith into the bosom of Abraham, that is to say, into the place from which pain, sorrow, and sighing flee away,*† not that it might be brought forth from any place of torment, into which Dionysius did not suppose any one of those who had lived holily to have fallen. We condemn not this practice of the Church rightly understood, but those weak reasoners, who from this practice busy themselves to derive purgatorial pains, and deliverances of some of the faithful from such punishments ; for which end we judge the pouring out prayers utterly vain.

2.—It may also be urged in objection, that it was the custom for some ages, not only to commend the souls of the dead to God at their interment, but that they employed prayers of this kind, on their anniversary solemnities, *Absolve the soul of thy servant : Give comfort to the souls of thy servants, &c.‡* These forms of prayer seem to intimate, that souls of the dead remain bound for a long time with the guilt of their sins, and banished from the blessed abodes, and at length are absolved and admitted into the society of the blessed by the efficacy of these prayers ; which, if we admit, they are of great profit to the dead.

I answer. The custom, which no prudent man will extol, stole into the Church of God, that those prayers, which had been fitly used when in the agony of death the soul of the dying man was commended to God, should be repeated also at his interment. Nor that only, but as often as they commemorated the anniversary of his decease (as though the souls of the dead were yet situated in the same danger), they repeated the same prayers. Consider this

* It may be asked, in the present day, Of what authority is this Dyonysius ? See Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. ii. p. 226. §. 12., and Du Pin's *Eccles. Hist.* cent. i. pp. 32—34.

† Vide de *Eccles. Hierarch.* cap. 7.

‡ Brev. Rom. in Offic. Def.

alone taken out of the Roman Breviary.* For when in the agony of its departure, the anxious soul is struggling with the horror of its sins and of Divine wrath, they prescribed these prayers to be offered by the priest:—*Deliver (O Lord) the soul of thy servant from all the terrors of hell, and from the bonds of punishment: Do not refuse that it should lie in the bosom of thy Patriarchs:†—Whatsoever sins it has committed through human frailty, do thou cleanse it by the pardon of thy godly mercy.‡* The same prayer was offered at the funeral with the same intent; when the solemn anniversary of the deceased recurred, the same prayers were then repeated: *Grant them, Lord, everlasting rest:—Absolve their souls:—Give them the place of comfort, &c.§* If you run through the whole service for the dead, in the Psalms, the lessons, the prayers, you will find nothing but what is suited to a soul just about to quit the body, and to pass to blessed rest. Prayers of this kind, therefore, do not confirm the error of the Papists praying for the liberation of souls from purgatory. First, because this very custom of transferring these prayers to the dead, which very properly applied to the living, and situated in the very agony of death, is altogether contrary to reason. But to seek an argument for establishing doctrines of faith from what is contrary to reason rightly instructed is dotage. Secondly, because in these very prayers which are used for the dying or the dead, there is no mention of delivering souls from purgatory, or out of purgatory. All the tenor of these prayers is this, that they may be transferred into the kingdom of glory, that they may be snatched from Satan and the power of hell; in one word, that they may not be condemned to eternal torments; not that they may be extricated from the place of torments. Which Bellarmine himself (*De Purg.* lib. 2. cap. 5.) acknowledges, when he confesses that the Roman Church, in her prayers for the dead, speaks as if their souls were now departing from their body. Lastly, what is most deserving of consideration is, in all the masses which are extant under the name of the Apostles or Fathers (such as those of James, of Peter, Chrysostome, Basil, &c.), in the very prayer which has respect to the dead, there is a profound silence concerning purgatory, or the liberation of souls from the pains of purgatory.||

* Vide Brev. Rom. *Commendat. Am.* p. 232.

† Ibid. p. 233.

‡ Ibid. p. 234.

§ Offic. Defunct. p. 190 et 194, &c.

|| Du Pin assures us (*Vide Cent. 5. c. 7. Abr. to 2. p. 255.*) that the Fathers of the fifth century held no purgatory, and that prayers for the dead only began in the eighth century. From the Council of Florence it is manifest, that the Greeks denied a purgatory. These, therefore, are not doctrines of the Primitive

3.—If we say that the public prayers of the Church had reference to souls only at the very moment of separation, or as on their passage to that world and the tribunal of Divine justice; yet what shall we say to the Fathers who frequently used oblations and prayers for the dead? Wherefore did they do this; unless that by these oblations they might expiate the sins of the deceased, and obtain for them freedom from punishment? Therefore, those prayers which are offered for the dead are not vain.

As to what pertains to oblations and prayers for the dead, I grant that in the time of Augustine a certain vague opinion prevailed concerning some believers, neither very good, nor very bad, who were tormented after death with temporal punishments; and, (which they thought connected with this) concerning their liberation from these punishments by virtue of prayers and oblations which the Church frequently used in their name. But this depended, by the confession of the same Fathers, upon uncertain conjecture, not upon Scripture, as we have before stated. Now, the Catholic Church, in the celebration of the Eucharist, offered it for the dead; but the sacrifice is *eucharistic*, not *expiatory*. Hence, in the canon which bears the name of St. Chrysostom, such are the words which express this oblation: *We offer unto thee this reasonable worship for our predecessors in the faith now at rest, for the Patriarchs, the Apostles, and especially for our most holy Lady the Mother of God, &c.** He who, from such an oblation, would endeavour to deduce a purgatory or liberation of the faithful from the pains of purgatory, should be banished to Anticyra. But even prayers and oblations of private persons occur for deceased friends. Did not these suppose them to be in torments, and to be delivered from them by the help of such oblations? I dare not answer for all: for I know that there were two errors common in the Church; one, of those who thought that departed souls were detained from heaven in certain secret receptacles, as in common custody, until the day of judgment; the other, of those who dreamed that all who embraced the Christian faith, however ungodly, would at length be saved.† It is very likely, that the persons involved in

and Universal Church; but additions and corruptions of the Roman Catholic schismatic sect. It was a conviction of such things as these which induced the Rev. W. Hudleston to renounce the Popish Church, and join himself to ours, in which he officiated as a zealous and useful minister, in Lancashire. See his *Irresistible Evidence against Popery*. See, also, Bishop Hall's *Old Religion*, and Edgar's *Variations of Popery*.

* Missa Chrys. tom. 5. p. 352.

† Vide Sixt. Senens. lib. 6. annot. 345. Vide August. Ench. cap. 112. Et De Civit. lib. 21. cap. 24, 25.

these errors, even in their prayers and oblations, had some other meaning than the Catholic Church or the sounder Fathers had. Among whom Cyprian (*Epist.* lib. 3. ep. 6.) writes, that they were about to celebrate oblations and sacrifices to commemorate the martyrs. And (lib. 4. epist. 5.) he says, that they offer sacrifices for the martyrs, *who merited crowns by their illustrious passion*: whence it is evident, that these oblations for the dead were undertaken without any expectation that they would be discharged from punishment. But neither had the prayers of the Fathers such a design; which may be easily shown from Nazianzen, Ambrose, Augustine, who all seem to require that in word only for their deceased friends which they already asserted to have taken place. We may learn from one prayer of Augustine for his mother what prayers of this kind import. Thus says he (*Confess.* lib. 9. cap. 13), *I entreat thee for the sins of my mother; enter not into judgment with her; let not the lion or the dragon interpose himself either by violence or stratagem.* He seems to fear lest his mother should perchance suffer in the flames of purgatory. But hear what occurs in the same place: *I believe that now thou wilt do what I ask thee, but accept, O Lord, the free-will offerings of my mouth.* The other things which are used to be adduced by the Papists, I willingly omit. I add only one as conclusive. Although these prayers about which there is dispute, produce no advantage to the dead, yet they afford very great profit to the living. For through the accumulation of these assistances, the riches of almost the whole world have fallen to monks and priests. Whilst the laity continue in this error, no one will persuade the advocates of the Papacy that prayers for the dead are vain.

QUESTION III.

TRUE BELIEVERS CAN BE SURE OF THEIR OWN SALVATION.

ROMANISTS are so much in the habit of making faith rest merely upon general and conditional propositions for the obtaining of salvation, that they are led to deny that any believer either can or ought to believe assuredly that his sins are remitted to him in particular; that life is laid up for him in Christ, and, in short, that he is made a child of God, and destined as an heir to the

eternal kingdom. We, on the other hand maintain, that true believers apprehend, by an act of faith, not only these universal declarations—*Whosoever shall believe, and shall persevere unto the end, shall be saved—Whosoever shall truly repent, he shall obtain the forgiveness of sins*, and the like; but also these particular and personal ones: *I am an adopted child of God—My sins are forgiven me—God will bring me to life eternal*;* with others of the like kind.

That this may be made the more evident, it must in the first place be borne in mind, that in this proposition, the term *true believer* denotes not those who yield a mere assent only to Evangelical doctrine, but those who have attained a faith which reposes upon Christ, leading them to God the Father, purifying their hearts, and, in short, placing them among the number of adopted children; all which things, it is clear from the Scriptures, belong to the faith which justifies. If any one should demur to the fact of faith operating in the heart of any man, he denies that Christ has a Church on earth, and shews that he is neither truly a believer, nor truly a Christian. Moreover, we must not leave unnoticed what is laid down in the proposition, that the true believers before mentioned can be sure of their own salvation. For that they may in any situation whatever, or at any point of time whatever be certain of it, or have a real apprehension of this certainty, this we do not assert. Nay, we freely acknowledge that this persuasion of faith is not at all times in operation; nay, more than that, that fear often takes possession of, and agitates the minds of even the regenerate; especially when they perceive that they are involved in the guilt of a crime of blacker dye than usual, and find themselves exposed on that account to the Divine anger. The position, then, which we maintain is, that every true believer or regenerate person, has always that within him, whereby he may certainly persuade himself, that he will, by the Divine mercy, be brought at last to eternal salvation. True, indeed, it is, (as the godly all perceive and bewail) that the exercise of faith is sometimes interrupted, and tossed about by the waves of various temptations to such a degree, that they cannot, without great effort, see the way to the enjoyment of Divine favour. But it is also not less true, that, when this darkness is dispelled, and light restored, the believer recovers himself, lays hold on the gracious promises of God, and on the salvation to be conferred upon him for Christ's sake; and that not by an exercise of uncertain conjecture or expectation, in which he

* Rom. v. 1.; Ephes. iii. 12.; Heb. x. 20., 21.; Acts xv. 9; John i. 12.

may be deceived; but by a true, a living, and infallible faith, wrought in his heart by the Spirit of God.

In order to confirm this our opinion, we shall,

1.—In the first place, bring forward an argument derived from the nature of faith, and the very end of believing. Faith, conceived in the heart, and directed to Christ the Redeemer, by the same operation whereby it apprehends Christ, apprehends life eternal to be bestowed upon the believer himself for the sake of Christ; nor has he any other object in coming to Christ, than that, by believing in him, he may become a partaker of life eternal. He who denies this, must needs admit that he is unacquainted with the Gospel. John iii. 16.: *God so loved the world, &c., that whosoever believeth in his Son, should not perish, but have eternal life.* And John v. 24.: *He that believeth hath eternal life, and shall not come into condemnation, &c.* John xx., the last verse, *These things are written that ye may believe, — —, and that believing ye should have life eternal through his name.* Cassander himself admits,* that this assurance of faith follows justification naturally, and that all the justified are from thence assured of the forgiveness of their sins, and the gracious disposition of the Father towards them.

But our opponents object that, *Although it is certain in general, there are some believing truly and justified truly, yet no one can certainly determine by faith that he is among the number of them, or that he possesses this faith.*†

The Apostle thought far otherwise: *We have received the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God;* (1 Cor. ii. 12.) *Being justified by faith we have peace with God;* (Rom. v. 1.) How will he obtain peace by faith, who is uncertain whether he possesses faith or not? Far otherwise thought Augustine:‡ *We perceive faith itself to be in us, inasmuch as it is in us.* Nor can it be otherwise; for faith resembles a great light, which makes itself visible, as well as other things. Even the Schoolmen themselves agree in opinion with St. Paul and Augustine. Aquinas says:§ *Whosoever possesses knowledge or faith, is sure that he has it; because it is of the nature of faith, that a man be assured of those things, of which he has faith.* Nor does Durandus withhold his assent.|| *Any one having faith, is as sure that he has faith, as he is sure of any other thing whatever; for by believing, he finds that he does believe.* Bellar-

* Consultat. art. 4.

† Bellarm. *de Justif.* 3. g.

‡ *De Trin.* 13. 1.

§ Lib. 3. dist. 23. quæst. 7.

|| 1. 2. quæst. 112. art. 5.

mine, however, discovers another loop-hole, whereby he fancies that he can escape.* For he replies, that we may be sure of the act itself of believing, when we do believe; but are ignorant whether that act proceeds from habit, one, that is to say, gratuitous and infused. But the Apostle is speaking concerning infused gifts, when he says, that we know, by the Spirit, *the things which are given us of God*; and, when he commands us to examine whether we are in the faith, or not; when he presses on us in this manner: *Know ye not your own selves that Jesus Christ is in you except ye be reprobates?* (2 Cor. xiii. 5.) If he is unwilling to yield to an Apostle, yet let him yield to a Cardinal. Thus, then, speaks Cajetan:† *With an assurance of faith, every one knows that he has the infused gift of faith, and this he believes, as he believes other things which are credited.*

There remains one other refuge of the Papists; namely, that justifying faith brings not with it certainty of salvation to the believer himself, because he cannot be certain that he shall persevere in this faith: but the crown is not given [say they] except to those who do persevere. But neither will this avail to weaken the assurance of salvation; because, the same God who inspired faith into the hearts of his children, will also preserve it from being altogether extinguished. *Ye are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time*; (1 Pet. i. 5.) He who keeps his children unto salvation, through faith, undoubtedly will preserve the faith itself, by losing which they would fail of salvation.

2.—Secondly, it may be permitted us to argue from other gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are most certain signs (τεκμηρια) of adoption already gained, and of the inheritance in prospect; such as love to God and our neighbour, the aim at mortification, spiritual delight in the Lord, peace of conscience, and the like. Concerning love, the Apostle John writes, *We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren*: (1 John iii. 14.) The same may be said of all the rest. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we hate sin, and earnestly desire to crucify the lusts of the flesh. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we delight in God, not in the things of the world. We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we have obtained peace with God, which passeth all understanding. Nor can our opponents say, that they who are endued with such gifts, are ignorant whether they possess them or

* *De Justif.* lib. 3. cap. 10.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 112. art. 5.

not; for, upon the authority of Augustine, *He who loves his brother, has a more intimate knowledge of the love wherewith he loves him, than the brother has whom he loves.** And truly it is most absurd to suppose that a man should participate in peace of conscience, and spiritual joy, and not vividly perceive these excellent gifts to exert their influence in his soul. For to constitute joy or spiritual delight, three things must concur, *an object of delight, a swing to the person desired, and an assured sense of the application so made,* as Gerson rightly observes, part. 2. *Compend. Theol. de delectat.* pag. 16. The regenerate, then, are certain of these things being obtained, certain also, of a salvation to be attained. Nor ought we in this case, to be content with such a certainty, as may spring merely from fallacious conjectures. For on such a supposition, our peace itself would soon prove false, our joy misplaced, our stability vanishing. I know that the Romanists admit that there is an assurance of *hope*, of the remission of sins, of a state of grace in the present life, and a state of glory in that which is to come; but assent not to there being an assurance of *faith*. But if by this, they mean a hope springing from fallacious conjecture and the inferences of human reason; do they grant *that* to exist in believers, which exists not in the ungodly and hypocrites? But if they mean a hope infused and theological, let them listen to the Decisive (*Resolutus*) Doctor† *That the subject of infused hope cannot but come to pass;* or rather to the Apostle, who constantly teaches that this hope has the same assurance as faith. In Rom. viii. 24., he says that we *are now saved* by this hope: he calls it *an anchor of the soul*, in Heb. vi. 19. In fine, in proportion to the degree of faith any believer has, the Apostle has decided the measure of hope is there also immoveable and steadfast. In Rom. xv. 13., he has these words, *The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope by the power of the Holy Ghost.* Hilary, adopting the style of the Scripture, has so united this hope with faith, that he has ascribed the same stability and certainty, or wavering and uncertainty, to both. His words are,‡ *The Lord would have us to hope for the kingdom of heaven without any hesitation or indecision in his good will: otherwise, there is no justification from faith, if faith itself hesitates.* It is, then, vain to make a distinction between the assurance of *hope*, and the assurance of *faith*; seeing that the hope of salvation cannot fluctuate in the regenerate and

* *De Trinit.* lib. 8. cap. 8.

† Durandus, [See Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. ii. p. 686, Note.]

‡ Comment. in Matt. pag. 261.

justified man, unless his faith in Christ fluctuates at the same time: nor can faith remain assured, except where hope maintains the same certainty. Hence, Clemens Alexandrinus, no less truly than elegantly observes,*—*Αἷμα τῆς πίστεως ἡ ἐλπὶς, The blood of faith is hope, by which it is sustained as faith by the soul. But when hope expires, just as if the blood had flowed away, τὸ ζωτικὸν τῆς πίστεως ὑπεκλύεται the vital principle of faith is gone.*

3.—A third argument may be added, derived from the inward witness of the Spirit; and to weaken the faith of a testimony of this kind is the province of a daring sacrilege. Let us hear, then, what the Spirit is wont to testify in the hearts of the regenerate who have received him: *Ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father. For the Spirit itself beareth witness with our Spirits that we are the children of God. And if children, then heirs, &c.;* (Rom. viii. 15, 16, 17.) We have almost the same words in Gal. iv. 5., &c. Now, what has Bellarmine to say to this? He answers,† That the Spirit does certainly testify this, but it is *not by Revelation, but from an experience of some kind of pleasantness, which does not, however, lead the way to any certainty, but what is conjectural, and such as may deceive; just as we see in the case of numbers who call God Father, and yet are not his children.* A foolish (not to say an impious) answer. For what matters it, in what manner the Spirit testifies this, when the enquiry is of *the faith of the testimony*, not of *the manner of testifying*? For these words of the Jesuit seem to convey the notion, as if the testimony of the Spirit, afforded in one way, was only *conjectural*, and that it *might deceive* a believer; but when afforded in another, it would be *sure* and *infallible*. We maintain, however, with Chrysostom,‡ that where the Spirit has vouchsafed a testimony of the truth of the thing itself, there there can be no doubt as to the reality. But Bellarmine replies, *That not all who say Abba, Father, are taught to say so by the Holy Spirit; for many ungodly and heretical persons presume that they have been taught by the Holy Spirit, what they have learnt grounded on their own fallacious conjectures.* This reply does not solve the difficulty. For the enquiry is concerning the truly regenerate and believers, whether they have in themselves the Spirit testifying that they are now children, and that they will be hereafter heirs of God; whether this testimony of the Spirit, in whatever way it be afforded, is either so obscure that it cannot

* Pædag. lib. 1. cap. 6. [§. 38., vol. i. p. 132. edit. Klotz.]

† De Justif. lib. 3. cap. 9.

‡ Hom. 14. in Epist. ad Rom.

be perceived ; or so uncertain and fallacious, that any one may be deceived by it. The answer of our opponents is, That the ungodly and heretics, who never had the Spirit of adoption, sometimes dream that they have heard such a testimony, and thence have been deceived. An answer ridiculous and foreign to the point in debate ! For, being questioned about the *regenerate*, and those *truly believing*, he replies concerning the *ungodly* and *heretics*. But the sacred Scriptures put this difference between the world and those believing truly, that the world cannot receive the Spirit of God, nor know him ; but the truly regenerate know him, because *he dwelleth in them, and shall be in them* ; John xiv. 17. Bellarmine then, would seem, consequently, to be acting much the same as if he would maintain, that watchful and sober men cannot certainly determine that they are awake and sober, because drunkards and sleepers suppose the same, and are deceived. This point, however, being settled and established, that the children of God, by the Spirit himself affording a testimony in their hearts, can certainly and infallibly know that they are the children of God ; it follows, that they may be, also, sure of their own salvation. For why should they not, with the Apostle, confidently conclude—*If children, then heirs ; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ* ? Rom. viii. 17. For *God never withdraws the gift of adoption*, as Ambrose has truly remarked, lib. 3. ; and which Biel, a Romish writer, openly admitted, when he wrote (dist. 10. quæst. 1. art. 1.) *That all those who come short of salvation, never were the children of God by adoption*.

4.—In the last place, we may be allowed to contend from the nature and scope of the promises of the Gospel concerning the forgiveness of sins, and obtaining life eternal. For such is their efficacy, that as soon as any one receives them by a living faith, and applies them to himself, he straightway derives from thence *firm and solid consolation*.* But how can the promise of the forgiveness of sins, or of the bestowal of life eternal, yield to the believer solid and true comfort, while the believer himself remains uncertain whether he has faith or not ? if, admitting that he is justified, he nevertheless cannot know with the certainty of faith that his sins are forgiven him, or that he shall be an heir of life eternal, but is compelled to have only an opinion concerning these things, and, as it were, to conjecture from certain signs which deceive the majority ? Consider, then, how cold and languid is that consolation which the faith of the Papists affords to believers.

* Heb. vi. 18.

For it is allowed to rest on this general proposition only : *Whosoever shall repent, believe, and persevere, he shall obtain the forgiveness of sins, and life eternal* : or on this condition, *If I shall believe and persevere, I shall be saved*. But this the ungodly and heretics certainly know ; this, even they can believe who despair of their salvation. They, therefore, who do not allow the believing children of God any other faith of their sins being remitted, and of their salvation, than what the lost and despairing may have, are acting maliciously towards them. But we affirm that every believer may believe, and say with the Apostle, *I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me*, (Gal. ii. 20.) ; and (2 Tim. iv. 18). *The Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and shall preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom*.

The Papists object, that this doctrine of assurance of faith, which we lay down, puts men at their ease, and that the effect is, that men take occasion hence to give the reins more boldly to unholy lusts ; and that it is, therefore, better to shew to believers and the regenerate, a *moral and conjectural hope* in these things, than a *theological and infallible certainty*. But they themselves break the force of their own objection. For among the Romanists themselves, who deny the regenerate this assurance of Divine faith, there are found such as teach that men can, nay, usually do, especially perfect men, arrive at such a degree of trust, as to have no fear about their being justified ; just in the same way as we believe, without the slightest hesitation or fear of mistake, that Cæsar used to govern in Italy, Alexander in Greece ; that Cicero was an Orator, Virgil a Poet.* This, to be sure, goes beyond what we either require or teach. For we concede to the regenerate a faith for the remission of sins and special justification, though not such as constantly to exclude all fear of the contrary ; but such as under all sorrow and temptation overcomes at the last. For to faith there may be a black measure of doubt, faith itself remaining unhurt ; according to that saying of our Saviour, *O thou of little faith, wherefore dost thou doubt ?* (Matt. xiv. 31.) And in Mark ix. 24., *Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief*. If, therefore, the doctrine we hold gives occasion to too much security, that of the Papists, which excludes all hesitation and fear, must, of course, generate it far more extensively.

Besides, according to the common opinion of the Romanists, they who have the greatest certainty of their own justification and sal-

* Vide Bellarm. *de Justif.* lib. 3. cap. 11.

vation, are always especially fruitful in holiness and mortification of the flesh. I instance the most holy Patriarchs, the Apostles, and especially the blessed Paul, and the Virgin Mother of our Lord; all of whom, the more assured they were than other individuals of their salvation, the more holy were they, and the more earnest in restraining their lusts.

In short, maintaining as we do, that faith wrought by the Spirit apprehends the forgiveness of sins, and the paternal love of God towards us; nevertheless, we do not assert, that this act of faith either is, or can be constant, but only exerts itself whilst we are striving after penitence and holiness; but that its light is withdrawn, as it were, and hidden when we yield to sin. The act of faith, then, in laying hold of the free love of God towards us, and the inheritance destined for us in the kingdom of heaven, does not make men reckless and easy; but the want of this assurance is the cause why men wallow in earthly lusts: *For every one that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself, even as God is pure, 1 John iii. 3.*

That beautiful saying of Bernard (Epist. 107.) shall end this enquiry. Thus, says he: *Men do not repay the love of God with a return of love, unless as the Spirit reveals to them, through faith, the eternal purpose of God respecting their future salvation.*

The Reader's attention may be directed to an able and important discussion of the interesting subject of this article in the "Morning Exercises against Popery," delivered in Southwark, and published by Vincent in 1675,—in 1 vol. 4to.—a rare, but very valuable series of discourses.

QUESTION IV.

THERE IS NO TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE OVER KINGS IN
IN ORDER TO THEIR SPIRITUAL BENEFIT.

I CALL that temporal power which restrains offenders by the deprivation of temporal advantages, under whatever pretext of spiritual benefit it be done; whether, for the glory of God, or the salvation of men. Now, that all this power has been usurped by the Pope of Rome, and yet, has no existence in right, I shall demonstrate by three propositions:—

1.—The first is this, *The Roman Pontiff ought not to exercise such power.* And here lest I should seem to be dealing too straitly

with our opponents, they may, if they please, enjoy their delightful dream even to this day. Let the Pope of Rome be Vicar-General of Christ upon earth; although endowed with this most august character, it will not secure for him temporal power. For it is confessed by Papists themselves, in whom anything of sense or shame remains, that this Vicar represents Christ to us, only as he was whilst he was living here among men, but not what he now is, since his glorious session at the right hand of God. Thus Bellarmine himself; *De Pont. Rom.* 5. 4.; *De Potest. Eccles. et Secul.* So Occam before him: *Christ committed that power alone to his Vicar, which he exercised as a mortal man; not that which he received in his glorification.* If, then, Christ in his state of humility, neither received nor exercised temporal compulsory power over Sovereigns, it is manifest that his Vicar neither can nor ought to claim it. Now, what Christ did do is plain; *first*, from his own confession, for he voluntarily acknowledged (John xix. 11.) that not only Cæsar, but Cæsar's representative, had a temporal power assigned over *him* by God himself. Secondly, from an express rejection of judicial power (Luke xii. 14.), *Man, who made me a judge over you?* as though he had said, I exercise no judicial power over *private* persons, either by human or Divine appointment, much less over Kings. Lastly, from his own example (John xvii. 4.); for he who completed the whole work which his Father gave him to do, never even attempted this work of coercing Kings, who were opposing spiritual good. As Sedulius truly said: *He does not take away earthly kingdoms, who bestows heavenly ones.* By what effrontery, therefore, can that pretended Vicar claim that power which the true Lord declined? With what face could that Lion of Cuma exercise temporal rule over Kings, which the Lion of the tribe of Judah, whilst he lived upon earth, accepted not? It is only in the character of an usurper, not by any right of his own to exercise such power, that he does so.

2.—I come to the second proposition, which respects the quality of the person against whom that power is usurped; and it is as follows: *This temporal power neither can, nor ought to be, exercised over Sovereigns.* For the very name of Ruler, and Supreme Majesty, repels this yoke of subjection, and claims to itself, in its own right, temporal rule over all others, even priests, and more than that, the head of the priests, if any such there be. The rest of the Pontiffs might have learned this from Gregory the Great, who (lib. 2. epist. 61. *ad Maur.*) acknowledges the Emperor as *his Lord*, and admits that this power was given unto him over all men. And Innocent III., who was unwilling that his legitimate power

should be in the least circumscribed, whether directly or indirectly, yet clearly allows (In Decretal. Extr.* *Qui filii legitimi*), that a Sovereign recognises no superior in temporal things. Since, therefore, it is abhorrent to common sense, that a superior should be subject to his inferior, in that very particular in which he holds supreme rank; the Royal supremacy in temporal things, thus acknowledged by the Pope himself, will not submit to be punished through the withdrawal of temporal power by a Pope. But we may add, in *the second place*, that temporal power, or the power of punishing, cannot be exercised, unless by the authority of the temporal sword; but the temporal sword ought not to be drawn in his own dominion, but by the command of the Sovereign. So Bernard formerly taught† that this sword is always to be exercised *at the will*, that is, by the direction of the Priest, sought from the word of God, but yet *at the command of the Emperor*. And Christ himself, too, much more clearly says (Matt. xxvi. 52.), *They who take the sword shall perish by the sword*; but he takes it, that is, usurps it, who employs it without his King's permission, who bears the sword by Divine appointment, (Rom. xiii. 4). To authorise the Pontiff, therefore, to restrain an offending Sovereign by temporal punishment, it behoves *him* to await the order of the offender, and (which is ridiculous,) at last to exercise this jurisdiction, when he has obtained authority to do so from the guilty person himself. Suppose, however, he should meet with any Monarch so weak, so foolish, as voluntarily to surrender the sword into his hand, and to command himself to be smitten, yet, even under the cover of this sort of temporal power, he would become not a *judge*, but an *executioner* of Kings.

Lastly, I will also add, That all others should withhold their hands from those persons, the coercing of whom God hath reserved to himself by a certain special privilege. For if the Pope is wont to take amiss the assumption by inferior Bishops of cases reserved to his own cognizance; God, without doubt, would be indignant that a Roman Popeling should assume to himself the punishing of Kings, which is reserved for the bar of heaven. This did not escape the wise prophet; who, on this very account acknowledges, that no one could, without the greatest wickedness, raise his hand against Saul, though unrighteous: *Who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed, and be guiltless? — The Lord shall smite him, &c.* (1 Sam. xxvi. 9, 10.) The same opinion have those Priests maintained whom the heresy of Hildebrand had not as yet

* [Decretal. Greg. IX. lib. iv. tit. xvii. § 13.]

† *De Consid. ad Eug.* 5. 3.

infected. Ambrose, on that saying of the Psalmist, AGAINST THEE ONLY HAVE I SINNED,* observes, *Inasmuch as he was a King, he had not sinned against man, to whom he was not amenable.* With which Gregory of Tours agrees, who thus accosts the King (lib. 5. cap. 17), *If any one of us should transgress the path of justice, he may be chastised by thee; but if thou shalt transgress, who shall condemn thee, except he who has pronounced himself to be Justice?* If, then, the Roman Pontiff desire to condemn and punish Kings, it will not suffice for him to claim some kind of indirect power; but he must claim directly for himself, as a right, the very titles of God, and declare himself, with more than Anti-Christian boldness, to be the fountain of justice. This may be sufficient for rescuing Sovereigns from the temporal sway of the Pope. But because the Jesuits, under the pretext of a spiritual advantage, endeavour to confer on the Pontiff a right they dare not directly ascribe to him, we will oppose this last refuge of the Papists by this our last proposition.

3.—*Spiritual advantage does not require, that any temporal power should be exercised by the Roman Pontiff.* For it is not directed to this end, either as a necessary, or convenient, or lawful means; or in short, in any way connected with the spiritual censure of excommunication. It is sufficiently known with what confidence Bellarmine asserts the necessity of this usurped power; as though the spiritual welfare of the Church could not be maintained, unless the Pope were empowered, at least indirectly, to depose Kings and Emperors. But the case itself shews that this is a most absurd notion: for the Church stood through many centuries under the worst and most cruel Emperors; care for spiritual good flourished, when all the while not one of the Roman Bishops ever entertained a thought, whether waking or sleeping, about this necessary medium of indirect power.† Is it likely, therefore, that the modern Pontiff's who sprung from the school of Hildebrand, should understand better what is necessary to promote spiritual good, than those ancient ones who were trained in the school of Christ, and who, though harassed by severe persecutions, never had recourse to this indirect means; but by direct ones, such too as were ordained by God, namely, by the prayers of Christians, by the preaching of Ministers, and by the sufferings of Martyrs, defended and adorned the Christian profession, and promoted this spiritual good.‡ When Suarez, therefore, maintains,§ that *there is no need of any superior power, to preserve the Roman Pontiff in office,*

* Apolog. Dav. cap. 10.

† Vide August. Epist. 42.

‡ Oth. Frising. lib. 6. cap. 35.

§ De Legib. lib. 4. cap. 9.

because Christ, in some superior way, will provide as concerns this matter, for his Church's good; that may be correctly applied to Sovereigns and Emperors: There is no need for them to be coerced by this temporal power of a Pope, because Christ himself will, in a superior manner, defend his Church, not only against the cruelty of persecutors, but against the very gates of hell. Athanasius well spake concerning Julian the Apostate when vexing the Christians, that it was nothing but *a little cloud that would quickly pass away*.^{*} The same may be said respecting the most powerful enemies of the Church: they are nothing but little clouds, which Christ, by the breath of his mouth, will blow away whensoever he shall please; and he will, whensoever the necessary good of his Church shall require it. It is not therefore the necessities of the Church, or a regard to spiritual good; but the ambition of the Pontiffs, and the thirst for temporal dominion, which has introduced this indirect power.

I have dwelt longer than was needful, perhaps, on a plain point: I now proceed, and assert that this temporal power is, indeed, neither a convenient nor a proper means to promote spiritual good; and therefore, never was ordained, either in his infinite wisdom by Christ to such an end, nor should be ordained by any wise Pontiff for that end. Christ foresaw and foretold, in Matt. x., that there would be many who would persecute the Apostles themselves, and would retard the spiritual benefit of souls, as much as in them lay. Did he, then, allow the Apostles to claim to themselves temporal power, and then to attack and wear down by force of arms those Sovereigns who were enemies to the Church *in ordine ad Deum*? Did he permit Peter to draw the sword, which he had before commanded him to put up? Nay, on the contrary, he promised them the sword of *the word*, not of *iron*; he counselled them *to flee*, not *to fight*: lastly, he admonishes them not *to fear* those who kill the body; but he does not give them any command *to engage in war*, or to *disturb any Sovereign in the seat of empire*: (Matt. x. 19, 23, 28). But if the Pontiffs are unwilling to give heed to Christ himself, let them be warned by experience, which has taught plain enough, that Kings, when assailed with temporal weapons by a Pope, meditate revenge oftener than repentance. I have not leisure for narrating histories, but the Papists may consult their Platina, and may learn from the example of Gregory and Boniface,[†] how admirably spiritual good is promoted by these temporal weapons of the Pope. Those mad Pontiffs did attempt this way, but at the same time they involved

^{*} Vide Theod. lib. 3. cap. 9.

[†] In vita Gregor. vii. et Bonifac. viii.

the State with war, and disturbed the Church with schism, and the World with multitudes of scandals. Yet what spiritual good was gained? Just this, and no more—that by exalting themselves so openly above Sovereigns, they make evident their Anti-Christian pride, and render all of us more steadfast in evangelic truth.

I hasten forward, and now in the third place, I affirm, that this medium of temporal power, which the Roman Pontiffs delight to employ, is unlawful and contrary to the Divine appointment. For it is held to be wicked by St. Paul himself, and to be worthy of damnation, to resist the powers which are ordained of God (Rom. xiii. 2.), and it is considered unlawful by every pious and prudent man, to step out of his own province, and invade another's, without an express command from God. Since, then, *the act is wicked*, upon the authority of Aquinas himself,* *it cannot be ad Deum ordinabilis*; neither will the pretext of spiritual good, or of *ordinis ad Deum*, excuse a Pontiff who takes up arms against Kings, unless he can first produce the charter by which he has been empowered as often as spiritual good is endangered, to become a *King* instead of a *Priest*; and, throwing away *the keys*, to bring the matter to *the decision of the sword*. But can any one believe that *ordinem a Deo*, and *ordinem ad Deum*, can ever be directly opposed to each other? Nothing is more certain, than that an ordinance established by God, commands Kings to bear the temporal sword (Rom. xii.), and to determine on all these temporal matters by their supreme coercive authority. Nothing is more notorious, than that this ordinance *ad Deum*, which has been introduced by the Jesuits, wrests this sword from Kings, and commits the supreme temporal power to a Roman Priest. What, in the meantime, are Christians to do, whilst a Divine ordinance is alleged on both sides? What is certain, they should hold to; what is uncertain, let them reject, at least for a while, until the favourers of Popery shall shew that an ordinance, constituted by God, can be lawfully violated, *in ordine ad Deum*.

It only remains to notice that this temporal power, which the Pontiffs assume to themselves as an ordinance for accomplishing some spiritual good, is not connected, nor allied, in reality, with any spiritual censure of excommunication. It is customary for the Pope, after hurling his thunder of excommunication against some Sovereign, to pronounce, forthwith, that he is deprived of his temporal dominion; and that his subjects are freed from their bond of fealty, and the obligation to maintain civil intercommunication.† But

* Quæst. disp. *de In. Glor.* art. 2

† Vide Gloss. in *Caus.* 11. quæst. 3.; *Caus.* 15. quæst. 7. *Nos Sanctorum.* Vide etiam Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 13. art. 2., et Cajet. *ibid.*

that this is most false is manifest from hence, that excommunication, in the opinion of even the Pontiffs themselves, has not of itself any such effect ; so as to deprive any one of the control over their own temporal possessions. When, then, *does it acquire this new and supernatural power over Kings alone ?* Suarez answers :— *When such an effect follows, it is not the effect of excommunication itself, but a special punishment imposed along with the excommunication by the Judge himself.** But explain to us, thou juggling Jesuit, by what authority, by what right it is the Roman Pontiff can unite this special temporal punishment with the spiritual censure of excommunication ? Since, as a ministerial Judge, he cannot, just as his own humour guides, impose any punishments he pleases upon the guilty ; but is bound to observe the rule of the law in inflicting them, and the intimation of the Supreme Legislator. Now the law and the will of Christ is this :— *If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as an heathen man and a publican* (Matt. xviii. 17.) ; that is, let him be driven from the precincts and the privileges of the Church ; not be deprived of his possessions nor forcibly removed from the government of the State. Nor is this opposed to that injunction of the Apostle (2 Thess, iii. 14) where he commands them *to avoid, and to have no friendly intercourse* with those upon whom the Church hath impressed its stigma of excommunication. For this holds good only when it is left at our option, whether we will or will not retain any civil communication with them ; but where there is a prior duty calling upon us, an excommunication supervening does not dissolve the bond of that duty, whether natural or civil. It is a common saying among the Canonists, that for this very reason, notwithstanding the censure of excommunication, wives ought to discharge the duty which they owe to their husbands, children to their parents, and servants to their masters, with the accustomed fidelity.† How much more, then, does it behove subjects to maintain a dutiful behaviour towards their Sovereigns, though smitten by the Pontifical thunder, when, in reference to the State, they at once sustain a threefold character,—that of husband, of parent, and of master ?

I conclude with one word :—Although the Church may enjoin it on its children, not to maintain free intercourse with any private person who has been cast out of the Church, yet it cannot command subjects to revolt from their Sovereigns when excommunicated ; because they are bound to continue rendering the obedience due to them by law natural, civil, and Divine.

* *De Censuris* disp. 15. sect. 6., pag. 201.

† Hostien. *de Senten. Excommun.*

QUESTION V.

AN INFALLIBLE DETERMINATION OF THE FAITH IS NOT ANNEXED
TO THE PAPAL CHAIR.*

(The following Translation is adopted from one which appeared in the British Magazine for October, 1836, and which, on a careful collation with the original, could not but be approved.)

THE Papists think that, in the Christian Church, there must always exist some external† judge, who is able to pronounce infallibly concerning all controversies of faith, and to whom all Christians may submit their belief without doubt or examination. But they expressly exclude God, or the Holy Spirit, speaking in the Scriptures, from this judicial authority; and they maintain, that it belongs to some human being, who is efficient by his presence among the faithful themselves in all ages, who sits in some visible (*external*, literally,) and known tribunal; and, lastly, who can, *viva voce*, clearly and publicly define and determine the matters in dispute. After laying down these positions, they are audacious enough to assert,‡ that their Roman Pontiff, let him be who he may, is this very judge, to whom this right of determination and this privilege of infallibility, is annexed. But our doctrine is this: that to every particular Church its own ministerial judges must be granted, whose business it is, *ex officio*, to determine all disputes that may have arisen, and to define causes belonging to the faith, according to the rules of the Divine word; but we do not attribute to these subordinate judges the Divine privilege of infallibility, which is to be conceded only to Christ, and to the inspired Prophets and Apostles. For, ordinary pastors, whilst they adhere to the infallible rule, propound to the people of God doctrines which are both perfectly certain, and cannot be erroneous;§ but when they recede from that rule, (which they can too frequently do,) both

* Greg. de Valent. Anal. Fidei, lib. 3. et lib. 8. cap. 6. Jesuitæ in Colloq. Ratisbon, Sess. 9., p. 110.

† (i. e.) *Some Judge known by external marks.* Transl.

‡ Gregor. de Valent. lib. 7.

§ Malach. ii. 7.

rush themselves into the abyss of errors, and drag others after them. But let us now concern ourselves with the Roman Pontiff, to whom, we shall shew, that this privilege of infallible judgment does not belong.

For, first, he could not obtain this universal judicial authority over the whole Church, and that, too, an altogether infallible judgment, except by the gift of God; but God has neither subjected all Christians to this Roman tribunal, nor annexed this privilege of infallibility to the Roman Pontiffs. For, if God had desired that the Church should have recourse to the Oracle of Rome in doubtful controversies of the faith, he would, undoubtedly, have declared in the Holy Scriptures, that such a judge had been appointed by him; he would have pointed out the Bishop of Rome by name to us; and, lastly, would have ordered us to acquiesce in his decision, as in a voice from heaven. For it is wholly incredible, that God should have wished the faith of the whole Church to be dependent on the responses of the Roman Pontiff, and yet not have given Christians any notice about these Pontiffs, their succession, or their See, even so much as by a single word. Let, then, the Papists search the Scriptures, and thence bring even one single syllable where Jesus Christ, St. Paul, or even St. Peter himself, has pointed out this Roman judge and arbiter of controversies; and then we will at once acknowledge and reverence him, as our only and infallible judge in matters of faith.

Besides, if on account of the privilege annexed by Divine power to the Roman Chair, the Bishops of that See were, so to speak, the perpetual dictators of the Universal Church, what reason can our adversaries assign, why God himself should not now, as well as of old, designate this new apostle and supreme judge of the faith, by his own immediate and extraordinary call? Is it right, that a modern and equivocal race of Clergy, of their own free-will and inconsiderate presumption, should assign to the whole world a supreme and infallible judge, about whose decisions it is a sin even to hesitate? If they mean that their Pontiff is endowed with an extraordinary, that is, an *apostolical* privilege of freedom from error, and that, too, by the appointment of God, they ought to permit God himself to choose this judge, after an extraordinary manner, and to set him over the Church: for *the Spirit bloweth where it listeth* itself, and not where the Cardinals of the Roman Church please.

It appears, also, from the following argument, that the Roman Pontiff is not constituted supreme and infallible Judge of the whole Church; namely, that he has not received all things which are

necessary for exercising this infallibility of judgment. For, in order to perceive and find out truth, it is necessary that the mind should be sanctified, illuminated, humble, and studious of the Divine law, *for the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God.** And *God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble.†* But it is a matter fairly confessed by all, that some of the Roman Pontiffs, after obtaining possession of the chair of St. Peter, remain natural (*animalos*) men, blinded, impure, proud, and despisers of the word of God; to whom one might more justly affirm a spirit of *vanity* (*vertigo*) and *error* is annexed, than of *truth* and *infallibility*.

But because they pretend that such a judge is necessary, in order that the Church, in doubtful and controverted questions of faith, should have something certain to rely upon, I will shew, in the second place, that, if this judge be admitted, the Church of God loses all certainty of faith. And here I ask,

First, what must be said in regard to those remote Christians, whom neither Papal decrees nor Legates-à-Latere have ever reached, and to whom, perhaps, the very name and fame of the Roman Pontiff is entirely unknown? For‡ that there are Christians who neither have, nor can have had, any intercourse with the Roman Pontiff, and who have never been acquainted with the Canons established by him, is a plain matter of fact. If, then, the Roman Pontiff be the only judge who directs infallibly the whole Church in matters of faith, it is clear that nations remotely placed, and inhabiting countries but little known (*incognitas*), can receive no advantage from this judge;§ and, therefore, that God has not sufficiently provided for their faith and salvation: a conclusion which is inconsistent with the Providence of God.

But setting aside distant nations, and the extremities of the globe,—the very Church within the limits of Europe, if we refer the supreme determination of the faith to the Pope, has often been without its infallible judge; or, at least, has not known who he was, nor where he was to be found. For Onuphrius|| enumerates thirty schisms in this very Roman Church, of which one lasted

* 1 Cor. ii. 14.

† James iv. 6.

‡ Gerson, Part 1. Serm. *in die Ascensionis*.

§ What advantage such nations do receive when Popery obtains a footing among them, the fate of Tahiti and its Queen shews us of the present age; and, as regards other countries, the reader who is desirous of explicit information may consult Mackay's *Warning from the East*, or the *Jesuits as Missionaries in India*, Nisbet, London.

|| In. Chron.

fifty years.* But during the whole of this interval the Roman Church was double; each Pontiff had his own Cardinals and supporters, set himself up as the successor of St. Peter, and at length the whole Church was plunged into so great uncertainty, that it was utterly unable to determine which of the two was the possessor of the chair of St. Peter.† Where, then, was that visible judge? where that sure tribunal? where that infallible settler of controversies? If God had appointed the certain determination of the faith to rest upon the Roman Pontiff, he would have taken care, above all things, that the Church should not be thus uncertain about this very Roman Pontiff. But, even granting the Pope to obtain his chair without a rival, yet there will be no certainty in our faith, if it depend on his infallibility. For the privilege of freedom from error, according to the doctrine of the Romanists, is only his, inasmuch as he is the legitimate successor of St. Peter. Therefore the assertion, that this or that Pope cannot err, pre-supposes the proof of this proposition—*This Pope is the legitimate successor of St. Peter.*‡ But how slippery and frail a foundation is this! How unfit to form the foundation of the certainty of the Catholic faith! For, first, this very opinion, that the Roman Pontiffs are the successors of St. Peter, is founded on the faith of *history*, and not on that of the *Scriptures*. Wherefore, I assent to this succession, but by *the ordinary mode of acquiring belief in any matter of human knowledge*, (*credulitate humana et acquisita*, literally by a *human* and *acquired* credence,) not with a *Catholic* and *theological* faith. Moreover, granting it even certain, as an article of Catholic faith, that the Popes are the successors of St. Peter in the See of Rome, yet it cannot be believed, even as a matter of *historical* faith, that this gift of infallible judgment, which was personal to St. Peter, is transmitted to his successors; for historians, who have mentioned many heretical Popes, appeal against such a decision. Lastly, let us assume that this privilege is annexed to the true and legitimate successors of St. Peter; yet, since to the true succession a canonical election is required, which is free from every kind of compact, simony, and other arts, too familiar to the Court of Rome, who can guarantee, who can believe, that any Pontiff is elected without something to vitiate this succession (*absque vitio*)? But, if he is raised to that See simoniacally, he receives not the Spirit of Christ, but the *Spirit of falsehood*.§ What a wretched mockery of

* On this subject the Reader may find some useful information in Baxter's *Key for Catholics*, Edit. of 1839.

† Gerson, Part. i., *De signis ruinæ Eccles.*

‡ Gerson, Part. 3. *De vit. spir.* lect. 2.

§ Gratian caus. 1. quæst. 1.

certainly, therefore, must the faith of Christians have, which rests upon the good faith and integrity of the Cardinals! For, if they are guilty of any corruption in electing a Pope, they set over the Christian world, not an infallible judge of the faith, nor a true successor of St. Peter, but a robber, and a successor of Simon Magus. Away, then, with so uncertain a source for the certainty of others!

3.—I will add now, in the third and last place, that this very Roman Pontiff, whom they wish us to acknowledge as an infallible judge, was not acknowledged as such by the Papists themselves in old times, nor, indeed, is he as yet acknowledged by them. For the opinion of those, who taught that a Council is superior to the Pope, has always obtained great reputation among the Romanists themselves; and the whole of this class have destroyed the primacy of the Pope, and his fictitious privilege of infallibility. Wherefore, they thought that an appeal would lie from the Pope to a Council in matters of faith;* they expressly declared that the decisions of the Pope did not oblige to believe; and, lastly, they demonstrated that the Pope was a member of the Church, who might err, and might be corrected, or even deposed by a Council. It is, therefore, most worthy of observation, that this very citadel of the Roman faith was not first stormed and levelled with the ground by Luther and Calvin, but long ago, by most learned Romanists; and also, by two most celebrated Councils, those of Constance and Basle. How miserable is it, then, in modern Papists, to endeavour to extort the certainty of their faith, in controverted matters, from one who, their predecessors have not hesitated to affirm, may be a member liable to mistake, erroneous, and even an heretic, in the very Chair itself! Let us add, that the whole of the Schoolmen in Theology (*quòd tota Schola Theologorum docet*) teach,† that the Church does not manifest the same faith in the successors of the Apostles, which she is wont to do in the Prophets and Apostles themselves. For we are not bound to give our faith to these successors, except in as far as they propound to us what those (Prophets and Apostles) have left recorded in their writings. *The authority of the Popes*, says Gerson,‡ *is not the same as that of the Apostles was; nor does any determination of a mere man* (*puri hominis*) *oblige his subjects* (*subditos*) *to believe it as a verity of faith*. Therefore, the Papal decrees are received by the old Romanists themselves under this limitation—*if they are not against God; if they are not opposed to the Gospel*:§ for, in that case,

* Gerson, Serm. coram Conc. Const.; et in Tract. *An liceat a Papa appellare*.

† Aquin. quæst. disp. *De fide*, art. 10.

‡ Gerson, Part. 3. *De vit. spirit.* Lect. 2., coroll. 7.

§ Mirand. Theor. 16.

they profess that credit should rather be given to any unlearned man whatever, than to the Pope. What need would there be for such exceptions, if the Pope were permitted and enabled, from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, infallibly to determine all controversies of the faith? No one uses such a caution, when he speaks of the doctrine of St. Peter or of St. Paul. If, therefore, the Pope had the same infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in teaching or in determining, why should they not have thought that equal obedience should be manifested to his doctrine and determination? Perhaps this infallibility of the Papal judgment was not very clear to the Romanists of ancient days; but the Jesuits, who are blessed with clearer eyes, are fully persuaded that the Roman Pontiffs enjoy this privilege. Alas! the Jesuits themselves here vacillate, and, in all their complicated discussions, have exhibited the Pope as an object rather of ridicule, than as one on whom to rest our faith. Gregory de Valentia* teaches, that the Pope, as a private person, may err in clear matters, and wish to obtrude his error on the Church; but in controverted matters, as a public person, that he cannot determine against the faith. How absurd and puerile is such a sentiment! For, what the Pope thinks, as a private person, he will bring forward when he enters on the public seat of judgment; and he who is liable to error, in matters which are manifest and clearer than the sun, would be far more likely to be blind in obscure things which have never before been elucidated. But an intimation, which we find in the same Gregory, will prevent us from submitting our faith to this judge; for he (Gregory) informs us,† that the Pope, if he falls even into secret heresy, loses his Pontifical authority. If he falls from his Papal authority, and is deposed in the sight of God, he loses the chair (of authority), if he had any such before, and also, the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. Since therefore, the faithful, who are unable to search the hearts of others, do not know for certain whether the Pope cherishes some secret heresy within him, or not, it follows of necessity, that they cannot know whether he has the infallible authority of determining in matters of faith.

Nor has Bellarmine defended this privilege very strenuously; for he grants to us,‡ that the Pope, as Pope, even with his assembly of Counsellors, may err in questions of fact; and secondly, as a private Doctor, he may err in questions of faith. Lastly, he confesses that many Romanists maintain,§ that the Roman Pontiff, making a determination with any particular Council, may err;

* Anal. lib. 8. cap. 3.

† De Pont. Rom. Lib. 2. cap. 2.

‡ Ibid. cap. 7.

§ De Concil. lib. 2. cap. 5.

nor does he himself dare to affirm, that this proposition ought to be considered contradictory to the Catholic faith. What then! shall I acknowledge him to be an infallible judge, whom the Catholic faith does not acknowledge to be free from the danger of error, not only when alone, but even when supported by a particular Council? But at last they come down to this proposition, that the Pope, supported by a General Council, cannot err in defining doctrines of faith. The Pope, then, will be an infallible judge, at least if the assistance of a General Council be afforded to him.

I shall not now discuss the authority of General Councils; I will only say, that this defence is quite at variance with the decisions (placitis) of the Jesuits, and the opinion commonly entertained by ordinary Papists: for ordinary Papists (*vulgus Papistarum*) believe that the Pope, even by himself, can determine infallibly. And the Jesuits, also, are wont to derive this infallibility from the chair of St. Peter, and the assistance of the Spirit. Does the Pope, then, occupy the chair of St. Peter only at such times as a General Council is convened? Is the infallible assistance of the Spirit wanting to the Pope, if he be not surrounded by a certain number of Bishops? What becomes of the arguments they have used, when they represented this their infallible judge to be constantly necessary to the Church, and to be visible and accessible in the Church at all times? For, if he is unable to proceed to the act of determining infallibly, except by the concurrence and assistance of a General Council, such a judge is neither necessary in the Church, nor perpetually in it. He is not necessary, because General Councils themselves are not absolutely necessary. This clearly follows from the circumstance, that for the first three hundred years the Church was without General Councils,* and yet it remained safe against heresies, persecutions, schisms, defects, and all the machinations of devils and men.

If, therefore, the Pontiff has not his infallible judgment except with a General Council, it is certain that the Church cannot be bound by any necessity to recur to such a judge. By the same argument it is shewn, that this infallible tribunal which they assign to the Roman Pontiff never was, is not, and never can be, so constant and perpetual in the Church, that the faithful can seek from it, at all seasons, certain and infallible determinations in doubtful causes relating to the faith. For General Councils could not be convened for three centuries, by reason of the persecutions of the heathen; and under Christian Emperors they were not held every

* Bellarm. *de Concil.* lib. 1. cap. 10.

year, and scarcely indeed every century. But in our age, on account of the despotism of the Pope, and the broils of Christian princes, there is very little, or scarcely any hope of witnessing a General Council.

If, then, the Pope does not enjoy his infallible judgment without the assistance of an Œcumenical Council, the infallible determination of the faith neither was for many ages, nor is now, residing in the Papal chair,—nay, the Church may last to the very end of the world without such a judge.

QUESTION VI.

THE BLIND OBEDIENCE* OF THE JESUITS UNLAWFUL.

Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits, designed this obedience to be the special mark of his followers,† which, by a true, though ominous name, he designated a *blind* obedience. This all, without exception, are bound to pay to their General, even as though he were Christ himself; and they who are called *Professors of the four vows*,‡ swear, moreover, that they will act in obedience in all things to the will of the Roman Pontiff; will depart in no matter, appertaining to religion or faith, from his decrees; in short, that they will attach themselves to this Vicar of Christ by a perpetual bond of obedience.

Now in this obedience there are two things specially required; the renunciation of a man's own will and judgment,—submission with an entire surrender to the power of the Superior.§ For

* [“Omnia justa esse, nobis persuadendo; omnem sententiam ac judicium nostrum contrarium *cæca quadam obedientia* abnegando, et id quidem in omnibus, quæ a superiore disponuntur, ubi definiri non possit (quemadmodum dictum est) aliquod peccati genus intercedere. Et sibi quisque persuadeat, quod qui sub obedientia vivunt, se ferri et regi a divina Providentia per superiores suos sinere debent, perinde ac si cadaver essent, quod quoque versus ferri, et quacunque ratione tractari se sinit, vel similiter atque senis baculus, qui, ubicunque, et quacunque in re velit eo uti, qui eum manu tenet, ei inservit.”—*Constitutiones Societatis Jesu*, part. vi. cap. 1. sect. 1. Romæ, in *Ædibus Societatis Jesu*, 1558.]

† Maffei *Vita Loiolæ*, lib. 3. cap. 7.

‡ Hospinian. *de origin. Mon.* cap. 66. pag. 296.

§ Hasenmul. pag. 157. [*Historia Jesuitici ordinis, in qua de Soc. Jesuitarum*

Loyola ever refused to acknowledge that man to be worthy of the name of *an obedient*, who was not willing to submit himself to his lawful Superior, as well in will, as in judgment.* But in yielding this blind obedience, is the demand satisfied by mere submission? Nay, a man must abandon, and altogether extinguish every inclination of his own will, and all the light of his own understanding, so as henceforward to be entirely directed by the will of his General, or the Pontiff; just as blind men are guided in all things by the hand of another. For this is manifestly intimated, when your submissive and obsequious Jesuit is likened to wax, a statue, a staff, a dead man.† For as all these do nothing of themselves, but are subjected entirely to the movements of another, so Loyola intended his company of men to be led and guided like *a puppet moved by strings not its own*.‡

But, in order that an obedience so absurd and irrational, might be rendered less offensive to men endowed with judgment and reason, he prepares and embues their minds with these two most erroneous opinions:—one, that it behoves them to view in their General, and much more in every Roman Pontiff, not a man liable to error; but to regard him even as Christ himself, who is the wisdom of the Father; and to attend to his instructions no less than as if they were the word of Christ himself, who can neither be deceived nor deceive.§ The other, that they ought to be fully assured, that whithersoever they are moved and directed by

nomine, gradibus, miraculis, doctrinæ, &c., tractatur; conscripta ab ELIA HASENMULLERO; Francof. ad Mœnum, 1593, pp. 108—112.

Half of the tasks prescribed to candidates desirous of entering into this worshipful Company, which Protestants, on hearing of or reading about, are too ready to satisfy themselves with merely entitling *absurd*, whilst the Company itself is busied in every work of darkness, are of the *tentative* order, and are intended to find out the degree of submission which may be reckoned on in the applicants. The Directors of the Company would, in this case, partially agree with the objector, and so get rid of him, not intending to reveal more of the mechanism—the object of the Company being, however, to subjugate the postulants to the most absolute subjection, as Bishop Davenant's authorities clearly shew. It is of course saving time, disappointment, &c., to try how far the candidate is likely to be willing to perform in the humble style. Protestants should be more aware than they are of the *reasons* for Popish legislation. It would save them from many mistakes.

* Maffei, lib. 3. cap. 7.

† Hasenmul. cap. 6. *De votis Jesuit.* p. 140.

‡ [Horat. Sat. Lib. ii. Sat. vii. The reader may see a fine modern illustration of the above governing principle in the "*Narrative of Iniquities and Barbarities practised at Rome in the 19th Century*," by R. Ciocchi, Nisbet, London.

§ Maffei, lib. 3. cap. 7.

their superior, it is the Divine Will and Providence which inspires and directs them.*

You perceive the character of this blind monster, not so much of obedience, as of Jesuitic madness. We proceed now to demolish it by our arguments. We affirm, then, that an obedience thus blind is unlawful, whether we regard the superior who requires it, or the inferior who yields it.

1.—The Superiors sin, seeing that, in order to extort this blind obedience, they first instil into the minds of their subjects poisonous errors, and such as are blasphemous against God himself. For in what other light can that maxim of Loyola be viewed? *It is necessary that in the person of every superior, his subjects should look upon him, not as an individual liable to error, but as Christ the wisdom of God!* Very differently thought Augustine, who commends Christians,† because they could make a distinction between an eternal Lord and a temporal Lord. For although we are bound to recognise the Divine appointment in the government of a legitimate superior; yet, to imagine the Divine wisdom of Christ [to be centred] in his person,‡ or to suppose unerring rectitude in all his enactments, is as revolting to reason as to Religion itself. For common sense teaches us, that there is no man but is liable to err; and experience shews, that they who possess legitimate power, very often enjoin things evil and unlawful.

Of the same stamp, also, is that other assumption, which they have laid as the foundation for this blind obedience. For they assert, that their subjects ought to consider themselves as influenced by the Divine will, in whatever they are directed to do by their superiors;§ and hence they conclude, that prudence is a virtue to be exercised by a *governor* alone; not by the *governed*. And in good truth, such instructions would not have a semblance even of truth, unless on the supposition, that their lawful superiors have their will confirmed in what is good. For while they themselves are liable to sin and mistakes, they impel their subjects so far in accordance with the Divine will, as far as they themselves keep their will conformed to the Divine law. For who would affirm, that the people of Israel were called to idolatry by the Divine will, because Jeroboam ordered them to worship the golden calf? or, that the Jews were induced by God to crucify Christ, because they were stirred up to it by the persuasion and authority of their priests? or, that the Papists are incited to worship images, and depose

* Sum. Constit. Jesuit. Regul. 36.

† Aug. Tom. 8. in Psalm. cxxiv.

‡ Vide Sum. Reg. 35.

§ Matt. iii. 7.

kings by the Divine will, because they are instigated to these superstitious and wicked acts by the decrees and commands of their superiors? And this is the first reason by which we mean to shew that this blind obedience is unlawful, as regards the superior; namely, that these premises, which they have laid down, and whereby they endeavour to lead the blinded dupes of the Company to yield that obedience, are false. [Again]

2.—It is a grievous sin to require such obedience from their followers, inasmuch as, what is due to God alone, they hesitate not, with a sacrilegious boldness, to assume to themselves. For an absolute dominion over the will and understanding of another is a prerogative reserved for God alone;* whose will, alone, is the first, absolute, and certain rule of righteousness and goodness: men ought not even to wish, much less to require, an absolute and blind obedience, excepting under this limitation,—if their commands shall not deviate from this primary and fixed rule of righteousness. For no one is required to yield obedience to a subordinate power, but so far as it observes the rule of the superior. Hence that expression of Peter, *We must obey God rather than men*. But how can that be done, if it is lawful for men to require absolute obedience according to their own caprice?

In fine, this manifests their impiety, that, contrary to the dictates of their own conscience, they claim to themselves an absolute control over the will and judgment of others, while they are aware that they are themselves deficient in the complete rectitude of their own will and judgment. For with what face can any one require that his own reason and will should become the settled rule of justice and equity to others, when they neither are, nor ought to be so to himself? God, indeed, may require absolute obedience from us, because he can command nothing contrary to justice; and this is the reason why, by the necessity of *justice*, the wills of all are held obedient to the Divine command, as, by the necessity of *nature*, all natural things are subjected to the Divine guidance. But any mortal, if he should require such a measure of obedience to be rendered to him, would act most impudently, and be doing violence to his own conscience, in assuming what he very well knows he has no claim to.

But seeing that the Jesuits care little, whether it be right or not to require this blind obedience, provided only it is not withheld by inferiors; we must now enquire whether the subjects†

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 104. art. 5.

† “*The subjects* :”—The Priesthood of a Diocese, and the youth intended for Holy Orders, are called *subjects* of the Bishop. Thus, in the evidence of

themselves are at liberty to vow or render such obedience to any mortal.

1.—In the first place, then, this blind obedience is objectionable on the ground that every man is bound to conduct himself as a human being, not as a brute; that is, to make use of his reason and judgment, and not to act, in any case, from a blind submission, at the mere bidding of another. For as in other matters, so, in rendering obedience itself, it behoves every one to act from his own judgment;* not because he should not consult the wishes of his superiors; but because it is right, that as well the person who is enjoined obedience, as he who commands it, should be both satisfied that the act required is not unlawful. *Every one*, says Aquinas,† *is bound to examine his actions by the knowledge which he has received from God, whether it be natural, or acquired, or infused: for every man ought to act according to reason.* The individual, then, who, according to the teaching of Loyola,‡ entertains the notion that he must perform whatever shall be enjoined him by his superiors, and esteems all their commands to be just, and, in short, foregoes the exercise of his own judgment by a blind obedience; such a man must needs, in yielding such obedience, play either a stock or a beast.

Dr. Doyle before the Committee of the House of Commons, on the state of Ireland in 1824, 1825, we find as follows:—

“Many of the Irish Prelates were unwilling to send *subjects* there” [the Irish College in France.] “It would not be in my power to give an account of the number of students at foreign Universities; it is only by application to the several Bishops of Ireland, whose *subjects* are upon the Continent, that such account can be furnished.” This expression has the authority of the Council of Trent, as appears from the following decree:—“In order that the Bishops may the better maintain the people whom they govern (*populum quem regunt*) in their duty and obedience, they are to have the authority of delegates of the Apostolic See, in all matters relative to the visitation and reformation of their *subjects*; so that they may decree, order, punish, and execute, according to the canonical sanctions, whatever shall appear to them necessary for the reformation of their *subjects*, and the improvement of the Diocese.” (Sess. 24. cap. 10.)

By another of the Trent Canons, *every member* of the Church of Rome is bound to believe that all baptised persons are liable to be compelled, *by punishment*, to be Christians; or, what is the same in Roman Catholic divinity, and Jesuitic casuistry, spiritual subjects of the Pope. The organisation of the Jesuits tended to bring these, and such like decrees, into full operation, in the perfect spirit of them, wherever they could obtain a footing.

See Phelan and O’Sullivan’s *Digest of Evidence for Ireland*, vol. ii. pp. 23—25—where is much additional information on this point; but for a practical illustration of the point, the reader may be referred to Pope’s *Roman Misquotation*, Notes, p. 278.

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 114. art. 10. † Quæst. disp. de Consc. art. 5.

‡ Summarium. Reg. 35.

2.—In the second place, the rule very generally admitted among Theologians, that *the man who knowingly exposes himself to the risk of committing mortal sin, does sin mortally*,* militates against this doctrine of blind obedience. For he who binds himself by this impious and rash vow, namely, that without any enquiry, he will do whatever his superior commands, or, without any examination, will believe whatever the Pope shall decree, throws himself open to evident risk, since it is quite certain, that every superior and every Pope, may give both unlawful commands and false definitions. Unless, therefore, the Superiors can themselves give bond or security that they will never err, their subjects cannot vow that they will always render them a blind obedience in all things.

3.—It is, besides, very evident, that this blind obedience cannot be pleasing to God, inasmuch as he will not hold excused those who, in obeying their Prelates, fall by this blind devotion either into heresy or some other sin.† But if this obedience were allowable, it would not place any one out of favour with God, because he would be acting properly in submitting his will and judgment to that of his superiors. But the Holy Scriptures teach that the matter is, indeed, far otherwise; for *if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch* :‡ the superior, perhaps, with a heavier

* Gerson. in Reg. Mor.

† To what extent of evil, in this respect, the lower orders of Romanists are exposed, by the operation of this principle among them, the following fact, which came out in the evidence given on Irish affairs before the House of Lords in 1825, illustrates. The Archbishop of Dublin in his examination, May 3, stated as follows :—

“ There has been lately a very extraordinary case in the Consistory Court of Dublin, as I was informed by one of the officers of the Court just before my departure from Dublin. A woman appeared at the Court, to administer to the effects of her father, who had lately died. She stated, on oath, that he had died intestate, and had left no widow. As she was leaving the office, she was asked by one of the clerks, who knew her, how she could possibly swear that her father had left no widow, when she knew perfectly well that her father had married a second time, and that the widow was now living? to which she answered, that it was not so; that she had gone to the priest (naming him) to know whether she should make the affidavit, and was informed by him that she might, for that the woman could not be called his widow, as she could never have been properly called his wife; and that when it was still put to her, that her oath was directly contrary to the fact, her answer was, that she could not presume to know better than her priest, or to say anything contrary to his word. The officer informed me, that the parties had been married by a Protestant minister, and that to this it was the priest alluded when he pronounced it not to be a marriage.”—*Digest of Evidence*, by Phelan and O’Sullivan, vol. i. p. 387.

‡ Matt. xv. 14.

fall, because he had boasted of his clear-sightedness; but the inferior, with a loss no less certain, because he had voluntarily and unwisely deprived himself of eye-sight. For when that terrible day of the last judgment shall come, *every one shall render an account for his deeds*; nor shall a man be considered as free from blame, if he shall have failed in any particular, on the ground that he had resigned his will and judgment up to his superior as to God. For who required this from him? Who obliged him to tender such obedience? *For every obligation must, to be reckoned lawful, be carried back to the authority of God, who is pleased thus to bind his own creatures.** You act, therefore, rashly and foolishly, in placing yourself in subjection to some frail man, as if he were God; who, before the judgment-seat of God, if in anything he have directed you amiss, will not be able to free you from harm.

4.—Lastly, that obedience cannot be lawful which involves a neglect of the Divine command; which this blind and Jesuitic obedience most plainly does. For God commands us to beware lest any one deceive us (Eph. v. 6.); He commands us to prove all things (1 Thess. v. 21.); He forbids us to be the servants of men (1 Cor. vii. 23.); He forbids us to be as horses or mules, which have no understanding (Psalm xxxii. 9).† But those persons who have obstinately determined to maintain whatever their superior commands, or thinks; to regard whatever he enjoins, as the command of God; to go through whatever he shall suggest, with a certain blind impulse of the will, without any examination at all: undoubtedly, their obedience excludes caution, sets aside proof, assigns them over as slaves to men; and, in fine, makes of them not only mules or horses, but stones and stocks.

But methinks I hear the Jesuits exclaiming, that we are doing Loyola great injustice. For, however he may enjoin a blind obedience upon his followers, and require from them a surrender of their own judgment; yet he does it with this exception—*That obedience must, indeed, be rendered to the superior in all things, unless where it seems to be sinful.‡* He shews himself sure enough here to be a humorous cheat, who, after he has put out the eyes of all, proceeds to make himself merry with their blindness. For he acts just like a man who should diligently inculcate on a traveller, whom he has deprived of his sight, to follow him as his guide wherever he should go, except where he perceived any precipice. For, like as the man deprived of his eye-sight cannot perceive a preci-

* Gerson, in Reg. Mor. pag. 128.

† Ex Epistola Ignat. de Obed.

‡ Reg. Jesuit. Regul. 31.

pice, so, neither can he who entirely renounces his own judgment discern what is sinful. For how can that be done? seeing that, at the command of Loyola, he has already renounced the eyes of his own understanding, and permits himself to be directed wholly by the eyes of another's judgment. But, suppose some novice to make use of the eyes of his judgment, and perceive manifest sin in the command of his superior; will he rest upon his own judgment, and reject the unjust command of his superior? Nay, he cannot act otherwise than refer his judgment to that of his superior, and that too, under the rule and caution, that as before, so after this application, his mind be prepared to approve, and think more correctly of the decision of his superior, whatever it be. The force and meaning of the aforesaid exception is, then, that he is not only to obey his Superior where sin is perceived, if the Superior himself, on being consulted, shall answer that it is indeed sin; but if the Superior shall stand to his opinion, then, what seemed to him when making use of his own eyes to be manifest sin, must now appear to him, trusting to another's eyes, to be right and good.

But, to cut off any way of escaping in this case, I shall shew by examples, that they approve of such obedience as is rendered to the command of the Superior, even in things which are plainly unlawful. I ask, then, whether it is allowable, either to require the labour of another, or, for a man to spend his own labour upon things ridiculous, useless, and altogether impossible?† If it is not, why should a Monk have been proposed, as a remarkable example of obedience to his followers, who, having been commanded by his Abbot to water a dry stake, as if it had been a green tree, for a whole twelve-month, persisted to do so? Why that other individual, who, at the bidding of his Superior, endeavoured to raise a stone of huge size himself alone, which one hundred men could not have removed from its place? It is quite incongruous that they, who believe that Christians must give an account for every idle word, should command actions thus idle, by way of experiment, and as an exercise of this blind obedience. If these instances should seem trifling and ridiculous, I will adduce graver, and one that is allied manifestly with sin; in the performing of which, however, the blind obedience of their subjects is both demanded and commended. For what greater wickedness could the devil himself suggest to those whom he influences, than that they should destroy themselves, and should cast themselves sometimes into the water, sometimes into the fire?

* Ignatius in *Epist. ad fratres Lusit.*

† See Note ‡ at the beginning of this article, for an answer to this.

(Mark ix. 22.) But if a Monk, at the command of his Abbot, should throw himself into the fire, or should presume to walk upon water, obedience, such as that, would meet with special commendation, and hence an imitation of this virtue is urged upon others.

I am aware, that some ancient writers, who used to listen too readily to the fables of the Monks, state, that obedience of this description has been honoured by miracles from God himself.* But, contrary to the plain word of God, which forbids us to tempt God, we ought not to give countenance to such obedience, whether it be accompanied by miracles true or false. But let us dismiss these more ancient writers, and come to Loyola himself. He, therefore, for the purpose of inspiring his novices, even in the case of manifest sin, to render this blind obedience, declares that if the Pope commanded it, he was willing to go on board a vessel, entirely unrigged, and trust himself, without any hesitation, to the winds and waves.† But what else does this prove, than that, at the bidding of the Pope, he would be willing, in opposition to the example and to the doctrine of Christ, to tempt the Lord his God?‡

Let us close with our own times. What sin is more gross or manifest, than the sin of perjury, rebellion, or murder? Yet, if the Pope should command the violation of allegiance to the King, their opinion is, that he must be obeyed; if, to bear arms against their King, they must not refuse; if to destroy all the heads of Church and State with gunpowder, they must not hold back, even from such a crime. How vain, then, and hypocritical is that exception in favour of manifest sin, when they are willing that all their followers should imbibe the notion, that, whatsoever is commanded by the Pontiff, or the General, however revolting and horrible it may be, does not bear the character of a manifest crime, but rather that of a meritorious performance. Indeed, the Jesuits engaged in the Conference at Ratisbon were not ashamed to assert, confidently,§ that the people are so far subjected to the guidance of their leaders, that if the latter should err in defining anything doubtful, the people may likewise, nay, ought to err, in virtue of their guidance.

Away, then, with this blind obedience of the Jesuits, by the fascination of which all must needs err with their Superiors, and cannot distinguish manifest sin from works of holiness.

* Sulpitius Dial. 1. *De virtutibus S. Martini*. Greg. Dial. lib. 2. cap. 7.

† Maffæius lib. 3. cap. 7.

‡ Matt. iv. 7.

§ Sessione 9. pp 282 and 288.

QUESTION VII.

PROTESTANTS CANNOT WITH A SAFE CONSCIENCE ATTEND THE
MASS.

It has been very justly observed by that great champion of Romanism, Bellarmine himself (tom. 1. *de Laic.* lib. 3, cap. 19), that *if all other controversies were settled, yet between Papists and Protestants peace cannot be effected*, because the Papists regard the Mass [or Popish service] to be the most divine worship of God, while we look upon it as abominable idolatry. It is not my present intention, however, to expose the blasphemous impiety of Masses,* but to shew that we, who abhor this impiety in our minds, cannot be present even in body at the celebration of these Masses.

This discussion we direct against those [Protestants] who foolishly think, that there is no danger or sin in the act of outward communion with idolaters, provided the mind itself abhors their depraved superstitions. But indeed every one who acts thus violates the integrity of a good conscience, and sins in many ways.

In the first place, he sins against himself, whilst, by an unlawful and impious insincerity, he inflicts an injury on his own conscience, and defiles and contaminates his soul. For the mind of a well-informed Protestant clearly suggests, that the Popish Mass is not an expiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead, but a sacrilegious violation of the sacrifice once offered through Christ; but the very act of any one entering a Popish temple, and uniting himself with those who adore the Mass, bears upon the face of the thing the hope of the expiation of sins from it, and the approbation thereof, as of a legitimate and sacred action. Moreover, the understanding of a Protestant pronounces that the morsel of bread which is elevated by the sacrificing priest, is not Christ, the God-man, the Son of the living God; but the act of prostrating and adoring signifies to all those present,—that God himself is worshipped and acknowledged under the empty appearance of bread.† This contradiction

* The sacrifice of Masses, in the which it is said, that the Priest offers Christ for the quick and the dead, to have remission of pain or guilt, “are blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.”—*See Art. XXXI. of the Church of England.*

† The Roman Catholic doctrine is, that the accidents of bread remain without its substance.—Translation in *British Magazine*, for May, 1836.

between external actions and the internal preparation of the mind, I call most shameful insincerity, and a lie no more to be tolerated, than if such an one should affirm, in express words, that he approves the Popish Mass. For it pertains to the essence of truth, that every one should shew himself by his outward conduct to be such as he really is; and when any one by outward signs signifies the very contrary to what is inwardly in his mind, he stands opposed to this truth; and such insincerity may properly be called *lying by deeds* (*mendacium in factis*), as Aquinas rightly says (2. 2. quæst. 3. art. 1). He, therefore, who from his heart abhors the Papists' Masses, and in the mean time openly participates with them, is thereby *the more to be condemned, because what he falsely exhibits in his actions, he yet does so, that the people suppose it to be done under the influence of truth*, as Augustine writes respecting Seneca the philosopher, (*De Civit.* 6, 10.)

Secondly, If any one of us shall attend the Masses of Papists he sins against his brethren, especially the weak; for whom he lays a stumbling-block (*scandalum ponit*), whilst by his example he allures and entices them to a similar liberty, whereby their consciences must necessarily be polluted. And how great this sin is appears from those words of Christ (Matt. xviii. 7.) *Woe to that man by whom the offence* (*scandalum*) *cometh*. And it cannot be denied but that a scandal is created—an offence occasioned, especially to the weaker brethren; since a scandal is nothing else than an incorrect word or deed, giving to another an occasion of falling; and *this* deed affords occasion to the weak to imagine, that the Mass is not an impious and idolatrous act, and so he paves the way for him to fall away to the Papists. They, therefore, who take this licence to themselves, to join with the Papists in the external celebration of Mass, although the mind may reject their idolatry, yet they violate that Apostolic injunction (1 Thess. v. 22,) *Abstain from all appearance of evil*. Nor will it avail in excuse to say, that they do not intend by this act to approve the things which are usually done in the Mass, much less to induce their weak brethren to think that the sacrifice of the Mass is lawful and pleasing to God; because a scandal is estimated, not from *the secret intention of the doer*, but from *the manifest nature of the act*. But such is the meaning and nature of that act, that it drives the weak into the aforesaid error, and draws them into sin; therefore, whatever might be the intention of the doer, the act itself will have in it the nature of a scandal.

Since then every one is bound to refrain from every act to which

he is not necessitated,* and from which an occasion of offence to the weak may be justly apprehended; how much more from this act of attending Mass, to which he is in no way bound, and by which the minds both of the weak and the strong are justly offended?

Thirdly, Those lukewarm Protestants who frequent Masses sin against the Papists themselves, whom by this insincerity they confirm still more in their errors and idolatries. Indeed, when they perceive that we attend their Masses, they forthwith think within themselves, that not only these, but all the other corruptions of Popery are approved; especially since the Mass is accounted a kind of symbol or mark whereby Romanists are distinguished from Protestants. Let them, therefore, answer how they can conscientiously confirm these in their superstitious acts of worship, whom they are bound by every means to reclaim from such works of darkness? for it is a positive command of the Apostle, *Have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them*; Eph. v. 2. Now consider how finely they fulfil this command! The Apostle forbids fellowship with unlawful works; these men, on the contrary, gratuitously thrust themselves among, and make common cause with, idolaters occupied in these very deeds of darkness! The Apostle commands us to reprove such works; but these men not only seem to consent to them by being silent, but, by themselves conforming to those superstitious rites appear really to approve and to commend (if not in words, yet by their deeds) the very act of idolatry! By this hypocrisy they render the Papists more obstinate in their pernicious error; they therefore sin against that charity which is due even to enemies,—an offence impossible to be committed with a safe conscience.

Lastly, They sin directly against God himself; for the Religion which binds us to God obliges us likewise to the open avowal of that religion; it forbids a dissembling of the true, and much more an assumption of the outward garb of a false profession. And hence it is, that God himself acknowledges those alone for his genuine servants, who do not communicate with idolaters in any external acts of their worship: *I have left to myself seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him*; 1 Kings, xix. 18. If they had bowed their knees before an idol, with the worshippers of Baal, although they despised that idol in their hearts, God, without doubt, would not have reckoned them as *his* people; for every one is under a perpetual obligation to that profession of his religion which con-

* Gerson, part. 3. Reg. Moral.

sists in the uniting himself publicly with the pious and orthodox, and the separating himself from the idolatrous and heretical, (1 Cor. x. 21). For since God is the Creator both of body and soul, since Christ is alike the Redeemer of both, it is just that we worship God, as well with the reverence of the body as of the mind; that we cleave to Christ as well with the fellowship of the body as of the mind; (1 Cor. vi. 20). Therefore, in vain do they allege that they remain in obedience to God and to Christ, who join themselves to the service of the Devil and of Anti-Christ, in an idolatrous worship. Elegantly and piously said Tertullian, *It is wicked for any one to lie about his religion; for, by his pretending that he worships one thing, when he worships another, he denies what he does worship; and does not, therefore, worship what he hath denied.*—(Apolog. cap. 21).

All these things might be illustrated by examples of the Saints, drawn as well from the sacred Scriptures as from Ecclesiastical History; but want of time forbids this.

Since, therefore, Protestants, who attend the idolatrous sacrifice of the Mass, pollute their own souls by hypocrisy; wound the weak brethren, by causing them to stumble; ruin the Papists, by confirming them in their impiety; and finally, dishonour God himself by halting between the true worship of him and idolatry; we conclude, that Protestants *cannot, with a safe conscience, be present at the Mass.*

Bishop Davenant has confined himself in this discussion to one point of doctrine—the Mass; and on this ground alone he contends that Protestants cannot be present at Popish worship without committing sin. The argument may be supported by an enumeration of other doctrines, held by the Italian Church in this country, calling itself *the Catholic Church*, especially these:—the honour paid to the Virgin Mary and the figure of the Cross, to the Images of Saints, to Relics, and to Angels. It is not possible for a Protestant to attend their worship without countenancing these and other errors, which are maintained by the Romish Church. The case is, therefore, clear that no Protestant can, without sin, be present at their worship: we believe it to be idolatrous; and had not the Reformers entertained the same belief, there would have been no Reformation—no return to the *true, ancient, apostolic* faith and worship; consequently, we cannot consistently sanction their practices by being present in their chapels at their Mass services.

It may not be without its use to supply an instance—an illustration and proof of what is meant by the worship of the Mass, or of Popish impieties and idolatry, and thus to shew, that we have just grounds for guarding inconsiderate and unwary Protestants against the artfulness of men who would in the present day be thought *Catholics*, instead of superstitious Papists;—the following account of Popery, or Roman Catholic idolatry, taken from the Report of the morning's Service and Sermon, in the *Achill Missionary Herald* of November 20, 1837,

or No. 5, may therefore be placed before the reader: it is no more than a sample of Popery, as it now is, or wafer-worship, as practised in the 500 Mass-houses so recently opened in England:—

“The inhabitants of the island (as the morning advanced) prepared for the occupations of the Sabbath. Some repaired to the Popish Chapel, to unite in worship with the man whom they had been taught to reverence as the REPRESENTATIVE OF JESUS CHRIST UPON EARTH.

“Poor souls! Their first act (after sprinkling themselves with holy water) was a breach of the second commandment—bowing down to a heap of stones which they call an altar.

“After the usual Latin Prayers, and the supposed Deification of their pastry idol—the Priest lifted it up in his hands, and called upon the people to worship it as ‘JESUS CHRIST, AS GREAT AND GLORIOUS AS HE IS IN HEAVEN!’

“The poor deluded people fell down in humble prostration before this idol, and addressed to it a prayer, of which the following words are the introduction:—‘Most adorable body, I adore thee with all the powers of my soul.’ In addition to this horrid blasphemy, were many prayers offered to the blessed Virgin Mary, as Queen of Heaven, &c., and to countless saints and angels.”

The Report of the Sermon which accompanied this act of idolatry cannot be submitted here: it is hoped, that awful as it is to have Popery introduced among us, so that England may fall under the curse of idolatry, yet no such abominably low and vulgar impieties, and seditious, heretical, and murderous effusions, are ever uttered in any idol-place in England, as are stated to have been uttered on the occasion here referred to.

As we have been delivered (but not without the cost of blood to our forefathers) from the despotism and tyranny of Popery over our civil liberties, and from the curse of its idolatry in regard to our souls and the worship of God, and yet it is making inroads upon our nation and our peace again, the appeal of Ezra to the Jews may well be added to the above argument and facts, and ought to have its due weight on our consciences and conduct, to restrain us, not only from forming any alliance with, but even giving any countenance to this baneful, superstitious, and idolatrous heresy:—“*And after all that is come upon us for our evil deeds, and our great trespass, seeing that Thou, our God, hast punished us less than our iniquities deserve, and hast given us such deliverance as this: should we again break thy commandments, and join us in affinity with the people of these abominations, wouldest Thou not be angry with us till Thou hadst consumed us, so that there should be no remnant nor escaping?*” Ezra, ix. 13, 14.)—Should we not regard the charge of our Lord to the Church of Thyatira, which seems to be remarkably apposite to the present state of this nation, lest we fall under a corresponding visitation and judgment? “*I have a few things against thee because thou sufferest that woman Jezebel, which calleth herself a prophetess, to teach and to seduce my servants to commit fornication, and to eat things sacrificed unto idols.*”—“*And I gave her space to repent of her fornication, and she repented not.*”—“*Behold I will cast her into a bed, and them that commit adultery with her into great tribulation, except they repent of their deeds.*”—“*And I will kill her children with death; and all the Churches shall know that I am he which searcheth the reins and hearts: and I will give unto every one of you according to your works.*”—Rev. ii. 20—23.

The Reader who is desirous of further information on the question discussed above, will find a very excellent letter of Bradford, quite to the point, in *Foxe's Acts and Monuments*, vol. vii. p. 244; and the opinion of Philpot, *ibid.* p. 688; Seeleys' Edition, 1838.

QUESTION VIII.

WORKS OF PENANCE ARE NOT SATISFACTIONS TO DIVINE JUSTICE.

(This Translation is adopted from the British Magazine for March, 1836.)

It is allowed by all, that remission of sins cannot be obtained except by the intervention of a full and exact satisfaction; but what that satisfaction is, and by whom rendered, which makes up for the injury offered to God, and by such compensation extinguishes the whole punishment due to sin, is a matter of debate between the Orthodox and the Papist. The Papists think that our Lord, by his obedience and death, so satisfied God, that every true penitent may at any time gain remission of *guilt* through this his satisfaction, but (if he sin after baptism) not *an absolute remission*, but *a merciful commutation of punishment*. For, according to their notion,* after guilt is remitted, the very same punishment of the bodily senses must be endured, as the sinner would have endured in hell, only taking away its eternity. For the plan of Divine justice requires that, when we are freed from guilt by Christ, we should satisfy the account of punishment, either by satisfaction in this life, or by suffering in purgatory. Now the Papists think that satisfaction is made to Divine justice by works of penance; which are either imposed according to the judgment of the Priest, or, are voluntarily undertaken at the will of the penitent; or, finally, are inflicted from without,—*if any one, by patiently bearing such inflictions, and offering them to God for his sins, makes them morally his own*, as Suarez teaches.† And in requiring satisfaction from us, they think that God acts so strictly, that he requires an exact and full measure of the punishment due; and if the sinner has not paid it, how much or how little soever of it is left, it must be paid in purgatory to the last farthing.‡ Such is the argument of the Popish fable.

We, on the contrary, teach, that our Lord offered to God that expiatory sacrifice, by which alone the *guilt*, as well as the *punishment* of all our sins is expiated and expunged; so that the duty of

* Bellarm. *de peccat.* lib. 4. cap. 1.

† In 3. Tom. 4. disp. 37. sect. 7.

‡ Ibid. disp. 38. sect. 4., 5.

satisfying God for the injury offered to him does not rest on penitents in any part.* Nor does any debt of punishment (taxed according to the rule of avenging justice) remain to be paid by any actions or sufferings of theirs, after the remission of *guilt*. The punishments, therefore, enjoined to penitents among the ancients, we affirm to have been imposed, not to satisfy *Divine justice*, but the *offended Church*. The works of penance, voluntarily undertaken and offered by the faithful, we judge not to have been the payments of redemption or satisfaction, but exercises of humility and mortification. Finally, we say, that afflictions and misfortunes, which, after the remission of guilt, are inflicted either by God himself, or by man, on the pious and reconciled, have no reference to the satisfaction of Divine justice as if not yet expiated; but to the bridling our corrupt concupiscence, which is not extirpated even in the regenerate.

We deny, then, that works of penance, or any human works whatever, are satisfactions of Divine justice, or compensations for the injury done to God, which is proved, first, by the definition of satisfaction; for *satisfaction is the giving an equivalent for an equivalent*, as Scotus truly teaches.† But who will say, that all our works of penance, if brought into one heap, can equal the pains of hell, even not considering the *eternity* of hell torments? When, then, the Papists suppose, that they are exhibiting and offering these *satisfactions* of theirs to God, to buy off the pains of hell; they do just the same, as if one condemned to the rack should say that he is willing to prick his finger with a needle, and, by this work of penance, to buy off the punishment laid on him. But he who pays less than he *owed*, has not yet made *satisfaction*. These satisfaction-men, then, never can set themselves right, for they never can make a satisfaction equal to the punishment settled for sin.

Secondly, we shew the same from the quality of our works. For the best of them are not wholly free from their faults and imperfections. If, therefore, the matter were transacted in the court of strict justice, we should be so far from expiating or expunging our debt of punishment by our works or sufferings, that we should be daily contracting a new one. But suppose our works were free from all blemish,—yet, as satisfaction is to be made from our own goods, and not from goods due and belonging to our creditor on another score,‡ our good works, which are the gift of God himself, and our acts of obedience, which certainly are most wholly

* 1 John ii. 2; Isa. liii. 5; Rom. viii. 1, 33, &c. Rev. xiv. 13; Jerem. l. 20.

† 4 Sent. dist. 15. quæst. 1.

‡ Anselm. *Cur Deus homo*, lib. 2.

due to God, on the mere score of creation, can never go to the discharge of a new debt. As often, therefore, as we act or suffer well and holily, we endeavour to satisfy the call of duty, and to approve ourselves to God by fulfilling his will; but we do not dream, that by these works we are expiating the vengeance due to our sins, or making up for the injury done to the Divine Majesty, by exhibiting to him, in this endeavour of ours, a worthy satisfaction.

Thirdly, we confirm our cause by the consideration of the Divine remission of sins. For* remission of sins is the work of free mercy. But that sin is not freely remitted, to expiate which a sufficient satisfaction is made by the sinner himself. Moreover, the remission made by God is always *entire*, and not by halves. But to be unwilling to exact the *whole* punishment, or such and such a degree of *eternal* punishment; and yet to be willing to inflict some, and that a very bitter degree of punishment, cannot be called an *entire remission*, but a punishing in moderation. Finally, the remission of sin should be such, that, when it is obtained, the sinner can settle in his conscience, that he is now fully reconciled to God, and has obtained peace with him.† But who can feel this, who thinks that he is still to be tortured in the most fearful manner, to satisfy an avenging God?

Fourthly, the truth of our opinion appears from the perfection of that satisfaction which Christ himself offered to God the Father, in the name of all believers.‡ For it is most certain, that our Redeemer offered to God a price abundantly sufficient to expiate the guilt and the punishment of our sins.§ Nor is it less certain, that this satisfaction is imputed to all those who believe and repent, just as if it had been offered to God by themselves. If, therefore, God should require satisfaction from the members of Christ, which they have paid to the last farthing in Christ their head, he would twice take vengeance for the same thing, and would do a manifest injury to the Redeemer and the redeemed.

Lastly, the error of the Papists is shewn by the nature of Divine justice. For justice never inflicts *the vengeance of punishment*, except with regard to *the debt of guilt*. When, then, the satisfaction of Christ abolished the guilt on which the debt of punishment is founded, he took away the object of Divine justice, and, consequently, the necessity of human satisfaction. To this it must be added, that, according to the laws of justice, no satisfaction can redeem the punishment due to sin, except by an express ordinance

* Eph. i. 7; Col. ii. 13; Isa. xliii. 25.; Mich. vii. 19.

† Rom. v. 1, 10.

‡ 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 21.

§ Rom. iii. 25.

of God for accepting such satisfaction in the room of a ransom.* Christ's satisfaction has this privilege by the eternal decree of God; but wretched sinners cannot bring forward any ordinance of God, in right of which he is obliged to accept these works of penance for the eternal punishment due to sin. The guilty party, then, must contend in vain, that that is a satisfactory infliction which he undergoes, not by the decree of the judge, but of his own pleasure.

* Suarez in 3. Tom. 4. disp. 37. sect. 8.

[For further discussion of this subject, see Elliotts's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, ch. xi. pp. 233., &c. Edit. Lond. 1844; and Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*; pp. 187—192, edit. 1841.

QUESTION IX.

FREE-WILL IS NOT GRANTED TO THE UNREGENERATE FOR
THEIR SPIRITUAL GOOD.

WE say that Free-will is granted for this or that special object, when there is the active faculty to will, to choose, or to do that freely. We contend not whether this faculty be disengaged or impeded, relaxed or bound, awake or stupid. If only this faculty be in man, although it needs some extraneous assistance to facilitate its operation, the Papists will prevail; but if this active faculty shall have utterly perished, and a mere capacity or receptive possibility be left, which God alone gives and perfects in renewing it, our opinion obtains.

As to the term *regenerated* or *born again*, I do not call one who is enlightened or breathed upon by any motion of the Holy Spirit, regenerated; but him who is raised from a death of sin, and quickened by the all-powerful operation of that Spirit. On the other hand, I call him *unregenerate*, who has not yet attained to this spiritual quickening, however he may have been affected by some preceding operations of the Holy Spirit.

But here it must be carefully observed, that the word *Regeneration*, either denotes the very first act, whereby spiritual life (as though by a creative act) is infused into man, and so is effected in a moment; or else a continued act of the Spirit, whereby the new powers and qualities breathed into him, together with this

life, are increased and strengthened; and so it is accomplished by degrees, and that not without the wrestlings and strivings of the regenerate person himself. For example, take the embryo; we affirm that this properly lives as soon as the heart partakes of life, although the other members of the body are not yet developed. Why, then, should we not say, that the spiritual embryo, from that very moment in which the heart is imbued with spiritual life, is quickened or regenerated, although many parts of sanctification have not yet acquired their distinct, and, as it were, perfect development.

In the last place, by *spiritual good*, we understand whatever work is ordained from the Divine promise for obtaining the remission of sins, or attaining possession of the kingdom of heaven. But we enquire now, chiefly, not respecting those good works which follow justification, but of those primary acts, on the efficacy of which justification itself follows; such as to repent truly, to believe in the Mediator, to love God; all which things are both coupled with one another, and with the very attaining of justification. These are called *spiritual* acts, because, with respect to the specific essence of an action, and the mode of acting, they surpass the connatural faculty of free-will, as it is now observable in fallen man.

From all these considerations, this meaning of the question is conspicuous:—That there is not any active power in free-will, whilst unquickened by regeneration, to saving repentance, faith, love, or whatever work is to be done, upon which, as a disposition rending thereto, justification is procured; or, upon which, as an appointed way, it advances to glorification. Before we proceed to confirm our opinion, it will not be beside the matter, to notice a few things, as to how far we agree with the Papists, and how far differ from them in this whole business.

We concede, then, to the Papists, that before the infusion of regenerating grace, many actions which lead the way to faith and contrition, are both required from men, and by them both can, and are wont to be done, through the sole assistance of awakening grace. Of this kind, are not only joining the Church and hearing the word; but thinking of God and Divine things; considering their peculiar sins, being alarmed by the sense of them, desiring deliverance from this fear, and many other such like things, which are pre-requisite to acts truly spiritual and saving. But we affirm, moreover, that the mind and disposition of the unregenerate is engaged in a natural way only with the aforesaid things; that the will is not elevated to produce an act truly spiritual, until regene-

rating or quickening efficacy shall have been added, besides, to the awakening and evidencing grace.* Moreover, we grant, that this regenerating grace is not infused into men remaining inactive, and idly looking for some vague fervors or other; but, to minds aroused, and brought under, and disposed, in some measure, by the aforesaid actions, through the word and Spirit of God; nevertheless, we deny, that the free-will of an unregenerate man is assisted by these auxiliaries, in such a way, so to dispose itself, that God should be bound to infuse quickening grace into any one from merit of congruity. Lastly, we confess, that in the Church of God, where men are excited constantly by the word and Spirit, this regenerating grace, which alone renders them capable of repenting and believing savingly, is denied to no adult, of whom it cannot be truly said, that he willingly resists the Holy Spirit in those actions beforementioned, and also, perversely repulses the quickening operation of the same.† Yet we deny that any mortal man can be found, who, in repelling the preparatory actions of the Spirit, does not incur, abundantly, this demerit; and, inasmuch as some, repelling God by this intervening, common demerit, are repelled of God and left to themselves; others, notwithstanding equal or greater demerit, are often, and more powerfully assailed by grace, and are at length quickened by the omnipotent operation of the Spirit. The mystery is to be referred to the gracious will of God, pitying or not pitying; and not to be rashly enquired into by any human curiosity.

These things being premised, I confirm our proposition by some arguments:—

1.—In the unregenerate, the faculty of free-will to spiritual good is not like a loco-motive power, in him who is bound by fetters; or, that of vision, in him who is thrust into some dark place, (as the Papists will have it;‡) but it is entirely destroyed, as motion in a dead man, or the visual faculty in a blind man. Hence, Augustine (Epist. 105.) says, *We lost the free-will to love God, by the vastness of the first sin*; and the most learned William, Bishop of Paris, says,§ *The human mind, not having yet attained to the grace of sanctification, is nothing else but a corpse, or mortified mass.* This doctrine is derived from the fountain of Scripture, which expressly pronounces sinners, when unregenerate, to be *dead in sin*; Eph. ii. 5. Their minds are sunk, not as it were into a dark place, but are *darkness itself* (Eph. v. 8). The heart is not merely

* Vide Suar. Opusc. *De Auxil. Div. Grat.* lib. 3. cap. 1. 2.

† Vide Spal. lib. 7. pag. 239. Et Suar. Opusc. p. 222.

‡ Bellarm. *de lib. Arb.* 6. 15.

§ *De Sacr. Bap.* cap. 3.

as earth under a strong weight, but *stone* itself, if we listen to the Scriptures; Ezek. xi. 19. Therefore, away with that opinion drawn from the dregs of the Pelagians, which attributes an active power to free-will, for things spiritual; as if it were sufficient that it should be excited to these works, and assisted in them, but had no need to be quickened.

2.—Moreover, besides the said privation of spiritual life in the will of the unregenerate, all Theologians lay down an habitual turning away from God, and an habitual turning to sensible and carnal things, contrary to the spiritual law of God. What aid, then, of mere exciting grace, can change this habitual corruption? or, how shall the power of the will remaining a bad tree, be able to produce good fruit? The principle must be habitual and formal, which, by opposing this habitual evil, must bring back the inclination to the contrary side. Therefore, the gift of faith and love is created by grace operating in the human heart, before the act of believing in, or loving God, is elicited from the human heart by grace co-operating. Prosper has rightly laid it down, that the inward sense is not open to the receiving or performing of spiritual acts unless in those *in whose heart God has put the foundation of faith and the fervor of love.** What else does the whole Scripture proclaim, which everywhere inculcates, that they alone believe, repent, and love God as they ought, to whom God has given eyes to see, ears to hear, a new heart to understand; and lastly, whom he hath created in Christ Jesus unto these good works? If these forms of speaking intimate nothing else than the grace of God exciting and morally persuading them, I, for my part, do not understand with what words saving and regenerating grace could be expressed.

3.—But since it by no means becomes mortals to circumscribe the Divine power by any limits, let us grant that the will, habitually evil and averse to spiritual good, can, by the aid of awakening grace alone, be applied to elicit spiritual acts; yet I say this is contrary to the goodness of Divine Providence, which actuates all beings in such a way, as is suited to their nature to be actuated. But if it should excite the will whilst unregenerate, which is habitually averse from all spiritual good, actually to choose spiritual good, it would move it, not sweetly, but as though it would force man along to work, from which, till then, the inclination had shrunk with dislike. It is unreasonable, therefore, to be believed, that God, who at the creation implanted an habitual inclination to spi-

* *Respons. ad Cap. object. Gall. cap. 5.*

ritual good, without man's co-operation, restores also in regeneration this habitual conversion without his co-operation; and then the power being indeed rectified, it co-operates with the free-will itself to good actions. Elegantly says Augustine:—*A wheel does not run well so as to become round, but because it is round.* In the same manner we may say, the will does not run well so that it may be regenerated, but because it has already begun to be regenerated.

Hitherto we have considered the nature of free-will; now let us argue from the nature of regeneration.

4.—What else, I ask, is regeneration than the action of the Holy Spirit inspiring the life of grace into man spiritually dead, and, by superinfusing the gifts of holiness, still renewing him more and more after the image of God? That this grace gives the first vigour for the exercise of every spiritual work, is clear from the Scriptures: It does so for the work of faith—*Whosoever believeth is begotten of God* (1 John, v. 1); for the work of love—*Every one that loveth is born of God* (1 John, iv. 7); finally, for all works of piety—*Without me ye can do nothing* (John xv. 5); that is, unless as branches ye are planted in me, who am the true vine, ye can do, he does not say much or little, but *ye can do nothing* in spiritual things. This the Papists may learn from Aquinas himself, who holds, that *grace imparts to the soul its spiritual being, and is first poured forth from God, for the performing actions designed for life eternal.*† From whence is the origin of such fruits, unless from the seed? And what else is that seed of God whence spiritual works arise, than the birth from God, or that by which man is born of God? as Bellarmine himself confesses.‡

5.—Another argument is derived from the nature of spiritual works. They are, from the confession of Papists, works of a superior order, and by no means proportioned to the free-will of animal man. But if he could be awakened to them by stimulating grace alone, and not changed by saving grace, he would have indeed an active power, and the same proportioned to such works, although bound, perhaps, or asleep. Overcome by this argument, some Papists concede,§ that a quality is always infused from God to draw forth spiritual acts which may supply the place of habit; from which it differs only in not being permanent, but immediately passes away with the act itself. But wherefore this shift? They who acknowledge that the will cannot effect supernatural acts with-

* *Ad Simp.* lib. 1. quæst. 2.

† Quæst. disp. *de Virtut.* art. 2. 10; et *de Grat.* art 5.

‡ *De Lib. Arb.* 6. 13.

§ Suar. Opusc. lib. 3, *de aux. Grat.* cap. 4.

out a new quality impressed upon the power itself, why do they not acknowledge this infusion of the power to be the quickening of the reformation itself,* not (as they dream) after the act is drawn forth immediately abolished, but increased, strengthened, and perfected? Admirably said Hugo de St. Victor,—*Repairing grace breathes a good will that it may be, then it breathes into the good will that it may work; it first produces it, then works by it.*†

Lastly, we shall overthrow this opinion of our adversaries by its inconveniences. Let it be assumed that supernatural actions spring from free-will awakened by grace, and not yet healed; and it clearly follows, that God is the inward monitor in reality,—the encourager, exhorter, and adviser, as far as respects the first acts of believing and repenting elicited; but that free-will itself is the principal author of the same! For this awakening grace, however efficacious it may be, is nothing else than a counselling,‡ and leaves the awakened and admonished will to its own indifference, whilst the habitual propensity to evil remains unchanged! Moreover, if this opinion should prevail, that appeal of St. Paul (1 Cor. iv. 7)

What hast thou which thou didst not receive? falls to the ground. For some one might answer, I have a determination of my will to the first act of believing and repenting, which I have not received from God, but from my free-will, excited indeed to this work, but left to its own natural powers. In fine, that saying also would fail,

Who maketh thee to differ? For any converted person might reply, I have made myself to differ; for I have received grace exciting me equally with many others, who have had God also equally ready to concur, if they would have repented and believed; but they, by reason of their liberty, repelled this grace; I, on the contrary, through my liberty, embraced the same; therefore free-will hath separated me from them. But we are proceeding too far. I conclude, that they do not yield much in the business of salvation, who hold that God gives inward faith to none, unless to those who, of their own unregenerated free-will, shall have exercised the act of faith; that he sheds abroad love in none except those who shall have first put forth the act of loving from the same; in one word, that God imparts spiritual life to none, except to those who shall have exercised the primary actions of the spiritual life before his quickening!

* Hanc potentiæ informationem esse ejusdem reformatæ vivificationem.

† *De Sacram. fidei*, p. 242.

‡ Bellarm. *de Lib. Arbit.* 6. 15.

QUESTION X.

THE WORKS OF THE REGENERATE ARE DEFILED WITH THE POLLUTION OF SIN.

PARTICULAR care should be taken that the question in this controversy be properly stated and understood ; because our opponents are accustomed purposely to obscure and perplex it.

Bellarmino, when disputing with our Theologians,* undertakes to make good the assertion, *that the good works of the regenerate are not sinful, but so truly just, that they may be even called actual righteousness.* But if he intends seriously to engage in controversy with us, the case ought to have been stated thus:—The good works of the regenerate are not defiled with any pollution of sin, but are perfectly just, so that they may be called complete legal righteousness. He, however, had in view the language of Luther, against whom the Papists inveigh, though very unreasonably, because he wrote,† *Every work of the regenerate is a mortal sin, if judged according to God's judgment.* They forget that Gregory the Great wrote,‡ *The whole merit of our virtue is evil ; all human righteousness is unrighteousness, if judged with strictness.* They forget that the most holy Isaiah said, *All our righteousness is as filthy rags.*§ For the correct explanation of these expressions we need a courteous interpreter, not a malignant slanderer. The meaning, then, is, that there is no work of human righteousness so free from pollution, that everything of a faulty character has been entirely purged away, and that according to the rigid sentence of the law (unless a mediator interpose,) it cannot escape condemnation and death.

In the foregoing propositions, therefore, the connection between the predicate and its subject is *accidental*, not *essential*, and it agrees with it in consequence of *cohesion*, not in *nature*: for example, *Every merit is a fault* ; that is, every merit of ours is damaged by some failing attaching thereto. *Every good work is a sin* ; that is, every good work is defiled by the dregs of some indwelling sin ;—a position thus perfectly true, and which it shall be our object briefly to illustrate.

* *De Justif.* 4. 15.

† *Moral.* 9. cap. 1. et 14.

‡ *Assert.* art. 31.

§ *Isa.* lxiv. 6.

But in order to place the whole subject in a clear light, we must observe, that as the regenerate are sinners, so are the unregenerate; yet each in a different way. The actions of the regenerate are vitiated by the pollution of sin, and those of the unregenerate by its poison, but clearly after a different manner. The evil deeds of the ungodly are called sins, either because the actions are bad in their very nature, as the commission of theft, adultery, and falsehood; or because the actions (though apparently good) are utterly corrupt through the evil in their intention; as the gift of alms to a poor woman, that she may be more readily induced to prostitution: or lastly, because the actions are altogether deprived of a proper beginning and ending, since they do not proceed from faith and love, and are not made to have reference to the glory of God. These are all called sins, and that too in the strictest sense of the term; according to that saying of Prosper:* *The whole life of unbelievers is sin*; and that of Augustine:† *Without faith, those works which seemed good are turned into sins*.

To come now to the good works of the regenerate, the essence itself of a good work is not sin, because it originates in grace; but some portion of sin adheres to this good work, which sin originates in the flesh. We will confirm this by a few arguments.

1.—The regenerate themselves remain partly carnal, and are not yet fully renovated and purified. *The Law is spiritual, I am carnal*; (Rom. vii. 14). *Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit*; (2 Cor. vii. 1). *The inner man is renewed day by day*; (2 Cor. iv. 16). And this is what Augustine clearly affirms:‡ *We are so purified, that we require to be more and more so, until this corruptible shall have put on incorruption*. And even Bellarmine himself allows,§ that something does inherently remain in the regenerate, which is called *evil, pollution, depravity*, nay, even *vice*. Since this point is agreed upon between us, how can an effect be superior to the causes inducing it? or the perfection of a work be superior to the perfection of the workman? or a holiness which remains yet short of entireness, yield perfect actions? If the qualities of the old and the new man are united together in the powers of the soul, it naturally follows that they will betray themselves in action. If therefore it is not repugnant to either reason or Scripture, that the same renewed man should be good, and yet defiled by some inherent evil; why should it be thought repugnant to either, that the same actions of the regenerate

* Sent. 106.

† In Joann. xv.

‡ Cont. duas Epist. Pelag. 3. 5.

§ De amiss. grat. 5. 12.

should be good, and at the same time defiled by the pollution of indwelling sin?

2. But let us proceed; and I will point out, as with the finger, this lurking corruption. Behold, then, the taint, and that in the very innermost part, which robs works of their entire perfection, namely, a deficiency of that perfect love with which all the works of the regenerate ought to be embodied. For not only are they destitute of that fulness of love, which the blessed possess in their state of *glory*; but they are deficient in that exact measure thereof, which the perfect rule of the Law requires even in this *life*. Augustine (Ep. 29) writes, *The fulness of love does not exist in any man; but that which is less than it ought to be is faulty; and through this deficiency there is not a just man upon earth*. You see, then, on the testimony of Augustine, not only that the highest degree of love, which is supposed to exist in the glorified man, is found to be deficient in the regenerate, but even that necessary degree of it, which ought to exist in a perfect man, is deficient. You see that this defect or deprivation not only partakes of the nature of a fault, but is itself the source which vitiates all our righteousness.

3. Thus far as respects this blot as arising from insufficiency; behold another *positive* one, which blackens even the best works of the regenerate, the opposing and inordinate motions of [evil] concupiscence, which betrays itself most manifestly in the regenerate, when they apply themselves to the performance of good works. If, for instance, they would avoid any forbidden evil, *this* concupiscence does not suffer their escape from the evil to be complete, but excites within their mind an inordinate affection towards that very evil, which it is avoiding. If any good is to be done, this concupiscence impedes its perfect accomplishment, while it retards and clogs the mind with respect to the good which it is doing. This is the import of that passage: *The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak* (Matt. xxvi. 41). *I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind* (Rom. vii. 23). *The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; — so that ye cannot do the things that ye would* (Gal. v. 17). And if any one does not feel this opposition, arising from evil concupiscence, in his good actions, I do not suppose he ever did a good action.

But our adversaries are very positive that this perverse motion of concupiscence is not sin, thence, they infer, that the actions of the regenerate are not infected with the slightest stain of sin. I answer, that it is sin in the very nature of it, and that, too, damnable; because it is not only contrary to the primeval law of righteousness engraven in the hearts of men, but also, to this

express precept of the moral law, *Thou shalt not covet*. Yet I acknowledge, that, on account of the state of the *person*, it is not imputable to the regenerate for condemnation, since he is not dealt with as in the old Adam, from whom flows this defilement of lust; but in the new Adam, from whom flows the power of subduing it.

4.—Lastly, there is but this one conclusion, that no work of the regenerate is thoroughly purged from every defilement, because the most holy works of the most holy persons cannot bear the scrutiny of the stern judge; but they humbly and seriously deprecate it.* For if we should suppose God to make to any one of those, who claim to themselves the having fulfilled the entire law, supererogation, or any angelic perfection of any sort, the offer that, if he have but even one work free from only the slightest stain of pollution, he shall be directly admitted into the kingdom of heaven; but, if that work, being examined before the tribunal of God, shall be in the least degree defiled, he shall be thrust down from heaven to hell, I should be glad to know, if one of these men would venture to hazard it with God, on this rigid condition. If he would not venture it, why should they force upon us the belief of what they do not receive themselves?

With Anselm, then, let us conclude, in this true and humble language: *If there is any fruit in my life, it is either so counterfeit, or imperfect, or in some way so corrupted, so that it must either dissatisfy, or displease God.*

* Job. ix. 20.; Ps. cxlii.

. See Davenant's Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians, art. "*Sin*" in the Index; and Sermon XII. in the "*Morning Exercises*" against Popery, with Elliott's *Delineations of Romanism*; and Burnet on the IXth and XIIIth Articles of the Anglican Church, by Rev. J. R. Page.

QUESTION XI.

CIVIL JURISDICTION IS RIGHTLY CONCEDED TO ECCLESIASTICAL PERSONS.

By the warrant of Christ himself the Church claims and exercises a certain spiritual jurisdiction in punishing the offences of her children. For she can listen to an accusation against any Christian walking disorderly, and if the accused is convicted by proper witnesses, can punish him, either by a refusal of the Sacraments, or by entirely excluding him, should he persist in his obstinacy, from the assembly and intercourse of his fellow-Christians.* No one is so captious or ignorant of Ecclesiastical law, as to venture to deny that this jurisdiction, which does not exceed the limits of Excommunication, belongs to Ecclesiastics by a Divine and perpetual right. But in this our Church, by the gift of Christian princes, certain Ecclesiastics have, in addition to this, a civil jurisdiction, by virtue of which they inflict civil punishments on heretics, schismatics, and other despisers of the Church. Besides this some of the higher theologians are in many places appointed preservers of justice and the public peace. Let us examine, then, whether this jurisdiction can be rightly conceded to Ecclesiastics. I am well persuaded that it can, for the following reasons:—

1.—We must remember, in the first place, that each jurisdiction is occupied in promoting righteousness and restraining iniquity; but with this difference, that merely spiritual jurisdiction endeavours to effect this by spiritual means,† while to this the civil adds the coercive measures and external punishments, such as imprisonments, fines, and bodily chastisements. I ask, therefore, what is there either impious or unlawful, or contrary to the sanctity or office of the priesthood in its repressing, not only by spiritual punishments, but also, where authority is granted, by civil and corporal in addition, heretics, schismatics, and all obstinate offenders and disturbers of the Christian state?‡ To resist and restrain impiety by

* Matt. xviii. 18; 1 Cor. v. 4, 5; 2 Thess. iii. 14.

† 2 Cor. x. 4, 5, 6.

‡ Vide Hacket's Life of Archbishop Williams, Part II., p. 171, or Life of Bishop Davenant prefixed to the Translation of the *Expositio ad Colossenses*.

either mode is surely a good and praiseworthy action, and in its own nature by no means unsuited to any character, however sacred. The blessed Angels, at the command of God, do not think it contrary to their sanctity to inflict corporal punishments on the guilty;* why then should *the Angels of the Church*† think it unlawful to adjudge the same offenders to deserved punishment, when their Sovereign, who is God's viceroy in the land, so decrees it? For an act of civil jurisdiction is not in its own nature unsuited to any person, however sacred, nor is it inconsistent with the office of the Priesthood.

2.—Again, from the plenary authority of the persons entrusting it to Ecclesiastics, it is clear that they have the best right to exercise this jurisdiction. For where a King is by Divine appointment, the fountain, as it were, of all civil jurisdiction,‡ he can lawfully devolve some rivulet of it to any fit person, whether lay or clerical: some rivulet, I say; because, though no portion of civil jurisdiction is by God's law incompatible with the clerical function, yet the law of prudence and equity itself forbids kings so to burden Ecclesiastics with civil jurisdiction, that they should be called off from their spiritual duties (2 Tim. ii. 4). It is therefore to be so committed to them that it may be rendered both useful and ornamental in the spiritual government of the Church, and by no means prove an impediment or cause distraction. But to what extent this jurisdiction should be committed to Ecclesiastics, with the view of aiding rather than impeding them in the discharge of spiritual duties, is not to be measured by the judgment of the multitude, or by that of any envious caviller, who may be rather above the common level. But the rule which Aristotle, the chief of Philosophers, has laid down§ concerning *the mean of virtue* should be observed here, *as a wise man would limit it*: the same I maintain concerning this civil jurisdiction, that it is only so far to be entrusted to the Clergy as a wise and religious Prince would think proper.

Since, therefore, it has seemed good to Christian Sovereigns to arm Ecclesiastics with some civil authority, and to enjoin them both temporal and spiritual jurisdiction, for the advantage of the Christian religion and the more effectual subversion of all impiety;|| it is lawful, pious, and altogether necessary that they should use both aids, as a two-edged sword, to promote piety and the peace of the Church, and to root out everything which is opposed to such good.

3.—In the third place, because many think it inconsistent, that

* Acts xii., 23.

† Revel. ii., 1.

‡ 1 Pet. ii., 13, 14.

§ Ethic. 2, cap. 6.

|| See 1 Tim. ii. 2, and Rom. xiii.

the successors of the Apostles should exercise a jurisdiction which the Apostles themselves did not possess, let us examine the difference of times a little; and then we shall see that this civil jurisdiction is as necessary to Ecclesiastics *now*, as it would have *then* been useless and out of place in the Apostles' case. Civil jurisdiction must be transmitted from the chief magistrate to subordinate ones, and must be administered according to laws laid down by him. As long as Kings declared war against Christ, they could neither assign, nor could the Apostles exercise a civil jurisdiction received from them, without reproach to Christ and the destruction of the Christian Religion. But after Kings and their laws yielded obedience to Christ, civil power being then transmitted from Christian Kings to Christ's Ministers, could materially assist them in governing the Church with confidence and success. Moreover, the Apostles and Pastors of the Primitive Church were armed with a Divine, extraordinary, and miraculous power, which tended more effectually to retain Christians in faith and obedience than any civil authority. But at present we have to deal with ordinary Ministers, who, since they are unprovided with this miraculous and extraordinary power, are usefully fortified and strengthened by this civil and ordinary authority. In short, when the Christian Church was in its infancy, piety was more fervent in the hearts of all Christians, and if they had been inclined to wax wanton against the discipline of the Church, the very cruelty of their persecutors, and the daily danger of impending death, restrained their unruly dispositions. But now luxury and pride have possessed the Christian world, and expelled all piety and modesty among men, to such a degree, that the spiritual power of the Clergy, and the discipline of the Church, destitute of civil jurisdiction, would be held in contempt rather than found of advantage, through the increased iniquity of the present age. Those persons, therefore, are by no means just and prudent judges of events, who conclude from the circumstances of the Apostles and their times, that civil jurisdiction is inconsistent with the present duties of ordinary Ministers.

4.—In addition to the arguments which have been brought forward, there is another derived from the authority of God and the most ancient practice of the Church. God himself, under the Law, annexed civil jurisdiction to the duty of the Priesthood; it is not, therefore, anything strange, or prohibited by Divine authority, that civil and sacerdotal jurisdiction should be united in the same person. Eli, Samuel, the Maccabees, and all the High Priests of the Old Testament, had their share of it. And we have just shewn why it was not the case, and was quite impossible, under the New

Testament dispensation for several centuries. But from the time when Constantine the Great laid the sceptre of the Empire at the foot of Christ, through all ages of the Church, we find civil jurisdiction committed to the Church by pious Emperors, and accepted and administered by godly Bishops. If time would allow, we could make this very clear, from Church History, from Councils, and from the laws of the Empire; but as this is well known to the learned, I should only impose unnecessary trouble on myself and my readers by going into particular cases.

5.—Lastly, from the very points which are conceded by our opponents, we shall convince them of what they deny. They concede jurisdiction to the Clergy, therefore, as far as citing before their tribunals adulterers, drunkards, heretics, and all who are guilty of any flagrant crimes, so that they may admit accusations against them, hear witnesses, and pass sentence of excommunication upon them, when lawfully convicted. But if they can do all these things in virtue of the jurisdiction committed to them by Christ, why, when civil jurisdiction is granted to them by the King, shall they not in addition, by imprisoning such malefactors, or by some such civil punishments, restrain their loose practices? This act of punishing is no less lawful in its own nature, than that other authority of excommunicating is just and lawful, as well with regard to the act itself, as to the mode of its exercise; in short, these civil punishments, no less than those merely spiritual ones, conduce to the reformation of sinners and the utility of the Church. Where, therefore, power is given to the Clergy, it is their duty to put in force both the one and the other.

To conclude in one word. The most learned Calvin grants,* that when any controversy formerly occurred among Christians, the pious were accustomed to submit the matter to the arbitration of the Bishops, that they might avoid the necessity for litigation. And Augustine relates,† that he spent a great deal of time in secular affairs of this kind; either settling them by judicious decisions, or cutting them short by previous intervention; and he adds besides, that the Apostle Paul has assigned these troublesome duties to Ecclesiastics. If private Christians lawfully commit to Bishops the decision of their temporal differences, then surely Christian Kings may lawfully commit the judgment of the like causes to them. If it is not unlawful for the Clergy to undertake this secular business at the request of private individuals, then it cannot be

* Calvin. Instit. 4, 11, 12. [Book IV. chap. iv. xi. xii. in vol. 1, of the Calvin Translation Society's edition.]

† *De opere Monach.* 29.

unlawful for them to do so on the appointment of the King. For as to the matter in hand, he is no less implicated in secular affairs, who decides disputes as *a chosen Arbitrator*, than he who does so as *a Judge appointed by his Sovereign*.

We conclude, then, that ambitiously to desire civil jurisdiction, or to exercise it to the prejudice of the ministerial office, betokens pride, and is unlawful; but to accept civil jurisdiction when conferred by the King, and to administer it alike for the peace of the Church, and the better establishing of discipline, is both lawful and laudable, as well as in accordance with the practice of the ancient Church, and by no means contrary to the word of God.

[N.B.—This subject is discussed at some length by the judicious Hooker: *Eccles. Polity*, Book vii. § 15.]

QUESTION XII.

THE PEOPLE MAY NOT ATTEMPT A REFORMATION IN THE CHURCH
AGAINST THE CONSENT OF THE MAGISTRATE.

[*This Translation was inserted in an interesting and able work entitled "The Lords and the People," and as the writer was informed by his friend William Henry C. Grey, Esq., the author, on the suggestion of the late Lord Eldon.—See Grey's "Lords and the People; or the Principles of Civil Government Illustrated, under the Connexion of Religion with the State and Nobility in Britain," p. 294, Edwards, London, 8vo., 1835; a work of superior excellence and importance, with but one drawback in its contents, that of advocating the payment of the Priests of idolatrous Rome by a Protestant State.*]

HE is called a *Magistrate* in whose power is the right of the chief rule in a State; and all who are subject to this Magistrate are included in the appellation *the people*. We therefore maintain the position, that when the Magistrate refuses it, it is not *lawful* for the people to go about reforming the Church by *conjoined force*, though it may be in the greatest need of Reformation.

For it may at once be objected,

1.—That by Divine as well as by human right the supreme Magistrate himself is appointed for managing business of this kind. In the Scriptures, 1 Kings xv. and xxii., it is the express eulogy of the good Kings, that *they took away* the high places and removed

the *idols*; on the contrary it is the perpetua stigma of the bad ones, that they did *not* take away, did *not* remove them; 2 Kings, xviii. and xxiii. It is also the duty of Sovereigns to rebuke careless priests; to set aside the bad; to visit the idolatrous with condign punishment; as is easily inferred from a variety of passages in the Books of Kings. Hence it is evident from whom God expects the Reformation of the Church and of Religion. The heads of the Church, worthy to be venerated, assembled in the Councils, have professed the same thing. In the Council of Ephesus, they thus addressed the Emperor,*—*We intreat your Majesty that you would provide that the faith may be preserved inviolate.* In that of Chalcedon,—*Thou hast regulated the Church, thou hast confirmed the orthodox faith*; and in the same strain Julius Firmicus spake to the two Cæsars, Constantius and Constans:—*Upon you, ye august Emperors, is imposed a necessity of avenging and punishing idolatry; it is enjoined on you by the law of the great God.* Lastly, Aristotle himself, in Polit. 3, 11, says that the King ought to be τῶν πρὸς τοῦς θεοῦς κῆρυον, *the chief Governor of those things which relate to the Divine worship.* The Church, therefore, hath her Censor pointed out, upon whom this office of reformation is imposed by the hand of God.

2.—Secondly, As the authority of reforming the Church is imposed upon Kings, so it is removed from the people. For where a vocation is wanting, although the thing which is done, considered in itself, be laudable, yet there is blame attaching to the *agent*, on account of *the defect of lawful power.* To offer sacrifices to God was in itself pious and religious; but in Saul, who had no call to this office, it was impious and sacrilegious; (1 Sam. xiii. 13.) By like reasoning, to reform a corrupt Church is a noble and laudable work; but not in those persons *whom God never constituted Reformers of the Church.* Search the Sacred Scriptures, you will find the people of God everywhere blamed, because they worshipped the golden calves, following the example and the command of the idolatrous Kings; but never censured by any Prophet, because they did not remove idolatry by force of arms, against the will of their Kings. That this work, consequently, does not belong to the people, the Prophets have taught by this their silence on the subject; as Augustine has clearly and expressly affirmed;† *No private individual is at liberty to order idols to be removed.* The truth of the matter is, that the carrying out public reform requires an *authority* which has the power of just revenge against the disobedient; and

[* Concill. tom. iii. col. 429; col. 571, edit. Labbei; Paris, 1671.]

† Cont. liter. Petilian. lib. 2, cap. 92.

that centres neither in any private individual, nor in *an assembled multitude of private persons*. If, then, the people, fired with a preposterous zeal, attempt any thing of this kind, we must bring against them the admonition of Paul, (1 Thess. iv. 11.) *Study to be quiet, and to do your own business*. We must also inculcate the counsel of Peter, (1 Pet. iv. 15.) *Let no one of you suffer as an evil doer, or as a busy-body in other men's matters, ἢ ὡς ἄλλοιτροὶ ἐπισκοπῶς*. We have never heard even a rumour of the common people being appointed a Bishop of the Church by God; but we read in the life of Constantine by Eusebius,* that the Emperor enjoyed this title.

Thirdly, even suppose that Kings, or other chief Magistrates failing in their duty, do not purge the Church from heresies or false worshippers, nay, what is worse, countenance corruptions by their authority; yet, in this state of things, the duty of reforming the Church by no means devolves upon the people:—

1.—Because God himself, content with other duties of the people, does not require this work of reformation from them. But what then [it may be asked] are those duties? I answer: To beware of bowing down before idols; to avoid heresies, not to extirpate them by force of arms; to bewail the corruptions of the Church, not to remove them; in one word, to endure the severest punishments inflicted by the Magistrate, rather than to desert the true religion; not to force the Magistrate to introduce true religion (1 Kings, xix.; Ezek. ix.) Thus were the three youths mentioned in Daniel animated (Dan. iii. 18.); in like manner the whole nation of Christians under idolatrous Emperors. *Religion certainly should be defended by all private individuals, though not by slaying, but by dying; not by severity, but by patience; not by wickedness, but by faith; as Lactantius has admirably said, Instit. 5, 20.*

2.—Moreover, it is not allowable in the people when the Magistrate refuses it, to put their hand to this business; because under whatever pretext it be cloaked, it involves the crime of *rebellion*. For he who undertakes to reform Religion when the Magistrate is reluctant, first *dethrones* the Magistrate himself, tramples upon him, and must necessarily reduce him to the *common level*. But we are *not to do evil that good may come*; nor must we engage in a rebellion in order to establish Religion. The language of the Scripture is, *Blessed are they who suffer persecution for truth and righteousness' sake* (Matt. v. 10); but cursed are they who stir up rebellion under the cloak of these things. It is a maxim of

* [Lib. 1. cap. 44.]

lawyers, *Par in parem non habet potestatem*; an equal has no power over his equal: how much less inferior over superior, the people over the Prince? those reformers of Magistrates, therefore, assume whatever mask of piety they please, will nevertheless be ranked rather as imitators of an *Albinus*, or *Niger*, or *Cassius*, than as *Christians*.*

3.—Besides, there is no utility from any such popular attempt redounding to the Church; but numberless disadvantages may and do generally spring from thence. For at the very outset, when they commence reforming the Church, *they must necessarily lacerate the State*; since, indeed, all those who think with the Magistrate will never suffer that Religion which they cherish to be oppressed with impunity, or that a *new one*, to which they are opposed, be established, especially by those whom they look upon as armed with no legitimate or public power.

But let us suppose that these reformers so exceed in numbers, that they could nullify all efforts of the Magistrate who withstood them, as well as all those who sided with him; yet I ask, with what instruments, by what means will they proceed to establish among us what they call their Reformation? They cannot give it the sanction of laws, because the legislative power is not in their hands. They cannot, either by pecuniary or corporal punishments, compel opponents to submit to their reformed Religion, because it is *the prerogative of the Magistrate alone* to inflict penalties. Finally, they cannot remove heretical Ministers from their situations, nor substitute orthodox ones in their places, because *no such power over their own pastors* has been given to the *people* from above.

Lastly, if they possessed all other qualifications, yet, to a people (unskilful) there is wanting the very knowledge itself for reforming properly. It is not the duty of every unlearned *empiric* to undertake to cure the diseases of the body; and even should he do so, although health might ensue by accident, notwithstanding, in the opinion of the most learned Theologians,† he would involve himself

* Vide Tertull. *ad Scapulam*. 3. Albinus and Niger, two Roman Generals, who contended for the empire against Severus, after the murder of Pertinax.

“Among the many great generals who commanded at this time the Roman armies in the different provinces of the Empire, the most famed were Pescennius Niger, in Syria, Septimus Severus, in Illyricum, and Clodius Albinus, in Britain.”—*Ancient Universal History*, vol. xiii. p. 374, edit. 1780. See, also, Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, chap. v.; or *Herodian*, lib. ii., at the end, and lib. iii. By Cassius, is probably intended the celebrated Roman Quæstor, who married the sister of Brutus, and stabbed Cæsar. See Bishop Kaye's *Ecclesiastical History*, p. 58, Note 89, where Cassius is placed *first*.

† Silvest. verbo *Medicus*.

in guilt. Who, then, shall dare to assert, that it is the duty of the commonalty to undertake the healing of the diseases of the Church? For although, in their rash undertaking of this nature, they might produce some effect of true reformation, yet they would not avoid the sin of impious presumption.*

I thus sum up all: Equity does not allow it; necessity does not require it; utility does not advise it: therefore, it is unlawful for the people, against the consent of the Magistrate, to attempt the Reformation of the Church.

* “Those who quit their proper character,”—Mr. Burke has, since the days of Davenant, well observed, with a reference equally as applicable in the case above,—“those who quit their proper character, to assume what does not belong to them, are, for the greater part, ignorant both of the character they leave, and of the character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world in which they are so fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs, on which they pronounce with so much confidence, they have nothing of politics, but the passions they excite.”—Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, p. 13.

*. See Dr. Thos. M’Crie’s *Miscellaneous Writings*; pp. 477, 78, &c.

QUESTION XIII.

THE POPISH MASS IS NOT A PROPITIATORY SACRIFICE FOR THE
LIVING AND THE DEAD.

THE Romanists, in this matter of theirs touching the Mass, obtrude three most grievous errors upon us; namely, that there is in the Mass a sacrifice, real, external, and properly so called; that there is there a Priest, who performs an act of sacrificing, properly so called; and, lastly, that there is a power in this Priest, according to his will and intention, of applying the saving efficacy of the aforesaid sacrifice as well to the living as the dead.

We, on the contrary, assert, First, that in the Mass nothing can be either mentioned or pointed out, which partakes of a sacrifice, or, which possesses the nature and essence of a real, external sacrifice, properly so called; although the prayers, the alms, and thanksgivings, which it is the custom to join to the same, are denominated *spiritual sacrifices*; although, also, the very representation of the body of Christ broken, and of his blood poured out, is figuratively very often called *a sacrifice* by the ancient writers.

When the Papists are pressed to specify what they mean by a *real sacrifice*, they waver very much, and are perplexed. Bellarmine says,* *That bread and wine are in a way offered in the Mass; but that it is the body and blood of the Lord which is that sacrifice, properly offered and sacrificed: yet so that the bread and wine, the body and blood of the Lord, are not two sacrifices, but one; because, it is not offered as simple bread, but bread transubstantiated; nor is it the body of the Lord simply, that is offered, but the body of the Lord under the appearance of bread, and prepared from bread.* As many riddles, not to say prodigies, as words; with which there is not time to grapple. I assert, briefly, that the bread and wine, in whatever light considered, cannot be that real sacrifice which we are discussing. It is admitted by all, that this sacrifice, which we call *real* and *propitiatory*, is always the same in number, and one only; but the new bread and the new wine in the Mass are consecrated daily. It is, also, of such a character, that by its virtue and efficacy it can take away the sins of men. But as the blood of bulls and goats could not take away sins, so, neither, can bread and wine have any such influence. It is evident, therefore, that the bread and wine is not that sacrifice, or the thing to be sacrificed, which we seek for in vain in the Mass. Moreover, the body and blood of Christ is not present in the Mass, to be offered as a sacrifice repeatedly unto God. We freely acknowledge, that, in the supper of the Lord rightly administered, there is offered and applied to us believers, together with Christ himself, that ever-living and saving efficacy of the sacrifice once offered upon the altar of the cross: but that this sacrifice in the Mass may, and ought daily to be repeated, and that the body and blood of Christ are there submitted to the Priest, as a thing to be offered in sacrifice by him, this we utterly deny.

The very nature of a sacrifice is opposed to this notion: for a thing to be sacrificed is something visible, and what meets the external senses of men; and so Bellarmine himself admits:† *In every sacrifice properly so called, there is required a sensible thing for offering.* We then ask the Papists to show us the visible and sensible body of Christ, which they say is the sacrifice properly so called in their Mass; and seeing that this is what they cannot do, let them confess that they must needs be offering to God but the empty appearances of bread and wine.

Moreover, upon the authority of Bellarmine himself,‡ *all those things which are truly and properly called sacrifices, must necessa-*

* Lib. 1. *de Missa*, cap. 27.

† *De Miss.* 1. 2.

‡ Ibid.

rily be destroyed by being slain in the very act of sacrificing them: but Christ's body is incapable of suffering, nor can it be destroyed or slain; it is therefore not offered in sacrifice. Here they have recourse to a received, but plainly frivolous distinction, about a *bloody* and *unbloody* sacrifice. But if the being slain enters into the principle of a sacrifice, that which they call an *unbloody* sacrifice will be nothing else than a representation of a true and real sacrifice; and consequently not a real sacrifice. For if Christ often offers himself, he must needs often suffer;* seeing that the offering of Christ, distinct from either his passion or his death, is a fiction contradictory of itself.

Besides, the true and real sacrifice of Christ considered in the act itself of being offered, has conjoined with it an actual satisfaction for sins. For Christ was delivered up for no other end, than to make satisfaction for us.† *He gave himself for our sins*, says the Apostle, Gal. i. 4. And no other view can be taken, when this sacrifice is offered a thousand times, but that there is paid unto God at the same time *a ransom* for our sins just as often. But this is opposed to the Holy Scriptures, which assert, that *Christ was once offered for our sins* (Heb. x.): it is opposed also to the Divine equity, which does not require a satisfaction for one and the same debt to be repeated. They contend that the satisfaction heretofore made on the cross is not *repeated* in the sacrifice of the Mass, but *applied*;‡ hence some *Papists* deny that the Mass is a *propitiatory* sacrifice, and yet assert that it is an *applicatory* sacrifice. But such persons ought to be reminded, that an application of a sacrifice heretofore offered is plainly one thing, the sacrifice itself another; and the application of which to individual cases afterwards is not by a new sacrifice, but by a believing apprehension.

In short, the body and blood of Christ do not come under the character of a sacrifice, except when they are offered to God, according to that form which God himself has prescribed from all eternity. Now God the Father ordained, that God his Son should be offered once by himself, and that upon the altar of the cross. The body and blood of Christ, then, when offered often to God, as well by Priests never summoned to do this, as also uncommanded by the shedding of blood, can in no way sustain the name or notion of a sacrifice properly so called.

And thus much for the first error, by which it is pretended that

* Heb. ix. 26.

† Rom. iv. 25.; 1 Cor. xv. 3.

‡ Gropp. Instit. et Antididag. Colon. [See Dupin's *Eccles. Hist.* xvith Cent. book v. p. 19; and Seckendorf *Comment. &c, Luth.*; lib. iii. pp. 447, 555.]

there is in the Mass a real, external sacrifice, and properly so called. I proceed to the second.

2.—Now, in the second place, the Romanists maintain, that their Presbyters are, as it were, secondary Priests of the New Testament, and perform in their Mass an act of sacrificing properly so called.

But Jesus Christ is our sole and eternal priest, needing neither successors nor vicars of the New Testament. And I ask, for what good are other Priests substituted for Christ himself? Not to shadow forth his sacrifice, as if it were future: for it has already been offered to God, is not now to be offered. Not to signify that it is accomplished; for to represent it as done is to celebrate a sacrament, not to offer a sacrifice. Lastly, not for the sake of doing what was done by Christ himself when offering himself; for that would both be useless, if it could be done, and is clearly impossible to be done.

It may moreover be added—that in the New Testament the same person is both Priest, Victim, and Mediator. The Romish sacrificers manifest no particular willingness to take the place of the victim; let them not put themselves forward then as Priests or Mediators. In short, in the New Testament there is no one appointed to offer for sin, unless one who is *holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners* (Heb. vii. 26.) For if the person of the offering is not free from sin, let the value of the thing offered be ever so great, it could not be pleasing to God, nor expiate for the sins of others. Let them then produce us even one, from among the multitude of their sacrificers, who is harmless and separate from sinners, and we will acknowledge him for a Priest of the New Testament. We admit that evangelical preachers were appointed by Christ to preach the Gospel, to administer the sacraments, and to govern the Church of Christ; but that any Priests have succeeded to the place of Christ for the purpose of carrying on a daily sacrifice, we can neither admit nor ought to believe.

Yet since even without the permission of Christ, they are willing to become Priests of the New Testament, let them point out how, or where, in the Mass, they do actually become sacrificers. He is truly a wonderful Priest, who does not understand when he offers up his own sacrifice! And here it will be just worth while to observe, in what a wretched manner Bellarmine (*De Missa* 1, 27) shuffles, to find in what the act of sacrificing consists, which the Mass-priests say that they perform in celebrating their daily Mass.

First, he very idly enumerates many things in which it does not consist. Then, he speaks of their opinion as probable, who have

made it to take place in the very words of consecration—*This is my body; this is my blood.* For when by virtue of these words—*This is my body*—the body alone is fixed, apart from the soul and the blood, upon the altar; and again by virtue of those—*This is my blood*—the blood is placed by itself upon the same altar; and that a separation of the blood from the body constitutes a true and proper offering; hence they conclude that the Priest when consecrating does truly immolate Christ.* That this, however, may not be done in a bloody manner, they have in reserve this shrewd device,—*Although by virtue of the words the body by itself, and the blood by itself, are at first apart by themselves upon the altar; yet that there is a prevention in consequence of a natural concomitancy, that the blood or the soul should be really separated from the body.* But stones indeed speak. For if the act of sacrificing consists in this, that by the words of the Priest a true separation takes place of the blood from the body; and yet that a natural concomitance does in fact forbid any such separation; the act of sacrificing must also at the same time be necessarily hindered. Christ is consequently under no obligation to the sacrificing Romanists, because they do not daily deprive him of life; for they do their best to slay him in reality; but a pious and merciful concomitancy intervenes, and releases him from an immediate death. But to dismiss these writers, in whose opinion Bellarmine confesses that his mind cannot fully acquiesce; let us hear what new and solid reason he has himself to bring. This act of sacrificing, then, he himself says, consists in three things.—

First, in this, that *by the Priestly consecration of the Eucharist, a profane thing becomes sacred; for bread, an earthly matter, by consecration becomes the body of Christ.* We shall not moot the question about transubstantiation for the present; which, even if admitted, would imply the performing of a *miracle*, not of a *sacrifice*. Neither also does it contribute anything to the essence of a sacrifice, that a profane thing becomes sacred, unless indeed the same identical thing, which before was profane, be offered in sacrifice to God after it is become sacred. Let Bellarmine, therefore, say that the Romish Priests sacrifice bread, and we will say that they do perform a sacrifice of some kind or other.

Secondly, he places the act of sacrificing in this, that *that thing made sacred out of a profane matter is offered to God, whilst by virtue of consecration it is placed upon the altar; for to place a victim upon the altar is in reality to offer it to God.* But who can

* See Ellliot's *Delineation of Romanism*; pp. 179, 80, Edit. London, 1845.

with patience hear it said, that the most sacred body of Christ, which is to be offered to God, is rendered so, being previously profane material? Then, who can allow that it is the same thing to place Christ upon the altar by some wonderful power of the words, as to sacrifice him to God? The former must indeed precede the act of sacrificing; but being placed there, unless immolation follows, there is no proof of an act of sacrificing having taken place. Finally, we acknowledge no altar except the altar of the cross, upon which Christ is placed as a victim to be sacrificed to God the Father.

Thirdly, he says, that the act of sacrificing consists chiefly in this, *that the thing which is offered be destined for a true, real, and external destruction*; and this he says is done, *when, after the consecration, the body of Christ is eaten by the Priest. For by this manducation, the body of Christ loses its sacramental character, and ceases to be really upon the altar.* But nothing can be imagined more absurd, or foreign from the point in question; although Bellarmine fancies that hereby he has hit the nail right on the head. For first let him shew, where God has appointed that his Son is to be offered to him in the way of manducation; or, whoever supposed that it was the same thing to devour a human body, as to sacrifice it to God?

But there still remains a difficulty for Bellarmine to remove; how a Priest, eating the body of Christ, can be said to sacrifice it, and yet, that any Christian who does the same, is not considered to have become a sacrificer. In fine, we must just hint to him, that it is not sufficient to constitute a real sacrifice, that a victim, being placed upon the altar, lose its *sacramental* character, unless, at the same time, it loses its *animal* character. So far, then, that in the Popish Mass, there is neither a sacrifice, properly so called, nor a Priest, nor the act itself of sacrificing, the very fabricators of Masses could themselves make evident to us. We now proceed to shew in what the third and last error consists.

3.—The Papists lay it down, that this sacrifice, as they fancy it, can be applied according to the intention of the offering Priest to all men whatsoever, whether living or dead; so that from the mere performance of the act, (*ex ipso opere operato*) there follows remission of sins and guilt, and other benefits spiritual and temporal.

To which I answer, that:—

1.—This mode of application is fictitious. The Scriptures teach, that this sacrifice of Christ is applied efficaciously to this and that particular person, for the remission of sins; *principally*, by the

operation of the Holy Spirit exciting faith in men's hearts, *instrumentally*, through the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments, by means of the same faith. But that, through the mere performance of any sacrificer, that living sacrifice can be applied to persons present or absent, penitent or impenitent; in short, to living or dead, those alone venture to assert, who are provided with a face of brass; those alone can assent to, who have a heart of lead. We give credit to the Apostle, who teaches (Rom. iii. 25.) that God hath set forth Christ to be a *propitiation* for every one, through faith in him, not by the mere performance of the officiating Priest. [Again]

2.—This mode of application is injurious to Christ. For the sacrifice of Christ is of such efficacy, that, if it is applied individually to any sinner, he is necessarily reconciled to God, and straightway delivered from his sins. But the sacrificers, whilst they chaunt a number of Masses for one and the same man, plainly set it forth, that the most precious blood of Christ, often applied to a particular person, avails but with difficulty to absolve him from all guilt and punishment. What congruity there can be in this case, that a sacrifice of infinite virtue should be applied to an individual person, and he yet not forthwith freed from his sins, is, I confess, more than I can pretend to be able to understand.

3.—This mode of application is plainly superfluous. For, as many as flee by means of faith and repentance, to the sacrifice of the Cross, they obtain remission of their sins, although no Mass be celebrated on their account; but as many as are wanting in faith and repentance, although a whole nation of sacrificers should burst themselves in resounding Masses, yet would they never be absolved from their sins.—But, perhaps, the sacrifice of the Mass obtains the gift of repentance for all those to whom it is applied, through the intention of the Priest. Not so, indeed; for, undoubtedly, great numbers remain unconverted, for whose deliverance those Mass-mongers have laboriously toiled. But at least (says Bellarmine*) it obtains some new disposition, by means of which they may turn themselves to God, if, by the freedom of their own will, they do not resist this grace. But again, I must ask, On what assurance do the sacrificers venture to rely, in applying this living sacrifice of Christ expressly to any particular person, since they are altogether ignorant whether or not he is one of those filthy swine, who despise the grace of God, and will tread this pearl under their feet.

* Bellarm, *de Miss.* 2. 5.

Lastly, this mode of application, grounded on the mere performance of the Priest, is more than ministerial, and elevates the Romish Priests far above even the Apostles of Christ. For the Apostles applied this sacrifice to particular persons, no otherwise than by preaching, and administering the sacraments, and that, upon the condition of faith and repentance. But the Romanists, whilst they celebrate Mass, apply it unconditionally to any one as they please. A privilege more than human. For he who can apply the fountain of life to particular persons, as he shall see fit, can infallibly confer grace and life eternal upon the same persons. But it is wearisome to be detained in refuting errors so gross. I conclude from all that has been so far discussed, that the Popish Mass is *not* a propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead, but a most base device for securing gain from the living and the dead.

. See Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, pp. 172, 294, &c., Edit. Lond. 1844; *Cranmer's Works*, p. 345 (Parker Society) vol. 1; *Hammersmith Discussion*, 1841, p. 175.

QUESTION XIV.

THE ANCIENT FATHERS DID NOT MERIT THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST, NOR ANY OF ITS CIRCUMSTANCES.

AMONG our Divines who attribute nothing to human merits, there is evidently no place for controversy on this point. But among the Papists, who are altogether inflated with a notion of their own merits, the Redeemer of the world even would not have met with acceptance; but that it might be shewn, that, as a reward for some human merit, at least, he was sent among men; so offensive to this class is anything flowing from the mere grace of God. Since, however, their own merits could not be obtruded in this case, they betake themselves to the merits of the ancient Fathers, whom they maintain to have merited, if not *the incarnation itself*, yet some of its *circumstances*, either *ex condigno*, or at least *ex congruo*.

We, on the contrary, shall shew first, that the benefit itself of the incarnation had not any connection with the merits of the

ancient Fathers; and then, that not even any of its circumstances are dependent on it.

If we were supplied with no other argument, that alone ought to suffice, that the Scriptures constantly refer this benefit to the mercy and benignity of God the Father, in sending his own Son not for any deserts whatever, either of ancients or moderns. Zacharias, according to Luke the Evangelist, celebrates this benefit, bestowed upon mankind, not as though a suitable reward should be rendered to the merits of the ancient Fathers; but that God might exercise mercy towards those Fathers, and shew himself mindful of the oath which he had sworn to Abraham; (Luke i. 72, 73.) and that *through the bowels of his mercy* (verse 78.) or *through the depths of his pity*, as Beza renders it. The Apostle Paul never mentions any other cause of this benefit than *the kindness and love of God* (Titus iii. 4.), *his great love* (Eph. ii. 4.), and the like. What need is there of more? Christ himself, who was in the counsels of the Father, plainly affirms (John iii. 16.) that *God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, &c.* Let there be no talk, then, about human meriting, whether of *condignity*, or of *congruity*; and let this whole benefit, how much soever it is, be altogether ascribed to Divine mercy.

Secondly, it is plain that God had destined and given Christ to the world, as the fountain and principle of grace to the whole human race; so that, whatever the holy Fathers had, could do, or did, of supernatural good, was all to be attributed to the coming Messiah, in whom they believed. They, consequently, whose merits, as they are termed, all flowed from Christ's being incarnate, did not previously win the incarnation of Christ by the desert of their own merits. Most true, indeed, is that maxim of the Schoolmen, and altogether founded in the judgment of right reason, that *the beginning to merit is no meriting at all*.

Thirdly, Theologians agree, that the human nature of Christ, which retained its personal union with the Deity, did not merit this incarnation. What infatuation, then, is it, to suppose that the Fathers merited anything higher or better than Christ himself, than he himself merited for himself! Add to this, that the incarnation of Christ is connected with the benefit of Redemption, as by a necessary bond; so that they who would maintain that the Fathers merited the incarnation of Christ, ought also to maintain that they merited the Redemption of mankind, and therefore, also their own. But that the benefit of restoring mankind should be due to the merits of particular persons, is altogether incredible.

Fourthly, they who mostly extol the merit of works, yet lay it

down, that the final reward which is due to them, is the fruition of God through a beatific vision, because there is the same just proportion between grace and glory, as between seed and the tree. To concede this, (for it is not the place for discussing it,) yet there are two objections against the incarnation of Christ being due to any of the works of the Fathers as a reward. One, that in this recompence of glory, all their good works are most abundantly compensated; therefore, such an overweight as the incarnation of Christ is, cannot be claimed in return for merit. Another, that, between the works of grace, and the incarnation of Christ, which is comprised in the personal union, there is no proportion any way discernible, since the things are of a different class. All the works of the Fathers, therefore, of whatever quality, are as nothing, if they are put in competition with such and so great a good.

To all these considerations it may be added, lastly, that it is a principle necessary for the establishing of a ground of merit, that the promise of God should precede it; or, a free engagement of his willingness, to recompense such and such works with such a reward. Let them turn over the whole Scriptures of the Old Covenant, and produce even one word, in which it is intimated, that the incarnation of Christ was promised to the Fathers as a return for the doings of any works whatever. Since there is no such thing to be found, it is plain, that this incarnation of Christ was owing, not to the meriting of any particular individuals, but, to the common misery of all mankind, and the mere mercy of God. Thus much of the *thing* itself; let us now come to the *circumstances*.

Some, then, are of opinion, that although the Fathers could not merit the incarnation itself of Christ, yet that they merited some of its circumstances; among which they chiefly urge *Kind* and *Time*. For they assert, that Abraham and other Saints merited that Christ should be born of their seed, and of the tribe of Judah; that Simeon, Zechariah, and others, merited by their earnest prayers the hastening of the incarnation, namely, that Christ should be born whilst they were living, and could enjoy a sight of him.

In regard to Abraham, they put foremost that passage, Gen. xxii. 18., *Because thou hast done this, in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed*. The word *because*, according to them, denotes a meritorious cause; as if God had said—To the extraordinary merit of thy faith and obedience, in performing this work, I will grant this reward, that the Messiah shall spring from thy seed.

But they overlook this, that a promise, on which the Schoolmen

rest the ground for meriting, ought always to precede the work itself. Now this promise was subsequent, and consequently, is of no avail for proving the merit of the work. Moreover, Abraham was selected, that, from his seed Christ should arise, not because he had exceeded other men in faith and obedience; but, because God had determined, from eternity, to distinguish Abraham by this honour, therefore he endowed him with such remarkable gifts. In short, by the term *because*, upon which alone the argument is founded, there is not meant to be expressed *a meritorious cause*, either of *congruity* or of *condignity*; but a sort of *inclining cause*, which it pleased God to seize upon, as it were, after he had determined with himself to deal kindly with men.

Now, in the second place, as to what relates to the circumstance of *time*, some think, that the ancient Fathers desired the hastening of the incarnation, and obtained it, by the merit of their prayers. And they quote the case of Simeon, whom they affirm to have merited by his constant prayers, that, before his death, Christ should be born, so that he might behold him, and (as the phrase is) *embrace him with both his arms*. Now, what this argument is founded on, is, that what was granted to him by God, when he rightly, piously, and perseveringly asked it, was given him in return for his good deserts.

But they take up matter on which to ground their conclusion, which we shall not by any means yield to them. We deny that the Fathers ever prayed, that God would hasten the coming of his Son; for they well knew, that God, without any previous foresight of human works, had determined, not only that Christ should become incarnate, but should be born at such a time. Hence that saying of the Apostle, Gal. iv. 4.,—*When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son*. The Fathers, therefore, would in vain have sought for the hastening of that which they knew would not be accomplished before this fulness of time. They expressed, indeed, at times, by pious vows and wishes, that desire of seeing the Messiah with which their souls were inflamed; though, in the meanwhile, it never entered into their imagination, that by such desires as these, the appointed time would be shortened. We deny, also, that Simeon himself merited the hastening of the coming of Christ. Luke writes, that he *waited for the consolation of Israel*; he writes, moreover, that it was revealed unto him, that he *should not see death before he had seen Christ* (Luke ii. 26.); but, as to hastening the incarnation, or his prayers being offered up for that end, there is not a word.

Lastly, we deny, also, that any of those benefits which God

bestows upon men who pray piously and perseveringly, are given in return for merit. For God requires and expects the duty of prayer from us, even that he may bestow those things upon us which he has determined freely to give us; and such benefits we at length obtain, through the instrumentality of our pious and persevering prayers, only as a *medium*, not on any account as the reward of *merit*.

There is no reason, then, but that we come to the conclusion, that the ancient Fathers neither merited the incarnation of Christ, nor any of its circumstances.

QUESTION XV.

THE POWER OF THE PRIESTHOOD IS WHOLLY SPIRITUAL.

By *Priests*, we understand Ministers of the New Testament, especially Overseers of the Church, whom the ancient Fathers called *Priests*, because they were engaged, not in any civil, but a sacred office. But in this enquiry, we have that power only in view, which they possess by virtue of their Priesthood. For Priests, like Fathers, have a paternal power over their children; like masters, a masterly power over their servants; and, like guardians of the public peace, appointed by Princes, they exercise a kind of civil jurisdiction. Setting aside, then, all their power, which, under any other title it is competent to Ecclesiastical persons to exercise, we affirm, that they can, in virtue of their sacred office, neither claim nor exercise any power, except such as is merely spiritual.* And we call that a spiritual power which directs and governs men in subjection to itself, with a view to their spiritual and supernatural good, by spiritual and supernatural means: These remarks premised, we proceed to shew, that the power entrusted to the priesthood is altogether spiritual.

1.—This appears, firstly, from the very fountain of the priestly power, namely, our chief Priest, Jesus Christ. For the same power

* See Hudleston's *Divine Truths vindicated in the Church of England*; a valuable work for information, and especially as coming from one who had been a servant of the Romish mystery; or, see Sermon III. in the *Morning Exercises at Southwark*.

as he intended to exercise in procuring the salvation of his Church, that he committed to his Apostles and Disciples, and the same they transmitted to their successors—Bishops and Presbyters. But Christ claimed to himself spiritual power only, *My kingdom* [said he] (John xviii. 36.) *is not of this world*; that is, I assume not to myself temporal power, like that of earthly kings and princes; but I administer a spiritual kingdom in the hearts of believers.* If Christ was content with spiritual power for the collecting of the Church, there is no reason why his Ministers should presume to claim to themselves temporal power. Bellarmine, convinced by this argument, would not assume any *direct* temporal power, even to the Roman Pontiff; and, in endeavouring to claim it for his Pontiff *indirectly*, he is but indulging mere mockery. For Christ is not to be supposed to have given any one, *indirectly*, what he denied *directly*, nor *indirectly* to have stripped kings of their own temporal power, with which God had *directly* provided them.

2.—Secondly, Let us consider what are the acts proper to the sacerdotal office; for, from them, it will appear of what kind the power itself is. It is the province of a Priest, by preaching, to call men to Christ, and to the participating of spiritual life in Christ; by dispensing the sacraments, to confirm and nourish those who are called and endowed with spiritual life; by excommunicating, to separate the diseased from the healthy, that they may be restored to health, and, in the meantime, may not infect others by their contagion. Add to this, whatsoever other duties of the Priesthood, properly so called, can be mentioned, there will nothing occur in which they can transgress the limits of spiritual power. For in all, they employ spiritual means alone, towards a spiritual end; and if Ministers do not succeed in attaining their object in this way, they have no other means for accomplishing their purpose. It does not fall within their province to restrain by corporal punishments, to fine men in loss of goods, to wear them out by imprisoning. These were the instructions Christ himself

* The Translator would take occasion to direct any of his readers fond of investigation, to an explanation of the text on which the above argument is founded, in No. 4, for November, 1831, of *the Investigator of Prophecy*, where a correspondent gives an interpretation of John xviii. 36—that oft-quoted passage, *My kingdom is not of this world*,—which certainly adds to its force. His interpretation is grounded on the use of the particle *ἐκ* in the passage meaning sometimes *from* or *by*: and which if adopted here, our Lord might then be understood as saying: “My kingdom is not derived from this world, nor is it from this world that it is to have that which shall establish it.”—See page 102 of the said number of *the Investigator*.

gave to his Apostles and Disciples, as appears from Luke ix. 2, 5. *He sent them to preach the kingdom of God.* But supposing the refractory to be unwilling to admit this Gospel; were Priests then to put in exercise any temporal power? By no means: They are commanded to shake off the dust from their feet, as a testimony against such, but they are not commanded to compel them by any external power. For as Rupert* says truly, *The rod of a King is the rod of dominion; the rod of the disciples of Christ is a rod of love.* (Lib. 8. on Matt. x).

3.—Thirdly, if God had intended to bestow any temporal power on Ministers of the Gospel, he would have bestowed upon them, likewise, the means for attaining such power. For it is not to be supposed that an all-wise God should give any power to men, and leave them altogether destitute of all those necessary helps, apart from which that power could in no way be put into operation. I ask, then, what support, what attendants, what insignia of office, (*quos fasces et secures*) has Christ provided for his Apostles, or their successors? For temporal power, unaccompanied by adjuncts of this description, would, so far from being *applicable*, become a *laughing-stock*. Christ himself shall answer us that, so far as regards temporal power, even the Apostles were unfurnished with any helps for exercising it, but were sent as sheep, unarmed, into the midst of wolves (Luke x. 3). On the other hand, Paul will answer that, as respects spiritual power, they were well furnished with spiritual arms for overthrowing every high thing exalting itself against the knowledge of God, (2 Cor. x. 4, 5). This is a manifest proof that all their power was spiritual; which heretofore was admitted by Romanists themselves, nay, even by some of the Pontiffs. For thus says Pope Nicolaus, in Gratian,† *The Church has no sword, except a spiritual one, with which it does not kill, but gives life.*

4.—In fine, it may be inferred from this circumstance even, that Priests have *not* temporal power; that in all necessary cases the Church is bound to have recourse to the Sovereign, or some chief Magistrate. This the Apostle teaches, Rom. xiii., where the sword is placed in the hand of the political Magistrate, that he may be a Minister of God, for punishing the bad and rewarding the good. When, therefore, Sovereigns, through the Divine goodness,

* RUPERT, Abbot of Duyts, A.D. 1111, near Cologne, wrote Commentaries on many books of Scripture. See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 656. See, also, the *Translation of Davenant on the Colossians*; vol. i. p. 336, Note.

† Caus. xxxiii. quæst. 2.

embrace the Christian Religion, it is their business to enforce what is good in their kingdom, to restrain the evil; not in those points merely which affect human society, but, also, in those which relate to the worship of God; as Augustine well observes.* *The Church, therefore, is bound, where there is a necessity, to apply to the temporal power, not to usurp to itself the management of what it has not received from God; but to have recourse to the chief Magistrate, who is authoritatively invested with such power.* Hence, the decision passed in the Council of Paris:† *That which the Priests are insufficient to effect by the word of doctrine, secular Princes ought to command by the terror of discipline.* Hence, also, that Rule prescribed to the Church in Gratian,‡ *Let the Church look for assistance against her enemies, from the Kings of the earth* (Caus. 23). From all which it is sufficiently plain, that the power which resides in the Priesthood is altogether spiritual. And on this point more need not have been added, had not the Roman Pontiff been adverse to this most true conclusion, and claimed to himself a certain supreme temporal power, even over Kings themselves, who have been placed at the summit of temporal power by God himself. Proceed we then to beat down the insane pride of this vain man by some reasons.

In the first place, I assume (having as I think made it sufficiently evident) that the Roman Bishop, *as a Bishop*, acquires thereby no temporal power, much less the greatest and most exalted, over the greatest and most exalted Potentates. By this Episcopal title, then, just admitting that the Roman Pontiff has such power, it must have been given to other Bishops equally as to him; which no one has as yet ventured to assert. For (as says Ambrose‡) *The arms of Priests are prayers and tears; in any other way, neither ought they nor can they contend against Kings.* Neither again has he such power, if considered as a successor to Peter; indeed Peter himself never possessed such power. Nay, what Paul said (Acts xxv. 10), *I stand at the judgment seat of Cæsar, where I ought to be judged*, that Peter too could truly affirm: It is incumbent on me to acknowledge the temporal power of Cæsar, not my-

* *Contra Cres.* lib. 3.

† Concil. Tom. 3. [The vith held A.D. 829, Lib. ii. cap. 2; tom. vii. Concill. Studio Labbei, col. 1640.]

‡ Rubric [quæst. iv. cap. 41.]

§ For evidence of the prevalence of the spirit here reprobated, the reader may consult "*The Power of the Popes*," translated from the French by R. T. H. 2 vols. 8vo. Tims, London, 1838.

|| *Cont. Auxent.* [and see Milner's *History of the Church*, Cent. iv. Chap. xv.]

self to usurp such power in opposition to Cæsar. Lastly, neither as the Vicar of Christ, can the Roman Pontiff exult as if invested with such power. For, upon the authority of our Occam* (and Bellarmine himself assents to it,†) Christ committed such power only to his Vicar, as he himself exercised as man. Now Christ rejected all temporal power in his state of humility, as altogether useless to him. The spiritual power, which works in the heart of men, was alone what he put in exercise. In vain, then, does the Roman Pontiff boast that he is the Vicar of Christ, that under this pretence he may lord it over Kings themselves.

Moreover, when we utter the word *King*, we do even by the very name refute the temporal power of the Pope over him. For it is expressly provided for in the law of God, that *every soul should be subject to these higher powers* (Rom. xiii. 1); hence it is plain, that their power is established not only over soldiers, or the laity; but over Priests themselves, as Gregory the Great admits, (Epist. lib. 3.)—*Superior to the Emperor*, says Optatus, *there is none except God alone, who made the Emperor*. In a word, Tertullian, in his Apology, says, *Sovereigns are subject to the power of God alone, to whom they are inferior, after whom they are first, before all and above all, both gods and men*. How, then, is it possible, that the Roman Pontiff can excel in temporal power Emperors and Sovereigns in whom resides the supreme temporal power; seeing that in the same rank there is assigned nothing higher than the highest? Or how can *he* assume any temporal power over Kings themselves, who himself has none except what is conceded him by Emperors and Kings? Hence that saying of Gerson (part 3.) that *the temporal power of the Pope may be abrogated by the temporal Lords from whom he obtained it*. It was not his opinion, therefore, that the temporal power of Sovereigns could be set aside by a Pope—a notion which the Jesuits now impudently enough put forth.

Lastly, it does not fall within the temporal power of the Pope to depose or restrain Sovereigns, seeing that God has reserved to

* Occam, *de Pot. Eccles. et Secul.*

“This year (1347) WILLIAM OCCAM, the famous Schoolman, died at Cologne: he was an Englishman of the order of St. Francis. He was bred under John Duns Scotus, though afterwards he struck out into opposite notions, and proved a great antagonist to his master: for Occam set up the distinction of the Nominalists against the Realists, of which Duns Scotus was the head. Occam was a person both of singularity and spirit, and is said to have been so hardy as to appear against the censure upon the Fratri-celli pronounced by Pope John XXII.”—Collier’s *Ecclesiastical History*, book vi. Cent. xiv.

† Bellarm *de Pont. Rom.* lib. 5. cap. 4.

himself the office of restraining them by a special privilege. *Who can stretch forth his hand against the Lord's anointed, and be guiltless? Unless the Lord shall smite him, &c.* 1 Sam. xxvi. 9, 10. *A King is punishable with material punishment by God alone*, says Alexander Hales (part 3, quæst. 4. m. 5.) It is well known what irritation the Roman Pontiff manifests, should any inferior Bishop presume to decide *cases reserved* for the Papal cognisance*, to use the language of Canonists. Let him know, then, that the indignation of the Divine Being is not less to be feared for himself, if he presumes rashly to usurp the office of punishing Sovereigns, which is reserved for God alone. Ambrose, upon those words of David, I HAVE SINNED AGAINST THEE ONLY, says, *Inasmuch as he was a King, he had not, therefore, sinned against man, to whom he was not held amenable.* The Roman Pontiff ought either to deny that he is a mortal, or to confess, as regards inflicting temporal punishment, that a Sovereign is not at all responsible to him.

Clear as the truth is in this matter, it is nevertheless put forward, That this temporal power of the Pope over Kings must be attributed to him, only with an eye to the spiritual good of their souls. And in this view they maintain that such a power is plainly necessary; for that otherwise, idolatrous Kings being heretics and ungodly would establish idolatry, cherish heresy, nay, overturn all Divine worship. But the actual state of affairs tells us the contrary. For the Christian Religion maintained its place, and flourished under Pagans, Heretics, and ungodly Emperors; and when no Roman Pontiff either did or could put such power in exercise. In what way, then [it may be asked] was Religion in the mean time defended, if there was no one to restrain the fierceness of Princes? I answer in the words of Lactantius,† *Not by slaying, but by dying; not by revenge, but by patience; not by crime, but by faith.* The temporal power of the Roman Pontiff is not a necessary thing, therefore, as a mean, in order to the spiritual good of souls.

Moreover, that it is not a fit and suitable mean, has been made abundantly evident from the issue. For never did the Roman Pontiff, under pretence of upholding Religion or the Church, set about opposing Kings or Emperors with temporal weapons, without at the same time embroiling the State with civil war, overrunning the Church with pernicious schisms, and almost filling the whole

* See Hough's *History of Christianity in India*; vol. ii. p. 67, Note.

† Instit. 5. 20.

of Christendom with innumerable scandals and miseries. Let that prince of contesters with Monarchs, Hildebrand, serve as an example, who after plaguing the Emperor Henry almost throughout his whole life in the strangest way, at last, having been brought to repentance, confessed that he had sinned very grievously, and, on the suggestion of the devil, had been engaged in exciting anger against the universe, as Sigibert relates in his *Chronicles*.* Behold who the adviser is of this usurped power! even the devil himself. Behold the fruit! not any spiritual advantage to the Church, but slaughter and calamity to the human race.

Lastly, to sum up in one word: if the Pope, by assuming to himself a temporal power over Sovereigns, might promote the spiritual good of the Church, yet by the help of such means as these the good of the Church would not really be promoted; seeing that no act, in itself unlawful, is the way for compassing any good whatever. For a Priest, however, to step beyond the bounds of his calling without the express command of God, and to oppose Sovereigns by force of arms, is an act plainly unlawful, contrary to the order established by God; and therefore never to be taken up as a mean for promoting the glory of God.

* Anno 1085 [In the *Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores* collected by Pistorius, tom. i. p. 845. edit. Ratisbonæ, 1726. A similar account is given in the *Chronicle of Alberic*, a Cistercian Monk, of Trefontaine. See Bower's *History of the Bishops of Rome*, vol. v. p. 291, edit. 4to. where the statement is alluded to, but considered as less well-founded than that given from Paulus Bernriedensis:—"There is no small disagreement amongst the cotemporary writers, with respect to his last sentiments concerning his quarrel with Henry. Sigibert writes, that sincerely repenting, in his last moments, what he had done, he absolved that Prince, with his last breath, from the excommunication which he had so often and with so much solemnity thundered out against him and all his followers. But the author of his life, who wrote soon after his death, assures us, that being asked, when past all hopes of recovery, whether he would shew, before his departure, any indulgences to those whom he had excommunicated, he answered, I absolve and bless all those who firmly believe that I have such a power, except Henry, whom they call King, the usurper of the Apostolic See; Guibert, and the chief persons who have encouraged and supported them in their wickedness, with their assistance or Counsels."—*Paul Bernried. Vit. Greg. c. 110.*

QUESTION XVI.

A PRONENESS TO EVIL DOES NOT FLOW FROM THE PRINCIPLES
OF UNCORRUPT NATURE.

WE call *proneness to evil* a certain habitual inclination either of the will, or of the inferior appetites, to desire and do those things which are contrary to the Divine law. Some have taught* that such inordinate propensity flows from the principles of uncorrupt nature by a kind of natural necessity; yet that it was, as it were, bound and fettered in Adam before his fall, by the bonds of original righteousness, that it should not break out into act. Certain Jesuits have eagerly embraced this error, with no other design (as it appears to me) than that they might ground their other most grievous errors upon this foundation. For, if you grant to them, that a proneness to evil, that is, the rebellion of the sensual appetite against the law of the mind, sprang from the principles of nature left to itself; they straightway infer, that this rebellious concupiscence is not sin; that the regenerate notwithstanding this are perfectly righteous, and free from all indwelling sin; that the *works* of the regenerate are perfectly righteous and strictly conformed to the standard of the Divine law; with many other positions of the same stamp.

But passing by all the rest let us hear Bellarmine, who correctly acknowledges that Adam was created in grace, yet he fancies a certain state purely natural, in which he would be created as free from grace as from sin: and hence he philosophises, stupidly enough, about what man would have been, being formed in perfect nature, according to this imagination. And he teaches,† *That the state of this man, considered in pure nature, no more differs from the present state of fallen man, than a naked man differs from a man stripped of his clothing.* Yea, he adds, *That the natural impulse of our flesh is not now more rebellious than it would have been before sin in that purely natural state; neither was the nature more sound or pure before sin than it is now after sin.* At length he confidently asserts,‡ *That such was man altogether in his pure*

* Dominicus Soto, *de Nat. et Grat.* lib. 1, cap. 3 et 13.

† *De Grat. primi homin.* cap. 5 et 7.

‡ *Ibid.* cap. 5 et 7.

nature, that in him there was that headlong inclination to vice which we experience in ourselves since the fall. But he fetches these monstrous opinions from the mere necessity of matter, contrary to the intention of God the Creator; and he contends that it cannot be but that in man, composed of a spiritual and sensual nature, there must be plainly the same rebellious and headlong concupiscence, which now exerts itself in man a sinner, unless otherwise restrained.

To these dreams of Bellarmine we oppose this our proposition,—*That proneness to evil does not flow from the principles of uncorrupt nature;* that is, the rebellious inclination of the appetite by which man is carried forward and headlong to lust, against the very law of his mind, is a depravation of natural rectitude; neither does it flow from the condition of matter, but from the corruption of nature itself. This we shall shew from these arguments:—

1.—God himself, who created man, was the author of the matter, as well as of the form, both of body and mind, and adorned and furnished both with its proper qualities and dispositions. If, then, that propensity to rebellion, and headlong inclination to vice, had flowed from the condition of pure matter, we acknowledge God (which is impious) to be the author of this vicious and inordinate inclination. Bellarmine answers, that God, indeed, is not to be accounted the author of this inordinate concupiscence; because, it follows, contrary to the intention of God the Creator, from the necessary condition of matter; just as a blacksmith is not the author of rust, although he makes an iron sword, which is liable to rust, from the necessity of matter. In this simile all things are unlike. This workman is but a weak and unskilful man, who does not himself make the iron material, but finds it made and ready to hand; but the framer of human nature is God himself, most wise, and most powerful; who takes the matter not from another, such as he finds it, but created it from nothing, such as he would have it. But to pass by other things, what is supposed by Bellarmine, namely, *that God cannot so create man, composed of a rational soul and sensible matter, but that, contrary to the Divine intention, man so constituted, should have an headlong inclination to sensual things,* is akin to blasphemy, and very reproachful against Almighty God. For what poison can there be in earthly matter, that, against the intention of Almighty God, it should necessarily force the soul, joined to it, headlong towards vice? We grant, that, from the union of a spiritual substance to a sensible, an inclination of the soul united to it, for sensible things, necessarily follows; but that an inordinate, rebellious, headlong inclination to sensible things follows

from thence, unless it is restrained as by a bridle, is in no way to be conceded. Although, also, it is not very accordant for God to resolve, that he would have this inclination of the flesh under perpetual restraint by a supernatural rein, if such had been the natural condition of the human material. For God is not accustomed to abolish the natural motions of his creatures. And, indeed, it is utterly foolish, first, to suppose that such a rebellious inclination appertains to man, according to the principles of pure and uncorrupted nature; and then, to suppose God repressing this natural inclination by some supernatural remedy. How much more correct is Hugo de St. Victor, who says* that, *in a state of innocence, the flesh, as a gentle animal, mildly bears the spirit, without being controlled by bridle or spurs; or, if perchance there was a bridle there, whereby the flesh should be ruled, as not knowing how to go by itself; still, there would be no need to use this bridle to restrain it, because it would not be impetuous.*

2.—This new notion of Bellarmine is contrary to the common opinion of all Theologians, who teach, by unanimous consent, that through the fall of Adam, man was despoiled of supernatural, and injured even in natural qualities; or, to use the words of Lombard,† *through original sin, natural good things were corrupted in man himself, gracious ones withdrawn.* But if we credit Bellarmine, natural qualities are no less pure and sound in us, after sin, than they were before; nay, fallen man, it is said, is *liberated* and *emancipated* in natural things, rather than *wounded* or *corrupted*; for by the very fall, he only shook off the supernatural restraint, and so returned, according to Bellarmine's opinion, to a state purely natural. Where, then, is that wounding, that corruption of human nature, occasioned by sin? where that disease and contagion, which, being propagated through successive generations, affected the person as well as the nature? Truly, these axioms of Theologians would all vanish in smoke, if Bellarmine's opinion should obtain, that *the state of fallen man was in no degree worse, or more impure, than the state of man, considered in perfect purity.* But take the opinion of that ancient and learned Divine, William, Bishop of Paris, in this matter,‡ *If we consider the state of man before he sinned, in the purity and dignity of natural perfections alone, and the state of this natural corruption with which we are born; we shall find that that state was truly human, but this state, for the most part, brutal.* Bellarmine's man, then, in perfect purity, is nothing else

* *De Sacr. Fidei*, lib. 1, part 7, cap. 19.

† Lib. 2, Distinct. 25.

‡ *De Univers.* part 2, cap. 29, pag. 851.

in the opinion of William of Paris than one in the impurity of brutes.

3.—That also especially proves, that this proneness to unlawful desires derives its origin, not from the condition of sensible matter; because, it exerts itself no less in the superior part of the soul, than in the inferior; and extends itself equally to spiritual, as to carnal and sensible objects. That observation of Augustine is remarkable: * *The will, without love, is altogether a depraved cupidity.* He does not say that the inferior and sensible appetite is polluted by this evil of unrestrained concupiscence; but, that the entire will itself is as if it was turned into depraved cupidity. Nay, Bellarmine himself says, † *Although concupiscence resides chiefly in the flesh, yet it must not be denied, that a like evil is also found in the superior part. For that part, also, of the soul, is prone to the coveting of honours, vain glory, and other empty things; and, although we are unwilling, yet it sometimes produces desires of this kind.* Here, then, I ask, Whence is that proneness to pride, to envy, and to other spiritual vices? Truly this inordinate concupiscence, which is nothing else than the unrestrained lust of fornication with the creature, cannot arise from the condition of matter, as far as regards the mind and will; since they are borne headlong towards objects which are by no means material, nor are subject to the senses. Bellarmine, then, trifles when he refers that concupiscence only to the condition of matter, which respects sensible things; and while he will not refer that which inordinately desires insensible things to the same condition of matter. We say with Augustine, ‡ that this evil of concupiscence, whether we regard the superior or inferior part of the soul, *did not proceed together with our nature from the hand of God, but passed from nature sinning into nature sinful.* For as drunkenness, which is a single vice, yet so disturbs soul and body, that neither the one nor the other can do anything decently and orderly, so original sin, which is but one actually in individuals, yet blinds the mind, perverts the will, corrupts the sensual appetite, and, in fine, depraves the whole man. Bellarmine therefore, impiously derives that evil of concupiscence from the condition of matter, which was derived from the contagion of original sin.

4.—That must be diligently weighed, That the faculty of concupiscence, or the sensitive appetite in man, is not the property of *the brute*, but of *the rational soul*. For we must not be so stupid

* *Retract.* 1. 15.

† *De Amiss. Grat.* lib. 5. cap. 15.

‡ *Hypog.* lib. 4.

as to suppose, that the flesh itself, or a certain irrational soul within us, desires carnal and sensible things; but, that a rational soul, united to a carnal and sensible body, is that which, whether ordinately or inordinately, desires carnal and sensible things. So Hugo de St. Victor,* *It is spirit itself which exceeds its measure in the desire of carnal things.* And before him, Augustine,† *The disease of a rational mind is, when delighted with inferior good things, it partly desires superior things, and partly does not desire them; and so it is divided into two wills.* The error of Bellarmine, then, is gross, when he so deduces headlong concupiscence from the condition of matter, as if either the very material of the flesh desired carnal things, or the rational soul, united to the flesh by a certain necessity of its nature, was hurried away to crave carnal things against the law and the control of reason itself. The Jesuit, then, ought to have remembered, that the *human* nature differs in kind from that of the brute, and that, in man, there is one and the same essence, in the foundation of which there is a two-fold appetite; one, rational, tending to superior and spiritual things; the other sensual, tending to inferior and sensible objects, but so tending, naturally, as becomes a sensitive rather than a brutal appetite, that it is, by nature, *under the dominion of reason, and governed by the light of reason.*‡ For the act of the sensitive appetite, in a rational creature, was intended to be controlled by the act of reason. Should we grant, therefore, to Bellarmine, that the sensitive appetite in brutes is borne headlong by a natural impulse towards the attractive object, yet we maintain with Gerson,§ *That there is a certain act, the peculiarity of sensuality, considered in itself, which act does not belong to the sensuality of man's nature.* In the rational soul, the natural desire for sensible objects is attracted towards the objects from the fact of its contact with them; while the soul's natural proneness towards the undue craving after such objects does not become excessive from its original condition. Hence Aquinas says,|| *This concupiscence, by which our nature is prone to lust, so that it is carried forward towards the pleasure of sense beyond the bounds of reason, as far as it exists in man, is contrary to his nature.* Still more plainly and briefly 1. 2. quæst. 82. art. 3.—*Concupiscence, which passes the bounds of reason, exists in man contrary to his nature.* Such concupiscence, then, did not exist in man, as he was constituted in his original purity; as Bellarmine will have it.

5.—This proneness itself, or the headlong inclination to lust

* Cap. 19, *De Sacr.* lib. 1. part. 7. et cap. 23.

† Apud Bed. in v. *ad Galut.*

‡ Vide Durand. lib. 3. D. 33. quæst. 3.

§ Part. 2. fol. 160. b.

|| Quæst. disp. *De Pec. Orig.* art 2.

against the law of the mind, is, on that account, called *sin* by the Apostle Paul, (Rom. vii.); and is accounted *original sin* by Augustine, Prosper, and the rest of the Fathers, and even so by the Master of the Sentences himself:* In short, it is by all Divines asserted to be propagated in us by generation, and contracted at our very birth. There is no one of their opinions which does not confirm ours, and root up that of Bellarmine from its very foundations.† For if this habitual concupiscence, or proneness to rebellion against the law of the mind, be sin; then in no way could it be considered to exist in man in his natural state, or be concealed, as though it were asleep and bound up in the principles of uncorrupt nature; for the natural purity of uncorrupt man excludes all taint of sin. Moreover, if this rebellious concupiscence be that very original sin itself, then it is posterior to the fall of Adam, and, therefore, could have its seat in no way in the principles of uncorrupt nature. In short, if by means of carnal generation from Adam, sin was propagated in us sinners, then it could not have arisen in a purely natural state, from the necessary condition of matter. What a Papist usually replies to this scarcely deserves refutation. Bellarmine says, that this inordinate concupiscence is not properly sin. What then? Is it credible that sin, improperly so called, lays concealed in the principles of uncorrupt nature, like a wild beast bound with a chain? Let Bellarmine credit it, we have faith in no such dreams. Moreover, what cause can be alleged, why we should suppose that the Apostle, Augustine, and all others who call this concupiscence *sin*, spake improperly? Those words of Augustine truly depict it as sin, properly so called:—*The lust of the flesh, against which the good Spirit lusteth, is both sin, because there is in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind; and is the punishment of sin, because it is paid as the reward of a disobedient mind; and is the cause of sin, through the defect of the mind consenting to it, or through the contagion of birth.* But they usually answer, That this concupiscence is only the *material*, not the *formal* of original sin. As if the *material* of original sin might lurk in pure and uncorrupt man, but not the *formal*. [See Note vol. i. p. 54.] If time allowed, it would be easy to annul this little foolish distinction. But I shall now only lay down this one position, That this inordinate concupiscence contains in it undue turning towards the creature, and an undue turning away from the Creator; and, therefore, it has the two-fold nature of sin.

It was my intention to have confirmed our opinion by more arguments, and to have dispelled all Bellarmine's little objections; but I must consider the weariness of my hearers, and yield to time. Here, then, I conclude.

* Lib. 2. dist. 30.

† Vide Aug. lib. 5. *Cont. Julian.* cap. 3.

QUESTION XVII.

THE PAPAL JESUITS CANNOT BE GOOD SUBJECTS.

[*This Translation is extracted from the Protestant Journal, where it appeared in the July Number, for 1834.*]

THAT the parties spoken of *are* not [good subjects] is indubitable; their villanous practices against Kings tell it out clearly. The question is, whether they *can* be good subjects. The doctrines promulgated by Jesuits, and received by all their followers, do not allow it;* for whoever approves of Jesuitical doctrine, and carries it into practice, whether he be a *Clerk*, or a *Layman*, cannot, on any ground, maintain the title of a good subject. Let us consider, first, the case of the *Clergy*.

And here I assume it as sufficiently manifest, that they are not to be reckoned for good subjects, nay, are not even to be ranked as subjects, who insist that they are so free from the yoke of the secular power, that the laws of Princes maintain not their constraining force over them; and what is more, if it happen that they offend against the civil laws, assert that they cannot be punished by the civil magistrate, nay, cannot be even brought before his tribunal. Can such, I ask, be accounted *subjects*, who profess that they are neither bound by the laws of their own Princes, nor, if they violate them, are obnoxious to the adjudication of penalty? The opinion of the Apostle concerning a good subject, in Rom. xiii. 1, is different, where he commands *every soul to be subject to the higher powers*, and likewise, judges it to pertain to this subjection, that you acknowledge yourself amenable to the sword of the magistrate, if you have been guilty of any crime, (verse 4). On the contrary, that saying of Bellarmine (*De Cler. lib. 1.*) obtains with the followers of the Jesuits, *the Clergy are not bound to civil laws, as those of Princes, for instance, by any coercive obligation; but only by a directive one.* But what if they are unwilling to be di-

* Dr. Alexander Geddes (a Roman Catholic Priest) says,—“ I have no hesitation to affirm, that the Popish Religion has been the cause of almost all the political disturbances in Europe, since the days of Gregory VII.”—Good’s *Life of Geddes*, p. 230.

rected? What, if they frowardly trample these laws under their feet? *Yet they cannot*, says the same Bellarmine, (ibid. cap. 28.) *be punished by the political magistrate, or in any way be brought to the tribunal of the secular magistrate.* And what if they should commit the very heinous crime of treason? Here the Jesuit Eudæmon meets us very opportunely, and suggests,* *That the crime of treason cannot, indeed, be properly committed by the Clergy, who are exempt from the law of subjection:* which Zimancha expressly teaches,† that is to say, *That the rebellion of a Clerk is not a crime of high treason, because he is not a subject of the King.* Let those boast no more of being good subjects, who do not even acknowledge that they are under the obligation of being subjects.—So far concerning the doctrine of exemption, which militates against the very ground of civil subjection.

To this we may add that Jesuitic dogma of the Seal of Confession, which compels the Popish Priests, infected with that poisonous notion, oftentimes to neglect the duty of a good and faithful subject. For suppose bloody traitors to have conspired against the life of the King, and against the whole State, and to have revealed it by confession to a Pontifical Priest, yet if he be imbued with the Jesuitical doctrine, he will say with Eudæmon, (Apolog. p. 355.) *It is not for me to reveal those things which are told in Confession, either to preserve the life of the King, or the safety of the whole State;* or, with Gregory de Valentia, (tom. iv. de Sigil. Confess.) *What any one has come to the knowledge of only at the Confessional, he may in no way reveal for any end whatever, although it may seem to relate to the public good.* Garnet, imbued with this Jesuitical theorem, set up as his defence (but falsely) for not having made known that mad crime of blowing up the whole kingdom, that forsooth *it came to his knowledge only through the Confessional.* Now it remains with you to judge what sort of subjects they are, who had rather for their Country and their Prince to perish, than infringe that fictitious seal. Assuredly, the safety of the State is a supreme law to good subjects, and not to be superseded by that Jesuitical dream. I call this figment about the Seal of Confession, in such a case, a *Jesuitical* dream, because it is their own device, by no means that of other Papists. Let our Hales, the Prince of Schoolmen, speak for all the rest: *A Priest* (says he‡) *is not bound to conceal whatever is revealed to him under the Seal, but those things only which ought to be concealed, according to the definition of things sanctioned; now those are things the commission of*

* Apolog. cap. 34. p. 110.

† Aphoris. de Confess.

‡ Part. 4. quæst. 19. memb. 2. art. 2. pag. 331, &c.

which has taken place, not what remain to be committed. Let then a Jesuit Priest take heed, lest while he improperly holds to the rule of not breaking a pretended Seal, he deservedly loses the character of a good subject. But, I fear, in a question about good subjects, it may seem a very absurd thing (*ἀπροσδιονυσον*) to speak at all of the Popish Priests, who are neither wont to be *good*, nor wish to be *subjects*. Therefore let us dismiss them and come to the *Laity*, whom we assert cannot be good subjects, if they desire to believe and obey the subtle Jesuits.

There are two doctrines of the Jesuits (to say nothing of the rest,) which completely root up the foundations of the allegiance of the *Laity*.

One is, that *an oath of fidelity given to his own Prince, may, by the authority of a foreign Prince or Potentate, that is, the Roman Pontiff, be dissolved.* For what will bind him in the duty of a good subject, who pays no regard to the obligation of a solemn oath? Now this the Jesuits instil into all the *Laity*,—That *they owe a slight allegiance towards their Prince, and that it has no weight unless it be derived from the will of the Pope; so that if the Pope should order them to renounce their allegiance, and to rush against their own Sovereign, piety itself would forthwith constrain them to be impious.* Bellarmine† has devoted an entire tract to prove *that an oath of fidelity cannot indeed be taken by our Papists, without a renunciation of the Catholic faith.* It is even a common opinion of all Jesuits, *That every oath of fidelity whatsoever, and by whatever solemnity procured or taken, may be abrogated by Papal authority.* To add no more, who shall say that he is a faithful subject towards his Prince, who will, no longer than it appears good to him, either continue faithful or subject, to whom Kings, the better and the more holy they are, upon that very account are the more odious to them?

Another doctrine, which cuts the very sinews of allegiance in the Popish *Laity*, is that which the Jesuits force upon their disciples, viz., *That it is not lawful for Christians to tolerate a heretical King, if he attempt to draw his subjects into his heresy; as Bellarmine decides (De Rom. Pont. 5. 7.)* And lest the minds of novices

* Does not such an appeal as this apply to recent evidences of lamentable laxity, in so important a concern? and, admitted and defended, as the light obligation of oaths has been, in certain quarters, can we wonder at the corresponding symptoms of irreverence, and of resistance to the powers that be, which have shewn themselves so alarmingly in others? And can we be at a loss to trace from what School all has emanated?

† *Respons. ad Apol. pro jur. fidelit.*

should waver in a matter of so much moment, Parsons confidently affirms*—*As to allegiance, it is clear that every Christian Prince, if he manifestly turns aside from the Catholic Religion, and shall wish to draw away others, cuts himself off immediately from all power and dignity, and that before the sentence of the Pope is issued; and that his subjects may and ought, if they have the means, to depose him, as a heretic, from the government of Christian men.* Suarez has the like in his book, *De Censuris*, disp. 15, sect. 6, p 262. It is not necessary further to stir this sink; consider well this one thing (of which you are all well aware) that our religion is that which the Jesuits call heresy; that our Protestant Sovereigns are those who, according to their opinion, endeavour to withdraw their subjects from the Catholic religion. This, then, is the tendency of the above dogma, namely, to persuade Papists that they are bound, as soon as they shall have the means, to attack and hurl from the throne their Protestant Monarchs, under whose governments they live. If they have not yet attempted this, Bellarmine (*De Rom. Pont.* 5. 7.) incautiously enough has blabbed the true reason: NOT THAT THEY WANT THE WILL, BUT THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET SUFFICIENT TEMPORAL POWER.

It would not be beside the matter, to treat, in this place, of blind obedience and Jesuitical equivocation, which two heads of Jesuitic doctrine whoever learns, he of necessity unlearns by the same means the duty of a good subject; for blind obedience prepares the Popish Jesuits for all the commands, however impious, required by their spiritual superiors. And would to God that the things which those superiors often enjoin to superstitious men, bringing mischief upon Sovereigns, and that under the notion of some extraordinary merit, needed proof.† And as to what relates to equivocation, or the mental reservation of the Jesuits, if it be impiety in a good subject to deceive the lawful Magistrate by lies and perjuries, they who do this under a change of name alone, and confidently maintain that they may do it, cannot claim to themselves either the title of good subjects or good men.

* *Philopat.* sect. 2. p. 109.

† Vide Valent. Tom. iv. *de Sigil. Con. punct.* 4.

*. * The Reader, who wishes to see something of the practical effects of the doctrines animadverted on in this article, may be referred for ample satisfaction to Foulis's *Popish Treasons*. And, as reference has been made in a preceding Note, to a declaration of Dr. Geddes, as to the character of the Popish Religion, in reference to States and Governments, the whole passage may prove

useful, and be acceptable to the Reader. The remarks it contains are quite confirmatory of our Prelate's position.

"The *Catholic* Religion, not only permits its children to be dutiful subjects, but expressly commands them to be such; but not so the *Popish* Religion. These two ought never to be confounded. The former is a most amiable matron, who inculcates nothing on the minds of her children but the peaceful maxims of the Gospel; the latter is an ambitious termagant, who has often encouraged her children to commit almost every sort of crime. It was the *Popish*, not the *Catholic* Religion, which (not to go out of our own country, nor back to a remote period,) could, in 1537, excite twenty thousand men, under the conduct of a Monk, to rise in rebellion against Henry VIII., in consequence of his subjects having been freed from their oaths of allegiance by a Bull of Paul III. It was the same *Popish* Religion, that, in 1539, attempted to depose the same King, and place on his throne the Dean of Exeter [afterwards Cardinal Pole]. It was *this* Religion that sent Ridolpho into England, in 1568, for the vile purpose of corrupting the loyalty of the English Catholics, and to pave the way for the famous Bull of Pius V., which deprived Queen Elizabeth of her title, dominion, dignity, and privileges; and forbad all her subjects, under pain of *anathema*, to obey her! It was *this* Religion, that, the very next year, again erected the standard of sedition under the Earls of Northumberland and Westmoreland; and their want of success, the Popish Surius thinks, might have been owing to this, *that the Papal denunciation had not been sufficiently made known to all the Catholics*. It was *this* Religion, that, in 1580, sent Parsons and Campion into England, with the qualified Bull of Gregory XIII., which, in the hands of those two artful men, was deemed a surer means of raising a successful rebellion, than the more violent one of his predecessor. It was *this* Religion, that, in 1588, sent the Spanish Armada to invade England, fraught with a powerful army, plenty of money, and treasures of indulgences, for the purpose of dethroning a Queen, against whom Sixtus V. had confirmed all the censures of Pius and Gregory; and granted a full pardon to all who should embark in the glorious enterprise! In short, I make no hesitation to affirm, that the *Popish* (not the *Catholic*) Religion has been mediately or immediately the cause of almost all the political disturbances in Europe, since the days of Gregory VII. It is against this Religion that we Catholic Dissenters protest, and whose interests ye Vicars Apostolic appear to be contending for!"—*An Answer to the Bishop of Comano's Pastoral Letter*, by Alexander Geddes, L.L.D., 8vo., London, 1790.

To the above it may not be amiss to add the following

HISTORIC PROOF OF BISHOP DAVENANT'S POSITION RESPECTING JESUITS.

"During the rejoicings which followed this inauspicious ceremony, Philip's (the IInd of Spain) proscription of the Prince of Orange put forth its fruits. The latter gave a grand dinner in the Chateau of Antwerp, which he occupied, on the 18th of March, the birthday of the Duke of Anjou; and, as he was quitting the dining-room, on his way to his private chamber, a young man stepped forward, and offered a pretended petition, William being at all times of easy access for such an object. While he read the paper, the treacherous suppliant discharged a pistol at his head; the ball struck him under the left ear, and passed out at the right cheek. As he tottered and fell, the assassin drew a poniard to add suicide to the crime, but he was instantly put to death by the attendant guards. The young Count Maurice, William's second son,

examined the murderer's body; and the papers found on him, and subsequent enquiries, told fully who and what he was. His name was John Jaureguay, his age, 23 years; he was a native of Biscay, and clerk to a Spanish merchant of Antwerp, called Jaspar Anastro. This man had instigated him to the crime; having received a promise, signed by King Philip, engaging to give him 28,000 ducats, and other advantages, if he would undertake to assassinate the Prince of Orange.* The inducements held out by Anastro to his simple dupe, were backed strongly by the persuasions of Antony Fimmerman, a *Dominican Monk*; and by Venero, Anastro's cashier, who had, from fear, declined becoming himself the murderer. Jaureguay *had duly heard Mass, and received the sacrament*, before executing his attempt; and in his pockets were found a *Catechism of the Jesuits*, with tablets, filled with prayers, in the Spanish language; one, in particular, being addressed to the angel Gabriel, imploring his intercession with God and the Virgin, to aid him in the consummation of his object. Other accompanying absurdities seem to pronounce this miserable wretch to be as much an instrument in the hands of others, as the weapon of his crime was in his own. Fimmerman and Venero made a full avowal of their criminality, and suffered death in the usual barbarous manner of the times. *The Jesuits, some years afterwards, solemnly gathered the remains of these three pretended martyrs, and exposed them as holy relics for public veneration!*† Anastro effected his escape."—*History of the Netherlands*, by T. C. Grattan, pp. 165, 6.

* Meteren, De Thou, &c.

† D'Ewes.

QUESTION XVIII.

THE RELIGIOUS WORSHIP OF THE CREATURE IS IDOLATRY.

[*This Translation is adopted from the Protestant Journal, where it appeared in the No. for June, 1833; the pages of which Journal contain a mass of information on the same subject, brought together from various sources.*]

A PERSPICUOUS explanation of the terms will open the way most advantageously to the treating of this question. We begin with the word *worship*; which is nothing else than an obeisance shown to any one according to his excellence. And this includes three acts: an act of the *mind*, whereby we apprehend the excellence of the person thus honoured; an act of *the will*, whereby we submit ourselves to him as inferiors, and are ready to acknowledge that inferiority by suitable offices; an act of *the body*, whereby we make the sign of our submission, as by prostration, inclination of the head, genuflexion, and the like. As to what pertains to the word *Religion*, we derive its origin from the idea of its binding us (religat) to the one Omnipotent God. Thus says Lactantius, Instit. lib. 4,

cap. 29, *We are bound and consecrated to God by the bond of piety, whence Religion itself has derived its name.* So Augustine, *De Civit.* lib. 10, cap. 1, says, *If it be the word worship (cultus) which is used, it does not appear to be appropriated to the one God; but the word Religion signifies more distinctly, not any indefinite worship, but the worship of God.* Aquinas, also, a man of great authority among the Schoolmen, restricts this religious worship to God, 2. 2, quæst. 81: *Religion*, says he, *properly imports our moral obligations to God*, (art. 1). And, *Religion is the virtue expressing obedience to God in those things which especially pertain to God*, (art. 8). For, as temperance renders a man virtuous as regards himself, righteousness, as far as regards his neighbour, so Religion does as far as it regards God. That this is the primary and genuine signification of this word, is evident even from profane authors. *Religion* (says Cicero) *is that which respects the worship and service of some superior nature, which they call Divine.* And elsewhere, *Religion is that which respects the pious worship of the gods.* I am the more particular on this point, because the Papists distribute religious worship among Angels, Saints, yea, even pictures and stocks. But, lest this controversy should seem to be spent in verbal trifling, we shall point out to you, in the first place, a three-fold worship; then we shall show the proper acts of this religious worship; lastly, we shall unfold the idolatry of the Papists, who render all these to creatures. All worship, then, is, either of *civil subjection*, or *moral reverence* (so to speak), or of *sacred Religion*.*

The worship of *civil subjection*, I call that obeisance which is rendered to any one by reason of particular eminence, and the authority which he hath over another through some participation of supreme power. An example or two will illustrate whatever may appear obscure. Princes, and all who are in authority, have some faint resemblance of the Supreme Governor: civil worship, therefore, is due to them, as far as they partake in the semblance of supreme authority, in the exercise of the legitimate powers of government. Thus, we owe honour to Ministers of the Word, and to Parents, inasmuch as, in respect of procreation and of education, they reflect the image of the Great Creator and heavenly Teacher.

* A modern writer in defence of Popery, when coming to this branch of it, discovered that the nature of respect shown to a person must *correspond* with his character and station; and thus illustrated the matter:—The respect shewn to a Clergyman is religious; to an officer of Government, civil; to a wicked man, vicious; and to a rogue, thievish.”—Vide M’CULLOCH’S “*Popery condemned by Scripture and the Fathers.*” Edinburgh, 1808. Vol. i. p. 368.

Therefore, the foundation of this civil worship is excellence in any one, not considered simply, but with reference to some particular power over another: and so it is rightly called by Aquinas (2. 2. quæst. 102. art. 2.) *a legal debt*; because we are bound to the exhibition of this worship, both by political laws and the express command of God.

I come to the worship of *moral reverence*, which I thus define: It is obeisance due to another, on account of his excellence, considered absolutely, without any sovereignty in the person so honoured, or any subjection in the person rendering the honour. For example, when I consider the Saints in heaven to excel us pilgrims, in favour, in dignity, in knowledge, and in innumerable gifts,—although we are not subject to them by any political ordination, yet I deem it right and just that, on account of their great eminence, we should yield them reverence and due honour. The same is the case with regard to the Angels, to whom even *civil* worship may be shown, by reason of their *appointment* and *guardianship*; and *moral* worship on account of *excellence*. So, holy and learned men, in distant countries, to whom we are in no manner subject, we are bound to reverence. Aquinas (ibid.) not inaptly, calls this worship *a moral debt*, because decorum enjoins us to yield due honour to all excellence. To this worship it pertains,—first, that we acknowledge another's excellence in our mind; secondly, that we embrace him with affection and love; thirdly, that we imitate him with all our might; and lastly, (when occasion serves), that, with the signs either of *words*, that is, with praises, we testify the opinion we have conceived respecting him; or of *deeds*, that is, by the inclination of the body, or by any other sign of humility, we confess that we ought to express our respect to him, as if to a more worthy person. This worship we yield freely, both to Angels and to Saints; for so saith Augustine (*De vera Religione*, cap. 55.)—*We render them the honour of love, not of servitude*. And in Lib. 22. *contra Faustum*: *We worship the Martyrs with the worship of love, and of friendship, with which, also, we worship holy men in this life*. And in another place (*De vera Religione*, cap. 55.), *They are to be honoured by imitation, not to be adored by Religious worship*.

At length I come to *religious worship*, which I thus define. It is the supreme obeisance, due to Him alone, who is the Source and Author of our creation, as well as of our happiness. Aquinas follows this opinion, in his work against the Gentiles, lib. 3. cap. 120, where he demonstrates that this special worship is to be shown to him alone from whom we have received the special benefit of creation. What relates to happiness is supplied by Augustine, Tract. 23, in

Evang. Joann.: *This is the Christian Religion, to worship one God, because it is only the one God who makes the soul happy.* But now, in order to come nearer to our purpose. This religious worship hath certain elicit* and proper acts, and those either *internal* or *external*. The first internal act is in *the understanding*, when it apprehends some being under the notion of the first cause and the chief good. The second is in *the will*, when it submits itself devotedly and humbly to the same, as the author of its salvation. As to what relates to *the external* acts, bowing, prostration, and the like, they are not religious in themselves, without the intention of the doer. If any one prostrates himself, with the view of adoring as a Deity the being whom he worships, it is an act of *religious worship*: but if not, it respects *civil worship*. But the undoubted and certain acts of supreme religious worship are the offering of sacrifice, the dedication of a temple or an altar, the paying of vows, invocation, and other things of the kind which we are bound to refer to God alone, as well from the Divine institution as from the meaning of the thing.† Therefore, all are to be deemed idolaters who exhibit these acts, which they peculiarly regard as Divine worship, under any pretext whatever to the creature. And I comprehend under the name *creature* not only the sun, the moon, the stars, Saints and Angels, but statues and images: in a word, whatever can be seen and imagined besides the one omnipotent and true God. But, lest our discourse should become vague, I shall restrict this whole discussion concerning the idolatry of the Papists to certain propositions. The first of which shall be this,

I.—*That images made to represent the Trinity cannot be adored with religious worship without manifest idolatry.*

We have the voices of the more sound Papists against this idolatry of the Roman Church. Aquinas, 3. part. quæst. 25. art. 3, says, *No bodily likeness to the true God can be made, since he is incorporeal*: therefore he cannot be adored by the image erected. Damascenus says, *To represent what is Divine, is the height of folly and impiety*. Lib. 3. dist. 9. quæst. 2. Durandus observes, *It is vain to make images to represent God, or to adore them*. Bellarmine himself, the fiercest advocate for Papistic superstition, acknowledges, by his silence, that such gross idolatry ought not to be defended. He endeavours to shew, by certain *petty* arguments, that it is not unlawful to express the Trinity by those figures in

* *Elicitos actus*:—The acts of the will are divided, in scholastic metaphysics, into elicit and imperate: the first being what the will derives from itself simply; the other, what proceeds from some other faculty than the will, but what the will commands.

† Vide August. Epist. 49.

which they have appeared; but not a word concerning adoration. The Doctors of the Sorbonne, forty years ago, put forth this public confession: *We desire that images and pictures of the Trinity be taken down from all temples and other places, public and private, because they are condemned both in the Scriptures, and by the decisions of Councils and the testimonies of the most learned men.* But the public authorised practice of the Roman Church is opposed to all these: for everywhere, in their temples, God the Father bears the likeness of a hoary old man; God the Son, of a lamb; and the Holy Spirit, of a dove: and these are not only painted to notify some history, but for worship and adoration. Hear the very remarkable words of Cajetan, who undertook the defence of so deplorable a cause (In Aquin. part. 3. quæst. 25. art. 3.): *The custom of the Roman Church admits images of the Trinity, and those are painted, not only that they may be shown, but that they may be adored.* Let us, then, see with what arguments we can overturn this error.

1.—The first shall be drawn from the command of God: for, as Aquinas rightly said, 2. 2. qu. 81. art. 2, *To offer worship to God is a dictate of reason; but to offer any determinate and true worship, depends upon the institution of the Divine law.* But now the worship of God by an image made with the hand is not only destitute of the command of God, but even opposed to it. That all worship of images is destitute of a command, I prove by the confession of those who teach that they are to be worshipped. Aquinas part. 3. quæst. 25 art. 3, says, *The Apostles, by inspiration of the Spirit, delivered certain things to be observed by the Churches, which they have not left in writing; and among traditions of this kind is the worship of images.* This assertion, that there is no command in the Scriptures for the adoration of images, I assume as a confirmation of my cause: what he dreams about Apostolic tradition, that I leave to be proved by the Papists. Alphonsus de Castro (Lib. 8. cont. Hær. In verbo Imago,) exculpates Epiphanius, and Serenus Bishop of Marseilles, in their opposition to images, on the ground that, in those times,* the worship of images had not been determined by the Church. If this worship be founded upon the Word of God, this would be no excuse. Therefore, it is evident, from the opinion of Alphonsus, that the worship of images was never instituted by any Divine precept; neither was it approved in those early times, or by the authority of the Roman Church itself. Lastly comes the confession of the Nicene Council (Nicæn. 2. art. 6),

* About the close of the fourth century.

Many things are observed by us without Scripture: for example, the veneration of images. Which words of the Council are adduced by Bellarmine himself, in the controversy concerning traditions. Hitherto it is proved that the adoration of images is not built upon the Word of God: now we shall shew this worship of images to be opposed to the command of God. In Deuteronomy iv. 15, 16, &c., we read, *Ye saw no similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire: lest ye should make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure.* And in Isaiah xl. 18: *To whom, then, will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto him?* That is, Ye ought not, ye cannot represent the Great God by any image. But the Papists have an answer at hand for the Prophet; namely, We will liken God the Father to a very old man, the Son to a lamb, and the Spirit to a dove; and we will worship, we will adore them, depicted by these figures. But let them hear what is contained in Deut. v. 8, 9: *Thou shalt not make thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, &c. Thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them.* And here it is worthy of observation, that it was not enacted, not, indeed, in the Nicene Synod itself (which was devoted to images), that the worship of latria should be given to any image. Nay, on the contrary, they plainly taught, *That no Christian should pay latria to an image, because this was a device of the Gentiles, and the invention of devils.* Synod. Nic. 2. Act. 6. Therefore, images of the Trinity, proposed to the people for the purpose of adoration, which the Roman Church approves, the Nicene Synod exploded.

2.—A second argument shall be drawn from the end of religious adoration, which those things wholly oppose: but all worship, not proportioned to its end, is superfluous (Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 93. art. 2). But the end of religious worship is, that glory, even the highest, may be ascribed to God, that his infinite power may be acknowledged. But now these images, as much as in them is, diminish the Divine glory,—first, in that they give a false representation of it; for when an invisible Being is likened to a visible figure, a Spirit to a stock, the Infinite One to a small piece of stone or of wood, *the Divine Majesty is debased by the foolishness of the figures.* (August. *de Civit. Dei*, lib. 4. cap. 31). Whence that declaration of Jeremiah (x. 8.), *The teaching of a stock is a doctrine of vanities*; and of the Prophet Habakkuk (ii. 18.), *Molten images are teachers of lies.* Next, by reason of the artificer himself, and the workmen. For what a dishonour is heaped upon God, when it is allowed to frail men, after their own will, to order this

image to represent the person of God the Father, that, of God the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit; and then, that they should be adored with *latria* for no other reason than that it seemed good to mortals to ascribe the name and representation of the Immortal to them! Whence that observation of Prudentius, *The pincers of Myron, the mallet of Polycletus, are the source and origin of your gods.* Isaiah attacks and condemns this madness, chap. xliv. The poets, also, deride their gods in this way, that it was in the power of the artist whether they should worship the gods or not. The Satyrist (*Horat. Satirum, lib. 1. Sat. 8.*), on this account, derides the tutelary god of the gardens in those lines:—

*In days of yore, our godship stood
A very worthless log of wood:
The joiner doubting, or to shape us
Into a stool or a Priapus,
At length resolved, for reasons wise,
Into a god to bid me rise.*

FRANCIS'S TRANSLATION.

Truly the same may be said of those images of the Papists: for the image of an old man; which is worshipped for God, if it should seem fit to the painter and if he had rather, he might have expressed, not God, but Nestor, or any other grey-beard. Rightly, therefore, said Augustine, *The works of men are not to be worshipped: the workmen are better.* And Lactantius, *Whatever is likened, is false: it is not Religion which consists in images, but the burlesque of Religion;* Inst. lib. 2. cap. 19.

3.—The last argument shall be drawn from the formal reason of religious adoration, which is incompatible with images, whether considered in themselves, or in the act of representation. For the adoration of *latria* [the highest degree of worship] (as we have before shown,) arises hence, that we apprehend some one as the very source of creation and of our happiness: but should we grant to the Papists as much as they wish, yet they never will persuade us, That an image can be apprehended as the source of happiness, but as the representative of this source; and that not by a precept of Divine institution, but from an error of human superstition. For that remark of Mirandula, in his Nine Hundred Conclusions, and in Apol. pag. 155, is true: *No created thing of the class of relation will include the adoration of latria.* Since, therefore, religious worship is meet for God alone, that he may be honoured in himself, and not that he is worshipped in the image by participation, it follows, that religious adoration ought not to be given to images, whether they are considered by us in their own nature, or in the very work of actual representation.

It is not necessary that we bring more arguments; let us just see a little with what arguments the Papists are wont to decline and evade these our weapons. This is principally alleged by them all, *That images may be considered, either so far as they possess the mere matter, either stone or wood; the artificial form, from the skill of the statuary or the painter; or, lastly, so far as they cause an actual representation of the exemplar itself in the mind of the worshippers.* They confess that the images of God or of Christ are not to be adored, by reason neither of the matter, nor of the form, but only by reason of this actual representation. But nothing can be said more unsound: for this is the very defence itself of the Pagans, in Lactantius (Instit. 2. 2.): *Idolaters say that they do not honour the images themselves, but those persons to whose names they are consecrated.** For if it might be allowed to adore with latria the picture of an old man, of a dove, of a lamb, or a man, as far as it represents God or Christ to our minds; by the same rule it will be allowable to adore a living old man, a living lamb, or a living dove; for they have an equal, yea, a more lively act of representation. With respect to the man, Aquinas concedes that it may be done, only for this cause, that he is capable of honour by himself; and therefore there may be danger, lest that worship should appear to be paid to the man for his own sake. But this liability does not exist in the lamb and the dove: therefore, Cajetan confesses, *If any one should venerate these creatures as far as they have a likeness to God, he would render the worship of latria to God himself and not to the creature.* Why, then, do not the Romanists rather adore God in the creatures themselves, than in a painted likeness of them? Cajetan's answer is no other than that, on account of the occasion of error annexed to this kind of worship, it is not to be practised. Ye perceive into what straights *they* cast themselves, who, to defend the superstitious adoration of images, are compelled to approve the heathenish worship of creatures. Bellarmine illustrates the aforesaid distinction by an example; he says, *De Imag. cult. 2. 20. He who adores a robed king, adores the king and his robes at the same time; for when any one is adored, all the appendages to him are adored by accident. Since, therefore, the image and the exemplar are united, through the act of representation, we do not adore the image properly, and by itself, but God himself, represented, and, as it were, clothed with the image.* The Jesuit blunders woefully in this example: and it

* The Translator, some few years ago, heard an Hindoo Juggler assert the same in vindication of his religious observances. And so do, or may, all other idolaters.

is really vile hobbling. Because, when any one adores a robed king, the worship which derives its cause and its beginning from the king himself, appears to fall afterwards, by reflexion, upon his robes: but, when any one adores God, represented by an image, the worship takes its beginning reversely from the image, and proceeds, as it were, to God, by a reflex act. For they themselves confess it, when they say, that images are *the books of the unlearned*, and that *they, through a sensible image, approach God*, who cannot be an object of the senses. Therefore the beginning of the motion is from the image to God, not from God to the image, which the example of Bellarmine plainly shews. Secondly, what he takes for granted is false and ridiculous; for he who adores a robed king, no more worships the king and his robes, than he who worships a king in a fever or leprosy, may be said to worship the fever or the leprosy: for there is a closer conjunction of the disease with the body, than there is of his garments. Lastly, what he asserts about the conjunction of the image and the exemplar, whether we regard *the right*, or *the fact*, the conjunction fails in both. Concerning *the right*, it is clear; because, in the very act itself of worshipping, those things are united, which God hath prescribed to be disunited; for God refuses to be adored, either in the image or with the image; *No image of him ought to be worshipped*, says Augustine, Ep. 119., *unless that which is what he himself is*. Concerning *the fact* it is also plain; for when they mutter long prayers to the image of God or of Christ, they do not always unite God himself or Christ in the act with the image. Where, then, is the actual conjunction, when the image is adored, while there is not even a thought about God?

Hence asks Augustine, in Psalm cxiii. *Who adores or prays, looking at an image, who is not so affected, that he thinks that he can be heard by it?* Bellarmine does not touch this difficulty, but Cajetan ingenuously confesses (to use his own words), that they *oftentimes worship images with a wandering mind, and do not actually unite the exemplar with the image*. But this manifest idolatry he endeavours to shelter by a veil of the most obscure distinction. *The worship*, says he, *is referred to God, although not by the continuation of actual thought, yet by virtue of the first intention*. Nothing is so destitute of all signification, which cannot be defended by such a distinction. For, let us imagine any one to enter a temple with the mind to listen and hear, yet in the mean time to fall asleep; Cajetan will prove by this wonderful distinction, that he was watching, even at the time when asleep. He sleeps, indeed, simply and actually; but he watches all the while by virtue of the first inten-

tion. But I am apprehensive it may seem childish any longer to discuss these puerilities: I therefore conclude this first proposition with that most true remark of Erasmus: *It would be much more easy to abolish the worship of images, than that its measure, and the grounds of this worship, could be defined by any man.*

Lest I should be tedious to you, I omit the adoration of the cross, and of all other things, and come to that religious worship which they attribute to the dead saints; and let this be our second proposition.

II.—*The Papistic invocation of Saints offers religious worship to the creature, and therefore contains in it manifest idolatry.*

Prayer is the act of religion and of latria; for *in praying we profess that we depend upon God, for all good things, as the Author:* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 83. art. 3. And as incense and sacrifice was offered to God alone under the old law, so also these internal and evangelical sacrifices, which are much better than those legal rites. *Offer unto God thanksgiving.—Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me.* Psalm l. 14, 15. And elsewhere, *Let my prayer be set forth before thee as incense.* Psalm cxli. 2. From which places it is manifest, that prayer, as well as sacrifice, pertains to God alone. The common evasion of the Papists is,—That to invoke any one is a two-fold act: for he is either invoked as he is himself—the *Author of grace*, in whose power it is to fulfil what we ask; or, as *an intercessor*, viz., one who can obtain from God what we desire. Each member of the distinction fails.

First,—The saints are not to be invoked as intercessors; for He alone is constituted the mediator of *intercession*, who was the mediator of *redemption*. 1 John ii. 1. *If any one sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins.* Since, therefore, no one of the saints is the propitiation for our sins, no one of them can discharge this office of advocate. Christ himself taught this in John xvi. 23. “In that day ye shall ask *in my name*,” not my mother’s, not of my apostles, or of the martyrs. For *no one prays to receive those things which he needs, from God and from the creatures; but from the Father, and the Son: as those things which are given are given through the Son.* Athanas. Serm. iv. But they object, *It is lawful to require the prayers of the living for our good; therefore, much more those of the saints reigning in heaven.* I answer, if they acknowledge the cases to be altogether dissimilar, when we require the prayers of our brethren, and when we invoke the saints, there is no ground why they should urge upon us this illustration: but

if they contend that they are alike, let them be convinced by these reasons. First, when we ask the living that they would supplicate God for us, we desire not that they should exercise the office of intercession by virtue of their own merits, but that they would suppliantly approach God the Father, together with us, by the common Intercessor Jesus Christ. But they ascribe both the name and the peculiar office of intercession to the saints. So Aquinas, 2. 2. quæst. 83. art. 4. *Prayer is offered to the saints, that our prayers may gain the end by their importunity and merits.* So Bellarmine, cap. 20. *de Sanct. beat.* writes, *That the saints, although they now neither merit for themselves nor others, yet, from their preceding merits, can obtain what they pray for, both for themselves and others.* Secondly, the reason is different, and that, because the mutual prayers of the living are encouraged by promise, by precept, and by example. But God hath not commanded us that we should invoke them; nor the saints, that they should commend the particular prayers of men to him: and lastly, we read of no one in the Scriptures, before the Law, under the Law, or after the revelation of the Gospel, who hath employed this intercession of the saints.

Secondly,—They are not to be invoked as intercessors, because it is uncertain to us whether or not they hear our prayers; and we ought to address our prayers to Him, whom we know both can and will present them to God. And that we may be convinced that this is uncertain, to pass by Origen, Nazianzen, and Augustine, who call it in question, I propose the conflicting opinions of the Papists themselves in this matter.

Some assert that the saints know our prayers from the report of angels. But this cannot be maintained, both because the prayers of believers are sometimes expressed by the affection of the heart alone, and by the internal excitement of the mind; but the angels know not our thoughts, therefore they cannot report concerning them to the saints. Then, because the Scriptures every where teach, that the angels are the messengers and the ministers of God himself; but never intimate that they are the ministers, and, as it were, the letter-carriers of the saints. Others think that our prayers are revealed by God to those saints whom we invoke, in that very instant in which we utter them. But this opinion the very custom itself of those invocators refutes; for they say, *Holy Peter, or Holy Paul, pray for us.* But would they follow up this belief; it should be said, *Holy God, give an account of my prayers to Peter or Paul, that he, after he shall know them from you, may then commend them to you.* The last opinion to which Bellarmine

assents, (Bellarmin. *de Sanctor. beatitudine*, lib. 1. cap. 20.) is this, *That the saints perceive, from the moment of their blessedness, all things which relate to them in the mirror of the Divinity itself, and therefore the prayers of those who invoke them.* I answer, first, that this dream about a mirror is very far from being approved by some of the Schoolmen themselves. Aquinas, (Quæst. disput. quæst. 20. *de scient. an. Ch.* art. 4.) says, *When a thing is said to be in God, it is assimilated more to that mode in which effects are in the cause, and conclusions in the premise, than in that mode in which forms are in a mirror.* And art. 5. *Some are deceived by this, because they imagine the mode of seeing things in God to be like the mode of seeing things in a material mirror.* Secondly, if this mirror be granted, it is yet voluntary, not natural; and of that kind, in which no one can behold more things than God himself is willing to reveal. Lastly, because he says *that at least ought to be conceded, That they see all things which relate to themselves, and by consequence the prayers of those invoking them;* I answer, If he would have the prayers of the living to pertain to the saints, by the appointment of the Divine law, it is so far false: but if he understands them to pertain to them by the belief of a human error, it is thus frivolous, neither does it prove his case.

Hitherto we have shown that they are not to be invoked as *intercessors*; now I proceed to the other member of the distinction, and show that the Papists invoke the saints as the very *bestowers of benefits*. When they invoke Peter, they use words of this kind: *Holy Peter, pity me, and open to me the door of heaven.* So from the other saints, without any palliations, they request health, deliverance from dangers, and almost all blessings. Bellarmine answers, *We must not strive about words, but about sense: and we would contend for nothing else, than that they obtain these blessings by their own intercession from God himself.* Since, therefore, they are unwilling that a judgment should be formed from words, let us judge what they think from the writings especially of their own people. Biel, who expounds the canon of the Mass, lect. 8. thus writes: *The Father of heaven yields half of his kingdom to the Blessed Virgin (which was prefigured in Esther, to whom Ahasuerus promised the half of his kingdom). For whereas there are two chief blessings of the heavenly kingdom, that is to say, justice and mercy, he hath reserved justice to himself, and hath yielded mercy to the Virgin Mary.* Bernard also, in the book which he inscribes *Mariale*, says, *It is proper to appeal from the tribunal of Divine justice, to the tribunal of the mercy*

of the Virgin Mary. And elsewhere, God hath committed all grace to Mary, who distributes it faithfully: therefore all grace is communicated to us by her.

I will not stir this sink farther. I only draw this one inference, that whatever they say when they are pressed with reason and Scripture, yet this belief is received in their Church,—that the saints not only intercede for others, but are even either themselves the authors of all blessings,* or at least have obtained from God that they may, by God's own will, dispense grace to men; of whose Divinity, this opinion ascribes one part to some; another—the proper function of Christ—it transfers to the rest. But I dismiss the invocation of the dead; and come to those other works of idolatry, all which I comprise in this one proposition:—

III.—*That the Papists, when they make vows, and erect temples and altars to the saints, commit idolatry.*

All these points I shall treat very briefly. As far as regards vows, that they are a part of religious worship, is clear from the Scriptures. In Isaiah xix. 21. we read, *And the Lord shall be known to Egypt and they shall do sacrifice and oblation; yea, they shall vow a vow unto the Lord, and perform it.* It is manifest, also, from that definition of Aquinas: *A vow, says he, (2. 2. quæst. 88. art. 5.) is a promise made to God, by which we constitute our promises Divine Obedience: and it is properly an act of latria, or religion.* Lastly, from the confession of the Jesuit himself. (Bellarmin. *de cultu Sanct.* lib. 3. cap. 9.) *The word vow (says he), is always taken in Scripture for a promise made to God.* Let us hear, therefore, what they allege in defence of such gross idolatry.

Some say, that the vows which are made to the saints include two promises; one, which is made to the saints; and that is *the matter* of the vow; the other, which is made to God; and that is *the essence* of the vow. But Cajetan himself rejects this as absurd. (Cajetan. in Aquin. loco allegato.) For in the profession of the Preaching Brothers, they vow obedience to their Prelate under this form,—*I vow to God, to the blessed Mary, and to all the Saints, that I will be obedient to my Prelate.* In this example, the matter of the vow regards the Prelate, the essence of the vow regards the saints as well as God. Cajetan has another device, but much worse (ibid): *The saints are either considered as they are creatures*

* See the present Pope's Encyclical Letter for evidence.

and so the promises made to them are not vows; or as they are participants, and so they are vows, since made to God in them. But whence has he learnt, first, that the creature can be considered as God? then, that he ought, on this consideration, to be honoured with Divine worship? Bellarmine (*de cultu Sanctor.* lib. 2. cap. 9.) seems to be sensible that both answers were invalid; he therefore invents a third, and that the worst of all. He says, *A vow is twofold: for we either vow in token of gratitude towards the Supreme Being, and so it applies to God alone: or in token of gratitude towards the intercessors through whom we have received benefits from God; and so vows may be made to the saints.* But Bellarmine falls into that error, that he thinks it to be in our power, to transfer those things to the saints which God claims to himself alone, provided they be offered to the saints in some inferior respect. But if we admit this kind of distinction, you may see in what the matter will terminate. What he alleges concerning vows, is what every one could pretend under the Mosaic Law; namely, that the sacrifice was two-fold; for we either sacrifice in token of gratitude towards the Great Head, and so it is addressed to Jehovah alone; or in token of gratitude towards some faithful patriarch, and so we may be allowed to sacrifice to deceased Abraham. The same might be feigned of every part of latria. But let it suffice to have shown the source of the error. I come

Lastly, to temples and altars. Concerning temples, Augustine speaks truly, (*Contra Maximin. Arianor. Episcop.* lib. 1. page 689.) *If we raised a temple to an angel, we should be anathematized by the truth of Christ, and the Church of God.* Concerning altars Augustine likewise speaks, on Matt. ii. Serm. 6. *An altar is that which testifies that he to whom it is erected is accounted a God.* Bellarmine answers, (*De cultu Sanctor.* lib. 3. cap. 4.) *That those things are to be dedicated to the saints, but not in the character of a temple or an altar, but as a monument.* This answer is defective in two ways. First, because it is not lawful to refer those works to inferior worship, which God, by his own appointment, confines to the highest worship. Secondly, because what he says is false: for under the proper notion of *a temple*, temples are dedicated by them to the saints. *My house shall be called the house of prayer,* says God, Matt. xxi. 13; but in this respect they build to the saints. I cannot prove this more clearly, than from the very words of Bellarmine: he says (*ibid*), *The Basilica may have been erected to St. Peter, that they who enter it should recollect the very name of St. Peter's temple, and that they worshipped and prayed to him as the patron in that place.*

I conclude in the words of Augustine (Epist. 49.), THE SERVICE OF RELIGION IS DUE TO THE CREATOR ALONE, THAT WHICH IN ONE WORD IS CALLED, IN GREEK, LATRIA. RELIGION, THEREFORE, BINDS US TO THE ONE OMNIPOTENT GOD.

* See Sermons x. and xvi. in Vincent's *Morning Exercises at Southwark*; and Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, pp. 182, 189, and 755; also, the *Protestant's Armory*, 12mo., Seeley's, a very valuable compilation of authorities, on all the more prominent features of Romanism.

QUESTION XIX.

A KING IN HIS OWN KINGDOM IS INFERIOR TO GOD ALONE.

WHEN we maintain kingly authority, if we confine our view to such as are called the Laity, and with reference to political affairs merely, the Romanists concede to us that every King is the supreme governor in his own kingdom; but if we extend the question so as to embrace Ecclesiastical persons and the business of Religion, they strenuously withhold assent thereto. We take what is conceded, and what they refuse to yield, that we shall extort from them; and shall include our opinion of the whole controversy in three propositions.

1.—The first will have reference to Ecclesiastical persons; *Bishops, Presbyters, and all who are accounted as belonging to the Clergy, are subjects of Regal power as well as the Laity.* The King has then the supreme power as regards both one and the other.

Now that in the first place is evident from the circumstance, that the Kings of Israel used to convene the Priests in virtue of their own authority, and Christian Emperors used to appoint Councils of Bishops.* They would not have commanded the meeting of such assemblies unless they had been superior to the Priests. How, but as it devolves on the King to command Priests to discharge their duties; to reprove and punish them should they act otherwise; nay, more, if they shall deserve it, to remove them

* See Elliott's *Delineation of Roman Catholicism*, p. 669, edit. London, 1844, where this is shewn at some length, with testimonies from original authority, either amply quoted, or clearly referred to.

entirely from the station they occupy. Josiah gave commands to Hilkiab, (2 Kings, xxii. 4); Jehoash reprobved Jehoiada (2 Kings, xii. 7); Solomon set aside Abiathar, (1 Kings, ii. 27). Christian Kings have exercised this same power. Constantine deposed Paul from the See of Constantinople,* and put Eusebius in his place. Theodosius commanded Demophilus, an Arian Bishop, either to embrace the Catholic faith, or to relinquish his Bishopric.† And in short, that we should have no doubts as to the superiority of Kings over Priests, Christ and his Apostles have taught us, if they exact tribute to pay it. If they summon us to their tribunals, again Christ and Paul have taught Priests by their own example to go before them, agreeably to that passage, Rom. xiii. 1, *Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers.* Who is there who makes Priests an exception from being included in this universality? *If any one attempts to except them, he endeavours to deceive,* says Bernard (Ep. 42. *ad Archiep. Senonensem*,) [cap. 8.]

2.—I proceed to the second proposition, which respects the ordering and regulating of matters of faith, and the business of Religion: *The supreme authority of establishing, preserving, and reforming Religion, belongs to the King as the chief deputy of God.* In this matter also he is inferior to God alone.

The Romanists on this point storm no little, leaving it to the Sovereign merely to defend the forms of Religion already established and approved by the Priests. But we shall make good our opinion; first, from the law of nations; for among all nations, although the administration of solemn rites was the province of the Priests, yet the chief authority of sanctioning, of reforming, of vindicating Religion always remained in the power of the Magistrate. Now that we might not imagine that heathen Kings were mistaken in so doing, Jews and Christians claimed the same right to themselves. It was the pleasure of God himself, that the ceremonies of Religion should be established and sanctioned by Moses, the civil Magistrate, not by Aaron. When Moses was removed, this care of Religion devolved on Joshua as Governor, not on the Priest. By his command was the ark removed; by his command were idols overthrown; by him was a religious covenant renewed between God and the people. It appears that David, also Solomon, Josiah, Hezekiah, used to exercise their power as Sovereigns, as

* Socrat. 2. 5. [This was done by Constantius, not Constantine—and a better instance of the exercise of Sovereign power might have been selected by the Bishop; as in this case an orthodox appointment was set aside in favour of an Arian: See *Socrates*, lib. 2. cap. 6.]

† Socrat. 5. 7.

well in ordaining and reforming the Religion, as in overturning and extirpating superstition. If any one has any doubts as respects the Christian emperors, let him look into the Codex and new Constitutions: Laws will be continually met with in them, concerning the Catholic faith, the Sacraments, the Churches, Bishops, Synods, Heretics, and, in short, the whole business of Religion. Nor ought such things to be considered as foreign to their office. For *herein Kings serve God, so far as they are Kings, if in their kingdom they enjoin what is good, and forbid evil, not merely in what appertains to the state of civil society, but also, to Divine Religion; Augustine contra Crescon. lib. 3. cap. 51.*

Thus we see the law of nations in favour of the authority of the King as supreme in the business of Religion. To this argument, I add another, derived from the necessity, or at least the convenience of the thing. For it is very necessary that there should be some one invested with supreme authority, for issuing commands in such matters as relate to Religion, and of punishing the refractory. For otherwise, the outward worship of God, at least, would vanish; heresies, blasphemies, and other violations of sacred religion, would spring up, unless there were some executive, furnished with such authority as should, by terror and compulsion, restrain the wicked. This, Priests and Ecclesiastics cannot do; for their province is to preach, to exhort, to reprove, to correct, by spiritual censures; they do not carry the sword, neither are they invested with that supreme power which can hold the wicked to their duty from fear of punishments. Even the external form, then, of a Christian Republic, will not be maintained, if we set aside the civil Magistrate from a chief direction in matters affecting Religion. Augustine shows this much at length in his book on *the Punishing of the Donatists*, cap. 13.

But to guard this second proposition of ours, concerning the supreme direction in the matter of religion by Kings, from calumnies, we shall circumscribe it within certain bounds. First, it is not an unlimited power, which we concede to Kings, allowing them to prescribe whatever Religion they please to their subjects; but that power which is delegated from God, and is, therefore, itself to be guided by the rules of the Divine law.* For as in civil matters, although Sovereigns be armed with supreme power, and yet cannot enact laws contrary to equity or nature; so, neither in ecclesiastical affairs, can they enforce anything contrary to the word and the will of God. Secondly, as Kings in civil matters use the advice of

* See Hudleston's *Divine Truths vindicated in the Church of England*, p. 25.

Lawyers; so, in religious affairs, they are bound to use the advice of Divines. Thirdly, they are not so bound by the opinions of even their Bishops or Divines, but that, if they are opposed to the Divine Law, (to which it behoves Kings to be specially attentive and well-informed in,) they are, from their Royal office, under obligation to maintain the true Religion, in spite of all the clamour of opponents, and to bring it before their subjects. Lastly, we admit that Kings may err, and abuse their authority as Sovereigns, by enacting laws in favour of superstition and opposed to the truth; but when they do so, *those who are sound in the faith are tried, they who persevere in the truth are crowned; but neither are they themselves, nor those who obey them, or their impious commands, excused thereby*, as Augustine has rightly determined; *De correct. Donatist. cap. 6.**

3.—There remains our last proposition, which refers to the power that the Roman Pontiff claims over Kings: *If it should happen that the Sovereign should err in forming an opinion, and obtrude heresy upon his subjects instead of true religion, yet the Pope [of Rome] cannot pass judgment on him, as if subject to himself, and remove him from his kingdom.* A King, therefore, although an heretic, is inferior only to God. This will be evident from two considerations;—

1.—The first is derived from the want in the Pope [of Rome] of judicial authority; for Christ did not give the keys of earthly sovereignties to Peter, nor to the successors of Peter. He did not himself exercise the power of deposing wicked and infidel kings, neither did he commit it to Bishops to exercise it. For Priests (as we have before shewn) are subject to kingly authority from the appointment of God; and an inferior has not the power of passing judgment on a superior. For eight hundred years the Popes acknowledged the Emperors for their masters; and were judged by them, and often dislodged from the Episcopal Chair by them. But if it be admitted, that the Pope of Rome is superior to a King, and can pass judgment on him; yet, this judgment would be confined only to Ecclesiastical censure, and could not extend to the depriving him of his kingdom. For the Pope, as a Pope, cannot deprive a private individual of his property for heresy; much less can he remove a Sovereign from his hereditary kingdom.

2.—Another reason may be derived from a want of just dealing with reference to the cause itself. For admitting some King to be an heretic, and that he is advancing by his own authority the

* [Tom. ii. col. 646, edit. Bened.]

heresy which he has himself embraced (as all the Arian Emperors did); yet, it does not, on that account follow, that he has lost all lawful claim to the Sovereignty. For civil rule is not lost, unless by the loss of that whereon it was founded; but a right to reign does not grow out either of faith or love, or the profession of the true Religion, but in hereditary and legitimate succession, or in other means by which that authority is justly acquired. *He who raised Constantine, the Christian, to the throne, also gave it to Julian, the Apostate*, says Augustine: But if *He* gave it, the Pope neither can, nor ought, under any pretence, to take it from him.* We conclude with that saying of Tertullian (*ad Scap. cap. 2.*) *Kings exist by the power of God alone; to whom alone they are inferior, after whom they are first, being before all, and above all others, both gods and men.*†

* Yet the learned Roman Catholic historian, Dupin, says, that Pope Gregory VII. “endeavoured to exercise an absolute dominion over the Church, and over kingdoms, over Ecclesiastics, and over seculars; to dispose of the possessions and dominions of Princes, and to depose Emperors and Kings, and put others in their place.” (Cent. xi. chap. 5.)

“They,” (the Roman Pontiffs, says Mosheim,) “not only aspired to the character of supreme legislators in the Church, * * * but they carried their insolent pretensions so far as to announce themselves Lords of the universe, arbiters of the fate of kingdoms and empires, and supreme rulers over the Kings and Princes of the earth.”—*Mosheim*, Cent. xi.

† The whole of this quotation does not occur in the treatise referred to—the latter half is taken from Tertullian’s *Apology*, cap. 30., p. 110. in Mr. Woodham’s Edition, Cambridge, 1843.

QUESTION XX.

THE ENGLISH CHURCH IS FULLY COMPETENT TO BIND TO THE
OBSERVANCE OF CEREMONIES.

TO PROVE this, three things must be made plain: First, that the Church is invested with authority which is obligatory; secondly, that there is a propriety in those ceremonies to which she requires obedience; thirdly, that there is equity in the mode itself of requiring it.

1.—As respects the first, the authority of the Church in prescribing ceremonies needs no laboured proof. First, it is incumbent upon

her, on the score of motherly care and authority, to provide that *all things be done decently and in order* (1 Cor. xiv. 40.) in her holy assemblies; on the other hand, it concerns the children of the Church, not to despise the commands of their Mother, but to *obey* them, and to *yield subjection*, (Heb. xiii. 17).

This power of instituting public ceremonies, all the Churches have exercised even from the times of the Apostles. Hence originated that rule of Augustine (Epist. 118.) *A prudent Christian ought to act in the manner in which the Church acts to which he has united himself*. There is no doubt, then, concerning the power of instituting ceremonies; but of the nature and quality of the ceremonies themselves, there is some doubt.

2.—We must shew, then, in the second place, that the ceremonies instituted by the English Church are allowable and proper. And here, that we may not be drawn aside by the prevalence of vulgar error, it should be understood that ceremonies are not, therefore, unlawful, because they are significant. For the holy kiss, respecting which mention is made in Rom. xvi. 16, was a sign by which they wished to signify the fraternal love and union of all Christians. And even the learned Peter Martyr, is so far from rejecting ceremonies because they are significant, that he says, *they are the more laudable, if, in the way of sermons, they admonish us of some duty*.* Above all, it must be observed, that ceremonies are not unlawful, because they are adopted by the Papists also. For not only may Papists, by the light of natural reason, but sometimes the very heathen themselves, entertain correct notions concerning the decorum which is required in external rites. Lastly, it must be added, that because some have superstitiously abused them, ceremonies are not, on that account, to be reckoned unlawful. For the Church could retain no rite long, if everything is forthwith to be rejected which has been distorted into superstitious and impious usage by others. What, then, in fact is it, which proves ceremonies to be impious and unlawful? I answer, briefly, If it can be shewn that they are repugnant to the word of God; for rightly says Cyprian,† *Whatever is appointed by human passion, and leads to a disturbance of the Divine economy, is spurious, mere impiety and sacrilege*: If it can be shown also, that the rites which have been instituted to form part of Divine worship are in effect thrust upon God and men, in the place of works of righteousness and holiness, (for God is worshipped in vain by the commandments and ordinances of men, Matt. xv. 9); or, if they

* In 1 Cor. xi.

† Epist. lib. 1. ep. 8. [p. 46, edit. Paris, 1836.]

who impose them, require us to ascribe to them a supernatural efficacy of imparting grace, of warding off spiritual evils, or taking away sins, or other things of that kind; lastly, if by their number and multitude they lead Christians away from the internal exercises of true piety, and bring them back to a Jewish servitude under ceremonies: for although they may not be contrary to the faith, yet if they should too much increase, they become very offensive, *from loading the Christian Religion, (which the mercy of God would have to be free) with servile burdens*, as Augustine complained (Epist. 119);—on all these accounts we justly disapprove of many of the Romish ceremonies. But if any one should measure ours by these rules, he will find nothing bad or distorted in them; hence it follows that they are in their own nature lawful and proper.

3.—It remains that we say something concerning the mode of binding; for if the English Church errs in this, she acts unjustly in making them obligatory; although the very thing itself be good and lawful, to which she requires obedience. The Papal Church requires that the very consciences of men should be held bound to the observance of her constitutions no less than to the Divine law;* a rash opinion, which not only have all our Divines long since unanimously exploded; but some even of the sounder Romanists.† But our Church acknowledges that these her regulations, on points which are indifferent and relate to ceremonials, are, both as regards the author, the matter, and the end, very different from the obligations of the Divine Law; and that where there is such a disparity in every respect, they cannot be equally binding upon the conscience. For since every law binds according to the just measure of the Lawgiver who looks for obedience to it; it is not the intention either of the Supreme Lawgiver, or of any pious Prelate, that the consciences of men should be laid under obligation by the constitutions of the Church, respecting things in their own nature indifferent, just as they would by the precepts of the Decalogue, respecting things absolutely good or evil. The Church, then, thinks that consciences should be bound to the observance of ceremonies only so far as the supreme law of love requires. Now that requires,

* Bellarm. [Witness, too, the binding article at the close of Pope Pius's Creed. Let the reader also consult a series of articles entitled PAPAL BONDS, which were published in the *Protestant Journal* for 1831; or, Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, pp. 2—6.]

† Gerson. [See "*the Grand Presumption of the Roman Church, in equalling their Traditions to the written Word*" &c., by Dr. Francis Gregory, 4to, 1675, in which, this subject is somewhat fully brought forward.]

that in these respects there should be neither commission of offences, nor omission of duty, so as to bring contempt on the Prelates, or cause scandal to others. Setting aside contempt and scandal, if, as affected these human precepts, these should occur, either through too much haste, or through imprudence and forgetfulness, or in short from any similar cause, any omission of duty, the penalty of the law is incurred; yet no wounding of the conscience nor guilt of deadly sin is incurred.

The nature of the obligation accordingly which the Church of England imposes, as regards ceremonies, consists with her admitting at the same time, that they are not, as affects their obligatory power, equal to the Divine laws; that is, they are not in every case to be performed under the penalty of incurring the guilt of sin; nay, although obedience be not rendered to what is enjoined in some cases, yet the intention of the party enjoining is satisfied, if the law of charity be not transgressed in those instances where submission is paid to it.

I will conclude with one word; The Church lays an obligation on conscience by its own laws, though not precisely, and in every case, as regards points which are indifferent; merely guarding the intention of the Lawgiver from contempt and giving an occasion for scandal;—duties which necessarily appertain to charity, and are of perpetual obligation, being commands of the Divine Law.

Whether, then, we regard *the power which enforces*, or *the nature of the ceremonies*, or *the mode of enforcing obligation*, the English Church is fully justified in requiring submission to ceremonies.

. The reader is strongly recommended, after the perusal of this Essay, to read Puller's *Moderation of the Church of England*, by the Rev. Robert Eden, M.A., 1 vol. 8vo. London.

Of course, such works as Beveridge and Burnet on the XXXIX Articles, will be in every one's recollection to refer to on this subject; but *The Institutions of the Church of England of Divine Authority*, by the Rev. Joseph Baylee, A.B., Curry, Dublin, 12mo., may also well be recommended, though rather too much trouble has been taken to support the apparatus of a Church Establishment in some particulars.

QUESTION XXI.

THE CHURCH OF ROME AN APOSTATE CHURCH.

To shew the truth of the subject proposed, three things especially require to be explained. The first, what we understand by the *Roman Church*. The second, in what sense we call it *apostate*. The third, and last, in what this *apostasy*, with which we charge her, consists.

I.—As to the first, the Roman Church, taken properly and strictly, denotes that body of Christians which is at Rome; in a more lax and larger sense, it embraces all those, who so adhere and submit to this Church, as to receive from it the same rule of doctrine, the same code of government. *Representatively*, it denotes the Pope, and the Romish Prelacy, in whom alone (as it appears to Bellarmine,*) the whole authority of the Church formally resides; because, as any one of the Prelates represents his particular Church, so all, taken together, represent the whole Church.† When, therefore, we institute an inquiry concerning the Roman Church, we comprehend the Prelates—the corrupters, and the people—the corrupted; yet so, that this crime of voluntary defection be especially charged upon the heads themselves, concerning whom Petrarch, lamenting the condition of the people, writes in this manner:‡ *While we follow our own standards, we are betrayed, and, under the very guidance of our leader, we rush into ruin; and, unless Christ avenge himself, the thing is lost.* Thus much of the first point.

II.—In the second place, when we call this Roman Church *apostate*, we mean not a full and entire defection from the Christian profession, such as we perceive in those who follow Mahomet; but a departure from the truth and purity of the Christian Religion, which the Apostle charges upon some among the Galatians and Corinthians.§ Nor must this word *apostate* be thought too severe, which Paul in 1 Tim. iv. 1, uses in the same sense. *Some* (to adopt the words of Cyprian) *shall apostatize from the faith*; and yet they had not renounced Christianity, but mingled heresies with

* *De Conc.* 2. 2.

† *Ep. sine tit. epist.* 5.

‡ *De Eccles. Milit.* 3. 14.

§ *Gal.* iii. 1.; *1 Cor.* xv. 12.

the Christian faith. We, therefore, say that the Roman Church is *apostate*, both because the Prelates of the Papacy have infected the doctrine of the Gospel with their poisoned errors, and more especially, because the people of the Papacy, through that blind obedience which they yield to their pastors, have eagerly imbibed the same errors.

III.—Let us proceed to the main matter of all ; and, in the third place, we shall demonstrate and show, as it were with the finger, to all the world, this *apostasy* of Romanism. This, then, is the primary act of apostatic defection, that they have driven from his seat Christ, our chief and only Teacher, and have placed in the same the Pope of Rome, as the infallible teacher of the whole Church. In this one error an infinite number is virtually involved. For that the Pope, on whose sleeve they pin their faith, can err, and that too, as Pope, is not the dogma of Luther or Calvin, but the decree of the Council of Constance. Hence that conclusion of Gerson, in his book *De Exam. Doctr.*—*The determination of the Pope, as Pope, obliges not to faith.* We hesitate not, therefore, to say, that that Church has apostatised from Christ, which has subjected its faith to him, who always can, and often has, acted in opposition to Christ.

There is another error akin to this, namely, that they alter the very rule of faith arbitrarily ; and (just as rebels are wont,) they cry out that the law ought to be subject to them. For what else do they, when they add not only apocryphal books to the Canonical Scriptures, but any traditions they please ? When by an arbitrary act, they prefer a barbarous and vicious interpretation to the fountains [of truth] themselves ? and when, in short, they regard the very Scriptures as devoid of sense or meaning, until the interpretation of the Roman Church, which they determine to be the mind of Scripture, has been added ? Let them employ whatever pretext they may, this is most clearly to depart from Christ, and from the Scriptures, and to surrender themselves to the government of men. For, as Tertullian has admirably said,* *No language is Divine, but that of God alone, with which the Prophets, with which the Apostles, with which Christ spake in all the plenitude of inspiration.*

Thirdly, we accuse them of defection, because they not only plead for an imperfect and obscure rule, and subject to their arbitrary interpretation, but because they openly approve it in those things which are of manifest and indubitable truth. This they do

* Tertull. *De Anim.*

in articles of Faith, in the precepts of the Law, in the administration of the Sacraments.*

I might recount many articles of the Faith corrupted by them; but, as including and paramount to all, is this, namely, *the article of the justification of a sinner*. On the explication of this, Paul especially laboured, deriving its origin from the gratuitous mercy of God alone; the form or substance from the remission of sins, and the obedience of Christ applied to us by faith. But they would have the beginning of justification to be divided between the exercise of free-will and the operation of Divine grace; the form or substance they ascribe partly to the merits and obedience of Christ, and partly to one's own merits and righteousness. Hence that saying of the Apostle is justly turned against them, *Ye are fallen from Christ, whosoever of you are justified by the law*. (Gal. v. 4).

Now let us look at the Moral Law. What is more expressly, what more frequently forbidden, than that the invisible God should not be worshipped under a visible image, the immortal God under the similitude of a mortal and corruptible creature? *It is unlawful for a Christian to place an image of God in a temple*; writes Augustine, *De Fide et Symb.* cap. 7. But, in spite of the command of God, they teach that the Father may be represented and *adored* under the image of an old man, the Son under the likeness of a lamb, and the Holy Spirit under the form of a dove. This will appear scarcely credible; but we have Cajetan, who best knew the doctrine and practice of the Roman Church, admitting it. Thus says he: *The custom of the Roman Church allows these images of the Trinity; and they are depicted, not only to be looked at, but to be adored!* in 3. Aquin. quæst. 25. art. 3: a passage well worthy of inspection, that all men may see how miserably the advocates for the Papacy strive to defend the idolatry of the Roman Church.

How far the Romanists have apostatized in the doctrine of the Sacraments, this one instance abundantly testifies, namely, their mutilation of the eucharist; and, in the place of the elements instituted by Christ, their having thrust some spectre of *concomitance* upon the Laity; which I wonder that they should have done, since it is a received opinion in the Schools, *That the elements, or external matter, pertain to the substance of a Sacrament*; which, as He alone could substitute who hath the keys of excellency, so he alone could change, diminish, or take away the same.

If it was my intention to follow up the enquiry as to all those

* See an *Appeal to the Roman Catholic Priesthood of Ireland*, by the Rev. William Digby, Killashee, who has demonstrated the truth of this charge with peculiar and irresistible evidence.

points in which the Roman Church hath departed from Evangelical purity, it would be necessary to discuss almost the whole of the doctrine of it; but, not to be tedious, I content myself with these, which clearly enough convict them of the guilt of apostasy: therefore, I briefly conclude. The Roman Church acknowledges the Pope (liable to errors,) for an infallible teacher, but does not acknowledge the Holy Scriptures for a sufficient rule of faith; she perverts the doctrines of faith, abrogates the commands of the law, violates the institution of the Sacraments: therefore, she has fallen from the purity of the Christian faith in the chief matters of religion, and, on that account, is rightly called *an Apostate Church*.

. For further demonstration on this subject, if desired, the reader may be referred to Cuninghame's *Church of Rome the Apostasy*, &c.; to Hearne's *Man of Sin*; Seeley's; and Archdeacon Brown's *Anti-Christianism of the Church of Rome investigated*, Hatchards: to which may also be added, Manton's *Sermons descriptive of Anti-Christ*, Achill Edition; and O'Sullivan's *Guide to an Irish Gentleman in search of Religion*.

QUESTION XXII.

GOD'S DECREE DOES NOT TAKE AWAY MAN'S FREEDOM.

By the term *Decree* we understand the act of the Divine will whereby God from all eternity determined beforehand with himself what he wished to exist and take place in time; what not to exist or take place. But for the present purpose we shall consider how far the decree of God has respect to human actions. We say then, that all things, whether good or evil, are subject to this eternal decree of the Divine will, but in a very different manner. In regard to good things, God not only decrees that they shall happen, but decrees also to prove it when they do happen, and to co-operate that they may happen. In regard to evil things, he decreed to permit the event; he decreed also, as universal Mover, to concur with the agent; finally, he decreed to ordain the very event; but he did not decree to show that an act is evil, if it be done, much less to infuse any wickedness into the doer that it should be done. In this opinion Hugo de St. Victor argues acutely:* *God willed*

* *De Sacr. Fid.* lib. 1. cap. 13.

that evil should be, and yet did not will evil ; He willed that evil should exist, because it is good that evil should exist. He did not will evil itself, because evil is not a good in itself

So much concerning the Decree itself, and the difference in the Decree.

Now as to what relates to *human liberty* ; we think that every man whatsoever uses free will, as often as by the preceding judgment of reason he chooses what seems best to him, not through compulsion from any external principle, but through willing inclination from an internal principle. *For the foundation of liberty is constituted in the free judgment of reason*, says Aquinas.* Liberty, therefore in acting, is not taken away, as long as the will from the judgment of its reason, not compelled by any external cause, is bent upon its object.

These things being laid down, we may easily shew, that the Decree of God does not take away human liberty, For God not only has decreed, or foreseen actions and events themselves, but the modes of actions and events ; for he decreed that some things should happen *naturally*, some *necessarily*, some *freely* and contingently. Liberty is not taken from me then by the Decree of God ; which it is more certain will be aiding on that account, because he whose Decree is not broken, has decreed that liberty shall belong to me in the action itself.† In things of this kind, therefore, the Divine Decree excludes an act or event contrary to the Decree, but may consist, with power and liberty to act contrary.

But, on the other hand, it is urged, *That not only the Decree, or naked foreknowledge of God, but the most efficacious operation concurs in good actions, which impels the wills of the pious to the willing and doing of those actions which God decreed.* We confess that that power to will, or not to will, is not so placed in our liberty, but that God can turn the inclination itself of the will as shall seem good to him ; but *that* he always does in the regenerate, not by compelling the will, but by advising and bending it sweetly. The *influx*, and *efficacy*, therefore, of *Divine grace*, does not take away, but *regulates* ; does not overturn, but *converts free-will*, says Prosper, (*De lib. arb.* near the end). For, with Augustine, *God so moves the creature, that he may suffer him in the mean while to exercise his own motion.* (De Civit. 7. 3).

Another scruple remains to be set aside concerning the evil actions of the wicked ; for these seem to sin *necessarily*, because they have in them a principle impelling them to evil, namely,

* Quæst. disp. de Lib. Arbit.

† Vide Aquin. quæst. disp. de Vol. Dei, art. 4.

original sin; and are destitute of the principle leading to good, namely, Divine grace. Therefore, by the alleged Decree of the Divine permission, they cannot but rush headlong into all evil.

We grant that the corrupt will cannot, by its own powers, shake off innate corruption; yet it does not follow from thence, that it wants the liberty for perpetrating any evil whatsoever. *For nothing more is understood in free-will, than that which flows from it freely and pleasantly.** There is nothing more voluntary, than that which, by its own act, is specially pleasing to the will. Hence that saying of Augustine,† *Free-will has not so perished in the sinner, that all who sin with delight, sin through it in the highest degree.* If this does not satisfy as yet, this also may be added, *That the wicked not only sin deliberately and willingly, but perform bad actions, when it is in their power to abstain from the same.* For although the evil habit of sin inclines the will always to evil; yet it does not limit or compel a man to this or that evil, here and now to be practised. The proof of this is manifest; because the most unholy men enter upon their wickedness with previous deliberation, and by the consent of reason; because they wait for the opportunity of time: lastly, because being prepared for that very wickedness, yet they could postpone it, if they observed danger at hand. All these things prove that liberty is not wanting to them.

Now these difficulties being removed, it would be easy to confirm the thing itself by many reasons, but there is no need for many in a matter so conspicuous; therefore, let us dispatch the subject with three remarks:—

1.—The very nature of the thing proclaims that the will is free (as to what pertains to elicit its act); for to will is an abiding act: therefore, although in good things it may have the principle of its *origin* from something else, yet it is necessary that it have the principle of *action* in itself: But, if it may have it in itself, that inclination will always be free and voluntary which is elicited from the will itself. He who states the contrary, involves a contradiction.

2.—The consent of the human race attests it; for all mortals employ deliberation, rewards, punishments; the reason and utility of which will not hold good, if the liberty of the will be taken away. For to what purpose is deliberation, if the choice itself be restricted by a fatal necessity? To what purpose rewards, or punishments, if no one does any thing except that which he could not but do?

* Paris. *de. vit. et pec.*

† *Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 2.*

3.—Thirdly, the experience of individuals favours it; for all agree, that, notwithstanding the Decree of Divine fore-knowledge, they have done many things which they could have omitted, and omitted many things which they could have done. But to deny one's own experience, is clearly the part of a madman. We conclude, therefore, that the Decree of God, neither in regard to good actions, nor bad ones, nor indifferent ones, takes away human liberty.

QUESTION XXIII.

THE SACRAMENTS DO NOT CONFER GRACE BY THE MERE EXTERNAL ACT, OR *EX OPERE OPERATO*.

It is a trite saying among Romanists, that the Sacraments of the old Law conferred grace *ex opere operantis*, that is, from the faith, devotion, and good disposition of the administrator; whereas they say that ours confer grace *ex opere operato*, that is, from the mere performance of the sacramental service, although faith may be inoperative, provided there is no impediment interposed. So Paludanus :*—*It is not required in the Sacraments of the New Testament that man should be properly disposed: the becoming disposition is effected by means of the sacrament itself; and this is to confer grace ex opere operato*. So Biel :†—*A Sacrament is said to confer grace ex opere operato; because if there is an outward exhibiting of the sign employed, an inward good disposition is not required in the receiver*. So Bellarmine himself :‡—*To confer grace ex opere operato is to confer it by virtue of the sacramental act itself, so that what produces grace actively, immediately, and instrumentally, altogether originates in the external action, which*

* Lib. 4. quæst. 1. dist. 1. PETRUS PALUDANUS, a French Dominican Theologian and Preacher; became a Licentiate at Paris, 1314, was made titular Patriarch of Jerusalem about A.D. 1330, and died on the 1st of January, 1342. He wrote commentaries on the four books of Sentences; of which those on the third and fourth books were printed at Paris, 1530, 2 vols. folio; also Sermons; a treatise on *Ecclesiastical Power*; and another, on *the right of the Franciscans to hold property*; besides several works never published. Bellarmine. *de Scrip.* pp. *Eccles.* p. 478. edit. Venetiis, 1728.

† Lib. 4. dist. 1. quæst. 3.

‡ Lib. 2, *de Sac.* cap. 1.

is called the Sacrament; and faith, and the good disposition of the recipient is excluded from the efficacy which the sacramental grace has. Where, by the way, notice the deceit of the Jesuit, and the means of escape which he had provided before battle; for he ought to have said, what all the rest have said, that the *opus operatum* excludes an act of faith as necessary for the receiving of the grace. But he, by the slight change of a word says, *for the producing of the grace*,—as though we were contending that grace is produced by faith, denying as we do that it can be produced by any creature whatsoever. Faith *receives*, does not *generate* grace.

The foundation of this Romish opinion, respecting an *opus operatum*, is this, namely, the notion that a spiritual virtue, *causative of grace* (as they phrase it) is inherent in the external sacrament itself; and consequently, when there is an outward exhibition of the sacrament, then there is an actual communication of the grace which is contained in it applied to men. But on this point they are not agreed among themselves; for some teach* that grace exists in the sacrament, as medicine does in a chest, that is, as a thing put in a set place, or an accident in its subject. Aquinas dissents from this view, and gives it as his opinion that grace is contained in our sacraments, as the effect in its instrumental cause, possessing a degree of efficacy flowing and incompleted, and which issues forth when there is an impulse from the movements of the principal cause; and he endeavours to illustrate his opinion by this comparison:†—*Like as a hatchet or axe, which in its own nature is qualified for nothing else than to cut, does, when worked by an artizan, acquire new power; so that the effects of its hewing would be to form a couch or bench; so water, which by itself is not suited for anything else than to cleanse the body, having an impulse given it by God, and being applied in the use of the sacrament, thus produces grace and cleanses the soul.* Such is the notion of our opponents; take now a brief refutation of it.

As regards the opinion of those who would have grace to exist in the sacrament as an accident does in its subject, they are abandoned almost entirely by their own party, and deservedly so. For the question is not about any accident existing in any subject; but that of a determinate one existing in a determinate subject. It is no less absurd, therefore, to give the grace an existence in water or bread of the sacrament (since the latter are corporeal substances, the former a purely spiritual thing) than as if a man should attribute moisture or whiteness to a spiritual essence: For as a bodily

* Altiss. lib. 4. p. 229.

† Aquin. part. 3. quæst. 62, art. 3, 4; et quæst. disp. de Grat. art 4. 7.

nature alone is capable of whiteness or moisture, so a spiritual nature alone is capable of grace.

But let us just consider the opinion entertained by those who fancy themselves more acute, and who hold to the notion of a kind of efflux of a certain incompleted virtue from God, the principal agent, into the sacraments as instrumental causes, by the help of which they find that way to the soul itself, and produce grace in the same *ex opere operato*. Now this notion we reject on three accounts:—

1.—It is very injurious to God himself; for he alone who could create, he alone also can, by his illapses into it, cleanse the soul. For that *the cleansing of the soul by infused grace approaches somewhat to the manner of creating*, the Schoolmen themselves admit;*—a case in which the creature cannot be regarded such an instrument as actively and immediately to be able to produce an effect. Hence that remark of Cyprian, in his book on baptism—*God alone imparts the substance of the Sacrament to us*; and Jerome on Isa. iv.—*Man supplies the water, God the Holy Spirit*. He does not say that the water being moved by God infuses the Holy Spirit. [Again]

2.—This figment is plainly contradictory to natural reason; for although reason says that an instrumental cause, when put into action by the principal agent, can effect many things which it could not effect by itself; yet all these things it effects by contact with the material, and by putting its own peculiar power in action on the substance brought under it. Thus an hatchet makes a bench, because it comes into contact with the material, and by cutting it brings about that effect; but the water of baptism does not touch the soul, nor can it by washing produce grace. This the more sound Schoolmen perceived, and have long since come over to our opinion. Hugo, *de Sacr.* lib. 1, part 9. cap. 3, observes, *They [the sacraments] do not impart that which is imparted through them; but He grants salvation through those means, who commands us to seek salvation in them*. More plainly, William Bishop of Paris† asserted, that *Sanctification comes not from the water, but from God alone, the Giver, who being invoked is present and assists for this purpose, and produces an effect within proportionably to the effect which the water produces without*. The whole inward operation he assigns to God, and leaves the outward to the water alone. In addition to these we can reckon up (as Bellarmine himself allows,) Scotus, Richardus,‡ Occam, Marsi-

* Altiss. lib. 4. pag. 251.

† *De Sacr.* pag. 400.

‡ Middleton; see vol. i. p. 145. Note.

lius,* Durandus, who, on the four books of the Sentences (Dist. 1.) calls the opinion which we hold *the ancient one*, and avowedly refutes the contrary dogma of Aquinas and Bellarmine. (Dist. 1.) Again,

3.—This figment of grace being conferred *ex opere operato* robs faith of its office, and promises a blessing to those whom God threatens with punishment. *He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; and he who believeth not shall receive not grace ex opere operato, but condemnation* (Mar. xvi. 16). In the same way of the Supper of the Lord, 1 Cor. xi.—*He who eateth and drinketh unworthily* acquires not grace *ex opere operato*;† but *eateth and drinketh to himself damnation*. Now he eateth unworthily, who does not with an actual and lively faith approach to the reception of the grace offered. I am speaking of adults who do not *ex opere operato* receive grace from the sacraments, but who, through faith working with the sacraments, receive from God the grace offered. Thus writes Clemens Alexandrinus; *They who are partakers of the Supper of the Lord through faith are sanctified both in body and soul*. And concerning Baptism Augustine asserts, *That he cannot obtain the celestial gift, who supposes that he is changed by means of the water,—not through faith*. And on Psalm x. he observes, *The grace of God will attend those who receive the Sacrament with faith*.

We come to the conclusion, then, that the sacraments are not mere signs, but hold out means of grace; yet so that this grace is produced in the souls of men, not from the bare receiving of the Sacraments themselves, *ex opere operato*, but from the appointment and operation of God alone, who, in the legitimate use of the Sacraments, always makes good that which he has promised.

* MARSILIUS ab Ingen, doctor at Paris, a Canon at Cologne, and Founder and first Rector of the Gymnasium at Heidelberg; flourished A.D. 1384, and died 1394. He wrote Commentaries on the Sentences, printed at Strasburg, A.D. 1501. Soames's *Mosheim*, Notes, vol. ii. p. 695. There was one Marsilius of Padua, an eminent Franciscan, concerning whom see Soames's account, given from Wadding, at p. 675. of the same vol.

* Or, by the efficacy of the mere external act of communion.

, The Reader is referred with solicitude to a small, but invaluable work, on the subject of the above article—*Sacramental Instruction*, by the Rev. C. Bridges: Seeley's.

QUESTION XXIV.

IN THE DIVINE ESSENCE THERE IS NEITHER DIVERSITY OF PARTS,
NOR ANYTHING CONTINGENT OR ADVENTITIOUS.*

SINCE no created being is able to penetrate the depth of infinite Majesty, it has always appeared to wise men more safe to endeavour to shew *negatively* what God is not, than to define *affirmatively* what He is. Hence theological writers have demonstrated, from the most firmly established principles of nature and of Scripture, that the Divine essence is in every respect uncompounded; so that it is impossible that anything which is distinct from Godhead itself, whether of the nature of *substance*, or of *accident*, can be either combined with it, or superadded to it.

1.—It would be superfluous to examine all the modes of combination or composition which are enumerated by Philosophers, and to prove concerning each of them, distinctly, that they are inapplicable to the Deity. We will, therefore, combat them collectively, and will shew by some arguments, alike applicable to all, that no diversity of parts, either *essential* or *accidental*, is to be found in the Divine nature.

1.—First, the *infinite nature of God* is incompatible with any combination of parts essentially distinct. For that which is infinite cannot admit anything which is finite to contribute to the formation of its essence. But if you assume even two things only in God which are essentially different from each other, either both or one of them will necessarily be finite; for the co-existence of two infinite natures, which are distinct from each other in essence, is one of those things which cannot possibly either actually occur or be imagined. Origen has rightly said,† *God is a simple nature, which does not contain in itself any kind of admixture, but is in every respect pure unity.*

* *In Essentia Divina nec aliud nec accidens*:—The term *aliud* in this title refers to the *distinction of essential parts* (whether real and actual, or metaphysical and in conception only) as discussed in the following division (i.); the term *accidens* to *contingent or adventitious* affections, in one word accidents as discussed in the next portion (ii..)

† Origen. *De Princip.* lib. 1, cap. 1.

Secondly, The *eternity of God* renders it impossible that the Divine nature can be compounded of distinct parts. For that declaration of God concerning himself is true: *Before me there was no God formed, neither shall there be after me* (Isaiah xliii. 10). But every compound is necessarily posterior to those things of which it is compounded, and also to the author of the composition; for things which are distinct from each other, do not coalesce into one substance, unless they are combined by means of some agent. Whoever, therefore, represents God as a compounded Being, must necessarily acknowledge some cause of the combination more ancient than God himself. For it is impossible that any compounded thing can be the first thing in nature.

Thirdly, the *perfection of the Divine goodness* contradicts this theory. For it is impious even to imagine anything in God which does not possess in and from itself complete and entire goodness. But when distinct things are combined in one subject, the very combination will evince that each of them was in itself something imperfect; and that the perfection which they possess arises from their union with each other. But in God there is not anything imperfect; therefore, there is not in Him any one thing distinct from another. Thus Tertullian long since observed, *God has not any diversity of parts in himself; He is altogether uniform.* (*De Trinit.*)

II.—We have proved that there cannot exist in the Divine essence any two or more elements distinct from each other as to *substance*. Let us now proceed to prove, first, that no *innate accidents* are inherent to this essence; and then, that no *extraneous accidents* can by any means be superadded to it.

I.—No accident or adjunct is *inherent* in the Divine nature. For God is a pure act and simple form; not compounded of being and essence,* or of any fundamental substance combined with a

* Davenant refers here to questions much discussed by the Schoolmen, but now happily, on account of their total uselessness, become obsolete. One was, Whether in God, the *esse* and the *essentia* are identical or distinct? We can conceive, for instance, what constitutes the essence of an ichthyosaurus, or of laughter, even though no act of laughter were at present occurring, or though no ichthyosaurus now exists. Therefore, the *essentia* and the *esse* are distinct. But in God, His being, His *I am*, is His essence: they are, therefore, identical. The other question alluded to is, Whether God is subject to the metaphysical distinction common to all *species* of things, namely, into *genus* and *difference*; whether there is in Him some *fundamental substance* common to Deity, with any other things, together with some *characteristic nature* distinguishing Him from those other things?—The next words in the text, *vel supposito et natura*, rendered as above *fundamental substance*, &c., might be more briefly translated *of a metaphysical genus and difference*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Prima Primæ*, Quæst. 3; also Scotus, Durandus, &c.

characteristic nature. For this kind of combination is peculiar to created beings only, and is utterly incompatible with Jehovah the Creator.—Moreover, (secondly,) a pure essence or simple form cannot be susceptible of anything *extraneous*. For although *a man* may be the subject of whiteness, of heat, and of other accidents, yet *humanity* itself, that is, the human nature, if it subsisted as a simple form, could not be either white or hot: in short, it could not be susceptible of anything which is distinct or different from the simple principle of humanity. Whence Cyril of Alexandria (in his *Dialogue on the Trinity*, near the beginning of the second book,) says, *The notion or idea of God comprehends simultaneously Himself and, in unity with Himself, every one of his attributes: nor is any accident or adjunct comprehended in the true notion of Him.* Nor is it possible that any accidental change can affect the Divine nature. *That which causes change is more powerful than that which experiences change. But nothing is more powerful than God. What, therefore, God is, that He always is; and such as He is, he always is.** Again: *Whatever undergoes change, was previously in a state susceptible of some new affection which it had not before.* But it is impious to ascribe to God passive susceptibility, or a capability of being acted on externally. *I am the Lord; I change not.* (Mal. iii. 6.) *With God is no variableness, neither shadow of turning.* (Jas. i. 17.) For, I ask, what can be the effect or result of this change? If, after this change, God has continued in all respects the same, then no change has taken place. If He has become better, then He was not God previously, because He was not perfectly good. If He has become worse, He no longer continues to be God, because He is no longer perfectly good.

II.—These are the arguments in confirmation of our proposition. Yet there are several considerations which have the appearance of invalidating and overthrowing the doctrine which we have established, namely, the uncompoundedness or simplicity of the Divine nature.

I.—The first of these considerations is, *the distinction of Persons and mutual relations*, which all acknowledge to exist in the blessed Trinity; which may seem to authorise the inference, that each Person includes in himself two distinct elements; namely, a communicable nature of Deity, and an incommunicable personal subsistence. Theologians reply, that these relations, inasmuch as they refer to the origin or primary notion of Deity, do not designate

* Tertullian *De Trinit.*

anything distinct from the essence, and capable of producing any combination in it; but denote the several modes of possessing the same essence; which is that which constitutes the distinction between the Persons themselves. For Philosophers also will admit, that the qualities which belong to the predicament of *Relation* do not enter into any combination with the subjects of which they are predicated, nor introduce any new or distinct element into the object which they designate; but merely denote the order or bearing of that object towards their respective correlatives.*

II.—The second consideration which appears to militate against our statement, is *the multiplicity of the Divine attributes*. For when we declare that God is powerful, just, merciful, wise;—who (it is urged) does not conceive that distinct things are denoted by these words? Who does not infer, that certain accidents or adjuncts are predicated concerning God, as the subject in which they exist?

But we ought not to form our judgment of the Divine Majesty, either according to the poverty of language, or the weakness of the human intellect. We cannot express the infinite perfection of God, either by a single act of understanding, or by a single word. We, therefore, examine the creatures; and whatever choice and excellent quality we find in them, we ascribe to God. Yet we must in the meantime remember, that these various words designate, under various relations, an object which is one, in the strictest sense of unity; namely, that Divine essence, which comprehends in itself, and infinitely surpasses, all the perfections of all created beings. These epithets, therefore, are applicable to God, in regard to the *qualities signified* by them, since God has these qualities pre-eminently in his own essence; but they are not appropriate to God as to the *mode of expressing* that signification; because the qualities are not in God, as anything distinct from, or only accidentally joined unto His essence. This sentiment is excellently expressed by Augustine: [*In the soul of man, to be, is not identical with to be courageous, or prudent, or just, or temperate. For the soul can be and yet be destitute of all these virtues. But*] in God, being is identical with being powerful, or being righteous, or being wise,

* “Neque asserendum putamus, essentiam Dei tribus personis divinis, tanquam totum quoddam, communicari, aut personas in eâ, tanquam partes in toto sibi communicato, subsistere. Nam cum essentia Dei sit infinita, ne prorsus impartibilis, non potest illa de divinis personis, ut totum de suis partibus, prædicam.

“Modus ergo hujus mysterii ut rationi humanæ inexplicabilis, humili potius fide adorandus, quam periculosus locutionibus definiendus est.” *Synopsis purioris Theologiæ* per Jo. Polyandrum. And. Rivetum, &c.; Lug. Bat. 1652, p. 76.

*or whatever other excellency, out of His undivided multiplicity, or manifold individuality, may be mentioned for the purpose of expressing his substance.**

III.—The last consideration which opposes the question that we maintain, and charges God with accidental change, is *that variation to which God appears to be subject in the exercise of His will, His operations, and His knowledge or understanding.*

1.—For instance, at one time He *wills* that men should be born and continue in life; at another time, He *wills* that the same men should die and depart out of life. Here, it is said, is an act of will in God which incurs change!—I answer, there is a change in the thing; there is no change in the will of God; because He has willed from eternity, that His creatures should, at the appointed season, undergo all these changes.

2.—But, (it is said,) God appears, accidentally at least, to incur change, when he passes from rest to *operation*, and, after a state of inaction, begins to act; as when He creates an individual soul which He has not created before.

This, indeed, would be true, if God acted by motion, or by any power intervening between Himself and the thing done: but, inasmuch as he acts by his own essence, which is always in one and the same condition, he is said, indeed, to do now, that which he was not previously doing, because the thing now begins to be that which it was not before; a great change being discerned in the thing produced, but none existing in the Agent. So Prosper in his Sentences says, *It is not allowable to believe that God is differently affected, when He works, and when he does not work. For it is not right that God should be spoken of as liable to any affections. For He is able† to act while continuing quiescent, and to be quiescent while he acts.* In the works of God, therefore, whatever is spoken of as prior or posterior, is to be referred, not to the *Doer*, but to the *things done*.

3.—Lastly; it is objected, that in the actings of his *understanding or knowledge*, God is susceptible of change. For, from all eternity, He knew that he would create the world: now, He knows that He *has* created it. And innumerable instances of this kind might be adduced, in which the very form and truth of the propositions incur a variation in the mind, corresponding with the variation and susceptibility of change in the things themselves.

* Augustin. De Trin. Lib. 6, cap. 4. or 6. [It seemed well to give the entire passage here referred to from Augustine.]

† *Novit enim*: a mere Gallicism, very naturally fallen into by Prosper, who had in his mind the idiom of his own language, *Il sait agir*; *Il sait se tenir tranquille*, for *He is able*.

But we assert, that this variation of perceptions does not exist in the Divine intellect; because, (as our countryman Hales has correctly said,*) *God knows propositions, not as propositions, but as things; and that, not as things are in their own nature, but as they are in their Cause, that is, in Himself.* But in God, (to use the words of Dionysius,) *temporal things exist without reference to time, changeable things without reference to change, material things without reference to matter, complex things as if they were simple, things which differ exist irrespectively of their differences, opposites without opposition.* In God, therefore, the perceptions of things are not subdivided into minute and successive parts;† but He simultaneously discerns, by his eternal knowledge, all the conflicting forms of change: nor does his thought incur change, in accordance with the irregularity of changeable things; because he comprehends all the events of time in one permanent, steadfast, and single glance.‡

* Part 1. quæst. 23. art. 5.

† Vide Hilar. *De Trin.* 12.—[In the reference here made to Hilary his words are—*Neque partibus cogitationum universitatis hujus corpus effectum est, ut primum sit de cœlo cogitatum, postea terræ cura Dei inierit, consultatumque per singula sit....*(and after enumerating successive parts or acts of creation, he proceeds)....*Non patitur hoc, existimari in Deo minutarum rerum particulatas cogitationes.*]

‡ Ambros. *De Vocat. Gent.* lib. 2. cap. 10. [This work is attributed to other writers, Prosper of Aquitaine, Leo I., Bishop of Rome, &c. See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 211; and also, Gerhard. *Loci Theolog.* iii. cap. x. vol. i. pp. 119-20, edit. in 4to. 1762. The language referred to in the Pseud-Ambrose is—"Omnes varietatum compugnantie, et universæ dissimilium proventum causæ, quas investigare et discernere non valemus, in illâ æternâ scientiâ simul notæ simulque divisæ sunt.....nec cogitatio ejus cum rerum mutabilium inæqualitate variatur; sed cuncta pariter tempora et temporalia sempiterno et stabili comprehendit intuitu."]

QUESTION XXV.

THE DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE
FALL OF MAN.

THE better to shew the truth of this point, we shall explain, by a word or two, the force of the terms. Foreknowledge, then, is the act of the Divine understanding, whereby God in himself perceives, from all eternity, things about to happen in time. And this is distinguished from knowledge, not in *fact*, but in *relation*. For we call it *knowledge*, as far as it comprehends all things; but *foreknowledge*, as far as it precedes the accomplishment of things temporal, and is related to them as though they were yet future. I say future, not as to the mode of the Divine intuition, but in comparison to other things, to which those which are therefore termed future succeed; for the order of the Divine cognizance with regard to anything, is, as it were, a united presence. Moreover, since we deny this foreknowledge of God to have been the cause of the fall of man, we would have it understood, not to have exerted any effective or operating cause, which either impelled our first parents to sin, or bound them under any necessity of sinning.

This will be demonstrated, firstly, from the nature of foreknowledge itself, which regards the intellect, not the will. Now the intellect does not transmit any power of producing effects on any thing apart from itself, but only perceives external things by its own internal action. Thus, every body allows that a skilful Astrologer can foresee an eclipse of the sun, but no man in his senses will assert that he causes one by his foreknowledge. For, if foreknowledge could have an effective power, since that would have existed in the Divine mind from eternity, all foreseen events must have existed also from eternity. For the sufficiency of the cause being admitted, the effect will immediately follow in operation. That remark of Augustine is therefore most true: *Since no one by the act of memory compels the performance of past acts, so God does not, by his foreknowledge, compel the performance of future acts.* *De lib. arbit. lib. 3. cap. 4.*

Secondly, This is likewise proved from the nature of God; for when we speak of the Divine foreknowledge, we intend nothing else than that God himself foresees things future. Moreover, nothing hinders this God, who is the fountain of goodness, nay, goodness itself, from knowing evil, because the knowledge of evil is good: but to effect or cause evil, is no less opposed to the chiefest and pure good, than that cold should emit heat, or darkness send forth light. Between knowing and effecting there is this great difference, that effects never proceed from knowledge alone, unless by intervention of *the will*, by way of *inducing*, and of *power*, by way of *working out*: But, in effecting, all these things, viz., to know, to will, and to be able, are found connected and woven together. Therefore, God could not be the efficient cause of the fall of man; because, although he might have foreseen that man would sin, yet he could not wish him to do so. *Thou, Lord, hatest them that work wickedness* (Psalm v. 5.); much less would he effect it; since sin is not the effect of the Divine power, but the defect of an erring creature. I venture, therefore, boldly to affirm with Basil: *If there is a cause of evil, it is not good; if it is not good, it is not God*; and with the Homily, that *God is not the Author of sin*.

Thirdly, it can be shewn from the clearest testimonies of Holy Scripture, which so relates the history of the fall of man, as to teach, that in no way could God be called an ally, or suspected of that crime. For Adam received from God suitable aids to avoid sin; for he was forewarned, lest he should have a pretext for ignorance; he was supported by supernatural grace, lest he should plead his inability. Whence, then, the cause of the fall? If we seek for it *externally*, Adam assigns, as a cause, the intreaty of the woman; the woman alleges the deceit of the serpent, but neither of them the foreknowledge, or the compulsion of God. If we enquire for it *internally*, it must be derived from the liberty of the will to sin, which, when it could have persevered in goodness, chose to rush into evil. Hence Christ accuses the devil as the author of this sin, in John viii. 44,—*He was a murderer from the beginning*. But Paul lays it to Adam himself, in Rom. v. 19, *By the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners*. Both speak truly, for the devil ruined the human race by advising them impiously; Adam in obeying him willingly. *The liberty of the will, therefore, would not charge its fault on God, by whom it was given, but it will impute the blame to itself, by whom it is not exercised as it ought*, as Tertullian most justly argues, lib. 2. *advers. Marcion*.

Lastly, That God was not the cause of man's fall, is shewn from the sentence passed against our first parents, and the punishment inflicted on them. For with what justice could God become an avenger, by punishing that thing of which he had been the author by foreseeing it? For if it be granted that his foreknowledge was the cause of the sin, it was as impossible to have avoided the sin, as to have frustrated the Divine foreknowledge. If a cause of infinite power operated to produce a certain effect, there could be no faculty of resistance in the power of a creature; and, if it were so, it would be blameworthy to resist the impulse of its own Creator. He, therefore, who defends the equity of the sentence passed upon Adam, must not attribute the human fall to the Divine foreknowledge. For *justice would not be justice if it could be said that it did not find the criminal, but made him an object of punishment.* (Fulgent. *ad Mon.* 1. 22.) Farther confirmation is not necessary in a case so clear; we shall discuss a few of those things which are usually brought on the opposite side.

1.—Some contend that the Divine foreknowledge cannot be deceived, but that whatever God has foreseen must necessarily come to pass: This being laid down, they deny the cause of the fall to be in God, who imposed its necessity by foreseeing it; they hold Adam almost excusable, who, by falling, yielded to inevitable necessity.

But to what end is this cavilling against God? As though he should foresee mere events, and not, also, the modes of their coming to pass. He foresees all things equally: but among these, he sees some things which must happen necessarily, some freely, and some contingently. He sees Adam about to sin, but *freely*; he sinned, therefore, not *necessarily*, by any power of foreknowledge. Therefore, what they say, that the Divine foreknowledge cannot be deceived, is true: But this infallibility depends, not from the necessary condition of the events, but from the necessary mode of the Divine cognizance. Indeed, that knowledge which is derived from things, (as ours is) follows the conditions of the things, whether in necessity, or in their contingencies; but what is not received from things, but from an eternal and immutable Cause, that will be necessary and most certain, although the things subjected to it may be fleeting and uncertain. And such is the Divine foreknowledge; for God, from himself, and in himself, knows all things from eternity, derives not his knowledge from the things, whether present or future.

2.—It may also be alleged, That the Scriptures themselves acknowledge the prophetic foreknowledge as the cause of sin, foreseen and foretold: *Therefore, they could not believe, because*

Isaiah said, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, &c. (John xii. 39, 40.) If the Jews could not believe, because the prophet foretold that they should be blinded; then Adam could not but sin, because God foresaw that he would sin.

But the true answer is here, that in phrases of this kind, the causal particle indicates not the cause of *the thing*, but the cause of *the knowledge*. The prophetic prediction, therefore, may be the cause of proof, whence certainty of the event is necessarily concluded: but it cannot be the efficient cause, whence the event itself necessarily arises. And this is what Damascenus writes, (*Orthodoxæ fidei*, lib. 4. cap. 20.) *The Scriptures are sometimes accustomed to utter those things, as if assigning a cause αἰτιολογικῶς, which are to be understood as explaining a consequence, ἐκβατικῶς.*

Lastly, This also is alleged, that God not only foresaw the human fall, but he decreed from all eternity to permit this fall. But now, it is most certain, that no *permissive* decree can be given, to which an *efficacious* one does not attach. The cause of this is evident: namely, because no evil is permitted, but that some good may thence be elicited; but that good must be referred to the efficacious decree of God.

We do not deny that a decree of permission preceded the fall; but yet we strenuously hold, that the sin of Adam happened afterwards, not from this decree, but according to it. Since permission alone is never the cause of the thing permitted, for the will of the person permitting determines and effects this only within itself, not to hinder the action of another, much less to promote it, by working or effecting it. But it has been said, that to a *permissive* decree, another *efficacious* one is always added: then did not the efficacy of this last one impel Adam to sin? By no means; for the ground of each is altogether different. The permissive decree permits the creature to fall into sin, foreseen by God, through his own voluntary defect; the efficacious decree determines not to effect that evil, but to elicit good from it by direction and superintendence. I shall conclude, therefore, this latter thesis in the words of Jerome, in his third dialogue against the Pelagians; *Adam did not sin, because God knew that he would sin; but God foreknew, as God, that he would sin, by his own voluntary act.*

QUESTION XXVI.

MAN FALLEN IS THE SUBJECT OF DIVINE PREDESTINATION.

THE Schoolmen are accustomed to restrict the word *Predestination* to the elect, but in this question it relates also to the reprobate. For there is an eternal Decree of God, of gratuitously choosing some to eternal happiness, and of leading them, by infallible means, to the same; but, on the contrary, of willingly passing by others, and justly assigning them to eternal punishment. So spake the Fathers in the Council of Valentia:* *We confess a Predestination of the elect to life, and a Predestination of the wicked to death.* So, also, Augustine,† Fulgentius,‡ and Prosper,§ have used the word Predestination in this broader signification. But now we term *the subject of Predestination*, Those persons on whom the eternal act of God falls, whether of choosing them to glory, or leaving them to misery. Finally, whereas we account *fallen man* as the subject of this Predestination; we understand not actually fallen, but [as fallen] in the view or foreknowledge of God.

This, then, is what we assert, that men were predestined to be accepted and rejected, as soon as fallen and sunk into a condition of misery by their own fault; so that this state of corruption is the foreseen condition of the subject, for either delivering any man through the good will of election, or abandoning him by the decree of reprobation.

But here it must first be laid down, That we do not assign a real precedence or succession of views or decrees in the Divine mind and will; for in God all things are seen and decreed at once from eternity;|| but, according to our mode of understanding things, like as things depend upon one another by a certain order, so, also, we are accustomed to apply the terms former or latter to the Divine intelligence and decrees. Certainly, then, the permission of the fall with regard to God himself, is neither before nor after in Predestination, (for each of them is from eternity;) yet, if we weigh the

* Conc. T. 3. cap. 3. pag. 476.

† Tract. 48. in Joann.

‡ Lib. 1. *ad Mon.*

§ Resp. 14, et 15. *ad Cap. Gall.*

|| Vide Ambr. *de Voc. Gent.* lib. 2. cap. 10.; Et Hilar. *de Trin.* lib. 12. pag. 192.

two things themselves by our mode of understanding, or in their relation to one another, we shall perceive Predestination to be so allied to the fall, that no one can be understood to be *predestined*, unless he is supposed to be *fallen*; which remains to be demonstrated by a few arguments.

1.—In the first place, there occurs the consideration of Christ incarnate and predestined, who is the head of all the elect, and the bond of union between God choosing and man chosen. If, then, Christ himself, who is regarded as the head in Predestination, is destined to be incarnate as Mediator, and Redeemer of the fallen, (Heb. ii. 14.) it is manifest, that all they who are chosen in Christ, are to be considered as in need of a Mediator and Redeemer, *i. e.* as *fallen*. *He hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world*, says the Apostle (Ephes. i. 4.); which is just as if he had said, that we, who clearly are lost in the first Adam, are by Predestination given to the second, that in Him, and through Him, we should obtain the favour of God and eternal life. Athanasius, hath beautifully expressed it† in this sentence, *The Son of God, from the love of men, and by the will of the Father, put on created flesh, that what the first man had rendered mortal by his transgression, he might quicken by his own blood*. All these things so involve, and bear upon the consideration of a foreseen fall, that any one may easily follow out this argument:—Christ himself is predestinated to be incarnate, and sent as the Redeemer to the fallen and miserable; therefore, men were not predestined in this incarnate Redeemer, unless as miserable and fallen.

2.—To this argument is added another, very nearly allied, deduced from those means of grace which are appointed in this eternal predestination for all who are elected to glory: for all these means lead us to believe that the act of predestination related to man when fallen, corrupt, nay, even dead; rather than when unfallen, innocent, or upright. For, in a decree of predestination, effectual calling, free justification, a new birth, and other benefits of that kind are prepared for the elect, (Rom. viii.) which, as soon as named, represent man to our mind as fallen. For God designed not to call *righteous persons* through Christ, but *sinner*s to repentance; not to justify *the upright* in Christ, but the *ungodly*, by gratuitous remission; lastly, not to renew men *living* and *healthy* by the Spirit of Christ, but those who, by ordinary birth, were *polluted*, and confessedly *dead*. Therefore, they who imagine the elect to be not yet formed, or fallen, seem to me to have paid little

† Serm. 3. in *Arian*.

attention to what is prepared for their predestination. For he who is designed to be healed by the medicines of spiritual grace, is regarded, by God, as seized with spiritual diseases.

3.—Furthermore, if we look at the very design of Predestination, it will point out to us, as the object of this act, not man *before his creation*, or *unfallen*, but *fallen*. For what has God in view in the whole work of predestination, unless to shew forth his glory by means of his sparing mercy towards the elect, and avenging justice towards the reprobate? But mercy, especially sparing mercy, inclines only to the *miserable*; nor does punitive justice visit any but the *wicked*; but man is neither *miserable* nor *wicked*, unless we suppose a *fall*. Since, then, as many as are delivered from misery, through election, are clearly *miserable* in themselves, and also, as many as are most justly assigned to damnation, by reprobation, are accounted *wicked* in themselves, it is clear that both come under God's predestination in a state of sin. So Tertullian long ago said,† *God is good for his own sake, and just for ours*. To which Augustine agrees,‡ *God can pardon without good works, because he is Good; but he can only condemn for wicked ones, because he is Just*.

4.—Lastly, that the subject of Predestination was man, not pure and unfallen, but *fallen* and *corrupt*, is plain from the unequal disposition of God towards the elect and the reprobate. For there is no disparity of Divine love towards the human race, as long as it is considered in unfallen Adam; but only when some men are viewed as planted in Christ the Mediator, and others as abandoned in Adam the sinner. For Adam unfallen, and with him all his posterity, were equally ordained to life eternal upon condition of continued obedience. I say *ordained* by a decree of Providence, which flows simply towards its end, and disposes and directs to that end by suitable means.§ I do not say *predestined* by a decree of election, which flows from an efficacious will, and decrees and effects the attainment of its end by unfailing means. Since then to Adam and his posterity, persevering in the command of God and their own integrity, eternal happiness was proposed and appointed, it agrees with this to say, that no one has been excluded from this eternal life, except by his own rebellion and fall; for that which is ordained to be bestowed upon all under a condition of obedience, must be denied to none unless through intervening disobedience. Reprobation, therefore, which denies eternal life to many, and

* Aquin. part. 1. quæst. 23. art. 5.

† *De Resurr. carn.*

‡ Epist. 106.

§ Aquin. quæst. disp. de Præd. art. 1.

destines the same to perish, cannot alight upon man when considered *unfallen*; but as he is beheld from all eternity, in the Divine mind, *disobedient* and *fallen*.

I refrain from bringing together more arguments for confirming this view of the case; but because many persons, remarkable alike for learning and piety, either differ from us partly, or only seem to do so, I will add a word or two on this variety of opinions.

Scotus, who heads a class among his own party, and draws a large band of Scotists after him, openly teaches,* that before anything was foreseen about the sinner, God chose all whom he would have. But not only he puts forth this opinion among the Papists;† Naclantus besides, Bishop of Clugium,‡ would have the decree of Predestination not only to be prior to and more ancient than the decree of permitting the fall, but also of creating man. Pighius, Catharinus, and Galatinus lay down the same order. Besides, after all these, the Prefect of the Cathedral in the Academy of Salamanca, Alfonsus Mendoza,§ professedly maintains, that Predestination was the first of all the Divine acts, from which followed all the other decrees of framing the world, creating man, and permitting sin. Do not expect either that I should endeavour to refute their opinion, or reconcile it with ours; I only desire this, that you would observe from hence, that the Papists themselves are the primary authors of this opinion, which denies that man fallen was the subject of the Divine Predestination. Let us now come to those among ourselves who seem to agree in the same, and what I shall say of one consider as spoken of all. The Jesuits blame Calvin, (vide Becanus, *de Præd.* part 2, cap. 5,) because he maintains that God, in the first instant, before all foresight of sin, absolutely chose whom he would to glory, and destined others to perish; but in the second instant ordained the sin of Adam for that end, that he might exercise his justice towards the reprobate and his mercy towards the elect; I answer that Calvin, in explaining this mystery of Predestination, was not accustomed to digest those different signs or instances of the Schoolmen in any accurate order; yet as to what relates to the pith of the matter, I affirm that the opinion of Calvin is most truly contained in these two propositions:—

* Lib. 3, dist. 19.

† Cajet. in 3. quæst. 1, art. 3.

‡ In 1. *ad Ephes.* et IX. *ad Rom.*

§ ALPHONSUS DE MENDOZA, an Augustinian Eremite, Professor of Theology at Salamanca. He wrote *Quæstiones Quodlibeticæ*, to which is subjoined *Relictio de Universali Christi Domino ac Regno*; Salamanticæ 1588, reprinted at Cologne, 1603. He died about the year 1591; *cujus immatura morte, si Deo placet, jacturam et nunquam satis deplorandam Theologica studia fecerunt.*—See *Antonio Biblioth. Hisp. Nova*, tom. 1, p. 36, Edit. 1783.

1.—*That the consideration of a foreseen fall did not occur to God when predestinating as a Cause.* Instit. 3, cap. 21, sect. 5. *Those who make foreknowledge its cause, involve Predestination in many difficulties.* And cap. 22, sect. 2, 4, 6—*God, in this matter of Predestination, does not look beyond himself: we must therefore always come back to the pleasure of the Divine will alone, and the cause of this is neither evident nor discoverable beyond itself.* If any one, therefore, should seek from Calvin whether the foreseeing of a corrupt mass or anything future offered itself to God, who, choosing Jacob, and rejecting Esau as the cause of this election and reprobation; undoubtedly he would deny it, and most consistently assert, that the matter is altogether regulated by the circumstances in which these persons were involved; for Jacob whether foreseen to be created, or as created, or fallen, is predestined to glory; Esau, on the contrary to be created, as created and fallen, never appears before God as elected to glory. And this is confessedly the case.

2.—The other proposition which I oppose to the censure of the Jesuits, and which I assert to be according to the mind of Calvin, is this:—*The consideration of sin foreseen offered itself to God when predestinating, by way of an annexed condition, which is inherent in all, whether elect or reprobate.* Let us hear what he himself has stated concerning the matter, Instit. 3, cap. 23, sect. 3: *If all whom the Lord predestined to death are obnoxious to its penalty by the condition of their nature,—if all are taken from a corrupt mass, it is not to be wondered at if they fall into condemnation.* But that testimony which is reported to have been taken up by Augustine, and approved by Calvin, (ibid, sect. 11,) is clearer than the sun, *We confess a common ruin; but we say that the mercy of God befriends some.* To which those sentiments of Augustine beautifully accord;—*Since the whole mass of our race fell into condemnation in the first man, the vessels which are made out of it unto honour are not properly vessels of God's justice, but of his mercy; and that others are made to dishonour is not to be assigned to partiality, but to judgment, &c.*

Blind is the man who sees not that the corrupt mass in these cases is the ground of Predestination, so that from it are selected vessels to honour through election, and in it vessels are left to dishonour through reprobation. And other of our Divines very clearly think the same, though they sometimes speak a little obscurely of the matter; for whoever will read their writings with an attentive and unprejudiced mind, will soon observe they, in their discussions, do not suppose the fall of man foreseen to God

when predestinating, but they rather urge, That the cause of reprobation is not to be found in this consideration of the fall.*

We conclude, therefore, according to the opinion of the orthodox, That the fall of man is not the cause of reprobation, but that man fallen is the proper subject of both election and reprobation.

* Vide Whitak. *in Conc. ultim.*

QUESTION XXVII.

PAPISTS OUGHT NOT TO ABSENT THEMSELVES FROM PROTESTANT FORMS OF WORSHIP.*

UNDER the term *forms of worship*, we comprehend public prayers, sermons, and the sacraments, at which, as Papists themselves are bound to be present, so they would both sin themselves, if they should withdraw from our Church assemblies, and the Magistrate would be neglecting his duty, if (as far as lies in his power) he were not to compel them to attend.

As to what relates to the Papists themselves, since they were both born and baptized† in this our Church, they owe this honour to their Mother, at least to give her a patient hearing; especially seeing there is nothing in the frequenting our services which can defile their consciences. For, to begin with our prayers, what, I would ask, occurs in them, which is not approved by Romanists themselves, and found in the Liturgies of the most holy Fathers? This is so far true, that even one of the Roman Pontiffs expressed his willingness to approve of that form of sacred offices which we use, if we would only have been willing to yield to his authority in

* The discussion of this subject would seem to be intended to counteract the endeavours of Jesuits of the time to prevent their dupes from attending the Reformed worship, with which view some of the bolder even ventured to publish discourses and tracts. The Lay members of the Church of Rome did attend the national Churches during the earlier portions of Queen Elizabeth's reign, till the Directors found that numbers were decreasing, and they were then *instructed* how wrong it was to attend, and were ordered to desist. See Goode's *Refutation of Tract XC.* pp. 41, 42, and Fuller's *Church History*, A.D. 1570.

† *Nati et renati*:—See *Art. IX. of the Church of England*, Latin and English; and Sandy's *True sense of the Baptismal Service*. Jackson, London.

this matter.* There is no reason, moreover, why they should absent themselves from our sermons, on the alleged ground that errors are preached in them; as that will prove nothing more than that they are allowed to renounce those errors, not to forsake the Churches themselves. For among the Galatians and Corinthians many propagated doctrines alien to the orthodox faith, yet the pious and faithful did not, on that account, think it right to forsake Church assemblies. He is insane who rejects food altogether, because poison may be sometimes mixed with it. Lastly, they could never allege any just cause why they should refuse to partake of the supper of the Lord. It is true, we do not overlay it with splendid ceremonies; we do not mutilate it in obedience to a Papal command, nor change it into a corporeal shape, by the wonderful dogma of transubstantiation; but we retain the matter, due and entire, the form, also, as instituted by Christ himself, and used by his Apostles, even in the judgment of our opponents. Then, again, Papists live in a much more happy condition among us, than Protestants do among them; since our people cannot be present at their sacred rites, without being compelled to do many things which may wound their souls; as to invoke saints, adore images, and innumerable other things similarly superstitious: but they, when they enter our temples, will only miss those paltry images and their nice little saints; but would not, in other respects, be compelled to do any thing which can wound their consciences.

There is but one thing which will serve as an excuse,—*That our Church is schismatical and heretical*, [as they are taught to believe]† *and therefore, to be avoided by Catholics and all the orthodox.*‡ Now it would be a tedious business, if, in order to

* See Sall's *Catholic and Apostolic faith maintained in the Church of England*, pp. 124, 5, Edit. 1840.

† It is not that Roman Catholics do *themselves* consider the services and worship of the Protestant Churches wrong, but that the directing Priesthood so teach, in order mainly to hinder all the consequences which would of course follow, loss of numbers, bigotry, &c.

‡ Our Church did not separate from the ancient British Church, nor create any schism at the period of the Reformation; she only renounced those soul-destroying errors which had crept into the Church, and abolished a mass of those corruptions and superstitious mummeries with which Popery had defiled the fair face of the King's daughter, and thus returned to the pattern of primitive beauty. She is, then, the Catholic and orthodox Church, and there is no ground in any quarter for abandoning her. Those who venture on that course incur the sin of schism. See Bird's *Defence of the Principles of the English Reformation*. How the case stands with regard to the Irish Church, the Reader may satisfactorily learn from *A sketch of its History and Doctrine*, by the Rev. M. W. Foye, Birmingham.

blunt the force of this weapon, I should undertake to contend with Romish calumniators for our possessing the whole truth ; besides that the shortness of the time allowed for my so doing would not permit the attempt. I will turn my attention rather to the unfortunate and miserably misled Laity, to whom I shall strive to shew, that there exists no just cause why they should either believe these slanderers, or at all shrink from our religion and services.

And, in the first place, I must be allowed to observe, that an erroneous conscience can never possess power sufficient to release any one from a duty, to the performance of which he is bound.* For it acquires neither the authority of a Lawgiver, nor of an authentic law ; but is rather to be accounted a servant, who is bound to be subject and conformable to the law.† An error of conscience, therefore, will be like a fetter, which holds a man tied and bound, so that he cannot proceed as the nature of his duties calls upon him ; it will not be like a privilege, so as to exempt him from the immediate discharge of duties which devolve upon him to fulfil by the command of God. I ask, now, to what is that scrupulosity owing, which deters Papists from attending our religious services ? Whence, and from whom, arose the opinion, that our Church is schismatical, our faith heretical,‡ and all our ceremonies polluted and profane ? Not from the sacred Scriptures, which it is a crime needing absolution for a layman to meddle with ;§ but from the paltry rumours of certain villanous jugglers, to whose tales, if any one pays any credit, in a matter however trifling, he must needs be looked on as *over credulous* ; if in this business of religion and salvation, which is by far the greatest of all, he is deservedly accounted *insane*. Since, then, the law of charity commands that we entertain a good opinion of every one, until the contrary appears on sufficient grounds, Papists in this country ought to think honourably of their Mother, the English Church, until those accusers can, from the Word of God, shew where any corruption is lurking ; which never has, and never will be done by them.

* Vid. Parisiensis *De Vitiis*, cap. 10.

† Vide Durand. lib. 2. dist. 39, quæst. 5.

‡ See Chillingworth's masterly discussion of these points.

§ See the Papal assumptions in this respect as intimated in Determination V. p. 241. This assertion should, however, be qualified in the present day, by limiting it to Papal countries, such as Spain, Italy, Belgium, which have no translation of the Scriptures authorised by the Church of Rome. In other countries, uncommissioned bodies are *let*, or find it most politic themselves to undertake something, in order to keep the Laity from Protestant versions—to serve some local purpose, &c. But see *Popery the Enemy and Falsifier of Scripture, illustrative of the conduct of the Modern Church of Rome* ; London, 1845.

But to have done with these notable witnesses, these deserters, I say, of a battered faith, to whose accusations of our Church assent is rashly given; if we weigh thoroughly the method adopted by them, and those of our side, in training our hearers, it will be evident to any sound, and sober-minded man, that ours ought to be heard, and they to be exploded. For our party does not attempt to lord it over the faith of the Laity; but, as is most proper, permits all to search the Scriptures privately; often to hear selections publicly read in the Churches, and that, too, in the vernacular language; in fine, in doubts and controversies to admit that as true, which they themselves ascertain to be agreeable to the rule of truth. But the Popish Prelates adopt a contrary course. They wish that senseless postulate of theirs to be admitted by all of their sect, at the very outset, viz. *That whatsoever the Roman Pontiff shall pronounce from his oracular Chair, is true and divine*. Nor is even this deemed to be security enough, unless they are allowed to add, also, a dogma of the same impudent character, *That the Laity ought not to be permitted to examine the Scriptures,* nor to bring any doctrine which their teachers put forward as true, to the touchstone of the rule of truth*. When with these devices they have deprived their pupil of all light and intelligence, he may then be led about, *ut nervis alienis mobile lignum*,

Like a thing of wood and wires, by others played.†

Nor is it wonderful if he is drawn away, as well from the truth, as from our worship. Now I leave it to any one who has a spark of proper feeling left, to judge, whether—on the faith of the calumnious tales of such men,‡ training their pupils in such a manner,—our Churches are to be condemned, unheard, and deserted by her children.

In the last place, I will add, also, that it is the safest way for unlearned men, who cannot form a proper judgment of controversies

* The Reader should bear in mind, constantly, that this is a general remark, and truer, in fact, in the times of Bishop Davenant, than in the present; when the fear of losing adherents, the zeal of Protestant Churches, and the reports brought from thoroughly Papal countries, lead the Papal Directors to adopt a different mode of acting, thus tolerating, at times, the circulation of Bibles, &c., in what are considered proper hands: See, however, as before, for the *general rule*, *Popery the Enemy and Falsifier of Scripture*, &c.

† Horace, Sat. lib. ii. sat. vii. l. 82. Francis's Translation, who adds in a Note:—"Nervis alienis mobile signum. Signum of the common Editions does not determine the meaning of the Poet; besides these, automata, *neurospasta*, *sigilla automata*, were often made of metal or ivory. That men are acted by their passions, as puppets are by wires, is a sentiment of Plato."

‡ See Dr. Geddes' *Miscellaneous Tracts*, London, 1705. vol. iii., for some effects produced by such misrepresenting fabrications.

which involve abstruse speculations, to turn their minds to those which are called moral; and to cease to regard, as an oracle, that Church which, in spite of the guidance of sound reason, errs shamefully in these things; nor yet, at her word of command, perversely to resist their Mother, namely, the English Church. Let the gross and foul idolatry of Romanism, so evident, be borne in mind. Let the practice of equivocation, so hateful to God and man, keenly maintained though it be by Romanists, not be forgotten; nor yet the deposing and murderings of Sovereigns to be undertaken, if a Pope but nod; nor again the releasing of subjects from their oaths by the same authority. Why should I further mention the traffickings in indulgences, as ridiculous to the sellers as to the purchasers? Why the public prostitution of women in brothels, gainful to the Pope, but disgraceful—as any thing can be—to the whole Christian name?

To understand that all these things are abominable and impious, there needs not the aid of some Theologian, but the exercise of common intelligence: not the light of supernatural faith, but the use of natural reason. These are subjects, which, if seriously thought of by our less learned Papists, would lead them, without doubt, from the Roman Synagogue, and bring them back to the bosom of our Church.

But if they cannot be induced by reasoning to attend our temples and sacred worship, (as I hinted at the beginning,) it devolves upon the Magistrate to compel them to their duty, by inspiring them with terror and alarm, and imposing penalties on them.

In the first place, the office of the Magistrate obliges him to this, for he is the guardian of both the Tables; and, on that account, he is bound to draw off those under his control from superstition, even against their wills, and to compel them, however reluctant, to attend the true worship of God. It is customary with shepherds to bring their wandering sheep homewards to their folds by inflicting stripes; and Sovereigns ought, in like manner, to recover their wandering subjects to the Church by imposing punishments. Either, then, we must deny that the true worship of God is practised in our temples, or must admit that all should be compelled to attend the sacred services of our Churches.*

* It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to express dissent from this opinion—though reference might be made in confirmation of it to the argument of the day, that *it is as lawful for Protestants as Papists to compel*. (See an important Pamphlet of the date of 1679, entitled *The Ungrateful Behaviour of the Papists, Priests, and Jesuits, &c.*);—it was an opinion which lingered long in various sections of the Church, though not, as with Rome, authorised. But let the Reader, who

Moreover, the interests of subjects themselves demands this care, as their right, from the Magistrate; for this forcible assembling of them together, breaks through their stubbornness, stimulates sluggish stupidity, excites the dormant intellect; and those whom on the first assault it made *afraid*, it afterwards will render *willing*, and, in the end, *intelligent* and *wise*. In Augustine, [we read] Epist. 48., that the Donatists having been brought to a better understanding by the fear of the law and punishments, made this confession voluntarily: *Misled by errors we were deterred from entering, the falseness of which we should not have learnt had we not entered; nor should we have entered, unless compelled to do so. Thanks to God, who shook off our indifference by the stimulus of fear.*

Lastly, external peace, and the public good, require that all living in the same Republic should be restricted to the observance of one and the true religion. For what Nazianzen has observed (Orat. 10.) is most true, that *Agreement in religion is the bond of the firmest peace and concord; but dissension is the fan of the bitterest contention and discord.* I close with this brief remark:—

Since there is nothing in our religious forms to which Papists can properly take dislike, and there is nothing in the ceremonies and religion of Romanism worthy of their embracing it, we conclude, both that they ought to be present at the worship of Protestants, and, if reluctant, should be brought back to our Churches by the command of the lawful authorities.

wishes to have a full view of the subject, see Gretton's admirable and soberly-argued Conclusion to his *Vindication of the Doctrines of the Church of England*, 8vo., 1725; and Dr. M'Crie's *Miscellaneous Writings*; pp. 483—86.

. A passage from Archbishop Tillotson's *Sermon before the King*, April 2, 1680, vindicating the Protestant Religion from the charge of singularity and novelty, may fitly be added here. It forms his fifth Observation, thus:—

“5.—*The example of Princes and Governors hath a very great influence upon the people in matters of Religion.* This I collect from the context; and Joshua was sensible of it: and therefore, though he firmly believed the true Religion to have those advantages that would certainly recommend it to every impartial man's judgment, yet knowing that the multitude are easily imposed upon and led into error, he thought fit to incline and determine them by his own example, and by declaring his own peremptory resolution in the case, *Choose you this day whom you will serve; as for me, I and my house will serve the Lord.* Laws are a good security to Religion, but the example of governors is a living law, which secretly overrules the minds of men, and binds them to a compliance with it,

—————*Non sic inflectere sensus
Humanos edicta valent, ut vita Regentis.*

The lives and actions of Princes [Magistrates] have usually a greater sway upon the minds of the people than their laws.”

QUESTION XXVIII.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE POPE IS NOT UNIVERSAL.

[*The Translation of this subject is adopted (after revision) from the Protestant Journal for January, 1834, in which No. it was inserted as a refutation of the following doctrines, which appeared in the Roman Catholic Magazine of the day :—*

“ (Not to dwell on their other enormities) Bishops are ejected who have been lawfully instituted by *him who alone holds the Primacy* in all ecclesiastical jurisdiction; invested, as he is, with plenitude of power in the Church, by Divine right; and to whom, alone, it belongs, to assign successors to every Church that has become widowed of its former pastor.” * * * * *

“ By virtue of this our universal apostleship and superintendency over the whole Christian flock, committed unto us by the sacred Prince of Shepherds, we found ourselves, in a most especial manner, compelled to exercise our authority, in order to consult the common interest of Religion, * * * * * and the foregoing of which on our part, involving as it does the abandonment of the Church, of Religion, and the salvation of souls, would have rendered us, indeed, completely miserable.”—“ *Allocution of Pope Gregory XVI. to the Cardinals, on the state of the Church in Portugal.*”—From a translation in the *Roman Catholic Magazine* for December, 1833, No. 35, p. lxxx.]

WE concede to every Bishop the jurisdiction over the particular flocks committed to him, from the Divine ordination; to Archbishops and Patriarchs in certain regions and provinces, in accordance with ecclesiastical prescription: but we affirm that the universal jurisdiction over the whole Church of God, either by Divine or human right, centres in no one, but is a mere Antichristian usurpation. Boniface the VIIIth, indeed, defined,* that *every human creature ought to be subject to the Roman Pontiff*; and he decreed this subjection to be *necessary to salvation*. The Canonists† applaud this decree, and teach that the Pope occupies the place of the living God over the whole globe, so that to this Vicar of God men and angels are bound to yield obedience. I will not touch that mad dream about the *temporal* jurisdiction of the Pope; but I will dis-

* Extravag. commun. de majoritate et obedientia.

Boniface flourished in the thirteenth century. The Gregory from whom the passage given above is quoted, is the *present* Pope of Rome. For the definitions of Boniface, see *The Power of the Popes*, (Part II. p. 100,) a very instructive work, translated from the French by R. T. H. Tims, Dublin, 1838.]

† Silvest. in verbo Papa. Alvar. l. 12.

prove the two primary heads of his *spiritual* jurisdiction, which being overthrown, this universal jurisdiction, in all other things, must of necessity fall to the ground.

First, then, the Roman Pontiff claims to himself an absolute power of proposing and deciding in matters of faith and religion, and that all Christians are under an obligation to receive and hold his decision, for the true and infallible oracle of the Divine Spirit. Now, on the contrary, we assert that

The privileges which are the right of the Supreme Lord alone, those a servant cannot usurp without the guilt of treason. And to wish that his voice should be heard by all the sheep of Christ, without any exception; to wish that his commands should be obeyed by all Christians, without any refusal, pertains alone to the dignity of Him who heretofore said, *My sheep hear my voice*, John x. 27; *Be not ye called Master, because one is your Master, even Christ*, Matt. xxiii. 10. *The Catholic Church does not admit the doctrine or decrees of any others concerning faith, merely on the ground of their assertion; but because they have been able to prove by Canonical authors that Christ so meant.* Augustine, Epist 19.

Moreover, He who prescribes the faith to the Catholic Church, and that by the ordination of Christ, ought to be himself altogether precluded from a possibility of erring. For should he err, (and this may happen to a Pope) he would endeavour to obtrude his heresy upon others: and since it is not allowable for subjects to judge of the sentence of the universal Judge, Christians must fall into the depths of the errors with their blind leader. Gregory the Great employs this very argument against John of Constantinople. *If one Bishop be called universal, this one falling, the universal Church will fall with him.**

Add to this, That Christ was not accustomed to delegate to his Ministers, by special command, a jurisdiction, the power of administering which he knew that they never could exercise. And here let the Jesuits answer me, Who of the Roman Pontiffs could ever determine and define all controversies of faith, arising everywhere in the world, by his judicial sentence? For the Church of Christ is extended widely, and many are the Christians through the whole earth, to whom neither the Pontifical decrees, nor the Legates from the Lateran, nay, scarcely the name itself of Rome, or of the Roman Pontiff, hath at any time reached even by report? How senseless, therefore, is this notion of the Pope, to claim a jurisdiction over nations situated so far distant, concerning whom he could have no knowledge, and with whom he could establish no intercourse!

* Epist. lib. 6. Epist. 24.

Lastly, If Christ had seen fit to bind the faith of Christians by the definitions and decrees of Popes, who can doubt but either Christ himself, or Paul, or surely Peter, or at all events some one of the Apostles, would have advertised the Church by one word at least concerning this Judge in ordinary of the whole Church? Let the Papists, therefore, search the Scriptures from beginning to end; if they are able to find even one syllable about this universal jurisdiction of the Roman Bishops, we all will transfer ourselves to the Papal camp in one body. In 1 Cor. xii. 28, and also in Ephes. iv. 11, the Apostle speaks about all those ministers, by whose means Christ, after his ascension, would edify the Church. But, most unluckily for Rome, there is not a word about the Bishop of Rome having the government of the whole Church, nor of his prescribing the rule of faith. If Christ had intended *this* Pontiff to be acknowledged for such an one, surely he would have announced him as such to his Church.

2.—But let us now come to the other head. As though it were a light thing to prescribe the faith to the whole Church, the Roman Pontiff, in the second place, claims to himself universal jurisdiction over all ecclesiastical persons whatsoever.* For he affirms that the right pertains to him to ordain, to depose, to condemn, to restore all Bishops; and if these things were done at any time by other Bishops or Councils, they affirm that it was done by power derived from the Roman Pontiff, *who is the Universal Ruler, and from whom the authority of ruling over all others descends*. Durand. lib. 4. dist. 24. quæst. 5. Now we shall easily show that not in these two respects even does universal jurisdiction centre in him.

First, right reason would never concede to a single individual liberty to judge over all ecclesiastical persons, and to be judged by none. For how could he, sitting at Rome, advantageously decide either concerning the crimes or the merits of those who are occupied in Churches far distant, and of whom he could hear nothing but uncertain rumours? Who should be ordained, who deposed, who restored, they would best determine, who could observe the manners and the lives of individuals, and who could call together and hear censures and witnesses, without any trouble; as Cyprian formerly contended, Epist. lib. 1. Epist. 3. And experience itself shows that rarely, especially in latter ages, have the Roman Pontiffs mingled themselves in the affairs of foreign Churches, without at the same time violating justice, patronizing the wicked, and corrupting the discipline of the Church.

Secondly, to reason I add the authority of Scripture, which plainly

* Gloss. Grat. in dist. 12. Alvar. lib. i. cap. 45. Sylvest. in verbo Papa.

prohibits this lordship of one over all others, Luke xxii. 25, 26, *The kings of the Gentiles exercise authority over them.....but ye shall not be so. Not lording it over the Clergy*, says Peter himself,* 1 Epist. v. 3. ; to whom, notwithstanding his disclaimer, the Papists endeavour to assign this dominion. Besides, Christ himself constituted every Church as judge of every person composing it—*If thy brother shall sin against thee.....tell it to the Church*, Matt. xviii. 15, 17. Either, therefore, the Pontiff must expunge himself from the number of the Christian fraternity, or acknowledge himself subject to the judgment of the Church. If, then, he is subjected to the judgment of the Roman Church, how much more to the Universal Church! *for if authority be sought, the world is greater than a city*, as Jerome heretofore said: (Epist. 85.) Our Jesuit notables may believe if they please, that he, over whom a particular Church can exercise jurisdiction, has a jurisdiction over the Universal Church ; certainly no Theologian will ever admit it.

Lastly, I may bring forward the practice of the Church, which, from the times of the Apostle unto their own, has not acknowledged this universal jurisdiction of the Roman Bishop. Who does not know that Paul and the other Apostles founded Churches, ordained Bishops, condemned and deposed heretics, immediately, and not by power delegated from Peter? So also in the Eastern Churches, Bishops were ordained, tried, and deposed by the authority of the Provincial Bishops, without waiting for the assent of Roman Pontiffs.† The reply of Cajetan‡ is ridiculous, *That a deciding authority in all these things rested with the Roman Pontiff, but that, after the laudable custom of the Church, he waived his privilege*. For whoever supposed that any permission was necessary for the Patriarch of Alexandria or Antioch, within their limits, to ordain Bishops subject to them, or pass judgment concerning the same in a Council convened among their own prelates. The Glossator of Gratian speaks more ingenuously and truly,§ who, seeing that not only the Metropolitans with their Provincials, but the Roman Bishops, now claimed to themselves the consecration of all Bishops, confessed that it was *contrary to right*, and adds, *that the Pope prescribed against right*: we say that he violated right, and usurped to himself the rights of others. But the authority of the Nicene Council is above all exception, in which (Canon 6) [it is decreed] that like all other Patriarchs, so the

* See *Protestant Journal*, 1836, p. 576, for an excellent paper on this very point ; as also Craig's *Refutation of Popery*.

† Grat. dist. 51 ; et Caus. 11. quæst. 3.

‡ *De Pontif. instit.* cap. 13.

§ Dist. 51 ; et Caus. 24. quæst 1.

Bishop of Rome also is restricted to his own limits. To which, as extra weight, the Decree of the Council of Milevi may be brought (Can. 22), prohibiting appeals to be made oversea (as was the way with the factious) to the See of Rome. These holy Prelates would assuredly never have ventured on such a course, if Christ had placed an universal sovereignty over the Church in the hands of the Bishop of Rome. But why need I say more? It has been a common opinion among Catholic authors, that the Pope may be judged and deposed by others. Gratian acknowledged that *it ought to be done for heresy*: To which the Glossator adds likewise (Dist. 40.) *for any other notorious crime*. Clemens, Bishop of Rome, in his Epistle to James (which Turrianus contends is genuine*) grants that he may be deposed even *for negligence*. The thing speaks for itself. Honorius the Emperor deposed Boniface; Otho, John XIII.; the Council of Constance, three rival Popes; the Council of Basil, Eugenius IV.† The Church, therefore, itself had, and by right always ought to have, the jurisdiction over the Pope: but the Pope neither hath any, nor ought to have any, over the Universal Church.

* “Et hi ipsi quidem Centuriatores, vel maxime hoc nomine commendandi sunt, quod rationibus solidissimis demonstrarunt, hasce veterum Pontificum Romanorum epistolas spurias esse, et supposititias, immo pessimo consilio a pseudo-ISIDORO isto confictas; l. c. Magno equidem conatu iis sese opposuit FRANCISCUS TURRIANUS, in opere ex instituto adversus illos scripto, sive *libris quinque, adversus Magdeburgenses pro Canonibus Apostolorum et Epistolis Decretalibus Pontificum Apostolicorum*, ubi per quatuor integros libros id agit, ut Epistolas istas Decretales defendat. Sed pœnas suæ temeritatis justissimas is dedit DAVIDI BLONDELLO, in *pseudo-Isidoro et Turriano vapulantibus, seu editione et censura nova Epistolarum omnium, quas piissimis urbis Romæ Præsulibus, a beato Clemente ad Siricium, &c., nefando ausu, infelici eventu, Isidorus cognomento Mercator supposuit, Franciscus Turrianus Jesuita adversus Magdeburgensium ἐλέγχους, aculeato stylo defendere conatus est, &c.* Genevæ MDCXXVIII. 4. Non tantum autem in prolegomenis, argumentis solidissimis, epistolas hasce a pseudo-ISIDORO confictas esse, demonstravit, et Turriani varias exceptiones dissipavit; sed et singulas deinceps epistolas exhibuit, easque sub examen revocavit, et incredibili diligentia auctores, e quorum centonibus consutæ sunt, investigavit, indicavitque.”—Buddei Isagogue, Lib. posterioris cap. 5. *De Jurisprudencia Eccles.* §. iv. towards the end.

† See Dr. Geddes's Introduction to his *Conncil of Trent no free Assembly*; Lond. 1697, for some account of this gentleman's freaks.

*. In reference to Papal Supremacy, or the arrogant presumption noticed on p. 365, the Translator cannot withhold a confirmation of its being assumed by Romanists, just derived from a volume of sonnets and hymns in Italian, in the British Museum, addressed to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; on the title page to which Pope Innocent the XI. is called *Vice-God*; the annunciation runs thus:—“DIO SONETTI ED HINNI CONSAGRATI AL VICE DIO INNOCENZO UNDECIMO, PONTIFICE OTTIMO MASSIMO, da Francesco de Lemene. In Milano 1692, Con Licenza de' Superiori.” 4to.

QUESTION XXIX.

IMPLICIT FAITH IS NOT SAVING FAITH.

To the term *implicit faith* more than one meaning is attached; for sometimes faith is called *implicit* in reference to our imperfect apprehension of the objects of faith, as being *implicitæ*, that is, complicated and abstruse. For as anything which is folded together and entwined or entangled with other things is not wholly accessible either to the sight or the touch; so it is with most of the mysteries of the Christian faith.* For instance, these doctrines,—*God is three and one; the word was made flesh; the godly will enjoy God in heaven*, and others of the like kind, every believer receives with *explicit* faith, inasmuch as he actually apprehends the propositions themselves, and yields actual assent to each. But because in these particular mysteries there are many points inscrutable, and which our mind and thoughts cannot grasp, we are rightly said to look upon them with an *implicit*, that is with an obscure and imperfect faith, as on objects which are involved and complicated. For our state of pilgrimage does not admit of a perfect and fully developed notion of Divine things in all their parts. For the Apostle testifies, 1 Cor. xiii. 12, *Now we see through a glass, darkly,†—we know but in part*, and so on. It is not such a faith that we are now treating of, which, whether it be termed *dark,‡* or *implicit*, is acceptable to God, and is accompanied with a saving virtue. Yet I think it should be added, that as an eye afflicted with bleariness yet guides the traveller to the end of his journey, because it possesses in itself some of the visual faculty, not because it is bleared; so this implicit or imperfect faith operates to the salvation of the believer, on the ground that it apprehends the doctrines of saving truth, not because it is deficient or dim-sighted in apprehending them.

2.—Sometimes the appellation of *implicit faith* is given, though improperly, to the simple promptitude, disposition, or general preparation of the mind to yield assent to the word of God, as soon

* Vide Aquin. quæst. disp. *De Fid.* art. 11.

* ἐν ἀνίγμاتي.

† ἀνίγμα.

as any doctrine becomes known to us under this formal principle.* And in this sense every Christian is said to believe implicitly, whatever God has revealed in the Scriptures. This general persuasion of the truth of the Divine word is *necessary* indeed; yet it is not in itself *saving*; for it may co-exist with ignorance of the doctrines wholly necessary to salvation: nay, it may consist with pernicious errors, contrary to the Scripture itself. For all heretics who allow that the authority of the Scripture is Divine and infallible, do, in the meantime, cherish many grievous errors, not being yet conscious of their being irreconcilable with these Scriptures. The general or implicit obedience therefore of faith which all Christians without distinction yield to the Scriptures, if not accompanied with an explicit perception of the doctrines to be believed, and with a firm assent wrought out by the operation of the Holy Spirit, comes not up to the nature and efficacy of saving faith. [Again]—

3.—That is generally called *implicit* faith by the Papists, and is most highly recommended to the Laity, which rests itself† upon the knowledge of the Rulers of the Church,‡ though the people the meanwhile are altogether ignorant of those doctrines to which they are thus said to give credence. For the particular points which, in their opinion, ought to be apprehended explicitly by the Laity, are but few, while the greatest part by far of the Christian doctrines are, they maintain, to be held by means of an implicit faith. It is of this that Hugo de St. Victor thus writes:§ *He who gives credit to a believer is not improperly said to believe what the latter believes, although he knows not what that is which the latter does believe.* And a little after, *Faith is sometimes accompanied with knowledge, when a man knows that which he believes; sometimes without knowledge, when he only yields credence to one who has both knowledge and belief.*

Let us now shew briefly, that this implicit faith, the only one which the Papists leave for their lay members, affecting too most of the heads of the Christian Religion, is neither *saving*, nor indeed *faith*.

It is not *saving*; for the faith which avails to salvation, always apprehends the word of the Gospel, which is *the power of God unto salvation* (Rom. i. 16). But this, which implicitly relies on the faith and knowledge of others, is not carried out so as to embrace

* Vide Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 2. art. 5.

† Or enwraps, or envelopes itself.

‡ Vide Bonav. in 3. sent. dist. 25. et Durand. lib. 3. dist. 25. quæst. 1.

§ *De Sacr. Fid.* lib. 1. part. 30. cap. 3.

any doctrine of the Gospel ; but merely believes that the things, of which it is wholly ignorant, are rightly understood and believed by the Rulers of the Church. But the correctness of his *own* faith, not that of *another man*, saves the believer. Again, that faith which can effect salvation ought to be so conceived in every one's own heart, that when the glory of God requires it, it can be also expressed by the mouth. (Rom. x. 9, 10.) But this, which they call *implicit* faith, seeing that it has not its seat in a man's own heart, could not make profession thereof by the mouth.

But it is a mistake to call it *faith* at all ; for, to believe is an act of reflection accompanied with assent ; he, therefore, who has never reflected on those doctrines which the Rulers of the Church believe, nor given to them actual assent (unless we have determined to misapply words) cannot be said to believe them either *habitually* or *actually*, either *explicitly* or *implicitly*. For no one is understood to believe, unless so far as *his own personal faith terminates in some object of faith*, as Aquinas correctly teaches * But let us grant to the Romanists, that their Laity do implicitly believe doctrines of the nature of which they are altogether ignorant, solely upon this principle, that they believe whatever the Church believes (now it holds and believes all the doctrines of the Christian faith), see what this will lead to ; for it might by the same argument be proved, that Mahometans and Pagans believe implicitly all the mysteries of the Christian faith ; because they all believe that whatsoever has been revealed by God himself is true : but all the doctrines of our faith have been laid open and revealed to the human race by God himself.†

4.—In the last place, that kind of faith is called *implicit* which, although it includes a definite apprehension of the doctrines believed, yet grounds its assurance of their certainty, not upon the testimony of the word or the Spirit, but upon the authority and testimony of the Prelates, who teach and determine that it is so. The faith last mentioned is implicit inasmuch as it rests on the *knowledge* of other men ; this faith is implicit inasmuch as it rests on the *authority* of other men. And in fact this is the common opinion of all Papists, that the Laity believe what they do believe

* 2. 2. quæst. 1. art. 2. [Aquinas's aim was to shew, that the immediate object of actual faith, as exercised by the believer, is not bare abstract truth, but facts or doctrines, capable of being expressed in the form of a logical proposition. The sentence might, therefore, have been given thus: *as his own personal faith terminates in some object of faith capable of being expressed by a definite proposition.*

† By this obvious non-sequitur and absurdity, Davenant illustrates the equal absurdity of the Popish argument.

in reliance on the external testimony of the Church, whether they themselves understand what is propounded to them to be agreeable to the word of God or not. This is what Lombard meant when he said,* *The younger in the Church cleave to the elder, and, as it were, commit their faith to them*; and what some Jesuit not long since wrote,† that it was *the duty of the Laity, in what concerned the doctrines of the faith, to see, not with their own eyes, but with the eyes of their Prelates*. The faith consequently which they leave to their Laity, is not founded and established in an understanding of the word, or the revelation of the Spirit; but is dependent upon the testimony of their ecclesiastical rulers, attaching itself to, and bound up, as it were, in their authority. But we affirm that this also is not *saving*:—

First, because the Prophet says (Jerem. xvii. 5.) *Cursed is he that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm*; to which curse those are in the highest degree subject, who, in by far the weightiest of all things—the business of their faith and salvation, are willing to depend on human authority merely. True it is, that God himself has been pleased to employ the ministry of men in making known the word of salvation; that he would also have the voice of these ministers to be listened to with due honour, and the deepest reverence by all Christians; yet he would not have the faith of his Church absolutely to depend upon the mere authority of the Preachers. For the *basis* and *rule* of faith is one thing, the *outward teacher* and *preacher* of faith is another. Saving faith ought always to rest itself upon the Rule of Faith, not upon the bare affirmations or determinations of Ecclesiastical Rulers.

Besides, that Faith is not truly Theological which may owe its origin to Free-will, without the grace of the Spirit illuminating it; whereas, that which reposes upon the authority of Ecclesiastics, is not a supernatural gift of God, but an effect of Free-will and nature. For among Turks and Pagans, the people depend with an implicit faith, such as this, on the guidance and testimony of their teachers. Such a faith as this, therefore, is a merely *human, self-acquired* readiness to believe; from which a *Theological* and *saving* faith always differs, because it carries light with it, by which the mind itself of the believer, having his eyes enlightened by God, perceives the Divine truth of the things believed.

Whosoever, then, believes unto salvation, the Holy Spirit so enlightens him by the word, that in believing he does not yield the obedience of a blind faith to his rulers, but he himself has *the eyes of his understanding enlightened*, as the Apostle says, Eph. i. 18.

* Lib. 3. dist. 35.

† Catalog. lib. 1. pag. 35.

In fine, saving faith is so firm, so solidly fixed and rooted in the heart of a believer, that if an angel from heaven should teach the contrary, he would not hesitate to call him accursed (Gal. i. 18.) But if, on the other hand, we seriously consider what this implicit and inherent faith is, which rests on the authority of Ecclesiastics, we shall easily perceive that it can never attain this Divine assuredness. For a superstructure cannot be more firm than the foundation upon which it is raised; but the testimony of Prelates themselves is itself unstable and mutable. In the Eastern Church the Prelates decreed it, by their unanimous votes, as true and Catholic doctrine, that Christ was consubstantial with the Father; and a little after, with no less concurrence, they withdrew the term consubstantial.* In the Church of England, too, the Prelates, within the space of a few years, first rejected, and then re-established the abomination of the Roman Antichrist.† There is an end, therefore, to the firmness of the faith of Christians, if it is always held as implicitly attached to the testimony of Ecclesiastics.

Let us, then, come to the conclusion, that since this implicit faith of the Papists relies on human testimony, and not on God, since it does not exceed the power of free-will, and since it obtains no supernatural certitude, that it is not, indeed, a faith which bringeth salvation.

* That is the term *ὁμοούσιον* used in their Creeds. [See Socrat. Hist. Eccles. Lib. ii. cap. 37.]

† It has lately been alleged, and by a Clerical member of the Church of England, too, that the Reformers were vastly accommodating as to their Creed. Whether the objector, living at his ease in these days, would *then* have acted differently, may be gravely doubted. Anyhow, the Reformers—just supposing the assertion correct—were not by any means *singular* in this respect. This is warmly adverted to in the Preface to the Conferences between Bishops Latimer and Ridley, written about 1556, and apparently by John Olde: “Which thing needeth none other proof, (especially for the realm of England) but only to call to mind with what conscience and constancy these pillars of the Church (that cannot err) have walked in Religion these twenty years by past: how they (not long ago) received and allowed things, which, with fire and faggot they persecute now; and shrank from that, then, which now they most earnestly maintain. And although there appeared in the latter days a shadow of stoutness in a few, yet it was, indeed, nothing. First, it sprang not out of any zeal to the cause, or clearness of conscience, but rather out of a like subtle and foxy presumption, as the Syrians once conceived, when they put themselves in the danger of king Ahab, saying: *Behold we have heard that the kings of the house of Israel are pitiful and merciful kings.* (1 Kings xx. 31). For out of all doubt, King Henry the Eighth could as easily have obtained at Winchester’s hands, and others, a conformity in putting down the Mass, and all the rest; whatsoever hath been done (by order) since, if he had earnestly minded it; as the abolishing of the Pope, monkery, pilgrimages, relics, with like baggage; all which are now again things well esteemed, and covered (as all the residue is) with the cloak of the Catholic Church.”—*Ridley’s Works*, (pp. 101, 102.) *Parker Society’s Edition*.

QUESTION XXX.

TEMPORAL DOMINION IS NOT FOUNDED IN GRACE.

WE call that *temporal dominion** which is usually so designated from *political* or *civil* possession; and is the right, or capability of having, of ruling, or using persons or things according to properly established laws.

Now we deny that this dominion is founded in grace; because it is not so connected with the supernatural gifts of faith, of love, or of holiness, that either those who have never had faith or grace, thereby lose the right of dominion in or over temporal things, or those forthwith forfeit their right, who have departed from soundness in the faith or holiness of manners. Waldo, Wickliffe, and Huss, of old, were diligent in maintaining the contrary error† (if we may believe the Monks‡); namely, that any one living in mortal sin has no just dominion over anything; and therefore, every King, Prince, or Prelate, if he is void of grace, has but a dubious possession of these titles; because, to establish real dominion, there is required true justice and supernatural grace in the person who holds it.§

* This term, as here used, does not signify what we ordinarily attach to it, but the general principle of possession or tenure in any property.

“Dominium signifies quiritarian ownership, or property in a thing; and Dominus, or Dominus legitimus, is the owner.

“Possessor is often used by Roman writers as equivalent to owner, but this is not a correct use of the word.

“Dominium properly signifies the right of dealing with a corporeal thing, as a person (*dominus*) pleases; this, of course, implies the right to exclude all others from meddling with it. The Dominus has the right to possess, and is distinguished, in that respect, from the bare possessor, who has only the right of possession.”

See Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*; in accordance with whose definitions, as above illustrated at some length, the use of the technical phraseology is retained throughout the translation of this article.

† See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, Edit. 1843, vol. iii. pp. 14, 81, 83, 122, 468; and Note p. 802.

‡ *Waldens. Doctr. fid.* lib. 2. art. 3. cap. 81.

§ Soto *de jure et just.* lib. 4. quæst 1. art. 1.

These opinions are everywhere censured by the Papists, who nevertheless have promoted the same error, and have, in our times, filled volumes on volumes in maintaining it. For Huss, who thought* that a King or a Prince living in mortal sin should be called a King only under a dubious title, yet without hesitation, allows that God himself approves *a King* of this kind, *so far*, as he terms it, *as he is a King externally*; and therefore, the deposing of such a King can never have entered his thoughts. But the Pope and Papists think the right of dominion to be so founded in the grace of faith, that if any King deserts the Roman faith, or shakes off the yoke of Roman obedience, he does, by this deadly sin, deserve to be deprived of his kingdom, and he may, and ought to be deprived of his legitimate dominion and hereditary kingdom, by the sentence of the Pope.† To these errors I shall oppose two propositions:—

I.—The first is this:—*There is a true and just dominion over temporal things, among those who never were endowed with faith and supernatural grace.*

1.—This is confirmed, in the first place, by the Divine gift. For who can claim anything by a more firm and just title, than from its having been the gift of God himself. Now it is evident that God, according to the settled law of his Providence, assigns outward good things to the ungodly and unbelievers. Thus says Augustine,‡ *There are gifts which God bestows on his enemies; there are others which he keeps for his friends alone: all external things are given promiscuously to the good and to the evil.* So Christ himself, (Matt. v. 45.) *God maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth his rain on the just and on the unjust.* Although, then, among unbelievers, and the ungodly, the mode of using these temporal things is for the most part unjust; yet the title for possessing them may be perfectly just.

2.—It tends, also, to corroborate this reason, that we find God communicating himself to many men in gifts, *natural* and *political*, to whom he does not communicate himself in *spiritual* things. He gives *natural* life to very many, to whom he does not impart *spiritual* life; he gives *political* foresight to some, to whom he does not give *saving* foresight. The principle of the Divine wisdom and goodness, then, seems to require, that to whom there has been granted temporal life, to the same, also, should be granted a dominion in temporal things; and that, those on whom gifts have been bestowed fit and proper for promoting the good of the State, should

* Traet. in *Decimis*, pag. 121.

† Aquin., Cajetan, Bellarm., Suarez, and others.

‡ On *Psal.* lvi. pag. 685.

not be excluded from their rightful power of administering. Nor have they been excluded if we credit the Scriptures, in which God acknowledges that he gave the regal dominion to Cyrus (Isa. xlv.); Christ shews that a true and lawful empire was given to Cæsar (Matt. xxii.); Paul and Peter confess that the dominion of Nero was established and confirmed by the Divine appointment. (Rom. xiii.; 1 Pet. ii.)

3.—It may be added, also, in the third place, that it is sufficient to establish legitimate right, that the individual has come into possession of it by such means as are approved by good laws. Hence Augustine affirms (Epist. 48, near the end,) that any earthly portion may be rightly possessed by any one, either under Divine right, as all the possessions of the just are held; or, by human right, which resides in the control of the Kings of the earth. He, therefore, who by succession, election, purchase, or donation, or by any other mode, shall have acquired a just claim for himself to these temporal things, is accounted a *bona fide* possessor upon good authority; not by men alone, but by God himself, which is clear from this circumstance, that the law of God considers the individual to be guilty of theft who despoils any man of his goods. To the same effect are those remarks of Augustine,* *On what is grounded the claim of any one to possess what he does possess? Is it not of human right? For by human right it is said, This cottage is mine, this house is mine, this servant is mine. Why? Because God has distributed through the Sovereigns of the world that human right for the service of mankind.* Since, then, human laws assign to the ungodly a true dominion over their own property, in the same way must God himself be accounted as assigning it.

4.—Moreover, since the grace of God is invisible, if dominion should be founded in it, no one could know, without a special revelation, who was a legitimate King, or who should be regarded as the true possessor of anything. If the case were so, there is no one but may easily perceive that all things would be filled with confusion and trouble. Therefore God, who is the author of peace and order, undoubtedly has placed the right of dominion, not in a thing which escapes the eye of human understanding, but in some outward and evident sign, which may be discerned by mankind. A sign of this kind is not grace, which lies hid in the heart of the possessor; but election, succession, and other things (to which we just now alluded) which easily fall under the observation of the generality.

* In Evang. Joan. Tract, 6. pag. 60. tom. 9. [tom. iii. pt. ii. col. 340. §. 25. Edit. Rom.]

5.—Lastly, such as deny the possession of legitimate dominion to those who are wanting in supernatural grace, ought to assert, also, that no one can buy or accept any thing from such persons; for legitimate possession is the basis of all contracts, which are transacted according to the rule of commutative justice. On the contrary, we know that the most just Abraham purchased a field of the children of Heth; and that Jacob used to purchase corn from the Egyptians. By which fact they acknowledged that those idolators had acquired a rightful claim to their temporal property. Nor have we ever met with any holy man who is said, on the strength of grace, to have pounced upon the property of the wicked, or claimed to himself, on that score, any new temporal right.

The maintainers, however, of the notion, that temporal dominion is founded in grace, set about endeavouring to prove it by many subtleties; the chief of which we will meet.

1.—They would fain argue, that all just dominion as regards men, presupposes, also, right as regards God; to which right, they suppose all those can have no claim who are devoid of sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, we hesitate not to affirm, in reply, that the dominion of the Gentiles themselves in temporal things, even as it regards God, is considered just and legitimate, whenever they have obtained possession of that dominion by just and lawful means. We have touched upon the reason before; namely, that God himself approves of human laws, devised for the good of the human race, by the benefit of which Gentiles and infidels succeed to inheritances, kingdoms, empires; with as full right to them as do Christians and saints.

2.—It is also pleaded, that they who have a just possession in temporal things, may also make a just use of them; But no one void of grace does anything justly, because he is full of injustice and impiety, as Augustine seems to intimate, Epist. 54, near the end; to which

I answer, that right of dominion in possessing is one thing, and righteous dealing in the possessor in using is another; the one has reference to the manner of acquiring a right, the other consists in the mode of administering it—things which have no necessary connexion with each other: besides that there is some ambiguity in the assertion, *That man destitute of supernatural grace can do nothing rightly*; if we understand thereby, supernatural righteousness, or that which is ordained for the reward of life eternal, nothing is more true; if of civil rectitude, such as conduces to the peace, and promoting the advantage of the State, there is nothing more mistaken. For the man who, by his wicked life as a private

individual, regards lightly his own salvation, does not unfrequently, by governing well as a public person, much promote the interest of others. [Again,]

3.—They insist, moreover, that it appertains to the nature of dominion, that he who is deemed to be the lord, should have a real inheritance to which he has a rightful claim; whereas, if grace be wanting, instead of a person assuming power over these temporal things, he is himself in base subjection to them. It is, then, [they say] grace alone which seems to confer true dominion; because that alone enables a man truly to exercise rule over the creatures, while he is himself subject to the Creator.

I observe, in reply, that a distinction is to be made between dominion *evangelical*, or *spiritual*, and dominion *political* or *temporal*. I acknowledge that it is the nature of the former dominion to confer the faculty of exercising spiritual power over these temporal things for a spiritual end; but I assert that dominion, in the latter case, is sufficiently carried out, if we assign to it the faculty of making these temporal things useful for temporal purposes; and in this sense, as regards the external use, they exercise a true dominion over these mundane things, who, as regards the internal affection, are at the same time slaves to them.

4.—Lastly, they object, That deserters and those guilty of treason, lose all right and dominion over those things which they held by the bounty of the King; and that, whosoever is destitute of grace, and a slave to sin, becomes a deserter to the cause of the devil, and is guilty of treason against the Divine Majesty; and that such an one, consequently, has not dominion over any creatures of God, nor is any respect to be shewn him by the friends and children of God.

I answer, that if the question be merely as affecting *merit*, I grant that the ungodly, by this their spiritual rebellion and betrayal, deserve, not only to be stripped of all right which they have over the creatures, but to be wholly consumed and reduced to nothing; but if they refer to matter of *fact*, I say that God, of his infinite goodness, does not immediately deprive these traitors of all the blessings they enjoy. He withholds, indeed, the bread of his children from such, that is, his paternal love, and those special gifts of grace and glory; but he is willing that they should retain the crumbs of dogs, that is, the good things of nature and of this world. Neither does he forbid believers to pay these traitors the services due to them, since they are not only tolerated by the Supreme King himself, but even armed with temporal power.

But let us dismiss these objectors, and engage a little with the

Jesuits, with whose opinion this our latter proposition will militate :
[We assert then,]

2.— *That Sovereigns who withdraw themselves from the faith of the Roman Church, or from fealty to the Roman Pontiff, do not lose their right of reigning, nor can they, by any sentence of the Roman Pontiff, be deprived of their dominion.*

A cause which has heretofore been so excellently pleaded by many, I shall not dwell upon long.

1.—Our first argument is this : The Royal power, from the nature of the thing, necessarily requires neither faith nor any gift of supernatural grace ; but may, in election, succession, or other modes by which a right to sovereignty is acquired, be firmly founded and sufficiently established. Since, then, the adoption of the Christian faith does not either change the nature, nor infringe upon the right of regal dominion, its dependence will not be upon the possession of a right faith in a Christian Prince, but while it rests upon its own foundation, whatever there may be of faith will remain unshaken. Gerson says rightly, *Dominion over subjects is not lost, except where that in which it is founded is lost.**

But I also ask ; If Christian Kings alone, from the circumstance of having submitted themselves to the faith and to the Church, may be deprived of their dominion in consequence of falling into heresy or disobedience, by what peculiar right is it done ? Not by Divine authority ; for no such inference is deducible from the Scriptures, that a Sovereign, heretical, or refractory, is to be deposed by the successor of Peter. Not by human laws ; for human laws derive their efficacy from Kings, who have made no such decree to their own prejudice. Not by Ecclesiastical laws ; for the ancient and orthodox Church not only always left to Pagan Emperors, but even to Heretics, their right of dominion unimpaired and untouched. The Pope, then, claims this by no other than an Anti-Christian right of which Hildebrand was the framer,† who, in imitation of Satan, used to boast that he could take away and bestow all the kingdoms of the world by virtue of his authority over them.‡

* *De vita spirit.*

† Platina in *Vita ejus* [p. 169, Edit. Col. Agrip. 1626.]

‡ “ Such unintelligible doctrines, and such intolerable practices have attended the licentious frisk of a Bishop of Rome, when he excommunicates and makes Kings and Princes his prey ; and seizeth and devoureth the prey ; and is thus become a *real chimera*. Let not this be too severely imputed to levity in me, since really I could not tell what to make of him ; for in his fore parts I find the mouth of a man, and hear the words of a father in admonition ; but when I

3.—But Romanists pretend, thnt it is not only *useful*, but altogether *necessary*, that the temporal dominion of Christian Princes should so depend upon the will of the Roman Pontiff, that for a violation of the faith they may be deprived of their authority by his judieial sentence; for unless [say they], we admit this, where could the Church, suffering under the tyranny and perfidy of heretical Princes, look for succour?

In opposition to all which we maintain, that it is neither *necessary*, nor *useful* to the Church that such power should reside in the Pope of Rome.

This power of releasing kingdoms from their allegiance is not *necessary*: for suppose any King to fall from the orthodox faith; suppose him to force his heresy upon his subjects; who does not know, that the ungodly commands of a Sovereign are not, as a matter of course, obligatory? Who does not know that the Christians of the Primitive Church preserved the integrity of the faith by suffering and dying, not by fighting or rebelling against either Pagan or heretical Emperors? Augustine has made this observation (Epist. 50.), *When Kings establish bad laws, favouring what is false, to the prejudice of the truth, true believers are proved and crowned*. He has not said, that believers are released from obedience to their just dominion, bnt that they are *proved*, when suffering under unjust cruelty.

But, moreover, such power is not merely *useless*; it would, in a spiritual Pastor, such as they assert the Roman Pontiff to be, be *noxious*. In fact, such power is truly *useless* and vain, which has not opportunities afforded for making itself felt. Now Christ furnished these Roman Pontiffs with no attendants, no armies, whereby alone (unless we have recourse to miracles) Kings can be dislodged from their Sovereignty. More than this, such power would be posi-

have looked down to the feet, I see the paws of a lion, and his talons always bloody with the prey. Their own Glossary represents him thus:—

Papa stupor mundi.....

Nec deus es, nec homo, quasi neuter es inter utrumque.

So, of a well-conducted officer as Christ and Peter left him, (if you credit them) he is made a mis-shapen monster, and the wonder of the world; and draws deceived proselytes to worship him, shewing them *the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them*, with promise that, as they merit by their good service to the Apostolic Chair, he will give them a right, and when they can they may take possession of his gift, for *unto him pertain all these things, and to whomsoever he will he giveth them*." Mr. Hurst's Sermon, in the *Morning Exercises against Popery*, 1689, Serm. vi. See, also, M'Ghee's *Nullity of the Government of Queen Victoria in Ireland, or the Laws of the Papacy, &c.* Fox's *Acts and Monuments*, vol. i. p. xxxi., edit. 1843, and Elliott's *Horæ Apocalypticæ*.

tively *hurtful* to the Church. For it would render the minds of Sovereigns more estranged from the Church and the Christian Religion, when they should come to understand that their right to reign was, on this very account of their being Christians, less well founded.

To conclude in one word; Suppose we were to grant to our adversaries, that the right to temporal dominion in any Christian Sovereign is so connected with the profession of the orthodox faith, that whosoever shakes off the faith deserves to be stripped of his dominion,* yet, what do the Jesuits gain thereby? Such a punishment may be just, yet the Bishop of Rome is not empowered to inflict it. Guilty persons of this class God has reserved, not for Ecclesiastical tribunals (so far as respects temporal punishments), but to his own. For the Keys of the Church conferred not on Bishops a dominion over the property of individuals, much less over the sceptres of Kings.

A sentence of Occam shall terminate this discussion: *No one can pass a judgment on those things over which it is plain he has no dominion*; hence, whatever sentence a Pope of Rome may issue for taking away the temporalities of Kings, is invalid and vain, seeing that over them he has received no power whatever from Christ.

QUESTION XXXI.

ALL SIN IS IN ITS OWN NATURE DEADLY.

THE grounds on which we form this opinion are the following very clear testimonies of Scripture: *Cursed is every one who continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law* (Deut. xxvii. 26.): *The soul that sinneth it shall die* (Ezek. xviii. 4.): *The wages of sin is death* (Rom. vi. 23.): *The sting of death is sin* (1 Cor. xv. 56.): *He who offends in one point, is guilty of all* (James ii. 10.)

Now, although from these declarations, it may not be right to infer that there is an equality of sins or punishments, yet the inference that the nature of every sin whatever is deadly is quite correct, if it is viewed in its own proper nature, and by the strict-

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 12.

ness of the Divine law. We oppose, therefore, that figment of the Papists, who define a venial sin to be*—*That which, without any relation either to the mercy of God, or to the state of the person sinning, is of such a kind, that, of its own nature, it deserves temporal punishment only.* We, on the contrary, affirm of all sins, universally, that they are, by their own desert, deadly, and *de facto* lead to death, unless the deadly poison of them be expelled by the antidote of repentance and grace.

This is demonstrated from the very nature of sin; the essential quality of which consists in its being a departure from that rule of the Divine law, to which, under the penalty of eternal death, we are bound to conform all the actions of our life. Hence the Apostle John (1 Epis. iii. 4.) called sin *ἁνομία*, that is, *the transgression of the law*; and Aquinas has determined,† *that it is the nature of sin to be opposed to our rule of action, that is, to the Divine Law.* That, therefore, ought not to be called, and cannot be understood to be sin, which is not at variance with the law of God; but that which opposes it must necessarily, of its own nature, subject the sinner to eternal death.

The Papists suppose that they evade the force of this argument, whilst they give as an answer, That the sins which are called *venial*, are so little at variance with the Divine law, that they are rather *beside*, than *against the law*:—a precious piece of absurdity, indeed! For if these sins are forbidden, they are contrary to the law; for he acts against the law, who does what is forbidden by the law. If they are not forbidden, they are not, indeed, to be reckoned as sins at all. There is, then, no room left for sins of which it is asserted they are beside the law. Thus writes Augustine:‡ *Sin is a word, a deed, or a desire against the law of God.* So also Bernard,§ *All sin, of course, contravenes the command of God.* So the sounder Romanists themselves; Durandus, Gerson, and others. Since then, every sin is a violation of the eternal law of God, which shall we believe? Paul, affirming that *The wages of sin is death?* or Bellarmine, exclaiming, *The wages of sin is temporal punishment?*

Let us pass on from the nature of sin itself, to consider the nature of the punishment due to it. It is a truth, and received in the schools—*The duration of punishment answers to the duration of the fault, not with reference to the act, which is transitory; but in regard to the stain and guiltiness, which are permanent.* If,

* Bellarm. *de Amiss. grat.* lib. 1. cap. 9.

† *Cont. Faust.* 22. 27.

‡ Quæst. disp. *de Pecc.* art 1.

§ *De Præc. et disp.* cap. 14.

then, apart from the grace and mercy of God, the stain of the lightest sin whatever is eternal, and the guiltiness eternal; it plainly follows, that every sin, considered in its own nature, excludes for ever from the kingdom of God, and subjects the sinner to eternal punishment. Cajetan argues theologically,* *That no sin is positively remissible, as if it could claim remission as a matter of right; but remissibility and irremissibility depend on the condition of the subject.* If the sinner is placed in a state of grace, there is no sin, however deadly in its own nature, which will incur eternal death; that is to say, on the interposing of repentance, grace, and the mercy of God, which does away the stain of sin, and releases the guilty: but if he is placed out of the pale of grace, everything will draw him to eternal damnation; because, the defilement and the guiltiness of every sin will adhere to the soul for ever. How impious, then, in Bellarmine, to affirm,† *that venial sins may exist, not only in just men, but even in the ungodly themselves.* Let him produce an ungodly man, and an unbeliever, who, without grace and mercy can purge himself from guilt, and the stain of every, even the lightest sin, and I will admit, forthwith, that some sin may be admitted to be in its own nature venial.

Let us now, in the *third* place, consider the nature of forgiveness or pardon; as it will be made evident from thence, that every sin is in its own nature deadly. For we all have this crude notion in our mind as to pardon, that it denotes an act of the Divine clemency; and that what God does of his clemency or mercy, he could not have done according to absolute justice. But if there is, from its own nature a termination owing to the punishment of some sin, he could not but grant pardon to such, without showing himself cruel and unjust. For justice requires that he should at length cease from punishing that, the guilt of which did not deserve eternal punishment. God, then, when at length he ceased from punishing such a sin, is not engaged in performing an act of mercy; because if he did not cease he would in that become obnoxious to the charge of cruelty. A notable defence, truly! which, in order to succeed in shewing that some sin is in its own nature venial, quite alters the nature of pardon and of Divine mercy itself.

To these reasons I add a *fourth*, derived from the consideration of the Divine nature, against which all sin is committed. God is infinite majesty and goodness. He therefore who would lessen such majesty by transgressing, be it ever so trifling, incurs infinite punishment; for, according to the quality of the person injured,

* In 2. 2. quæst. 87, art. 5.

† *De Amiss. Grat.* lib. 1. cap. 11.

we are accustomed to estimate the magnitude of the crime committed, and to impose equitable punishment. Nay, there is always a mutual proportion between an obligation to duty and the transgression of it; and still further between the transgression and the punishment. Since, then, the obligation of every man to an infinite God is infinite, every transgression against him will be infinite, and the punishment, also, of each transgression will be infinite. And what can the Romanists allege in opposition to a case so perspicuous?

In the first place, they maintain, that there are some sins in their own nature not at all deadly, because they are not inconsistent with charity; and among these they reckon an idle word, immoderate laughter, and the like.* But Christ thought otherwise, who taught that, unless it be forgiven in this life, for every idle word an account must be rendered at the last judgment (Matt. xii. 36, 37.); when no place will be left for venial sins and temporal punishments. Besides, it is a mistake to say, that sins of this kind do not offend against charity. They do not, indeed, cast away or expel charity from the bosom of the regenerate man, but yet they are at variance with that perfect charity which the law commands, and take their rise from that inordinate concupiscence which is contrary to charity and the Divine law. In short, our adversaries are unfortunate in this opinion, namely, that they judge the nature of sin to be deadly, merely when it leads to the *extinction* of charity, seeing it manifests itself in every declension from charity and the Divine law.

Secondly, They plead that some sins, from the very smallness of the matter, are venial; as when a man filches only a penny from his neighbour. But wherever a manifest want of obedience to the Divine command is found, there the smallness of the matter cannot change the deadly nature of the sin. Adam sinned in a small matter, when he ate but a morsel of one apple, notwithstanding he contracted deadly guilt, because he violated a command of God. Thus he sins in a small matter who steals a single penny from his neighbour; but yet he fastens upon himself guilt of mortal offence, because he transgresses that law of God which clearly forbids us even to *covet* what is our neighbour's, much more to *steal* or *take away*. The advice of Augustine, then, should be here embraced,† *Let us not take to ourselves deceitful balances, wherewith we may weigh what we wish, and how we wish, according to our caprice,*

* See Dr. Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, p. 206.

† *Contra Donat.* 2. 6.

saying, this is heavy, that is light; but let us bring out the Divine balances of the Holy Scriptures, and weigh our sins thereby, or rather let us look upon them as weighed there by the Lord.

Lastly, they would argue from the incompleteness of the deeds themselves, that some sins must be accounted as *venial*, not as *deadly*. Such [say they] are the sudden motions of inordinate concupiscence, which very often steal upon us unawares. Sins of this kind, seeing they are not altogether voluntary, neither are they perfected sins; and therefore do not merit the punishment of eternal death, which is the most perfect of all punishments.

These quibbles avail nothing; because, that is reckoned as voluntary, not only which is committed with an express and actual willingness, but that which is not hindered by the will, when it is bound to impose hindrance; and the will is under obligation to lay its command on the reason, to be watchful in repressing all the emotions of inordinate concupiscence.* Neither, as they [the Romanists] dream, does that which diametrically opposes this command—*Thou shalt not covet*—partake of the nature of a sin imperfectly formed. But not to be tedious, I will conclude with the most learned Gerson,† *All sin, in so far as it is an offence against God, and his eternal law, is in its own quality, and by its indignity, deadly; and, according to the severity of Divine justice, leads to separation from the life of glory.*

QUESTION XXXII.

EVANGELICAL COUNSELS, AS THEY ARE CALLED, SOMETIMES
HAVE THE FORCE OF A PRECEPT.

THERE are many Evangelical Counsels had in estimation by the Papists, but three in particular, to the observance of which, as extraordinary works of supererogation, all the Monks are bound by solemn vow. The first is that Council of Celibacy, or of Virginal Continence, which they think to be founded in the words of Christ, *There are some Eunuchs who have made themselves Eu-*

* [See Morning Exercises at Southwark, pp. 274 and 276.]

† *De Vit. Spirit.* Lect. 1. pag. 319

[See Elliott's *Delineations*, &c. p. 205.]

nuchs for the kingdom of Heaven's sake. He that can receive it, let him receive it (Matt. ix. 12). The second, is that of Voluntary Poverty; which they deduce from that saying of our Saviour to the young man (ibid. verse 21.) *If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor.* The third and last, is that appertaining to the rule of Obedience; which they endeavour to establish from the words of Christ to his disciples (Luke ix. 23.) *If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily and follow me.* All these are said to be works of perfection, not imposed on any one by any absolute command, but left to the free choice of every one, and which, if omitted, entail no guilt; if observed, bring after them a special reward.

Thus far the Papists. We, on the contrary, affirm, that no work is pleasing to God, and accepted to enjoy the reward of life eternal, unless it is commanded by God, either in the common law, or there is some special call to undertake it, by, as it were, a private law of the Holy Spirit; which, whosoever rejects, he offends grievously.

But, to come to particulars; and first, as respects Celibacy, or a state of Virginité.* I admit that there is no common precept which should bind it upon all equally; and that, in this respect, to lead a life of virginity is in general a matter of *counsel*, not of *precept*. More than this, I add, that, where particular individuals have received a peculiar call thereto from God, an impulse of the Holy Spirit, and a consciousness of having received the gift; under such circumstances, the matter, which, universally considered, is left to a man's free choice, cannot be omitted by an individual so specially invited without sin. For the Apostle, who had no command respecting virginity, nevertheless enjoined, *As God hath distributed to every man, as the Lord hath called every one, so let him walk* (1 Cor. vii. 17.) And the Schoolmen themselves allow that men pious and religious have applied to the work of Counsels, not under the mere impulse of their own free will, but by a secret influence of the Holy Spirit, who excites them to undertake such works, and strengthens and directs them by the gift of Counsel. In these cases it is clear enough, that when so particularly called, they could not omit such things without incurring guilt. *They who are influenced by a Divine instinct*, says Aquinas,† *do not*

* Celibacy and the Monastic life was first preached by St. Anthony, in Egypt, about A.D. 305. The doctrine was rejected in the Council of Nice, A.D. 325. Celibacy was enjoined Bishops only in 692. Pope Hildebrand, who embraced the Monastic Rule whilst studying in France, seems to have been the first who established this dogma, as binding on Ecclesiastics. See *Power of the Popes*, p. 100. or Appendix to this vol. No. 1.

† Aquin. 1. 2. quæst. 68. art. 1.

enter upon a discharge of the duties of Counsels under the guidance of human reason, but because they follow the inward instinct; because they are moved by a better principle than human reason is. And Cajetan says, To contemn God when counselling is a mortal sin, as also to despise him when commanding. What can be more manifest contempt, than to resist the Holy Spirit when it calls to undertake more perfect works, and affords strength thereto by the gifts of special grace? But Aquinas most plainly teaches this in his treatise against men drawing back from the profession of religion:†—If we must immediately obey the outward call of the voice of our Creator, then much more ought no one to resist the inward speaking whereby the Holy Spirit changes the mind, but to yield obedience without hesitation. And cap. 10,—From the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of fortitude and piety, this purpose is inspired into man; and from the same, who is a Spirit of counsel and knowledge, propulsion is inwardly ministered.*

From these things it is plain that all those who rightly embrace a state of virginity, or other works, which are called works of *perfection*,‡ do it induced by a secret law, which is *the law of the Holy Spirit* (as Pope Urban expresses it;§) and which, therefore, cannot be neglected without sin.

Thus much concerning the Counsel of Virginal Continence.||

* 2. 2. quæst. 86. art. 2.

† Opusc. 17. cap. 9.

‡ Aquin. quæst. 86, art. 2. cap. 11.

§ Caus. 19, quæst. 2.

|| For a full view of this interesting subject, I would refer the Reader to Hawkins's *Essay on the Law of Celibacy, and on the Origin of the Monastic Life*, 8vo. Mr. Hawkins was originally a Priest of the Church of Rome, at Worcester, but left that communion, and joined the Church of England, publishing afterwards several valuable and instructive works. As the one just mentioned is now very scarce, the reader may be gratified, and good promoted, by a quotation from his concluding pages. Page 192, he says:—"Upon a review of what I have here advanced, I think I may affirm that I have shewn in the foregoing pages, that a life of celibacy, as enjoined to the Clergy and Religious in Roman Catholic countries, is neither countenanced, nor even insinuated in the Sacred Scriptures; that it is not founded upon the known practice of the Apostles or others, in the first and purest ages of Christianity; that it never was universally observed at any period of time; that, whenever a motion was made to introduce it as a general law, this always met with opposition, and was protested against by many as highly injudicious and oppressive; that it has been upheld by a false idea of the excellence of virginity, and a preposterous notion of the uncleanness of marriage, derived from the illusions of heretics, and a misconception of the Holy Writings; that, considering the state of man, and his various duties to God, his neighbour, and himself, it is of little service towards arriving at the perfection taught in the Christian Law; that it has occasioned infinite abuses: that being originally founded on prejudice, it has been handed down by the same unequitable means; that it is an unnatural state, destructive

Then with regard to Voluntary Poverty, or the abdication of property, that, so far as readiness of mind is concerned, is a matter of unchanging precept; in such cases also, where the demands of justice and faith call for it, the actual abandonment itself of all temporal things comes under a precept; but the poverty of Monastics, which relinquishes any private claim for form's sake, while it reserves to itself an affluent use of the [Company's] riches, is undertaken in consequence of neither the command nor the counsel of Christ.

Lastly, with respect to Obedience; the law of God most strictly enjoins that which is truly religious, which is due to God, to our parents, and to lawful superiors; but that blind, superstitious, and monastic obedience which, under the guidance of a man, entirely submits his own will to that of another, or subjects himself to the trifling observances of a rule of human invention, with the view of meriting, or of satisfying God; such (I say) God never commanded, and Christ has often condemned.

Respecting other works, which are by the Papists called works of Perfection, of Counsel, or of Supererogation (such as was that of Paul, when he preached the Gospel freely; and numbers which may be performed by the godly, under the command of charity or the direction of prudence), respecting such I say, That the internal act or affection of the soul (without which the external work is a thing of no value) comes under precept; and by the internal act I mean a desire for the Divine glory, and the love of our neighbour, for promoting whose salvation the external act is put in exercise. Concerning this inward part of the work Aquinas correctly says, that *The love of God and of our neighbour does not fall under a precept according to a certain measure, so that what is more may be left optional as if it were a Counsel*; and in this case there is consequently no room for supererogation or a counsel.

of the happiness of individuals and of society, whether it be considered in a moral, a physical, or a political light; that the *vows of Religion*, as they are termed in Roman Catholic countries, have no foundation in Scripture, even as *Evangelical Councils*; that there actually is no *vow* of Continency either tendered to, or taken by the *secular* Clergy abroad, nor by those who engage in some *Religious* Orders: that the Church has no authority to declare the marriage of the Clergy null and void; that if any of their Clergy should actually enter into the marriage state, this sacred contract could never be rescinded without a grievous crime, &c., &c., &c. All this I presume I have supported by fair argument, and undeniable facts; nay even by the authority of those very Fathers who are often cited to prove the opposite statement; though I have sometimes been forced to shew them inconsistent with each other, and with themselves."

* 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 3.

Secondly, the external act itself, though it may be expressly enjoined by no precept, yet Christian prudence standing forward, as it were, and recommending it, and charity calling for it,—does, in this special case, take its place among obligatory precepts of loving God and our neighbour. For instance, the Law of God does not enjoin Ministers to undertake missions *at their own charges* (1 Cor. ix. 7.) Yet seeing that in Paul's case Christian prudence dictated, that, considering present circumstances, If he were to receive a reward he would be hindering the Divine glory, be placing an obstacle to the course of the Gospel, and would be estranging the weak brethren from Christ;—the law of charity immediately enjoined him to consult for the furtherance of the Divine glory and the salvation of souls, rather than his own private advantage. For although it may suffice ordinarily, in common cases, without entering into any lengthened inquiry as to what course it may be best to take, just to do what is lawful, to avoid what is forbidden; yet as soon as the matter becomes self-evident, and a man's conscience plainly says, This, which in its own nature is left free, will, or will not greatly tend to the glory of God and the benefit of his neighbour; then what was before an optional proceeding assumes the character of an obligatory duty. And thus you perceive how what are, and may not inappropriately be styled *Counsels*, when the quality of the action suggested is considered, may, on duly weighing the particular circumstances of the case, become at some times positive *precepts*.

*. See chap. xxxix. vol. 1, for a more full discussion of the foregoing topics.

The following extract from a letter of Bishop Stillingfleet, to a lady, concerning vows of virginity, may be very properly appended to the foregoing discussion, being well adapted to guard the Protestant Christian against the various lures with which, in these days, he is surrounded, to induce him to apostatize from the true faith:—

“ We have one great vow upon us already, viz. our baptismal vow; if we perform that, we need not trouble nor perplex ourselves with others. I wonder not at all to hear persons speak of the great pleasure they took in the fancy of such things; for it is the nature of all new things, especially in Religion, to have this effect: But that is a very unsafe way of judging. For I have known those who, having gone through several ways of Religion, have been almost ravished with the pleasure of every new way at first, and after awhile have cast off that and taken another, because the pleasure of its being new could not continue long. Madam, if you value the peace of your own mind, keep yourself free in what God hath left to your choice; never think that God is better pleased with us for any crotchets of our own, than with doing what he commands us. Value his word and precepts above the directions of all men in the world. Do what he commands, and forbear what he forbids, and no doubt you shall be happy. Let no man carry you beyond the bounds God has set you, nor make you believe that he hath found a plainer or more certain way to heaven than

QUESTION XXXIII.

WHEN GUILT IS REMITTED, ITS PUNISHMENT IS REMITTED.

THE Romanists explode this position, most true as it is, and not without a cause. For, if it be established that, together with the remission of the guilt, the punishment of sin also is always remitted, we put out the fire of purgatory, we abrogate Papal indulgences, we shew that prayers for the dead are useless; in short, we entirely overturn that perpetual and most profitable traffic in Masses. To such proceedings the Papalines manifest no inconsiderable antipathy; but with such as measure the truth of doctrines by the word of God, not by what they may gain thereby, will be easily understood, how, with the remission of guilt, remission of punishment is necessarily and inseparably connected. This is manifest from several considerations.

First, from the justice of God, which never inflicts punishment, except with an eye to the guiltiness of the crime. For to exact punishment, by way of satisfaction, from him who is not guilty, but even freed and purged from the guilt of all crime, is to exercise an act, not of JUSTICE, but of *cruelty*, or at least of *absolute power*.

Secondly, the same may be inferred from the nature of the thing itself. For what else is the remitting the sin, or the fault, but the no longer imputing it for punishment? He, then, who says that God forgives the sinner his crimes, but does not release him from punishment, may, in the same way, maintain, that a King might forgive a traitor his rebellion, and notwithstanding, condemn him for the very same crime to the mines or the gallies.

Thirdly, this is also proved from the manner in which Christ took upon him our sins; which he did no otherwise than by taking them upon himself, and bearing the punishment due on account of

Christ hath given you. Think nothing necessary in order to the pardon of sin, but what God hath made so; and suspect those guides that would carry you beyond this infallible rule of Scripture; which alone is able to make us wise unto salvation."—(Stillington's *Miscel. Disc.* pp. 306—309.)

The Reader may be referred to Whittaker's *Answer to Campian*, respecting the Counsels in general, as it contains much interesting matter relative to the Counsels discussed in this article in particular.

them. If, then, in our stead, he endured the punishment, he doubtless also took it away. So says the prophet Isaiah, (liii. 5.)

He was wounded for our transgressions,—

—And by his stripes we are healed.

Yet, how are we healed, if notwithstanding the passion and satisfaction of Christ, we are, after all, to be tormented for our sins by punishments the most bitter?

Fourthly, our opinion is confirmed from the effect of the satisfaction of Christ; for it is the peculiar effect of this, to render God reconciled and at peace with every believer and truly penitent person. *We are reconciled to God by the death of his son,* (Rom. v. 10.) *Being justified by faith, we have peace with God,* (Rom. v. i.) But, if penitents are not released from punishment, but must still be tortured and tormented to make satisfaction to God, it is clear that [in that case] God is *not* reconciled and at peace with them through Christ.

Lastly, the view we take may be established, also, from the circumstance, that God forgives us our debts no less freely and fully than he teaches us to forgive our debtors. Now God would have us so forgive the offences of our brethren who offend against us, that we should lay aside, at the same time, any wish to be revenged. It is not, consequently, a half or verbal, but a full and true forgiveness which he grants to penitents—one which delivers as well from the guilt as from the punishment of sin.*

But against the opinion which we would establish, our opponents bring forward a long list of examples; and are for shewing how Moses, David, and others, were punished by God, after the forgiveness of the fault.†—But not to be misled by the equivocation of their language, we should be aware that the nature of punishment, properly so called, (that I mean, which is the subject of the present discussion) is always to be determined by the final cause. For that which is inflicted by God, as an avenging judge, with the intention of satisfying his justice, carries with it the true and proper nature of punishment. But we deny that punishment of this kind was inflicted upon Moses, David, or any of the faithful, after the for-

* [God's word to such, is not only

Turn you to the strong hold, ye prisoners of hope;

but he immediately promises (see Zechar. ix. 12.),

Even to day do I declare that I will render double unto thee.

And this God abundantly fulfils by the consolation, the happiness, the succour, the prosperity and success, which is vouchsafed to every penitent, pardoned, and believing soul.]

† [See Elliott's *Delineation of Roman Catholicism*, p. 226.]

giveness of their sin. On the contrary, that which is inflicted by the same God, as a wise father, with the intention of promoting the safety of his children,* takes the nature of a *medicine*, not of *punishment*. And such we admit very often to be laid upon the penitent, after the forgiveness of the fault. As, therefore, a Judge, who, to avenge the crime, orders that a forger shall have his hand cut off, imposes a real punishment, properly so called, upon him; but when a physician prescribes the same with a different design, it is not in that case deemed a *punishment*, but a *medicine*: so, when the ungodly and impenitent are chastised, they are paying but a penalty due to *Divine justice*; when the godly and penitent experience the same chastisements, after forgiveness has been received, they feel *the effects*, not of *Divine anger*, but of *care*; not of *vengeance*, but of *healing*.

* Heb. xii. 5—10, &c.

QUESTION XXXIV.

NO ONE CAN OF CONGRUITY MERIT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
DIVINE FAVOUR.

THIS merit of congruity is, on the free avowal of certain Papists, some small, disproportionate merit—one which might more fitly be called *an impetratory*, or *preparatory work*, than one *meritorious of grace*. For they consider that the efficacy of this merit lies in this, that it provokes God, as it were, by offering him some slight occasion, to confer his grace; and because, by the removal of some obstacles, it renders the individual himself disposed to receive it. Hence that saying of the Schoolmen: *God does not deny his grace to the man who does what in him lies*. Now he does what in him lies who forsakes the commission of sin, and the will of sinning, and strives after that which is good, and to convert himself to God. The man who does this, they say, deserves grace by this *merit of congruity*;* since it is congruous, that God should requite, accord-

* “This is what Roman Catholic Divines call the ‘*second justification*.’ In the *first* justification the sinner is supposed to have no absolute merit, although his faith, hope, &c., *dispose* and *prepare* him for justification; that is, have the merit of *congruity*. In his *second* justification, his works are positively meritorious, and *deserve* heaven; *this* is the merit of *condignity*.” Cramp’s *Text Book of Popery*, Edit. 1839, p. 89, Note.

ing to the excellence of his nature, the man who acts according to his ability; since, moreover, it would be incongruous to impart grace to those who neglect to do this, whilst they put a voluntary hindrance in the way of grace. This doctrine of the merit of congruity has therefore been introduced by the Schoolmen in order to shew, that, *on the part of man there must be some kind of reason, why to some should be given justifying grace, to others not.** Scotus proceeds a good deal farther,† and scarcely thinks that God can be defended from the charge of being *a respecter of persons* without supposing this merit of congruity. *Unless there be conceded some rule of congruity according to natural causes, it is difficult to shew that there is not respect of persons with God.*

But all these notions are plainly devices of man's ignorance as to the miserable slavery of mankind under sin, the free and special mercy of God in delivering the elect from sin, and, in short, the excellency itself of that heavenly grace which bestows as it were a new being upon the sinner.

First, then, they who think that man under a state of sin, by doing what in him lies, can merit Divine grace of congruity, do not consider that men of this kind are still enemies to God and children of wrath; and the things which are done by such men have no efficacy at all for meriting from God, whether arising from *condignity* or *congruity*. The person, indeed, of the doer is neither beloved by God, nor does he love God; he does works, not from the love of God, nor with a reference to the honour of God: God, then, does nothing incongruous, or out of character, in not deeming such workmen worthy to receive the gift of saving grace. For what else did Pelagius mean; what else did the Catholics refuse to allow, than that merit of any kind whatever is an antecedent to the grace of justification, and in some measure an inducement to it? Hence Fulgentius observed, *Grace is unjustly so called, which is not given gratuitously to men, but is attributed to a good-will.* Besides, the taking it for granted, that men, living still under the dominion of the devil and sin, can (if they would do what in them lies) turn themselves with a pious mind to God, and forsake the practice and intention of sinning, is grounded on a great mistake. For the first and smallest beginning of an aim after that which is good, is the very inclining itself of the thought to that good; but *we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything good, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God* (2 Cor. iii. 5). And that say-

* Aquin. quæst. de Lib. Arbit. art. 15.

† Apud Scotum, de Nat. et Grat. lib. 2. cap. 4.

ing of Augustine is most true :* *Merits do not precede the reception of this grace, by which a man becomes just who was before unjust ; seeing it is not grace but punishment that is due to the merits of a wicked man.*

Secondly, such as maintain the doctrine of a merit of congruity, seem to be ignorant of the mystery of free and special mercy which exerts itself in all who are saved. For this saving mercy of God, he himself dispenses according to the good pleasure of his own will, not according to the preparations or congruous merits of man's will. *I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy.* (Rom. ix. 15.) He does not say, I will have mercy on those who, by first doing what in them lies, will thus, from the merit of congruity, be in the way for the reception of saving grace ; but, on the contrary, (verse 16) *It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy ;*—a position which it will be evident was always maintained by the orthodox Fathers against the Pelagians. Augustine says, in almost the same words,† *We maintain, against the new error of the Pelagians, that the grace of God is bestowed, not according to our merits ; but to whom it is given, to them it is given freely ; because it is neither of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy ; whereas it is by a just judgment that it is not given, to whom it is not given ; because there is no unrighteousness with God.* Prosper is of the same opinion :‡ *It is impiety to affirm, that the grace by which we are saved is given either as a return for good deeds, or withheld by evil ones.* Ambrose, on the calling of the Gentiles, lib. 1, cap. 18, says that, *To all men the cause of their receiving grace is the will of God, in whom the reasons for making election are hidden ; their merits commencing from that grace which they receive without deservings.* Moreover, this notion of merit of congruity originating in man's own will implies, that certain individuals, before the grace of God is received, have, by their own effort, emancipated themselves, being superior to others who did not make such an effort. Now this is opposed to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. iv. 7.) *Who maketh thee to differ ? What hast thou which thou hast not received ?* For such persons might truly answer—'The merit of congruity, arising from my own free will, made me to differ. I have an inclination for good which I have not received from the fulness of Christ, but from the fountain of nature, or of free-will.' Now it is such a difference of the human will, between one man and another, before the infusion of saving grace, which

* Epist. 105, *ad Sixtum*. [Epist. 194. cap. 3.]

† *De Præd. Sanctor.* cap. 14.

‡ Resp. 8. *ad Gallor.*

Augustine is opposing, where he refutes that assertion of the Pelagians,* *That all would receive grace if they did not refuse it of their own will*; and he shews in this matter, that no merits of man's will are to be taken into the account; *since indeed they to whom grace is not given are in a like condition to those to whom it is given*. And the second Council of Orange† (Can. 25.) affirmed—*God inspires faith and love of himself, irrespective of any good deserts preceding*.

Lastly, such as before grace presuppose some merit, whatever it may be, of grace, never consider the dignity and excellence of this heavenly gift. For it constitutes the prerogative of grace, that it is the root and beginning of every merit or work pleasing to God; and to suppose that the originating of merit should become itself meritorious, is quite absurd. More than this, that the gift of grace is plainly above the powers of human nature, especially in a corrupted state. For *every one, with respect to that which is above his nature, is* (as the Schoolmen say) *to be considered only as passive, not as a prime mover*. The sinner cannot, therefore, by the strength of his own will, put himself into a condition proper for receiving the supernatural gift of grace,—nay, the very preparation or capability of the subject, is effected by the same God by whom this gift is infused.‡ The Schoolmen, then, are mistaken, in looking for a sufficiency to merit grace, in the merit of congruity, but for the grace itself as a gift from God; for both are imparted by God.

But the Papists, perceiving at last that this gross Pelagianism could not be defended, have hit upon a new scheme. They say that grace is to be understood in a two-fold sense §: for it either denotes everything that stirs up the will, which is set before the individual by Divine Providence itself, or it denotes a disposition given and implanted in the soul. If grace is taken in the former sense, they acknowledge that there is no meriting the first grace, seeing it preceded all human endeavours; if the latter, they affirm that free-will may be excited by this preventing grace, so as to merit justifying or habitual grace of congruity. We must not, however, admit even this.

* Epist. 107. [now 217, cap. 6.]

† Held A.D. 529. See some of the Canons quoted at length in *Archbishop Usher's Reply to a Jesuit*, pp. 468, 9; edit. Cambr. 1835. The corruption to which the Archbishop has referred, as appearing in some of the earlier copies of the Canon—the one from which a portion is cited by Bishop Davenant—will be found to remain in that of Binius (Col. Agripp. 1618) tom. ii. pt. I. col. 639; and is the more remarkable from the circumstance, that the Canons of this Council have—what is given to very few—various readings subjoined.

‡ Coloss. i. 12.

§ Aquin.

For, in the first place, some of the most learned Romanists* protest against it, and expressly teach, that no disposition preceding the habit of grace can be entitled a *merit*, either of *congruity* or of *condignity*; and that, in the justifying of an individual freely, is to be understood just his being placed in that state, without any previous merit, whether proceeding from the powers of nature, or from the assistance of God exciting it. They can hardly expect us to believe what they have not yet persuaded their own party to receive.

Secondly, they who lay it down, that the assistance of grace is necessary to establish a merit of congruity, will, if properly sifted, be found, under the name of grace, to understand at most nothing more than some ordinary assistances, which, according to the common course of nature and of Divine Providence, are usually within the reach of all indifferently, even of those upon whom the *saving grace* of Jesus Christ has never shone. For Aquinas† terms sickness of body an admonition of some individual; and, in fine, any outward occasion, *exciting grace*. Their opinion, then, comes to this—That from free-will alone, if put in activity by some event, the individual can deserve, of congruity, justifying grace; which is all the same as if they had said, that they can do it by their own strength; for occasions of this kind do not furnish the will with supernatural power.

Lastly, We do not allow that there is a merit of congruity, even on the supposition of the existence of such exciting grace; seeing that all those arguments which were brought against the former opinion, militate against this also.

For they who are under the dominion of Satan and sin cannot, in this easy way, be released from such a captivity as this; for besides excitement of this kind, in order to relinquish the pleasure of sinning, and to turn themselves to God, there is required such a degree of grace as may loosen the chains, and begin to heal the wounds of sinners; which may inspire new strength, and exempt the free-will from its previous evil bent. For as with a wounded captive, thrown on the ground and bound with fetters of iron, it is idle to bid him go leave his prison and return into his native country; so as regards a sinner tied to earthly things, bound with the chains of his sins, and dead in sins, merely to advise or provoke him, by some inward or external excitement, to forsake sin and return to God, is quite insufficient. For in addition to this, a

* See *Archbishop Usher's Reply to a Jesuit*, Chap. xii. pp. 497—9; Edit. Cambridge, 1835.

† 2. Sent. dist. 28. quæst. 4.

remedy is needed; persuading is not enough. For *it is only through infused grace, that the will takes up a free slavery, and lets go a servile liberty*, as Prosper has elegantly expressed it.*

In the next place, this opinion does not accord with that deep mystery of special and free mercy with which God, before the foundation of the world was laid, embraced the elect, and which he shews to them in time. For if the doctrine of a merit of congruity, or of demerit, is to be admitted, in accordance with which justifying grace is granted or withheld, in proportion as men may have used or abused the aforesaid excitement, the whole mystery of election and reprobation is resolved into a difference in the acting of the human will, in applying or not applying itself to this exciting grace. It is, however, admitted by the sounder Romanists, that the efficacy of grace depends upon the Divine Predestination. It is clearly asserted by Aquinas,† that *the very wishing to receive grace springs of the Divine predestination*. Dominic Soto also confesses,‡ that *that disposition which justifying grace surely and infallibly follows, is the effect of the Divine predestination*. William Estius, Professor at Douay,§ acknowledges the same, in 1 Sentent. dist. 41, sect. 6: *It is through the operation of the grace of predestination, that any man receives the proffered grace, makes a good use of it, and perseveres in it*. And in 2 Sent. dist. 26, sect. 33, *Grace is the proper effect of predestination; if grace, therefore, is given according to merits, predestination will be from merits*. Away then with the merit of congruity, which on the one hand acknowledges the common offering of grace to spring from the mercy of God, while on the other, the credit of the acceptance and possession of justifying grace is laid to the merits of free-will.

Lastly, They overturn the prerogative of saving grace by this device of theirs. For the proper effect of grace is, not only to excite to good, by means of an external or internal monitor, but to render a man fit and competent for the performance of it; nay, to bestow even the *to will and to do*. That grace is merely the Instigator of free-will is a doctrine held among the Pelagians;|| but the opinion of Catholics always was, that the grace of Christ is properly said to be the creator of a good will, and the producer of good actions:— *God works by a secret and wonderful power in the hearts of men, not only true revelations, but good wills, as*

* *De Gratia Dei contra Collatorem*.

† Quæst. disp. de Præd. art. 2.

‡ *De Nat. et Grat.* lib. 2. cap. 3.

§ Vide *Translation of the Expositio ad Coloss.* vol. ii. p. 510.

|| Prosper de Lib. Arbit.

Augustine rightly observes, *De Grat. Ch.* lib. 1. cap. 24; and a little after, *Let Pelagius cease to assert, That the fact of our being able to do, say, think all good, is from Him who has bestowed the power to do this; but that we do well is from ourselves; let him, I say, cease to make such assertions: for not only does God bestow upon us our ability, and help us, but He also works in us both to will and to DO* (cap. 25). But more clearly have the African Bishops taught this in their Synodical Epistle, where we meet with these words: *In quickening men, God awaits no beginning on the part of man's will, but quickens by making the will itself good.* It is all up, then, with merit of congruity, under the guidance, and as it were arrangement, of which they maintain, that the sinner is quickened by justifying grace.

But some one will say, Shall we then explode all the efforts of man's will? Are we to reject all the preparations and dispositions previous to justifying grace? Far from it. We acknowledge that the endeavours of our will are required; the efforts of which, however, come to nothing if not excited,—are useless if not assisted. We admit also, that it is not the usual way with God to infuse justifying and saving grace, unless where the minds have been made willing, softened, and prepared. But he himself works these preparations by his Spirit, who not only advises the freed wills, but refreshes, strengthens, and draws them whithersoever he will, —gently leading them, as it were, by the hand. If this grace be wanting, such is the blindness and hardness of the human heart, that it will present an eternal barrier to the excitements of Divine grace of which we have been speaking. But why this secret grace, which is rejected by every hard heart, and by which alone the hardness of the depraved heart is overcome, is granted to some, and withheld from others,* enquire not, if thou wouldest not fall into error; attribute nothing whatever to merit, unless thou art willing to rank as a Pelagian.

* Vide Aug. Tom. 7. *De Præd. Sanct.* lib. 1. capp 8. et 10.

QUESTION XXXV.

THE INVISIBLE CHURCH IS NOT A PLATONIC IDEA.*

A TWOFOLD meaning may be given to this question :—One, that an invisible Church is not a mere figment of our divines, but that that holy Catholic Church, in which in the Creed we profess to believe, is really invisible.† The other that the orthodox Church, which rightly worships God, may be reduced within such narrow limits, and by a prevailing faction of the superstitious or heretical, be for a time so oppressed, as to come before the eyes of the vulgar with no external splendour. We will speak of both these briefly. What we assert concerning the invisible Church is, it is evident, perfectly true :—

1.—First, because the main part of it, that which is triumphant in heaven, is not apparent to human vision, but to faith, For, who is there but is aware, that the denominations of things are very properly taken, either from the predominant or the more noble part of them ? Since then that numerous and noble Church, which is now triumphant in heaven, is plainly invisible to us ; since Christ himself, the Head of the Catholic Church, is also invisible ; when we say, bearing these things in mind, that the Church is invisible, we are not putting forward a Platonic idea ; on the contrary, we intend to point out the best, the chief, the most holy, and most sure part of the Church.—When the Scriptures mention the Church as without spot, or wrinkle, Augustine thinks, that that title appertains to the invisible portion we have spoken of, not to that which is now remaining on earth ; as may be seen in his *Retractions*, and many other places of his works.‡ The Romanists

*The Platonic use of the word *ἰδέα* or *εἶδος*, commonly rendered *Idea*, is quite distinct from the present use of that word as denoting thought, conception, or abstract notion. It was the theory of Plato, that all created substances and qualities derive their character as well as their name from certain absolute *ἰδέαι* or *εἶδη* forms, models, or archetypes, which he conceived to be real and independent existences, eternal, indestructible, and unaffected by any adjuncts or accidents ; and of which all created things are but images and imitations. The sentiments of the Realists among the Schoolmen nearly coincided with those of Plato.—See further, on this subject, Appendix.

† See Whitaker's *Answer to Campian's Third Reason*.

‡ Lib. 1. *de Nupt. et Concup.* cap. 34.

scarcely acknowledge this invisible Church of the blessed, perhaps, because it does not at all acknowledge the Roman Pontiff as its Head.

2.—Secondly, We maintain that the Church is invisible, on the ground that this part itself, which sojourns upon earth, cannot be perceived or judged of by any outward sense. We see the individuals, indeed, of whom particular Churches are formed; but which of them belongs to the Holy Catholic Church (which is Christ's mystical body) there is no evidence for the eyes to discern. For *whether men seem to be within, or whether they are without—what is chaff is chaff, and always divided from the Unity of the true Church*, as Augustine truly teaches.* The visible members of Churches are easily known; but to see, and to know who are the true members of the Catholic Church, that is the main question.† For *many are mixed with the assembly of the saints in the temple made by hands, who are removed from the mystical body of Christ. Many are so said to be in the house, though they do not belong to the structure of the house.* August. lib. 7. *De Baptism. contra Donat.* cap. 51. There is no absurdity, then, in considering the true Church, as in this sense, *invisible*.

3.—Thirdly, That this proposition—*The Church is invisible*—is not a mere fiction of the Protestants, but a real truth, may be proved from the fact, that nothing which is capable of being perceived by the sight, or by any other natural sense, affords certain proof concerning any one that he is a member of the Catholic Church. Our eyes afford evidence what persons join themselves to the Society of any particular Church; what persons hear the word, and receive the Sacraments; but they do not afford evidence who is united to Christ the Head, who is imbued with saving grace, who is quickened by the Spirit of Christ; and these alone are the characteristics by which men are constituted genuine members of the Catholic Church. The Papists, therefore, must be furnished with eyes more than human, if the holy Catholic Church can be seen and ascertained by them, as to its distinguishing and characteristic principle; or, from any external tokens or indications which point out with certainty the genuine members of the Church. First, *That is not really the body of Christ, which will not be with Him throughout eternity.*‡ Let the Papists assert, that they are able, by the sight of their eyes, to distinguish those who are to reign hereafter with Christ, from those who will endure future

* August. *De Bapt. Contra Donat.* lib. 1. cap. 17.

† Cypr. *De Dupl. Martyr.*

‡ August. *de Doctr. Christ.* lib. 3. cap. 32.

torment with Satan. Again, secondly, *They are not genuine members of the Church, who are united by the bond of love, both to each other, and to Christ their Head.** Let the Papists assert that they are so sharp-sighted, as to be able to discern in the hearts of others, that Divine love and grace which each of them acknowledges himself unable to discover, with certainty, in his own heart. Lastly; neither ungodly men, nor hypocrites, form part of that holy Catholic Church which we believe; but it consists of those only who are with truth denominated *a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people, the bride, and body of Christ.* Let the Papists assert that they discern who are the persons that are justly honoured with these titles, and who are they that falsely assume them to themselves. Then, and not before will we concede to them, that the true Church, under its essential character, as the true Church, is not invisible. In vain, then, they attempt to prove against us, that which we do not deny, namely, that the Churches of Christians are visible as to their external profession: let them prove that the Catholic Church, or any member of the Catholic Church, is visible as to its constituent and essential principle.†

I come now to that other meaning, which we have said may be attached to this question, namely, that the true and orthodox Church may sometimes be reduced within such limits, and be so driven, as it were, into a corner, as to appear in the eyes of the vulgar in no external splendour, nor to be accounted by those who preside and rule in the Church for the true and orthodox Church, but be condemned as heretical or schismatical. In this manner it has been sometimes invisible, and yet was there a true Church remaining in the world. In the times of Elijah we find that it so happened (1 Kings xix. 14). Hence that complaint of Elijah to God: *The children of Israel have broken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars—and I only am left.* If (as Lactantius affirms‡) that alone is the Catholic Church which retains the true worship, there was, then, no Catholic Church visible in the world. For, as regards Elijah, he was accounted the troubler of Israel, and those seven thousand who had not bowed the knee to Baal, were so concealed in obscurity, that they were not known to the prophet. Moreover, at that time when Christ was dwelling upon earth, the Scribes, Pharisees, Sadducees, and Priests, so corrupted the word and Divine worship, that no person in his senses could acknowledge

* August. *de Doctr. Christ.* lib. 3. cap. 32.

† See Rogers's *Visible and Invisible Church*, 8vo. 1729.

‡ Instit. 4. cap. 30.

that Jewish Church a sound and orthodox Church. But that sound and true Church which existed in Christ and Christ's disciples, was not only *invisible* to the Jewish Priests, under the character of a Church, but was *hated* by, and *detestable* to them, (John ix. 22). *The Jews had agreed that if any one should confess that Jesus was the Christ, he should be put out of the Synagogue.* Add to this, that some celebrated Romanists have given it as their opinion,* that in the time of the passion faith remained in the Virgin alone; and if this be deemed true, who was there at that time who could point out as with the finger the visible Church?

Let us come to the state of the Church after Christ was received into heaven. When in the Council at Rimini, the Homousians† were accounted as heretics, when the orthodox pastors were driven into exile, when the whole world was astonished to find itself turned Arian; where was then the face of the visible Church? Of the miseries of these times Athanasius thus writes.‡ *What Church now worships Christ freely? If there do exist any godly, and adherents of Christ anywhere (and there are everywhere many) they are hidden and conceal themselves in caverns and caves of the earth, or sojourn, wandering in solitude.* And Hilary, *De Trinitate* lib, 10. [§. 3.] says, *The hearing of sound doctrine is not encouraged; on the contrary, both it and the preachers thereof are sent into banishment.*§ If Protestants have stated that for some years the orthodox Church was invisible under the tyranny of Antichrist, they meant nothing more, than that pious Pastors were driven from their posts, the pious Laity were afflicted and dispersed, and that sound faith was condemned by the Prelates of the Church as heresy; in one word, (as Athanasius and Hilary complained,) that the truth, and the professors of the true faith, were forced to flee to caverns and caves, whilst wolves in sheep's clothing were swelling and domineering over the Church. Christ himself foretold that this would be the case towards the end of the world; *When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?* (Luke xviii. 8). In short, the Papists themselves acknowledge the probability of this: for, during the cruelty of Antichrist, they say that the public intercourse of believers with the Roman Church

* See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*; vol. iii. p. 614, edit. 1843, and Note, p. 851.—“*Nam quod eo tempore in sola B. Virgine fides permanserit, candela inquit, illa significat, quæ in officiis eorum dierum sola non extinguitur; unde discipuli lumen, quod amiserant, re ceperunt.*” Canus lib. 4. cap. 5.

† See Pearson *on the Creed*; art. ii. pp. 229, 30, Notes, edit. 1824.

‡ Epist. *ad solit. vitam agentes* [See Milner's *Church History*, Cent. iv. chap. 4.]

§ Vide etiam Aug. Epist. 48.

will cease, and yet that the godly in heart and soul will communicate with this Church—admitting, consequently, that the Church which retired into obscurity might yet, after all, be the true Church. When, therefore, our Divines affirm that, during the prevalence of the Roman Antichrist, the professors of the true and orthodox faith may, for a long time, be hidden, and yet that Christ may, in the meanwhile, have a true Church even on earth; it is not to be regarded either in the light of a Platonic idea, or as an idle notion.

QUESTION XXXVI.

THE SACRIFICE MADE BY CHRIST IS ALONE TRULY EXPIATORY.

THIS question is directed against those human satisfactions which the Romanists conjoin with the merit and death of Christ in the very work of Redemption. For they affirm that Christ has, as Mediator, delivered sinners from the wrath of God and eternal punishment; but add, that it is the business of men to redeem themselves, by their own satisfactions, from temporal punishment. Now such persons as teach that men, miserable and defiled by sin, can, either by doing or suffering, make expiation for any punishments due to their sins,—

Must necessarily, in the first place, whether intending it or not, be doing a violence to the office of the Redeemer, and be abstracting some part of it to the sinner himself. For to make satisfaction to God for the penalty due to sin, is the special work of the Redeemer,—*There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a ransom for all* (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6). If we offer our satisfactions to God for the redemption of our sins, we are doubtless thus assuming to ourselves this office of Mediator and Redeemer. Nor was Bellarmine ashamed to utter such blasphemy; endeavouring to fix it even upon the holy Scriptures:—*Man is called* (says he*) *his own Redeemer and Saviour, and that without any injury being done thereby to Christ; inasmuch as the whole virtue of our satisfaction depends upon the blood of Christ.* As if Christ had come into the world, not that he should himself fulfil the character of a Redeemer

* *De Purg.* lib. 1. cap. 14. [col. 609.]

in every part, but to qualify men, so that they might become Redeemers themselves. To have mentioned this extraordinary statement is itself refutation enough.

Secondly, Bellarmine advances in assertion; and, as though it were but a small matter to have shared this work of satisfaction between Christ the Mediator and man, the sinner, comes at length to deny expressly the satisfaction of Christ himself. *There are some, says he,* who assert that there is one satisfaction only, and that it is that of Christ, and that we do not properly make satisfaction;—an opinion which seems to me to be erroneous.—Others say that there are two satisfactions, one of which depends on the other; a method† not improbable.* But Bellarmine himself says, that there is only one actual satisfaction, and that is our own. So he has at last thrust the satisfaction of Christ fairly out of doors! But that Christ may not complain for being so set aside, he assigns to his satisfaction thus much, namely, that through it we obtain grace, whereby we may make satisfaction to God. An unheard of kind of satisfaction, to make the injured party provide means, so that the guilty may himself furnish satisfaction on his own score! Just as if any one should say, that he had made satisfaction for a robber, because he obtained this favour for him, of being set at liberty after having been nearly scourged to death.

Thirdly, The Papists are [as usual] at variance amongst themselves, in asserting,‡ that it has been allowed to man, for his own greater honour, to make satisfaction even from himself. For who accounts it a benefit to be stript of a privilege which has been placed in his hands to do him an honour? And yet it is very well known, that the Popes imagine that they are doing Christians a benefit when, by means of their indulgences, they deprive them of this supposed honour of making satisfaction, and that Papists are as eager in gaping after this loss of the honour.§ Either then Christ has merited useless honours for his people, or the Roman Pontiff, under pretence of conferring a benefit, treacherously despoils them of these honours.|| [However,]

Fourthly, They are not agreed in this point, that these satisfac-

* *De Purg.* lib. 1. [cap. 4.]

† [*Sententia*, but the word in Bellarmine is *modus*.]

‡ Bellarm. *ibid.* [col. 610].

§ Indulgences are (or used to be) actually *forced* upon the people of Popish countries—they were compelled to purchase; and in Spain the Sovereign shared in the trade of them. See Dr. Elliott's *Delineation of Roman Catholicism*, edit. Lond. 1844, pp. 348, &c., for ample confirmation of these statements.

|| And truly we may say, in the language of Isaiah xxiv. 16.,

The treacherous dealers have dealt very treacherously.

tions have been brought forward in order to [satisfy Divine justice ; which, though the guilt has been expiated by Christ, yet (as they will have it*) demands payment of the penalties, and such too as are neither light nor despicable, but equivalent, setting aside the eternal duration, to the pains of hell. But since they have laid it down that Divine justice is rigid and inexorable to such a degree that it will not be turned aside even by the precious blood of Christ, so as to allow any relaxation of punishment ; whether their impiety or their folly be the more conspicuous in deciding, after all, that by undertaking a pilgrimage to some notable image of the blessed Virgin, or by a visit to the temple on the Lateran ; or that, if all other schemes fail, by the payment of a fixed sum of money, these penalties can be relaxed, may well admit of a doubt. Who but must at once perceive, that they are by this doctrine of theirs, not seeking means for the satisfying of Divine justice, but for filling the coffers of the Roman Pontiff.

Fifthly, To require the payment of these satisfactions, after the fault has been remitted, is to make God less bountiful and more severe towards the reconciled and his friends than towards his enemies and haters ; and the blood of Christ of less efficacy for taking away the guilt of sins committed after baptism than before ;—a position little accordant with the Divine goodness.

They do not deny that the satisfaction of Christ is sufficient in itself for blotting out the guilt and punishment altogether ; so far from it, they contend that that is done in baptism, without the aid of human satisfaction at all. Thus Aquinas says,† *By baptism man is freed from the penalty of sin altogether ; because the penalty of Christ's death is communicated to the baptized, as if the individual himself had sustained it ; and therefore his sins are perfectly rectified (or atoned for) by means of the penalty of Christ's sufferings.‡* Now, if we are allowed to infer, that the benefit of the

* Bellarm. *de Pœnit.* lib. 4. cap. 1. et 5.

† Part. 3. quæst. 69, art. 2.

‡ *Et ideo ejus peccata remanent ordinata per pœnam passionis Christi.* There are two difficulties in this passage. One arises from the barbarity of the language ; *ordinata* being perverted from its true sense :—the other from the misapplication of Scripture. The passage in Romans xiii. 1, which the Vulgate renders *Quæ autem sunt a Deo ordinatæ sunt* [sc. potestates] Aquinas always renders *Quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.*—On one occasion he applies it thus :—Whatever is from God is appointed for the attainment of some end, and with an appropriateness to that end (*Prima Secunda q. 102. 1*). In the context, however, to which Davenant refers, he expresses himself thus : *Quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt, sed culpa non ordinatur nisi per pœnam, ut Augustinus dicit ;* from which premises he represents the impugnors of his thesis as inferring

death of Christ communicated to every believer and penitent for taking away sins committed even after baptism is equally available, so that the punishment of them also passes away through the suffering of Christ, and that there is consequently no new satisfaction needed, who but must see that the conclusion is irrefragable?

Yet Bellarmine objects,* That God, though acting as he does most freely in the sacrament of Baptism, and in applying the merit of Christ for the removal of guilt and punishment altogether, is, nevertheless, in the forgiveness of sin after baptism, less liberal; and though making the merit of Christ applicable for taking away the guilt and eternal punishment; yet, that after all, he requires satisfactory works, whereby the temporal punishments may be bought off.

Such devices are however perfectly useless, seeing that Bellarmine himself produces no sufficient reason for any such distinction; and that the Roman Pontiff does away with it by granting plenary indulgences releasing from both guilt and punishment, even to those who commit sin after Baptism.

We might shew how this error of the Romanists is beset with a multitude of other incongruities; but it is sufficiently clear from those alluded to that we must have recourse to Christ alone as the only offering for redemption; the contrary opinion having as we see driven the Papists to the adoption of many notions truly absurd.†

—*Ergo per baptismum non tollitur reatus pœnæ præcedentum peccatorum.* To this inference the quotation in Davenant is the reply adduced by Aquinas.—The appeal to Augustine is scarcely appropriate; as he only uses the general language—*Omnis pœna, si justa est, peccati pœna est, &c.*—This, however, confirms the sense in which Aquinas speaks of *culpa ordinata per pœnam*.

* *De Purg.* lib. 1, cap. 10. [col. 608]; et *De Pœn.* 4. 14.

† See Palmer's Letters to N. Wiseman, D.D., *on the errors of Romanism*; Nos. iii. vi. and vii.

QUESTION XXXVII.

JUSTIFYING FAITH IS CONFIDENCE IN CHRIST AS MEDIATOR.

FAITH as usually considered is the parent of many acts of very different kinds, and has almost innumerable objects in particular; for however numerous the announcements of Scripture, these are proposed as objects in particular to our faith.

But in this discussion we are not enquiring into the acts and objects of faith in general, but only of justifying faith; and not any act, and any object, but that special act which it performs, and that special object which it regards, at the very moment in which a person is freed from a state of condemnation, and is placed in a state of justification in the judgment of the Almighty himself. Therefore my opinion is this:—that the act of justifying, as the Almighty regards it, falls upon man the sinner at that very point of time at which he apprehends the promise of salvation made to every believer in Christ, and consequently rests with his whole heart for obtaining this salvation, on Him as Mediator.

With respect then to this special act it is not the bare knowledge of the Divine word; for the devils have this, who are not capable of justification; nor is it that general assent by which we acknowledge and admit for divinely revealed truth whatever is revealed in the Scriptures; for bad Christians have this who are not yet justified: nor is it, lastly, a conditional and universal apprehending of even gratuitous promises; for the impenitent have a notion of this, and yet they do not thereby obtain justification. There is then one thing left; which is a certain special confidence, excited in the heart by the ministry of the Word, and by the operation of the Spirit, which reposes upon the justifying cause offered and applied to itself in particular, and drinks as it were from it the grace of justification. We do not therefore deny that there are preceding and common acts of faith, by which men are prepared to receive justification, but we say that this faith is that ultimate act, with the presence of which justification is coincident; as in the physical sciences, the form is coincident with that which Philosophers call *the ultimate disposition*. Thus far concerning the special act of justifying faith.

Now with respect to that peculiar special object on which faith

fixes at the very instant at which it receives justification from God, it is certain that in the historical narration of creation or of government the guilty soul cannot find this remission of sins. Hence Aquinas says, *In the justification of a sinner, it is not necessary that other articles should be thought of, but only that God should be considered as remitting sins*; quæst. disp. De just. art. 4. Moreover, in the commands and threatenings of the Law this special object is less than ever discernible; for such a consideration begets nothing else but terrors; but with the addition of grace, it excites sinners to look around for that which frees us from its condemnation: yet so, that for this teaching of the Law, faith can never find its own object (if I may so call it) *consolatory and justificatory*. There remains therefore the sweet promises of the Gospel, concerning favour and the gratuitous remission of sin, through and on account of a Mediator; and while faith looks at these promises the sinner conceives confidence, he relies upon this Mediator offered to him, he subjects himself to the Divine mercy for justification, and thus obtains the entire benefit of justification.*

That the faith which we call *justifying* is such an act as we have described, and that at the very moment of justification the eye and heart of the believer tend towards the Mediator, in the very manner in which we have affirmed, can be made manifest,

First, because Scripture clearly points out that the proper and formal act of faith which justifies is the reception of the offered promise in Christ, whether as a particular application, or as a confidence in obtaining remission and safety through Jesus Christ the Mediator; for these all tend the same way: for what else do these testimonies mean? Acts xiii. 38, 39, *Be it known unto you, men and brethren, that through this Jesus is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins: And ————— by him all that believe are justified*. You see here the special object which faith contemplates in the act of justification, namely, the promise of remission of sin; you see, also, on whom it relies for obtaining this remission and safety, namely, on Christ, by whom God reconciles the world unto himself. I add that passage also, Rom. iii. 22, 23, 24: *The righteousness of God, by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all them that believe on him, &c.*; and verse 25, *Whom God hath set forth as a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past*. What

* See Bickersteth's discourse on *Justification* in the *Tavistock Lectures*, which is rich with references to standard authorities on the whole subject.

else does the righteousness of God in this passage signify, than the gratuitous justification of the sinner, by which he who remains a sinner, as to his *proper person*, is esteemed righteous by *Divine mercy*?—But by what means do men become partakers of this righteousness? By believing in Him whom God has proposed as a propitiator; that is, by relying, by reposing on Christ, in whom the Gospel promises have their foundation and efficacy. I add, finally, this verse of St. Paul to the Romans, iv. 16: *Therefore, it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure*: where you see that our justification depends upon faith apprehending and applying to itself gratuitous promises; which is much the same as saying, that it depends on faith relying on Christ as Mediator.*

Secondly, to this confidence in Christ as Mediator, we attribute the instrumental efficacy of justification, rather than to any act of man the sinner; because, it is evident, that men are justified by that method by which the Divine glory is most illustrated, and the honour of our salvation referred to God alone. But those who determine that man is justified by any virtues or works, in the matter of justification, they do not leave the glory of man's salvation entirely with God, but ascribe it, in some part, to their own merit. But as we are accustomed to ascribe the whole glory of alms promised and given, not to the beggar receiving them, but to the donor freely bestowing them, so we assign the whole glory of man's justification and salvation, not to faith tending towards Christ and attaching it to itself, but to God himself gratuitously justifying the believer.

Thirdly, to this confidence in Christ we think that our justification is to be referred, because it is certain that God sets a higher value on this act than on any other, inasmuch, as by the same act Christ the Mediator is made of the greatest value to us, and is, as it were, placed in his throne and adored. The Saviour himself hinted at this, when, to the Jews asking him, *What shall we do that we may work the works of God?* Christ answered, *This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom He hath sent*, (John vi. 28, 29). As if he had said, Ye desire to know, by the performance of what works ye may be most acceptable to God; but I say to you, there is one only work which will render you pleasing and acceptable to God; namely, if ye acknowledge me to be God's Son and the Messiah, and rely upon me with a faithful heart. And at verse 40, [we have] to nearly the same purpose, *This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and*

* See Gataker's *Antidote against error concerning Justification*, or the true notion of justifying faith, 4to., 1670.

believeth on him, may have everlasting life. From which it is manifest, that two acts are required from us for the attainment of justification and salvation: one is, *to see the Son*—to see Christ preached, and to acknowledge him for the Son of God and the Redeemer of the world: by which act we discern the fountain of eternal life, and tend directly towards it; the other is *to believe on him*: by which act, we draw life from the fountain of life, and plunge, as it were, our whole selves into Him. By this act, we chiefly know God the Father, and Christ sent by Him. He, therefore, confers the greatest honour on this act, that justification and reception into God's favour should always accompany it.

Now let us see, in few words, what our adversaries are accustomed to offer on the contrary side.

First, they argue, that faith pertains to the intellect, and confidence to the will, and therefore, that we erroneously affirm that justifying faith is confidence in Christ as Mediator.

We reply, that the speculative or naked act of faith, apprehending the truth of the Gospel, and assenting to it, as to an undoubted history, does not pertain to justification; but that faith which Scripture acknowledges as justifying, has in itself the complicated act of the will and the intellect. For, to apprehend Christ to be the Redeemer of the world, and to assent to this proposition—

Whosoever believeth in him shall be saved, truly appertains to the intellect; but this faith, although at once beholding and acknowledging the Redeemer, does not justify, before the sinner has drawn, as it were, Christ to his own home, and joined himself to this Mediator: and this does not happen, unless by that act of confidence which we assert belongs also to the will. Whence Durandus affirms*—*No one can be justified unless through union to Christ; but the first union to Christ takes place through faith.* Not by a merely speculative union situated in the intellect, which looks only at the justifying cause; but, by a confidence which tends towards, and strives for this union, which regards also the will. And this seems the meaning of the distinction of Augustine:† *to believe in God, to believe God, and to believe upon God.* He affirms the two former acts to be necessary for man's salvation, which yet he confesses, that not only bad Christians, but even devils can perform. But as to the last, viz. *to believe upon God*, by which alone justification is acquired, he declares belongs to the will, while he shews that there is a certain adhesive principle in it. But what else can this adhesion be, but that which we call confidence in God, using,

* Lib. 4. dist. 2. quæst. 8.

† Sermone *De Temp.* 181.

indeed, another word, but in the same sense ? Albert agrees with Augustine,* *To believe upon God, is to enter into God by believing, and to be incorporated with his members*; and not even the Papists themselves dare to say, that this can be done by the bare act of the intellect.

Secondly, they object that one virtue cannot exist in two faculties distinct in kind; but that this faith, which we call justifying, is one of the theological virtues, and is situated in the intellect, and not in the will: but, as to the confidence for which we contend, we confess that it has reference to the will.

I answer, that, as to this philosophical dogma, that the will and the intellect are two faculties essentially distinct, it is not universally received, and, consequently, is unfit to be made the basis of an argument on theological doctrines. Estius confesses,† that many have doubted, without rashness, whether the powers of the intellect and the will are essentially distinct. Besides, we do not grant that the faith which we call justifying is the same which our adversaries place among the Theological virtues. For their theological faith is nothing more than a supernatural assent, afforded to Divine revelation on account of the authority of the Revealer. They allow, too, that this may be found in bad Christians; whence it is surprising that they are so confused in their reasonings as to confound justifying faith with this, which they acknowledge can remain informal; and, at the same time, they are bound to acknowledge cannot justify. What they say is true, namely, that justifying faith assents to the revelation of God; but it is false that it is justifying from this general assent. This assent ought to go forward to the doctrine revealed by God concerning Christ the Mediator; and this act is produced by the intellect alone, supernaturally illuminated; but it is necessary that confidence be joined with it, (all other things being cast away) reposing on this very Mediator, which draws the whole heart, or the whole soul to Christ, and unites it firmly to Christ; and in this act of confidence the will also executes its own office. Nor does it seem to us absurd, but in every way consistent, that the act by which the whole soul is purified and justified, should belong to the whole soul; so that, while it has its beginning in the bare intellect, it should have its completion in the will.

Thirdly, they contend that confidence is nothing but full assurance of hope; but hope is a virtue, distinct from faith, according

* Compend. lib. 5, cap. 21.

† In Sent. lib. 2. dist. 24.

to the common opinion of Theologians, who establish three Theological virtues, namely, Faith, Hope, and Charity.

We deny that this confidence, which relies entirely upon the Mediator, and which apprehends God remitting our sins on account of the Mediator, is an act of hope: nay, we affirm that it is the peculiar act of faith, which we call *justifying*. For that hope which they call *full assurance*, is a firm expectation of future blessedness: but faith does not tend to its object as a *future*, but as a *present* good. It conceives of and apprehends the Mediator as already present to the sinner, and as reconciling him to God the Father. It cleaves to the truth of the Gospel promises, not by way of *expectation*, but as a *possessor*, according to the word of the Saviour, *He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life.**

* John iii. 36, and vi. 37.

Bishop O'Brien, referring to the foregoing passage of Davenant, in his Appendix to his *Sermons on Faith*, after stating that the most important distinction between the two states of mind adverted to is certainly given in the answer of Bishop Davenant, observes:—"But it seems to require some explanation and addition. He who simply hopes for a fulfilment of Gospel promises (of which assuredly a most important part is happiness in a future life) is not more an expectant, or less a possessor, with respect to this part of the promises, than he who trusts in Christ for the fulfilment of them. They both have the present enjoyment which such hopes are fitted to supply, and both have equally to wait for the perfect fruition of them. But the two states of mind differ very intelligibly and importantly, though they have so much in common. That faith includes feelings, with respect to the Being whose sufferings secured those benefits, and to the Being whose bounty will bestow them, which do not enter into a mere hope of the blessings themselves, is, as I have remarked, p. 16, immediately apparent from the true account of the nature of faith. And here, what the Bishop says of *faith conceiving and apprehending the Mediator*, &c., is well grounded, and most important. So that it may be seen—and that is a sufficient answer to the difficulty, though, perhaps, not a perfect account of the whole difference—that, though faith cannot exist without some degree of hope, it does not depend for its life and energy upon the same causes, and may be strong and cordial, while our hopes are not powerfully raised, for want of the distinct knowledge which is essential to their liveliness; and, moreover, that the liveliest hopes may exist without any faith whatever.—But, it may be said, though this distinction is well founded in the abstract, what application can it have to the particular case for which it is intended? For assuredly the hope of which the Scriptures speak, is that, and that only, which believers in the Lord feel. I answer, that the distinction holds not less in the particular case than in the abstract. For, though the believer entertains no hopes which are not founded on the Redeemer's work, this does not hinder, that, at certain seasons, the objects of his hopes may be present to his mind, apart from their true foundation. He may form vivid pictures of future happiness, may indulge ardent longings for it, and enjoy a lively expectation of it, without adverting, at the moment, to what forms the sole foundation of such hopes. Nor does he, by so doing, cease to be a believer; but he certainly is not, at the time, exercising *faith*. On the other hand, he may, while he meditates upon joys in store for

Lastly, Our adversaries argue, That confidence by which any one trusts that his sins are forgiven, and that he is accepted by God, and certain of the heavenly kingdom, is posterior to justification, and so cannot be justifying faith. For such confidence is not granted to men, unless they walk in newness of life, and preserve a good conscience: therefore, we are not justified by such a confidence, but after our justification and sanctification, such confidence is excited in the hearts of the elect by the Holy Spirit.

I answer, In reality the word has two senses. One implies the act of resting upon, and cleaving to Christ Jesus, by which we embrace him, as it were, with both our arms, and, by this act, strive to obtain from God the Father, pardon, grace, and glory; and we think that this is the act on which justification always follows, that is, absolution from sin, and reception into grace and Divine favour, whether or not the sinner, at the very first moment, grasps the *full assurance* of the remission obtained. Besides this sense, confidence is sometimes used to denote the consequent effects of justifying faith, viz. a full persuasion, and, as it were, a vivid sense, of the remission enjoyed, and the Divine favour obtained. We confess that this confidence is not justifying faith, but its offspring; which the justified cannot produce until after the performance of many exercises of faith and holiness.

We conclude, therefore, that confidence in the Mediator, appointed by God, and proposed to us in the Gospel, is the very act to which God thinks fit to grant remission of sins, or the justification of the sinner.

him, think even more of Him to whom he owes them, and think of Him, in assurance, that through Him he shall obtain them: he is in the former state hoping; in the latter, confiding—trusting in the *God of hope*, and in Christ, *who is our hope.*”—Appendix (p. 325.) to *Ten Sermons on the nature and effects of Faith*, by James Thomas O'Brien, D.D. Dublin, 1833; now Bishop of Ossory and Fergus.

QUESTION XXXVIII.

JUSTIFYING FAITH CANNOT BE DISUNITED FROM CHARITY.

BELLARMINE proposes this controversy in these very words,—*An fides justificans possit à charitate disjungi? Can justifying faith be disunited from charity?** But (and it is worth observing) on coming to the conflict, he is compelled to change the terms of the question under consideration, and to express his opinion thus:† —*True and Christian faith, which justifies per modum dispositionis can be separated from love (dilectione) and other virtues.* The Jesuit did not dare to say, that justifying faith, but that faith which justifies by means of disposition, can be disunited from charity. Whereas we state and hold that to be justifying faith which is certainly and infallibly followed or accompanied by justification, not by any remote and imperfect disposition, which is previously required for the attainment of justification, but precedes it in such a manner, that in the majority justification never follows. Dominic Soto adopts the same shuffling method:—*True and orthodox faith* (says he‡) *and that which is necessary for justification can exist without charity.* But the being necessary for justification is quite another thing to the being *de facto* a justifying faith. Our opponents might have carried on a controversy about a justifying cause under that sense. For the exercise of reason and previous thinking are necessary, as well for the very act itself of faith, as for the effect of justification; inasmuch as to believe is nothing else than to think with assent. If they jumble justifying faith into a mass of remote dispositions, why do they not attach the same epithet to all the other dispositions? But to come to the point: We deny that that faith which we call justifying, not in name merely, but in fact, is disunited from charity; and in doing so we rely on the following reasons,—

First, because holy Scripture connects justifying faith with the new birth; for, *whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God* (1 John, v. 1.) *As many as received him, to them*

* *De Justif.* lib. 1. *Ord. disp.*† *Idem*, cap. 15.‡ *De Nat. et Grat.* lib. 2, cap. 8.

gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name (John i. 12). But those who are devoid of charity are bastards, and children of Satan; therefore they who have not charity, have not justifying faith. Hear Augustine*—*They alone know how to believe in God who love him; who are Christians not only in name, but in life.* Now hear Bellarmine on the other side:—*True and Christian faith, which justifies an ungodly man by means of a disposition, can be separated from love (dilectione).* If he understands by means of a disposition *remote*, he is wrong in calling that justifying which does not yet justify, and which perhaps never will justify; if by means of a disposition *attinent*, it is clear that those have never learned to believe in God after this manner, who have not at the same time learned to love God.

Secondly, because justifying faith (as the Scriptures also bear witness) is not an inactive and idle quality, but a living and active one, aroused and set in motion by the sanctifying Spirit. But that misshapen faith, which the Papists denominate *orthodox, Christian, and justifying*, is found to be in most cases idle and buried in sleep. Bellarmine, while vehemently contending that justifying faith is nothing else than an assent to what is contained in the word, at the same time confesses, yea contends, that this his justifying faith consists with the fact of those endowed with such a faith remaining wicked. But that which is truly designated justifying faith purifies the heart, produces a holy life, brings forth good works (Acts xv. 9); in a word, has charity as an inseparable companion. Hence says Augustine,† *Faith without charity can exist indeed, but cannot be of any profit.* But that which is rightly called justifying cannot exist in any man, and not be profitable to him for salvation. Hence Dominic Soto pronounces that misshapen and inactive faith, which remains without charity, to be unworthy of the name of virtue. But justifying faith is a heaven-inspired and illustrious virtue, and such as is worthy of the name. *For not a moment can be assigned in which the act of that faith which is the proximate preparation of justifying grace may be found without grace*; § therefore it is not without charity.

Thirdly, whoever has justifying faith, abides in God and God in him; for Christ dwells in our hearts by this faith (Eph. iii. 17); by this faith we eat the flesh of Christ and drink his blood; hence we abide in Him, and He in us (John vi. 56). *For it is by faith, not with the teeth, that we eat Christ*, as Cyprian truly expresses it. If God abides in those who believe in Christ, they cannot by

* Serm. de Temp. 181.

† De Trin. 15, 18.

† De Justif. lib. 1, cap. 15.

§ Soto De Nat. et Grat. 2. 12.

any means be devoid of charity. For as a vessel filled with fire is never destitute of heat; so a man full of God cannot be without charity.

Fourthly, the Papists themselves teach,* that the term *justification* is taken in a three-fold sense; namely, for the acquiring of righteousness; for the increase of righteousness acquired; and for the declaration of righteousness or absolution from sins. Let them grant us, therefore, that justifying faith by which inherent righteousness is acquired, or increased when acquired; or, in fine, by which remission of sins is procured; and let them shew that it has, nevertheless, been disjoined from charity. They will not be able, nay, they do not even try: but they fancy that they have brought the matter to a conclusion, if they shew that that faith, which acknowledges the doctrine revealed in the Scriptures as true and divinely inspired, exists in many devoid of charity. But such a faith as this may be possessed, not only by the reprobate and the accursed, but even by devils, and hence it is that they tremble. Whereas, justifying faith not only apprehends the events recorded by Christ, by means of a true and divinely revealed history, but apprehends Christ himself, and applies him to the sinner, by means of a divinely appointed remedy. Therefore, let them prove that that general assent given to the Scriptures draws life and salvation from Christ, the source of life and salvation, and then we will acknowledge that justifying faith is found disunited from charity.

Lastly; not to dwell too long on a matter that is not very obscure, I send the Romanists back to their own Angelical Doctor. He teaches† that there are four requisites for the justification of the ungodly:—the infusion of grace, the motion of free-will to God through faith, the motion of free-will to sin, and the remission of guilt. Now, whoever puts infused grace in the first place, and makes it the foundation of faith, the same makes charity, united with it, the foundation. For we can make no distinction between charity and infused grace, certainly they are never separate. The same, in his *Disputations*,‡ says, *Free-will in justification moves to God by the motion of faith, charity, and hope; for he who is justified must be converted to God, loving him with the hope of pardon.* What pretence have they, then, for calling that general assent *justifying faith* which scarcely ever moves the mind to God, by the motions requisite for justification? What pretence have they for maintaining faith to be ever separated from charity, since

* Bellarm. *De Justif.* 1. 1.

† 1. 2. Quæst. 113, art 6.

‡ *De Justif.* art. 4.

to believe in God is not precisely an act of solitary faith, but of faith and charity working together, if not by nature, yet in time? Hence Augustine, wherever he speaks of justifying faith, considers no other faith worthy of this name, than that which has charity united with it.

But let us hear the reasons which induce the Papists to maintain that that faith, which they call *justifying*, is, nevertheless, devoid of charity.

1—First, they bring forward John xii. 42:* *Among the chief rulers many believed on him, but did not confess him.—For they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God.* Here the Evangelist testifies, that in those chief rulers there was faith without charity.

I answer; that the Evangelist does not testify that this was justifying faith, nay, he most clearly shews that it was not; for those imbued with justifying faith have a greater love for the glory of God than for the praise of men. But they are said to have believed; But that was only when convinced by miracles; which even was the case with devils, who, moreover, did what these did not, namely, confessed Jesus to be the Son of the Most High God; yet they were not endued with justifying faith (Matt. viii. 29). Let us allow that these rulers gave an assent that was not at all feigned or extorted, by the evidence of facts, to this proposition;—*Jesus the Son of Mary is the Messiah sent into the world by God.* This act is, indeed, by reason of the object, a true act of true faith; but not an act peculiar to justifying faith, because it is not directed towards an acknowledged Mediator in that way in which justification is obtained. If those rulers had obtained justifying faith, then all Christians have obtained justifying faith—a thing which no one in his senses will assert.

2.—That passage in 1 Cor. xiii. 2, is incessantly in the mouth of all of them:—*Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.* Therefore, all faith can be found separate from charity.

I answer: The *all faith* of which the Apostle speaks, in that place, that is, all faith of miracles, however great it may be, may be devoid of charity; but that this is not the same with justifying faith, but rather a gift freely given for the use of others, is evident from hence, that, notwithstanding this faith, men may remain *workers of iniquity*; may remain such as Christ never knew (Matt. vii. 22, 23). But this cannot be truly said of those who

* Bellarm. *De Justif.* 1. 15.

have obtained justifying faith; neither that they are *nothing*. For those who have justifying faith are declared as possessing all things in Christ, who is the store-house of all spiritual goods.

3.—Thirdly, they infer from those passages in which our Saviour teaches the existence of good and bad in his Church; as Matt. iii. 12, where the similitude of chaff and wheat is set forth; and Matt. xiii. 48, where the similitude of good and bad fishes in the same net occurs, &c., that since those who are in the Church are faithful, if the same can be bad, it follows that the faith whence they derive the appellation of faithful can be united with sin, from which they are called bad; and consequently can be disunited from charity.

I answer: It is one thing to be in the Church by an external profession of faith, another, to be a true member of Christ, and thence denominated justified. That faith which is common to the good and bad, constitutes the difference between those who are Christians, and those who are not; but not at all between the justified and those who are not so: it is, therefore, silly to call that justifying, which, while it remains such, neither does nor can justify.

4.—Fourthly; Bellarmine quibbles in this way: If faith and charity cannot be disunited, it arises either from the circumstance of one being of the nature of the other, or certainly of one being the offspring of the other; neither of which it can be said to be. Not the first; for faith and charity are not one virtue, but two, having different subjects, acts, and objects. Not the second; since, though charity springs from faith, it does not spring as a passion peculiar to it, but as a virtue to which faith inclines. But inclination does not force free-will, but leaves a man free, so as to love if he please, or not to love if he please.

I answer: We do not say that there is no faith that can be disunited from charity, but that justifying faith cannot. Nay, we freely grant to Bellarmine that this faith is a virtue *distinct* from charity; yet we do not admit that it is *disunited* or *severed* from it. Nor yet do we draw the necessary concurrence of these virtues mainly from this, that charity springs from faith as a passion peculiar to it; but we prove it from other reasons. For however the term faith may denote an imperfect, and (in the language of the Schools) *informal* quality, yet, on the addition of the term *justifying*, it denotes a more perfect quality; and one deserving to be honoured with the name of a Theological virtue, as being conceived in the soul by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But that the Theological virtues have a mutual connexion, is an admitted

maxim among the Schoolmen themselves. Whence says Aquinas,* *Faith and hope may exist without charity, but, properly speaking, there are no virtues without charity.* Our proof, therefore, of the necessary connection between justifying faith and charity, we demonstrate from the fact, that justifying faith is the work of the Holy Spirit imbuing a man with his grace, and begetting this excellent and saving virtue in his mind. Now such is the bountifulness of God, that he does not bestow a faith reposing on Christ the Mediator, without bestowing, at the same time, an inspiring hope, and a charity, enkindling the love of God our Saviour in our minds. Hence says Gregory, on Ezekiel (Homil. 22.), *We love in this life in proportion as we believe; and we anticipate, by hope, to the extent that we love.* Besides, the nature of faith (especially that which justifies) consists not merely in the assurance of the understanding, which devils may have in a more eminent degree than we; but in this, that it is embraced in the way of obedience and compliance of the will. But God does not render the human will obedient to, and complying with himself, without inspiring some love of himself. In a word, we conclude, that charity springs from faith in the way of an incliner only; but from God giving justifying faith in the way of an inspirer, and, at the same time, a generator of this virtue of charity within us; and hence it is that they are never found apart.

5.—Lastly; Bellarmine adduces testimonies of the Fathers, but such as are not at all of service to his cause: Let us, however, consider them.

1.—*Faith without charity can exist, indeed, but cannot be of any profit.* Aug. de Trinit. 15. 18.

I answer: He is not speaking of justifying faith, but of dead faith; which in other passages he calls *the faith*, not of Christians, but of devils.

2.—*Here is some one who believes in Christ, but hates Christ; he has faith's confession in the fear of punishment, but not in the love of a crown: Add love to this faith, so that it may become such faith as that of which the Apostle Paul speaks—FAITH WHICH WORKETH BY LOVE.* Aug. Tract. 10. in Epist. Joan.

I answer: A knowledge of Christian doctrine, with an admission that it is true, can be called faith; but to call that faith justifying which consists with a hatred of Christ, is repugnant to common sense. Therefore, that *such* faith may exist without charity, we admit without any damage to our cause.

* 1. 2. Quæst. 65. art. 4.

3.—*Whence is that love by which faith works, but from the same source from which faith itself has obtained it?* August. *de Spirit. et lit.* cap. 32. If faith obtains charity, it is certainly prior to charity, and, before obtaining it, exists without it.

I answer: We confess that that faith which is a bare knowledge of what is to be believed, accompanied by assent, is found in many Christians devoid of charity. But the nature of justifying faith is different, in the act of which the whole soul turns to the justifying cause—a thing which is not and cannot be done by a soul entirely destitute of charity. Now we must understand Augustine's saying, that this initial faith obtains charity in this sense, namely, that it shews and informs us of the source from which we must seek and obtain charity. But as regards the faith to which Scripture attributes the power of justifying, Augustine neither thought nor wrote that it was, even for a moment, distinct from charity. If we look to their natural order, faith precedes hope, hope charity; but if we regard time, justifying faith has both of them as inseparable companions.

QUESTION XXXIX.

THE LAITY ARE NOT TO BE RESTRAINED FROM READING THE
HOLY SCRIPTURES.

THE reasons—so to call them—which induce Romanists to withhold the private perusal of the Scriptures from their Lay-members,* are of very little or no weight. For to allege as their wont is, that *an occasion is thereby given to inexperienced individuals of erring, committing sin, and blaspheming*, is just as much the case with the Clergy as the Laity. More than that, the records of past ages furnish instances of men of learning, and ecclesiastics too, from a mistaken apprehension and perversion of the words of Scripture, far more commonly falling into heresies and blasphemies, than any of the commonalty; for these, as every one well knows, are generally led aside into error by the learned. There can therefore be no valid ground for the Laity being refused the use of

* That the Church of Rome does prohibit the use of the Scriptures from the Laity, see Allport's *Sall's Catholic Faith maintained in the Church of England* pp. 38, and 448.

the Scriptures, from causes which originate in an abuse of Scripture, and may be equally applicable to Clergy as to Laity. The Church of Rome acts just as a person would do, who, because *bon vivants* misuse food and wine, and hence contract diseases, should forbid the proper use of them to all. The Laity are not then to be repelled from a perusal of the Scriptures, but recommended to read them with a sober and pious mind, to seek the illuminating grace of the Spirit, to attend diligently the public preaching of the word; when needful to consult their ministers; in short, to be on their guard against errors, not against the Scriptures. Augustine said well,* that *instruction was so suitably dispensed in the holy Scriptures, that there was no man but might derive satisfaction from them provided he sought it with a devout and pious mind.*

Such, however, as treat the Christian Laity with more scorn, pretend a reverence for the dignity of the Sacred Writings,† as though the allowing the generality the possession of a pearl of so great price, was equivalent to casting pearls before swine to be trodden under foot by them. But that word of Peter, *Ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy nation*, is applicable not to the Clergy alone, but to all good Christians, who are sanctified by the Spirit, by faith, and the Sacraments, and are dedicated to God. Now the saints are not to be refused a participation in either holy things or actions, unless they are such as no one is qualified for undertaking, but by special appointment; and that cannot be asserted with respect to the books of Holy Writ. It is not, however, to be supposed, that it is owing to any peculiar respect for the Scriptures, that the Church of Rome debars her people from access to them, seeing that her writers have compared them to a nose of wax; are eager to set forward the ambiguity and obscurity of their meaning, which meaning, say they, is to be learnt from the interpretation of the Bishop of Rome for the time being; and in short deny that they were either put into writing by Divine command, or are superior to unwritten traditions.‡ To tell the truth, the adherents of Rome perceived that the numberless errors with which they have overlaid the Church could not bear the light of the Word of God; and consequently decided upon its being [virtually] set aside; not as though they had any particular zeal for

* *De utilitate credendi ad Honor.* cap. 6.

† Vide Hosium *de Expos. Dei Verb.* p. 640.

[‡ See Sir H. Lynde's *Safe way*, sect. 14; Bishop Jewel's *Defence of Apology*, pt. 4. p. 423, and *Replie to Harding*, art. 15.; Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, p. 45, edit. 1841; *Downside Discussion*, p. 47; Riveti *Catholicus Orthodoxus*, tract. 1, quæst. 9.]

securing the Laity from falling into error through that mean, but lest the people should at last discover that it was their leaders who were causing them to err.*

Again, it may be pretended also, that the reading of Scripture is only necessary for those who sustain the office of teachers; and that it is the safer way for the Laity (as with infants) to receive food as prepared for them by their nurses. Be that as it may, nevertheless the mere necessity of learning, if it is to be effected with any comfort or readiness, requires a private perusal of the Scriptures. For, as Chrysostom has well observed,† *the private perusal renders what is taught in public more easy to be understood*. But still on the Laity will devolve, in some measure, the office of giving instruction; for fathers of families are under obligation to inform their own wives and children. On which ground Chrysostom again, after having urged it upon all laymen to furnish themselves with Bibles, thus addresses householders :‡ *It is only you who should look for instruction from us; but from you your wives, and from you your children*.

Once more, some allege, as if it made to the point they would establish, that the Jews were in the habit of not allowing some portions of Scripture to be read by their youth, as Gregory of Nazianzum mentions in his oration, *on observing moderation in disputes*. Origen also writes :§—*Among the Hebrews, none but such as had arrived at mature age were permitted even to meddle with the Canticles*. To which may be added the Jewish tradition mentioned by Jerome (*Præm. in Ezech.*) that *such as had not passed their thirteenth year, were forbidden to read either the opening chapters of Genesis, or the Song of Solomon, or the beginning and close of Ezekiel*. But so far from these instances giving any support to the scheme of parties who would deprive the people of the Word of God, they every one tell against it. For, in the first place, be it observed, the perusal of these portions of Scripture was not *utterly forbidden*, but *merely deferred*. Besides, that such a tradition, having reference to age, would go to debar Ecclesiastics as well as the Laity. And, in short, a rule, by which the perusal of certain portions was for a time suspended, and young persons forbade the reading of them, implied that the other Scriptures *should* be read by them; as well as the former also, when they had arrived at a proper age.

[* Isa. ix. 16—a modern illustration !]

† Hom. 1. in *Matthew* [tom. vii. p. 15. edit. 1836.]

‡ Hom. ix. in *Epis. ad Coloss.*

§ Prolog. in *Cantic. Cantice*.

Having thus set aside the cavils of our opponents, we will now bring forward our own arguments.

The first shall be laid in the command and will of God, as revealed in Scripture, to which more credit is to be given than to either the traditions of Jews or the decrees of Tridentines. *Ye shall lay up these my words in your heart:—ye shall teach them your children:—Thou shalt write them upon the door-posts of thy house, &c.* (Deut. xi. 18—20.) The command of Christ is also well known, *Search the Scriptures* (John v. 49). The Bereans who did this are approved, (Acts xvii.) while the Israelites who neglected to do so are reprov'd:—*I have written to him the great things of my law, but they were accounted as a strange thing* (Hos. viii. 12). What more can be desired? Those persons are declared to be blessed who pay devout obedience to the command of God, and occupy themselves constantly and diligently in a study of the Scriptures:—*Blessed is the man who meditates on the Law of God day and night* (Psalm i. 2). There is no distinction made here between Lay and Clergy-men—all are invited to peruse the Scriptures—all are at liberty to unroll and read the Scriptures.

Our second argument may be grounded on the practice of Prophets and Apostles; for what the Church of Rome would willingly debar the people from possessing, *that* they made public, not to the Priesthood alone, but to mankind at large. The same word, when put into writing, it was equally their wish should be read, not by Ecclesiastics merely, but by the Laity; assuredly *they* never debarred any one from perusing them by an edict, never compelled any to apply for permission so to do either from Bishop or Inquisitor. It is evident that the Romans, Corinthians, and others, to whom letters were addressed by the Apostles, both could and were obliged to give them a reading. For it is absurd to imagine, that the writings of the Apostles were sent to the whole Church, with this limitation however—that no Layman should be permitted to inspect them, without permission being duly sought for and obtained from the Ordinary of the place, or some Inquisitor.* Gregory the Great calls the Bible *a Letter from the Omnipotent God to his creature*; and Augustine, *an embassy sent from God to us*. Who, then, shall forbid the people an acquaintance with letters addressed as well to them as to the Priesthood? who shall impede any man's receiving, perusing, meditating on, a solemn message intended for himself? The very learned Count Mirandula says,†

* As in the Tridentine Church's Rule *de libris prohibitis* §. iv.

† *Præfat. in Heptaplum*, [See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, Edit. 1843, vol. iv. p. 135.]

that as regards the Old Testament,* *the Law was set forth to be read by every Israelite*; and of the New Testament, that *the Gospel History should be in constant perusal by all Christians*.

A third argument may be deduced from the ultimate end or benefit of the Scriptures. They were put into writing, in order that from them we might seek the enlightening of the soul in matters to be believed, and direction for a course of life in matters of practice; that we should from them derive consolation in adversity; and, in short, become, through them, fitted for every good work. Hence are those praises with which the Psalmist so frequently commends the word of God:—*It converteth the soul;—it giveth wisdom unto the simple*: (Psal. xix. 7.) *It guides even the path of the young* (Psal. cxix. 9). The Apostle, also, has pointed out clearly the advantageous uses of it;—*All Scripture is given by inspiration of God,† and is profitable for doctrine, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works* (2 Tim. iii. 16, 17). Either, then, the Laity have no need of such benefits, or they are not to be debarred from the Scriptures, whence such benefits may be derived. Should our opponents assert, that the people come in for their measure of these privileges, from the public preaching of the word, not by private perusal thereof, there is not a learned and pious individual but will protest against such a notion. *Love* (says Augustine‡) *the reading of Scripture, and you will become well acquainted with every thing worth knowing; or at all events, by the blessing of God, with a large proportion*. Here he shews how, by perusing the Scriptures, the minds of men are used to be enlightened: And that their hearts, moreover, are changed and cleansed, he has taught us in his own case; as may be seen in his *Confessions*, lib. viii. cap. ult.

A fourth argument may be derived from the divisions existing amongst Christians on the subject of Religion. For if what Chrysostom asserted, in reference to his own times,§ were true, *that all Christians should have recourse to the Scriptures, inasmuch as there is no other [definite] resource for them*, far more is it incumbent upon Christians of our day, so to abound in know-

* Expos. Orat. Dom.

† Davenant, as in other instances, here makes his quotation according to the Latin Vulgate; but let the reader see Dr. Henderson's valuable work on *Divine Inspiration*, pp. 309, 558.

‡ August. Epist. 120.

§ In Matth. Hom. 29. [This reference is incorrect, and should be to the 49th Homily in the *Opus Imperfectum* on Matthew; tom. vi. p. 946: See Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, p. 77.]

ledge of the word of God, that they may be enabled to prove the spirits, to be on their guard against deceivers, and in all points appertaining to soundness in the faith and holiness of manners, be qualified to distinguish truth from falsehood. For such as are unskilled in the Scriptures, are unable to do this; and, like children, are carried away by any current of false doctrine; or, like blind persons, are, under the guidance of any blind leader, precipitated to destruction. Not that it is my opinion that every individual Christian, either can make himself acquainted with, or should aspire to possess information as to the subjects now in controversy; but that it lies within their power, by diligent and faithful application, to acquire that measure of information as shall secure them, *in points of faith*, either from embracing pernicious error instead of orthodox truth; or, *in points of practice*, from substituting superstitious, impious, and unwarranted acts of worship, in the place of duties enjoined by the word of God. This is enough for those on whom it does not devolve to communicate *public* instruction in the Church; this is what private individuals can attain, if they will not fail to accompany their reading of the Scriptures with the proper means and aids for acquiring information. For let Papists labour as they please in displaying the difficulties and obscurities in the Scriptures, in order to scare Laymen from their sacred pages, the holy Fathers are unanimous in thinking, that such as approach with a pious disposition to the perusal of them, may derive thence all saving knowledge. To pass by the testimonies of others, I will produce those of two only; one from Augustine, and another from his most learned follower, Prosper of Aquitain. Thus, then, Augustine:* *In the plain declarations of Holy Writ may be discerned every thing appertaining either to faith or manner of life.* Now what is there to hinder a Layman from deriving a knowledge, through reading the Scriptures, of such points as are plainly discernible in them? But now for Prosper's opinion: *The teaching of the Apostles is so salutary and vivifying, that no one can depart, so far as he is capable of receiving it, without sharing in the benefit.*† *Because, be they little or great, healthy or weak,*

* *De Doctrina Christiana*, lib. 2. cap. 9.

“† Once let the mind [however] begin to allow itself to look out of God's word for some clearer light than is there to be found, and it is the prey of every phantom and delusion. Once begin to set your Scriptural faith right by your gleanings amongst Fathers and Councils, and there is no amount of error which you may not most logically develope. Let us clearly understand what God's gift to us in Holy Scripture is, how alone and unapproachable it stands, and we shall be safe from these delusions.”—Bishop Wilberforce's *Sermon to Candidates for Ordination*, Oxford, December 21, 1845.

here they may find sources, both of nutriment and of full satisfaction. Or, as he has expressed the same in a very elegant epigram:—

*Exuerat Deus ut tetrâ caligine mundum,
Doctrinæ accendit lumen Apostolicæ ·
Quæ nullis animis, nullis non congruit annis,
Lacte rigans parvos, pane cibans validos.**

What selfishness must it be, then, to refuse the uninformed Laymen access to writings, so adapted by the Divine Author for enlightening and saving the souls of all! to allow them to the learned alone! But, says Bellarmine, the reading of Scripture in the vulgar tongue is not forbidden to the Laity; so far from it, *we see that the perusal of books of that description is allowed to such as can make a proper and beneficial use of them; to such, that is, as have obtained permission from the Ordinary.*† Now, what difference is there, I should be glad to know, between forbidding and

* Epigram [xvii.] *de doctr. Apost.*—which is thus attempted for the benefit of the mere English reader:—

Heaven, this our world from darkness to redeem,
Bade forth the Apostles' doctrine brightly beam,
This with each temper, and each age accords,
And milk for babes, and meat for men affords.

† *De Verbo Dei*, lib. 2. cap. 15. [It may be well to quote the sentiments of a defender of Bellarmine on this subject, and a brother Jesuit too. They differ materially, it will be observed, from the *accommodating* statements uttered *pro tem.* in a *Protestant* country in modern times:—"Recte Bellarminus asseruit Catholicam Ecclesiam non prohibere omnino Vulgares Bibliorum versiones, ut constat experientia manifesta in universa Germania, Polonia, &c., hæresi infectis, sed permitti communiter cum consensu (saltem tacito) ipsius Rom. Pontificis, ne scilicet si Catholicæ Versiones vernaculæ desint, Lutherana aut Genevensis subintroducatur. [Very true, but the brethren in England do not let it out so freely.] Quod vero severe vetentur in Hispania et Italia [just the contrary has been vented in England] utpote regionibus a lue hæretica intactis, sancte et salubri consilio fit, ne ex abusu rei in se optimæ et sanctissimæ incautum vulgus [what friends of the 'people!'] detrimentum animæ patiatur. Unde Amesius frustra recitat ex Azorio quæ circa hoc Decretum Indicis Libr. Prohib. reg. iv. servantur in Hispania. Qui Latinam non callent, merito præsumuntur non esse tantæ capacitatis, ut quosvis Græcos codices sine periculo et offendiculo evolvere queant. Nec ulli pio et prudenti mirum videri protest, rem ex se alias sanctissimam saluberrimamque, per accidens posse esse noxiam, atque adeo justissime ejus usu arceri omnes, in quibus prudenter tale periculum præsumitur. Res ipsa loquitur, ex incauta et promiscua vernaculi textus lectione in Germania, Gallia, Anglia, &c., quanta sit oborta Religionis confusio." Bellarm. Disputt. tom. 1. p. 184. edit. Moguntiæ, 1842.

So wrote Mr. Vitus Erbermann, about the middle of the 17th century—*now* other tactics are needed to keep the troops together, and large editions in the vernacular tongue have appeared in Ireland.

inhibiting any Layman from meddling with the Scriptures, unless he has previously obtained permission for so doing from the Ordinary or the Inquisitors—a regulation sanctioned by Pope Pius IV. and approved by the Council of Trent? How can the regarding as Heretics, those Laymen who read the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue, and condemning them to the flames, be viewed otherwise than as a prohibition to the reading of the Word of God? Aye, but you may read when you have obtained a faculty. Excellent, indeed! How few are there who would trouble themselves to obtain the requisite permission! how few who (lest they should appear affected with heretical novelties) would venture to apply for it; how few (if we except such as are sworn to maintain all the articles of the Romish Church) could hope to receive such a favour! The matter, then, comes to this, that a Layman, though desirous of reading the Scriptures, is not allowed to do so unless he has an express permission granted him, and to obtain such a favour is impossible, except where the Ordinary is fully assured that the applicant would not swerve even a hair's breadth from the doctrines of Romanism.

Let Bellarmine, then, pretend what he pleases, it is evident, that Laymen are debarred from an [unrestricted] perusal of the Scriptures; as, indeed, John Molanus* frankly admitted, and with his words we will close this our dissertation. *We deny*, says he, *that the Laity are required to study the Scriptures: nay, we assert that it is for their benefit that they are restrained from perusing them, and that it is quite enough if they shape their course of life as their Pastors and the Doctors of the Church prescribe.*

* *De Pract. Theolog.* tract. 3, cap. 27, con. 2.

JOHN VERMEULEN, or (as Latanized) MOLANUS, was a Romish Divine of Louvain. He was the first who published a critical edition of "Usuard's Martyrology," in 1568; and his work, *De historia SS. Imaginum et Picturarum*, was reprinted with enlargements at Louvain in 1771. There is a copy of the volume from which Bishop Davenant has quoted the truly and characteristically Roman sentiment, in the Sion College Library. It was published in 1585, in which year the author died at Louvain, Sept. 18.—See Dupin's *Eccles. Hist.* cent. xiv. book v. p. 129.

On the foregoing subject, too, the reader may be referred to Horne's *Rome the Enemy and Falsifier of Scripture*; to Dr. Sall's testimony and sentiments, in his *Catholic Religion maintained in the Church of England*, pp. 63, and 448, Allport's Edition; and Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, Chap. ii.

QUESTION XL.

PRIDE WAS THE FIRST SIN OF ANGELS.

IN the Scriptures we meet with clear intimations of the fall and apostasy of angels ; but of what kind, or to what special sin this their apostasy owed its origin, is not so clearly ascertainable.

Among the Fathers, Schoolmen, and almost all Theologians, the opinion which fixes on pride, as having been the first sin of the angels, has generally prevailed. Nazianzen, in his discourse upon the nativity of our Saviour, observes, that *he who for his brightness was hailed as Lucifer, for his pride both became and was called Darkness*. Augustine, 12, *de Civit. Dei*. cap. 6, says, *When a reason is asked for the misery of evil angels, it may very properly be replied, that turning away from Him who is supreme, they turned towards themselves, who were not so ; and what can this offence be otherwise termed than pride ?* Prosper, *de Vita Contemplativa*, lib. 3, cap. 3. says, *Pride turned angels into demons, humility renders men like to holy angels*. And lastly, Bernard, Serm. xxii. §. 6. on the Canticles, says, *The angels having sunk into an irremediable fall, through pride, were not afterwards vouchsafed a redemption*. And indeed, this is, of all, the most probable opinion. For since a spiritual nature cannot be assumed, unless with some spiritual advantage, and that there is no sin committed in aspiring after spiritual benefits, unless in cases where the rule of a superior is not attended to in such aspiration ; the consequence is that pride, the nature of which is, in aiming at superiority to exceed due bounds, was the first of all sins. Besides, since the angels were adorned by their Creator with the fairest endowments, it is not easy to imagine any kind of sin by which they could be so liable to fall as by pride. For the notion which some of the ancients have taken up concerning the sin of lust committed with women, is unworthy of refutation. Nor is Cyprian more admissible, where he speaks of envy being the first sin of the devil.* *Hence, says he, the devil at the very beginning of the world, was both the first who sinned, and was lost. He who*

* Serm. *de Zelo et Livore*.

reposed in angelic majesty, he who was acceptable and dear to God, after he had beheld man made in his image, burst into a flame of malevolent envy; even before dislodging another in the impulse of jealousy, he himself is overthrown by the violence of the passion; a captive before making captive, lost before destroying; whilst, stimulated by envy, he snatches away the grace of immortality bestowed on man, he himself has already lost even that which he had before. Thus far Cyprian: In which words he seems to intimate, that the devil envied man, made in the image of God, and by this, his first sin, destroyed himself as well as man. But this is not quite the case; for envy is not (as I may say) a primary sin, but itself always originates in pride. Augustine shews this very excellently, (lib. 11. *de Genesi ad literam*. cap. 14). *Some (says he) say, that the cause of the devil's falling from his lofty eminence was, that he envied man made in the image of God; but envy follows pride, does not precede it. For to be envious is not the cause of being proud, but pride is the cause of being envious.* And not much after, *An individual's envying, therefore, arises in his being proud, not his pride from envying.* We admit, certainly, that death entered into our world through the envy of the devil, but then it was through the envy of a fallen devil, who, with evil eyes, looked on man destined to that immortality and blessedness from which he himself had fallen. No cause can be assigned, why the angel before his fall should envy mankind; but, having, after this his first sin, been shut out from all hope of obtaining happiness, he could not but envy man, whom he understood to be designed for it. When, therefore, he had ruined himself by pride, urged on by envy, his aim was to draw the human race along with him. To all these reasons it may be added, that the devil, according to the common opinion of all Divines, committed sin before man was created by God. His first sin, then, could not be envy towards mankind, concerning whom he was himself in ignorance whether he would be created, or at least how, and with what endowments he would, when created, be adorned. Lastly, it is not improbable that the devil ensnared our first Parents, by the same suggestion wherewith he himself was taken. Now, what he infused into them was, an ardent thirst for their own exaltation—*Ye shall be as gods, &c.*; and he would, consequently, seem to have fallen himself by some proud notion of this kind. On this point, that saying in Ecclesiasticus (chap. x.) is frequently adduced—*Pride is the beginning of all sin.* The expressions, also, with which Isaiah has set forth the arrogance of the King of Babylon, are constantly adopted by the Fathers to set forth this pride of the

devil; as also are many similar passages which we have in Ezekiel (chap. xxviii.) in reference to the King of Tyre.

Suppose, then, we were to admit this common and most probable opinion, that pride was the first sin of angels, yet it is difficult to point out what could be the special object in the first movement of this pride. Many suppose that Satan was led to aspire in thoughtless ambition after an equality with God—a notion repeatedly alluded to by Augustine; but that one in his first discourse on the lxviiith Psalm [tom. iv. col. 695.] may suffice for all;—*Christ did not think it robbery to be equal with God; and yet He made himself of no reputation. But who was the first to rob him thereof? He who seduced Adam. How then did the devil rob? I WILL MAKE MY SEAT IN THE SIDES OF THE NORTH, AND I WILL BE LIKE TO THE MOST HIGH.** *He intended to acquire Deity, and lost happiness.* And this is the opinion which Scotus, among the doctors of the School takes up, and gives the following as his own notion of it.† *The devil could not, indeed, have aspired to equality with God by an act of efficacious will, because this kind of will is not applicable to things impossible; but he desired it, with a kind of wishfulness, or conditionate act of the will; and this is enough for contracting the guilt of sinning.* And he seems to have borrowed this notion of his from Lombard, who says in express words,‡ that *the devil wished to be equal with God.* Others say that the devil desired happiness for himself, from himself, and in himself, without any reference to God; not that he directly coveted divinity, but indirectly, by desiring that which is compatible with Deity alone. For it exceeds the limits and condition of a creature to possess either being or felicity from itself, and to be independent of another. This is the privilege of God alone, and he who has hankerings after this, indirectly aims at divinity. To this, the following words of Gregory,§ concerning the fall of the devil, have reference:—*He would have been great, if he had cleaved to Him who is truly great; he would have been great, if he had been satisfied with his imparted share of genuine greatness: but, while he proudly aspired to independent greatness, he deservedly forfeited that which had been imparted to him. For he deserted Him to whom he ought to have cleaved as his source and origin; and aspired to be, if we may so speak, the source and origin to himself.*

[* See Isaiah xiv. 13, 14; and Archbishop Usher's *Body of Divinity*, as edited by Dr. Robinson, p. 147.]

† In lib. 2. Sent. dist. 6. quæst. 1.

‡ Lib. 2. dist. 5.

§ Moral. lib. 34. cap. 17. [The passage is part of Gregory's Exposition of Job xli., the whole of which he applies to Satan.]

Catharinus,* and some others have supposed, that the offence lay in aspiring to an union of an hypostatic nature, so that his object was to have his own nature placed in union with the Divine person. For they suppose, that immediately after the angels had been created, God revealed to them his intention of creating also mankind, of an earthly substance, whose human nature the Son of God would assume with his own. And that the angels received intimation, at the same time, to submit themselves to him, and to look to him as the source of their preservation. But that the leader of the evil angels, disdaining to yield such submission to man, proudly demanded this honour for himself, and that other evil angels concurred in this his pride. This conjecture seems to derive support from the circumstance, that, as man had a positive command laid on him, in order to try his measure of obedience when in a state of innocence; so it is not improbable that the angels might receive some similar injunction for the same object; and nothing better occurs, as a test, than this of worshipping the Word, which was to become incarnate, or the Christ, who was God and man. Nevertheless, assertions, unsupported by the authority of the Scriptures and the ancient Fathers, may be as readily set aside as they are made. The opinion of Jerome Zanchy† varies but little from this. But, as regards myself, the conclusion I come to is, that the object of the devil's pride is yet to be ascertained, though, generally speaking, I take it to have been his primary act in sinning.

* Comm. in *Epist. ad Philip.* cap. 2.

[† See Translation of *Davenant on the Colossians.* vol. i. p. 246.]

De oper. creat. 4. 2. [See *Exposition on the Colossians*, chap. i. 16, 17, 18.]

QUESTION LVI.

THE PUBLIC EXERCISES OF RELIGION ARE TO BE PERFORMED IN
THE LANGUAGE UNDERSTOOD BY THE COMMON PEOPLE.

THOSE are accounted the public exercises of Religion, which are solemnly performed in the Churches when the people are gathered together. Of this kind, are Sermons, the administration of Sacraments, Prayers, the reading of the Scriptures, and, in one word, all the sacred services which are celebrated by the Priest-

hood in the solemn assembly of the people. That all these ought to be performed in the vulgar tongue, that is, in the language known and commonly understood, is our opinion, and for these reasons :—

First, because the Apostolic Canon is, that in the Church of God all things should be done for edification. But no one is edified in hearing what he does not understand, which the Apostle plainly shews, 1 Cor. xiv. 6, &c. The reply of Estius to this argument and testimony is frivolous, namely, *That Paul did not mean that all the people should understand, but that the individual who any how represents the congregation by his answering and assent; who, in short, is generally regarded as more learned than the rest, and in whom, as their substitute, the people in a way understand, should do so.* So far he.

But first, it is a mistake to assert that Paul did not intend that the people generally should understand; for he was anxious that, as far as in him lay, all assembled in the Church, to the very last, should be edified by the discourses, prayers, psalmody, and the celebration of the Sacraments in the Church. Whether, then, the duty of responding devolved upon the whole people or not, the people, nevertheless, must be able to understand what was brought before them, if they were generally to be edified. Moreover, the notion which Estius appears to entertain, namely, that in the times of the Apostle there was one (whom they now call *the Clerk*) who, by himself, used to return answer to the Priest who was performing the sacred offices, in the stead of the whole people, is absurd. Cyprian, in his Sermon on the *Lord's Prayer*, Jerome (Prolog. 2.) in his *Commentary on the Galatians*, and other Fathers, plainly indicate the contrary, expressly asserting that all the people used to respond to the Priest. A misapprehension of those words—1 Cor. xiv. 16, *he that occupieth the room of the unlearned*, has given occasion to this erroneous conjecture of Papal writers, supposing that the Clerk supplying the place of the people is thereby denoted; whereas, nothing more is intended by them, than some individual from the mass of the Laity. Lastly, the conclusion of Estius,* that the people exercise their understandings in some way through this his deputy-Clerk, is quite wide of the meaning of the Apostle. For he who was desirous that Christians should be built up in knowledge and godliness, not through a substitute, but every one by himself, intended, also, that they should have an intelligent perception of those things which related to their edification, not by means of a substitute, but in their own persons.

* Professor of Divinity, and Chancellor of Douay; See Soames's *Mosheim*.

Secondly, because to use an unknown language is inconsistent with the nature and the design of public preaching; for public prayers require, not only the bodily presence of the whole Christian people, but much more, their public and common concurrence, and consent with the Priest, in the prayers which are offered to God. Hence Augustine shews,* that it is not always necessary to use audible words in prayer, if a man is praying privately, *unless, as the Priests do, for the sake of making his mind understood; not in order that God, but that men may hear him; and that all, with general consent, as it were, might, through hearing the words used, be directed towards God.* Hence Tertullian, describing the custom of the Primitive Church on this point, says,† *We meet together in an assembly and congregation, that we may, in one united band, assail God with our prayers.—We are assembled in order to hear the word of Divine instruction:—We nourish our faith by holy words, we confirm our hope, we establish our confidence, &c.* If the Priest had been in the habit of reciting the prayers and the Scriptures in an unknown tongue, all these remarks would have been both erroneous and foolish. They, therefore, whose main object, it seems to be, that the public prayers should be understood by none of the Laity, or at least, but by a very few, are perverting the intention of public, by rendering them private prayers. The extreme absurdity of such proceedings is discernible even from this, that the Apostle himself intended that the *people* should answer *Amen* to the Prayer of the Priest; and this he maintains that they could not properly do, if they did not know what the Minister was saying, (1 Cor. xiv. 16).

Our third reason is because, whilst praying, it is not enough that the mind should be piously affected in any way, but it ought to be affected in conformity with what we seek to obtain from God. Now the people who do not understand the Priest praying, may certainly, in the mean time, be influenced by pious affection of some kind or other; but it cannot be in accordance with the business itself which is being transacted. Gerson concedes to us,‡ *That the turning of the heart to God in the time of prayer, if it be done according to the sense of the prayer, is, on the whole the more praiseworthy;* although he does not admit this to be absolutely necessary as respects the unlearned. But, whatever opinion be adopted as to this absolute necessity, if it be the more praiseworthy that the people, while praying to God, should understand the meaning of the prayer

* *De Magistr.* cap. 1.

† *In Apologet. adversus Gentes*, cap. 39. [See Mr. Woodham's Note in his Edition.]

‡ *In Regulis. Moralibus de Acedia.*

offered, the Romanists are not to be commended, who have carefully ordered public prayers to be celebrated so that the people should not altogether understand them.* William, Bishop of Paris, in his book of Divine Rhetoric (cap. 40) where he is enquiring what is to be understood by *the calves of the lips* in the prophet Hosea, (chap. xiv. 2) has these words:—*The lips of that calf are the understandings and the thoughts of the things which are signified by the words of prayer. The fatness of such flesh is devotion; and the skin or hide of that calf is the scope and succession of words; the hairs also of that calf mean the outward sound of the voice.* A little after he says, *There are some who render the hide of that calf to God. And this so far is well, if they do not defraud God of the better parts of that calf, namely, whilst they either possess not, or care not for an understanding reception and meaning of the words uttered; and if they seem to satisfy God with the hide merely, while as regards the flesh they withhold or mangle no little portion of the sacrifice of praise.* The Papists consequently, in the public sacrifice of prayer, may offer the skin and the hairs of the sacrifice to God, (that is, a certain succession and sound of words); but the flesh and the fat of this sacrifice, that is, the sense of the words and the devotion of the mind agreeable to the words, that they cannot offer.

Our last reason is because it is manifest, from the practice of the Primitive Church, that the public reading of the Scriptures, and public prayers, were celebrated in no other language than public discourses were: and that these latter were always made in the language best understood by the people there can be no doubt. Although, therefore, whilst the Roman Empire flourished, sacred services might, without inconvenience, be performed in Latin, because the Latin language was so well known to Christians in general, scattered through the Provinces subject to the Roman Empire, so that they could understand the Fathers even when preaching in Latin; yet, after that the common use of the Latin language vanished, together with the Empire of the Latins, still to retain the Scriptures and prayers in Latin, in public assemblies, and to obtrude them thus upon the people, was the extreme of folly.

And here, I would ask the Romanists, why, seeing that Ambrose, Augustine, and other Fathers made their addresses to the people in Latin in the Western Churches, they make use, at the present day, of the vernacular language in preaching, and not the Latin?

* Surely this non-necessity should be limited to the opinion of their instructors. See Bishop Stillingfleet's *Doctrines and Practices of the Church of Rome*; p. 300. edit. Edinburgh, 1845.

They can give no other reason, than that Latin discourses would be altogether unfruitful and ridiculous to a people who did not understand Latin. Just so we say, with regard to reading the Scriptures, the prayers, and, in short, of all other things which relate to a public service, and which collect assemblies of people. Why should the people be assembled to hear those things which there are hindrances to their understanding? Why are words which ought to serve as signs, so used, that the hearers do not know what is signified by them? It is truly wonderful that so gross an error has not yet been reformed by the heads of the Roman Church.* But that Church, in boasting that it cannot err, deservedly pays the penalty, from having once erred, to be compelled for ever to persevere in its errors. That some, indeed, of the sounder Papists were aware of this absurd error, we may gather from the expressions of De Lyra, who, on 1 Cor. xiv. writes, *that the people understanding the prayers of the Priest, would the sooner be brought to God, and the more devoutly answer, Amen;* and also from Cajetan, who writes in his *Commentaries* upon the same passage, that *it would be more for the edification of the Church, that public prayers were said in the vulgar tongue, instead of in Latin*—a position, the truth of which he recognises, and asserts that it is founded in the doctrine of Paul, (tom. 3, in Opusc. Tract. 15, in answer to the articles imposed upon him, art. 7).

In fine, there is the lamentation of John Billet, extant in the pages of Jewel of blessed memory, respecting this matter. *In the Primitive Church*, says he, *it was forbidden to any one to speak in a foreign language, unless he could interpret it. For what advantage would it be to speak, if the speaker could not be understood? Hence, also, the laudable custom arose, that as soon as the Gospel was plainly read out, it should be explained to the common people. But how stands the case in our days, when there are few or none found, whether readers or hearers, who exercise their understanding? It seems, therefore, preferable to be silent, than to speak to the air.*

The Papists, then, must celebrate sacred services in a language commonly understood by the people, or let them cease from their vain bellowing.

* It is, as the Bishop afterwards intimates, idle to expect it, though, in a Protestant country, accommodation does somewhat; but there neither is, nor can be, any *authorised* reform in the Church of Rome. She is secured, as it were, against it. It is suicidal for her—Reform is to her destruction.—See M'Ghee's *Truth and Error contrasted*, Dublin, 1830.

† Jewel's *Reply to Harding*, art. 3, p. 118. [p. 132, edit. 1611.]

QUESTION XLII.

DIVERSITY OF DEGREES IN THE MINISTERS OF THE GOSPEL IS
NOT REPUGNANT TO THE WORD OF GOD.

IT does not belong to our present question to touch upon the assertions of Papists concerning seven degrees or orders of spiritual offices, especially since they are themselves compelled to confess, that all beyond the Diaconate have been added. My only topic of discussion is concerning the office of the Bishop and the Presbyter. Nor will it here be necessary to enquire minutely whether Episcopacy be a distinct Order from Presbytery, or only another and higher degree in the same Order. William of Auverne, Bishop of Paris, distinctly affirms that Episcopacy is not an *Order*, but an *honour*; which is also maintained by Gerson, whose words are these:—*Bishops do not possess a different power of order from that of Priests, but they possess the same power in a more perfect measure.* Finally, Durandus is of the same opinion: *Episcopacy*, says he,* *is not an order strictly distinct from the simple priesthood, but the distinction between them is of perfect and imperfect.* Hither tends the argument of the Schoolmen, that the Episcopate, as distinguished from the simple Priesthood, is not another order, but a more eminent power and dignity of certain persons who are in the same sacerdotal order. It is sufficient for us (laying aside this verbal contention) to shew, that those who are peculiarly called Bishops, have a higher dignity, greater power, and more excellent offices annexed to them than other Presbyters have, and that this is not repugnant to the word of God. But it were trivial to say, *not repugnant*; for it is easy to demonstrate that, in the Divine word, this eminence of Bishops above Presbyters is shadowed out, delineated, and by the Apostles themselves established.

For, first, that which was instituted in the Jewish Church, by the most wise God, that a High Priest should be set over the other Priests, and the Priests over the Levites, (Numbers iii. and iv.) afforded to the Christian Church a clear precedent for the establish-

* Lib. 4. dist. 24.

ment of a similar order. Hence the remark of Jerome,* *That we may know that the Apostolical ordinances were taken from the Old Testament, what Aaron, and his sons, and the Levites, were in the temple, the Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons, claim for themselves in the Church.* It was the will of God that a certain order should be established among the Ministers of the Old Testament: the Church willed that an order, not dissimilar, should be found among hers. But where all are equal in dignity and power, there not even a shadow of becoming order is retained. For order is nothing else than the arrangement of equals and unequals, assigning to each its place. Take away the inequality, and, by the same act, you will overthrow all order among the Ministers of Religion.†

Secondly, It is evident that Christ himself constituted Ministers for the edification of his Church, not endued with equal authority, but distinct in degree of dignity and power. For the twelve Apostles were superior to the seventy disciples, and were placed above the same, not by excellency of gifts alone, but by extent of authority and power. Moreover, it is the constant doctrine of nearly all the Fathers, that the Bishops succeeded the Apostles in the ordinary government of the Church, as the Presbyters also succeeded the seventy disciples. Let one of them—Augustine, speak for all, upon those words of the Psalmist (xlv. 16.) *INSTEAD OF THY FATHERS, THOU SHALT HAVE CHILDREN—What is this,* says he, *INSTEAD OF THY FATHERS, THOU SHALT HAVE CHILDREN? The Apostles were sent as Fathers. Instead of the Apostles, sons were born to thee.—Bishops were constituted. For those who are at this day Bishops through all the world, whose children were they? The Church herself calls them Fathers; but she herself gave them birth, and she herself has placed them in the seats of the Fathers.* The same is the sentiment of Jerome, Ambrose, and Theodoret; all of whom agree in acknowledging Bishops to be the successors of the Apostles, not in those extraordinary privileges which were necessary to lay the foundation of the Church; but in that ordinary superiority which is required for her perpetual conservation and extension when founded. Add to this, that immediately after the ascension of Christ, the Church was distinguished by, and supplied with Ministers of the Gospel who differed from each other, not merely in variety of gifts, but in a certain imparity of dignity and power, (1 Cor. xii. 28, 29). *God hath set in his Church, first Apostles, secondly Prophets, then teachers, &c. Are all Apostles? Are all Prophets, &c.?* They who will have all Ministers of the

* Epist. ad Evag.

† [See Davenant's *Exposition on the Colossians*, chap. ii. 5.]

Gospel to be of equal power, appear either not to know what Christ did, or account it unfit for his Church to imitate the same.

Let us proceed, in the third place, to the Apostles themselves. We assert, then, that before they departed from earth to heaven, they placed in the great cities a Bishop, in authority superior to, and in power greater than, the other Presbyters. He was chief Pastor of that city; he possessed a superiority not only over the Laity, but over the Clergy or Presbyters of the same city. Such was Titus at Crete, Timothy at Ephesus, James at Jerusalem, Euodias at Antioch, Amianus at Alexandria, Polycarp at Smyrna, not to mention others, who, it is most certain, were exalted to the Episcopal seat; the Apostles being alive, and seeing, and approving, nay, even directing that very thing. It is also certain that, throughout the universal Church of Christ, the successors of these always held a certain eminent authority over those of their own body, namely, over inferior ministers. And it is equally certain that there was a perpetual succession of the same. This is attested by the very titles which the ancients continually apply to these Bishops and to their successors. They are called *the Great Pastors, Prelates, Heads, Princes of the Church*,* If the power and dignity of all ministers were equal, the Bishops would never have been dignified above others, or rather derided, with such empty titles. Nay, Christ himself gave to those chief Pastors (whom we call Bishops) the especial appellation of Angels of their respective Churches (Rev. ii). In the Church of Ephesus, of Smyrna, of Pergamos, and the rest, there were many Presbyters; but there was only one Angel, or Bishop, whom Christ addresses singly. If he had been one of the body of Presbyters, neither in dignity nor power greater than the rest, there was no reason why Christ should address him, as it were, by name. Beza not inaptly expounds these words (Rev. ii.) TO THE ANGEL OF THE CHURCH OF EPHEBUS, *that is, to the President*; which term very well suits a Bishop, who presides not only over the Laity, but the other Clergy. But what he adds about the office of this President not being perpetual, is so clearly refuted by Ecclesiastical history, that it is surprising to see it asserted by a learned man not unacquainted with antiquity.

Be this, therefore, fixed and established, that among many Presbyters, who in any one city administered the word and sacraments, there was one set over the rest by the Apostles themselves, and armed with a certain peculiar dignity and power. It is certain

* Apud Nazianz., et Hilar.

that these Bishops, having been thus established by the authority of the Apostles, were succeeded in a continued series by men appointed in their place in the same cities; and that, after the same precedent, whenever it was thought expedient by the Church, new Bishops were established in other cities.

And, in the last place, we must ascertain in what consists this superior dignity and power of Bishops, by which they are distinguished from other inferior Presbyters, and that not by any assumption on their own part, but by Apostolical appointment. And here it must be candidly acknowledged, that Bishops have certain privileges above Presbyters, which are derived, not from the primitive institution of the Apostles, but either from the especial beneficence of Christian Princes, or from the authority of Councils; and of such, we say with Jerome, in his dialogue against the Luciferians,—*These are rather for honour to the Priesthood, than of legal necessity.*

But of Bishops there are three peculiar marks by which they are readily distinguished from other Presbyters, and recognised as superior.

The first is, that in cities, however large and populous, wherein many Presbyters were created, the Apostles ordained one Bishop only, at whose decease another succeeded singly in the same See. Hence that decree of the Council of Nice,—*Let there not be two Bishops in one city.* Hence Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, reproaches Novatus with ignorance for not acknowledging the singleness of Episcopal succession: This vindicator of the Gospel did not know that there ought to be one Bishop in that Church, in which he is not ignorant that there are forty-six Presbyters.* If the Apostles had approved a parity of all Ministers, why would they have one to be distinguished from all the rest by this singleness of succession? Jerome, who was esteemed not very favourable to Episcopal dignity, nevertheless confesses, that with this singleness of succession, a singular dignity and eminence was joined. For thus he writes† concerning the Bishop of Alexandria:—*At Alexandria, from the Evangelist Mark, down to the Bishops Heraclas and Dionysius, the Presbyters always having elected one from themselves, and placed him in a higher degree, named him Bishop.* Upon this preeminent authority of one Bishop in one city or diocese, the most wise and holy Fathers saw that the peace and unity of the Church depended, and they have left this testimony to us. Cyprian, a man far removed from all pride and ambition, shews that this sa-

* Euseb. 6. 42.

† Epist. ad Evagrium.

cerdotal authority of one Bishop was confirmed by the Divine approbation, and immediately adds,* *From no other quarter have heresies arisen, or schisms sprung up, than from this, that men do not render obedience to the Priest of God, nor reflect that, in the place of Christ, there is one Priest in the Church at a time, and one Judge at a time.* Which words are most impudently wrested by the Romanists to establish the monarchy of the Pope, when it is clearer than the meridian light, that the blessed martyr was speaking of himself, not of the Roman Pontiff. If, in the cause of Bishops, the testimony of a Bishop be suspicious, let us again hear St. Jerome, who was not wont to depress Presbyters, or unduly to exalt Bishops. Thus speaks he against the Luciferians,† *The safety of the Church depends on the dignity of the chief Priest, to whom, if a certain peculiar and pre-eminent power be not granted by all, there will be formed in the Churches as many schisms as there are Priests.* This very singleness of the Episcopal succession, always joined with a certain amplitude of authority, is sufficient, of itself, to crush the modern error of the parity of all Ministers.

But we are to add the *second* mark of Episcopal dignity, namely, the right and power of ordination, which was transmitted by the Apostles themselves to Bishops, but denied to inferior Presbyters. Now both these statements are evident, from this fact, that the Apostles sent Timothy and Titus to Churches in which there were many Presbyters, namely, to Ephesus and Crete, that they might ordain Presbyters whenever it might be necessary. *Lay hands suddenly on no man*, is the admonition of Paul to Timothy, (1 Tim. v. 22.) who was endued with the power of Ordination. *For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain Presbyters in every city*, are the words of the same Apostle to Titus (i. 5.), and referring to the same thing. Why could not the Ephesian Presbyters ordain others before the arrival of Timothy? Why was it not lawful for the Ministers of Crete to do the like before Titus came? No adequate reason for this can be assigned, unless the power of ordaining resides in those alone who discharge the Episcopal function. Jerome (whom some suppose to agree with Ærius,‡) yet admits, that ordi-

* Epist. lib. 1. epist. 3.

† Cap. 4, p. 199.

‡ Vide Medin. lib. 1. *de Sacr. hom. cont.* cap. 5.

ÆRIUS was a Presbyter Monk, and Semi-arian, who, about the middle of the 4th Century erected a new Sect, and excited divisions throughout Armenia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, under the plea of reducing Christianity to its primitive simplicity;—"a purpose, indeed," (observes Mosheim very justly) "laudable

nation is so peculiar to Bishops, that it is not lawful for Presbyters to exercise it. *What does a Bishop do, says he,* ordination excepted, which a Presbyter does not?* In this Apostolic institution the Catholic Church has always acquiesced, and has not acknowledged any other ordination lawful, than that which was solemnised by a lawful Bishop. We find a remarkable example of this in the works of Athanasius. One Colythus, a Presbyter in the Church of Alexandria, presumed to ordain other Presbyters. What afterwards became of them? *This ordination of his was rescinded, and all the Presbyters made by him were reduced to the rank of Laymen.*† It is, therefore, certain, that the power of ordaining belongs officially to Bishops only, and does not belong to inferior Presbyters; which is a manifest proof of the dignity of the Episcopate, and the inferiority of Presbyters.

But here, in passing, we have to solve a doubt which was not omitted by the Schoolmen themselves;‡ for it is often questioned, Whether, besides a Bishop, who by his office dispenses sacred orders, can one inferior to a Bishop confer the same in case of necessity? To which, I answer, Seeing that to confer holy orders is by Apostolic institution an act of the Episcopal office, if Presbyters, in a well constituted Church do that, their act is not only unlawful, but is null and void. For here obtains the axiom of Hugo—*What is performed contrary to the institution is accounted null.* But in a disturbed Church, where all the Bishops have fallen into heresy or idolatry, where they have refused to ordain orthodox Ministers, or where they have accounted those alone to be worthy of holy orders who participate in their error and faction, if orthodox Presbyters be compelled to ordain other Presbyters, that the Church may not perish, I could not venture to pronounce ordinations of this kind vain and invalid. For if the danger that threatens a single infant, be sufficient to transfer the office of baptising to any Layman, which, by the original institution, belongs to Ministers alone, why is not the danger impending over a particular Church, sufficient to transfer to simple Priests, that office of ordaining, which, by its

and noble, when considered in itself, though the principles from whence it springs, and the means by which it is executed, are generally, in many respects, worthy of censure, and may have been so in the case of this Reformer.”—One of Ærius’s principal tenets was, that Bishops were not distinguished from Presbyters by any Divine right, but that, according to the institution of the New Testament, their offices and authority were absolutely the same. See Mosheim. Cent. iv. pt. ii. §. 21. whose remarks upon Ærius’s conduct are well deserving of serious consideration by such as coincide in similar notions in these our days.

† Epist. ad Evag.

‡ Athan. Apolog. 2.

§ Vide Durand. lib. 4. disp. 7. quæst. 3.

primary institution, belongs to Bishops alone? Necessity has been aptly called *temporary law*; and in such case it defends that to which it has compelled recourse. It is the opinion of the Archbishop of Armagh,* that if all Bishops were dead, inferior Priests could ordain. Certainly the principle is the same when all have become sworn enemies to the truth. For, as every Commonwealth, so every particular Church, has a certain extraordinary power for the necessary preservation of itself. If, then, certain Protestant Churches, which could not look for ordination from Popish Bishops, have, under this necessity, ordained Presbyters, by the unanimous act of their own Presbyters, they are not to be considered as having passed any judgment derogatory to the Episcopal dignity, but as having yielded to the necessity of the Church.

The *last* mark of Episcopal dignity remains, which exalts them above Presbyters, and by no means allows them to be accounted equal in degree. This is the power of jurisdiction, not only over the Laity, but over the Clergy, who are, also, by Apostolic institution, subject to Bishops. It is a saying as true as it is common, *Equal hath not power over equal*: But Bishops have power over the Clergy; not, indeed, a *regal*, or *lordly* power, but one that is *Pastoral* or *Paternal*; which is inconsistent with entire parity or equality. To say nothing of other acts, excommunication, which is, as it were, the spiritual staff, is delivered into the Bishop's hand, to chastise, not only the vicious or contumacious of the Laity, but also Presbyters who deserve this censure. This is most evident from the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, of whom one was constituted Bishop of the Church of Ephesus, and the other of Crete, by St. Paul. They are commanded to enjoin some not to preach

* RICHARD FITZ-RALPH, or, RICHARD RADULPHUS: he was a native of Ireland, Professor of Theology at Oxford, much esteemed by King Edward III. of England, created by him Dean of Lichfield, and, A.D. 1333, Chancellor of Oxford. In the year 1347, Clement VI., by his Pontifical right of *provision*, constituted him Archbishop of Armagh, in Ireland [hence designated *Armachanus*]. He strenuously opposed the Mendicants, both before and after his elevation to the See of Armagh. While at Oxford, he exposed their vain and proud poverty in his public lectures; and when a Bishop, he came out still more powerfully against them. In 1356 he came to London, and there published in his preaching, nine theses against them. They now accused him to the Pope of heresy, and caused him to be cited to Avignon. He went there, and after three years' attendance, his cause not being yet decided, he was removed by death, A.D. 1360. He has left us a number of Sermons; a *Summa, seu libri xix adversus errores Armenorum*; and his defence against the Mendicants, delivered at Avignon, in 1357, besides several Sermons and Tracts never published. A little before his death, an Irish Translation of the New Testament was found concealed in a wall of his Church, which has been supposed to be his production.—Soames's *Mosheim*, 2nd Edition, vol. ii. p. 618.

diverse doctrines, to stop the mouths of deceivers, to reject heretics, and other points of the same nature, implying superiority and jurisdiction. It is also evident from the language of Christ himself to the Angels of the Asiatic Churches. The Angel (that is, the Bishop) of the Church of Pergamos is reprov'd, (Revel. ii. 15.) because he had in his Church some who held the doctrine of the Nicolaitans. Thus, also, the Angel of the Church of Thyatira, (Revel. ii. 20.) because he permitted the woman Jezebel to teach and to seduce the people. Therefore, in the judgment of Christ himself, the Bishop hath authority to restrain heretics, and to expel them from the Church. I do not say that the Bishop was accustomed to do this, without the council of Presbyters; for what Cyprian declares of himself,* *that from the commencement of his Episcopate, he had determined to do nothing of his own private opinion, without advice*, was probably observed by other Bishops. Nevertheless, it is manifest, that the *sentence* proceeded from the Episcopal authority alone, and passed upon offenders as an act of Episcopal jurisdiction. For excommunication is called *the Episcopal sword*. In the case of excommunication, there was an appeal from the Episcopal judgment to a Synod; which confirmed the Bishop's sentence, if it had been rightly denounced, or rescinded it if otherwise. Therefore, in the act of excommunication, not the people, nor the Presbyters, are the acknowledged judges, but the Bishop alone. That this was the discipline of the Primitive Church, can be made clear from ancient Councils. Let the Councils of Nice, Can. 5; of Antioch, Can. 6; of Sardica, Can. 14, be inspected. Nay, Jerome himself does not doubt, that the power of excommunicating Presbyters belongs to the Bishop. Hence, he writes thus to Riparius, (Epist. 53.) concerning Vigilantius, an heretical Presbyter, *I wonder that the holy Bishop, in whose Diocese he is said to be a Presbyter, acquiesces in the phrensy of the man, and does not break this unprofitable vessel with the Apostolical rod, even a rod of iron, and deliver him up for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit may be saved.*

These things shew clearly enough, that from the very times of the Apostles, Bishops were superior in power and degree to Presbyters, and that a parity among Ministers of the Gospel never obtained. But a few arguments, which are alleged for the contrary, remain to be briefly refuted.

1.—Christ himself [it is said] seems to have prohibited this inequality among Ministers of the Gospel, in Matt. xx. 25, 26:

* Epist. lib. 3, epist. 10.

The Princes of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them ; but it shall not be so among you. To which may be added the direction of St. Peter, 1 Epis. v. 2, 3, Feed the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly ; not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind : Neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock.

In reply,—We allow that, as to the Apostles, *they* were all equal in degree and authority, according to the institution of Christ ; but we deny, that this passage, or any other, establishes that parity among Ministers of the Gospel, for which they contend who attack the Episcopal dignity. For, notwithstanding this command of Christ the twelve Apostles were higher in dignity and greater in authority than the seventy disciples. Notwithstanding this same command, chief Pastors were constituted by the Apostles themselves (as has before been proved), in the Church of Ephesus, of Crete, and in other places ; who had a power of jurisdiction, not only over the Laity, but over the Elders, also, of their respective Churches. Therefore, neither Christ, nor Peter, intended to take away difference of degrees among Ecclesiastical persons ; but whilst they granted to the Apostles, and to the Bishops, their successors, *Pastoral rule and Paternal superiority*, they would not have them to assume over the Elders, or the people of God, *a regal or lordly dominion*. This inequality Jerome acknowledged in his Epistle to Nepotian : *Be subject to thy Pontiff, and receive him as a father to thy soul*. And a little after, *Let the Bishops know that they are Priests, not Lords ; let them honour the Clergy, as Clergy ; and also let honour be paid to them, as Bishops, by the Clergy*.

2.—It is objected, that in the Acts, and in the Epistles of St. Paul, Presbyters, are called Bishops, and *vice versa*. Hence, some labour to prove, not only that Presbyters are equal to Bishops, but that they are altogether the same with Bishops. Thus, Acts xx. 17, 28, Paul, addressing the Presbyters of one Church, calls them all *Bishops*. So also Phil. ii. he calls all the Presbyters of that Church *Bishops* ; and in Titus i. 7., he designates the same persons by the name of *Presbyters and Bishops*. Moreover, the Apostle Peter applies the name *Elder*, or *Presbyter*, to himself, 1 Epistle v. i., *The Elders which are among you I exhort, who am a FELLOW ELDER*. So, also, St. John, Epis. ii. and iii. calls himself *the Elder*. From which passages, Jerome, in his Epistle to Evagrius, long ago inferred, that the Apostles clearly taught that Presbyters and Bishops are the same.

To this, we concede, that in the times of the Apostles these titles were promiscuously used ; and that for many reasons. First, the

Apostles being in or near the spot, placed, for the time, in many Churches which they had founded, Presbyters alone, endued with equal power; to whose care, in common, the Church was entrusted. These, therefore, were rightly called *Bishops*, whose office was to superintend and preside over the flock committed to them. Furthermore, in those things which are of greatest moment to the salvation of men, namely, in preaching the Gospel, and dispensing the Sacraments, Presbyters, no less than Bishops, keep watch, and superintend the promoting the salvation of souls; wherefore, the title of Bishop might aptly be applied to them. Finally, it is probable that the Apostles, to testify humility, employed indiscriminately the name of the Ecclesiastical offices; because, as Gregory observes, *in respect of humility, all Priests are equals*. But as the Apostles, when called Disciples or Presbyters, are not, therefore, depressed below the degree of the Apostleship; so, when certain of the Disciples are called *Apostles*, and certain of the Presbyters *Bishops*, they are not directly equalled with Apostles and Bishops, properly so called. *Words signify according as they are understood*, says Durandus, *by those using them*. Now we understand as well from Scripture, as from the perpetual practice of the Church, that the term *Bishop*, taken largely, may be applied to any one who has the care of souls; but taken strictly and appropriately, it suits those alone who have the exclusive power of ordaining and exercising the keys. It is, therefore, not correct, from the promiscuous use of the terms, to infer the parity of all Ministers.

3.—They object, that although it be acknowledged that the Apostles were superior to the other Ministers of the Gospel, yet, as their vocation was extraordinary, so also was their power. Bishops, therefore, cannot claim superiority or power over other Presbyters, because this superior power having been annexed to the persons of the Apostles, did not pass over to the Bishops their successors.

We answer, that Jerome said rightly—*Bishops hold, in the Catholic Church, the place of the Apostles*. Yet we allow that many of their privileges were personal, and cannot be claimed by Bishops: Such were their immediate vocation, universal delegation to all nations, infallibility in teaching, the gift of tongues and miracles; in one word, whatever specially related to the laying the first foundations of the Christian Church. But the Apostles had certain other privileges which distinguished them from ordinary Presbyters, and were altogether necessary for the enlargement of the Church. Of this kind were the *ordination* of Presbyters, that

the Ministry of the Gospel might not utterly perish; and the *government* of Presbyters, that they might not destroy the Church by heresies, schisms, or corrupt morals. These offices, and such as these, without which a Church cannot be either firmly established, or rightly governed, have been transmitted to Bishops, and make them higher in degree, and greater in power, than other Presbyters.

In the last place, they strongly object the authority of Jerome, who writes on Titus i,—*The Bishop and the Presbyter are one; and before parties took place in Religion, the Church was governed by the common Council of Presbyters.* And he adds; *Let Bishops know that they are superior to Presbyters, more by custom than by any true appointment of the Lord.*

To the two first remarks the reply is easy. For Jerome was referring to that time when the Apostles had not yet ordained Bishops, properly so called, but retained to themselves those privileges which are now proper to Bishops. In that interval, the same persons were called Bishops and Presbyters; and the Churches of Ephesus, Corinth, and others, were governed by the united Council of these; yet so that the Apostles, being near, reserved to themselves the ordaining of Presbyters, and excommunicating of sinners. But the opinion of some learned men, that this order of governing Churches, as it were, by a Senate of Presbyters, had not been changed, or that one had not been appointed over the rest, as a Bishop, whilst the Apostles were alive, is plainly repugnant to Scripture and Ecclesiastical history. For it is certain, that Timothy, Titus, James, and many other Bishops, properly so called, were set over, and, as it were, affixed to the Churches of Ephesus, Crete, and Jerusalem, whilst the Apostles were alive. It is also certain, that those Asiatic Churches to which Christ wrote (Rev. ii.) had their own Bishops, superior to other Presbyters, whilst the Apostle John was living. It is no objection, therefore, to the dignity of Bishops, that Presbyters did, for a short time, rule certain Churches with equal authority and by common counsel; but it rather confirms the necessity of the Episcopal office, seeing that this form of government rent the Churches with perpetual discords, even while the Apostles were alive to witness it.

As to the last quotation from Jerome, namely, that Bishops are greater than Presbyters more by custom than any true appointment of the Lord, it appears to press somewhat closer. But we answer, first, that his words are not to be too closely pressed; for he writes differently in different places, and inconsistently, on this same subject. Nevertheless, his words may be allowed in a sound sense; since he may be understood to speak of *the titles*, not of *the offices*;

for custom, and not any appointment of the Lord, or his Apostles, hath made the *title* of Bishop greater than that of Presbyter. Or, Jerome may be understood to speak of that authority which Bishops had obtained over Presbyters in his age. For this consisted, in a great degree, in privileges which had been conceded to them by custom, and the authority of Councils, but was not founded in any constitution of the Apostles. Finally, Jerome perhaps intended, by the expression *true appointment of the Lord*, an express command of our Lord in Scripture, and *by custom*, a practice begun by the Apostles, and perpetually observed in the Church. But in whatever way his words be expounded, it is certain that Jerome acknowledged a diversity of degrees among the Clergy, which is sufficient to refute the hypothesis of the equality of Ministers.

QUESTION XLIII.

CELIBACY IS NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH HOLY ORDERS.

It is an opinion entertained by some Romanists, that celibacy is, by a Divine right, annexed to holy orders. So John Major,* so Turrian;† who maintains that celibacy is essentially, and by law Divine, joined to the Evangelical Ministry; so that it is no more allowable for the Pope or the Church to permit Priests to marry, than to legalise theft or adultery. Pope Syricius fell into this heresy, who pronounced those that entered into wedlock, *to be in the flesh, and not able to please God*; he terms the same persons *polluted, and eagerly panting after filthy lusts*, as may be seen in his *Decretal Epistles*. But this doctrine of devils, so openly

* JOHN MAJOR, was a Scottish Historian, born at Gleghorn, near North Berwick, in 1469. He studied at the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Paris and St. Andrews, of which latter, after filling for some years the Chair of Theological Professor, he at length became Provost. The divided state of the Society to which he belonged, proved, however, so great a state of mortification to him, that he went back for a while to France; but the circumstances which caused his disgust being at length removed, he returned to Scotland, where he died in 1550. He was the author of a *Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle*, an *Exposition of St. Matthew's Gospel*, and a *history of the Scotch, from the earliest periods of Antiquity*, all written in very rude Latin.—*Gorton's Dictionary*.

† Turrian was a Spanish Jesuit, he died in 1584.

proposed, has not been liked by the more cautious Romanists.* For they perceived that the Pontiff assumed this power to himself, in order to the dispensing with the vow of celibacy; they saw that he, in fact, had permitted the Grecian Priesthood conjugal intercourse with the wives whom they had married previous to ordination. They are, therefore, led to deny that this continence of Priests is of Divine right, that the Pope may not (which is wrong) appear to be in opposition to Divine right.† Setting aside, however, these notions, others affirm that the Decree concerning celibacy, being necessarily annexed to holy orders, is not, indeed, strictly speaking, Divine; but yet that it is Apostolical, and was observed by the whole Church from the very days of the Apostles. So Bellarmine and many others.‡ But that this mode of getting over the matter is equally shameless, you shall learn shortly. A third opinion is, that Priests were forbidden to enter into wedlock by a plain law, but one merely human—by a regulation which Symon first iniquitously endeavoured to obtrude upon the whole Church. Thus much is admitted in the Gloss on Gratian,§ which makes the decree to be as ancient as the time of Symon; and affirms that all Priests could enter into marriage antecedent to the time of Symon. The same assertion is being constantly made by other Romanists. It ought, however, to be added, that in the Western Church very little attention was paid to this decree, by whomsoever promulgated; until that impious and insane Hildebrand,|| by force and tyranny, imposed that heavy yoke upon the Priesthood, notwithstanding the Bishops of Italy, of Germany, and Gaul, protested against it. Vide Baron, anno 1074. But now, in the fourth place, among those very Papists who acknowledge this decree of celibacy, or perpetual continence of the Priesthood to be human, it is still a question, whether it is of such a quality as that it would be expedient, in our times, to have it abrogated or not? The more common opinion, not venturing to oppose itself to the practice of the Roman Church, lays it down, that it is a most just and useful decree, by no means to be relaxed: But the more prudent party, on a consideration of disadvantages and scandals which arise from this forced and impure celibacy of Romanists, maintains that it would be beneficial to

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 88. artic. 11. [See Note at the end, p. 455.]

† Bellarm. *De Cler.* 1. 18.

‡ Bellarm. *ibid.*

§ Decr. part. 1. dist. 84, cap. 3, *Cum in præterito*. [See Gieseler's *Text Book of Ecclesiastical History*, vol. ii. p. 251., for some account of this and other portions of the Canon Law.]

|| See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, edit. 1843, vol. ii. p. 117.

the Church, if it were entirely set aside. So says Panormitan,* *I believe it would be for the good and safety of souls, that they who desire it should be at liberty to contract marriage.* So Polydore affirms,† *That it would be an advantage to the Christian Commonwealth, if the Priesthood was at last to be allowed publicly‡ to enter the married state.* So Erasmus, so Cassander, so the very Roman Pontiff himself, Pius II., who, as Platina quotes him,§ confesses that there were good reasons for the Priesthood being deprived of the privilege of marriage, nevertheless, there now seemed better for restoring it. To all these vacillating opinions of Papists, we oppose this, and a most true one, that celibacy is not, by Divine, Apostolic, nor by any other right, necessarily annexed to sacred orders; nor could it be annexed by Ecclesiastical authority; and hence we affirm that this Papal decree was, even from the beginning, vain, impious, and in fact, of itself, null and void. This is proved,

* *De Cler. Conjug.* [PANORMITAN, *Nicolaus Tudeschus*, a Sicilian, commonly called as above, because he was Abbot of an Abbey of the Order of St. Benedict, in *Palermo*, and afterwards Archbishop of that city. He was one of the most famous Canonists, was present at the Council of Basil, and had a great hand in what was done there against Pope Eugenius. He died in 1445. Vide Allport's Edition of Baxter's *Key for Catholics*, p. 282; or Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. iii. edit. 1845, p. 45.

† POLYDORE VERGIL, an Italian writer of Urbino, co-temporary with Erasmus, was the author of *Adagia*, in 1498, *De Rerum Inventoribus*, 1499, and *Dialogue de Prodigis* in 1531. About the commencement of the sixth century, Pope Alexander VI. deputed him to England, for the purpose of collecting the Papal tribute called Peter-pence. As he was admired in this country for his learning and Latin style, he was promoted to the Archdeaconry of Wells, and engaged by Henry VII. to write a history of England. This work was begun in 1505, and printed at Basil in 1548, with a dedication to Henry VIII. Enjoying in this country the preferments of Prebend and Archdeacon, he wished to continue in it, notwithstanding the changes of Religion that had occurred, and the cessation of his office as collector of a tax that no longer subsisted; more especially, as he evinced himself, by his *approbation of the marriage of the Clergy*, and his condemnation of the worship of images, to be no strict Romanist. He had likewise introduced into his treatise, *De Inventoribus*, some passages which the Inquisition expunged, and reflected on the pride of the Clergy, by suggesting that St. Peter would not suffer Cornelius the Centurion to kiss his feet. He ventured, however, in 1550, being in advanced life, to return to his own country, for the benefit of a warmer climate. His English benefices were continued till his death, which happened at Urbino, about 1555. Of his works, that by which he is most known (though his others were frequently reprinted) is his *Historia Anglica*, as it serves to fill up a chasm in our English history of seventy years, including particularly the reigns of Edward IV. and V.—See Platt's and Crabb's *Historical Dictionaries*.

‡ See Dr. Elliott's *Delineation*, &c., p. 732, for the reason of this adjunct.

§ Page 311, Edit. Col. Agrip. 1626.

First, Because, if that right were founded upon Divine or Apostolic authority, it must be derived either from the Old or the New Testament. The Old establishes the fact of Priests being married men: the New, not only permits it, but distinctly points out what the wives of Priests ought to be, and how it behoves them to rule over their children and their households (1 Tim. iii. 4). Moreover, the Scripture recognises marriage as *honourable in all* (Heb. xiii. 4.); and brands with the mark of diabolical heresies those who attempt to forbid matrimony (1 Tim. iv. 3). In short, the Apostle himself says plainly, that he had received no commandment in favour of celibacy (1 Cor. vii. 2, &c.).

Secondly, If by Divine right, or Apostolical tradition, the vow of continence had been annexed to holy orders, how is it that the Eastern Church (with the approbation, too, of the Bishop of Rome) has constantly retained married Priests? It is not to be supposed that so many holy Bishops would wantonly contravene an Apostolic tradition; nor can it be said that the Apostolic tradition did certainly allow married men to become Presbyters or Bishops, but on the condition that, as soon as they had received holy orders, they should abstain from conjugal intercourse: for this is diametrically opposed to Apostolic doctrine, which in general recommends all married persons, that the one should not defraud the other of conjugal duty, without consent, except for a time only, that they may be more at liberty for fasting and prayer (1 Cor. vii. 5). But the traditions of the Apostles must not be set at variance with their written doctrines, nor can they. And here I may mention Cherimon, Spiridion, Synesius, and several other Bishops, who were married men, enjoying marriage also during their Episcopal state. Socrates plainly affirms,* that *in the East, not a few, whilst sustaining the Episcopal office, had also children by a lawful wife*. And Gregory Nazianzen testifies, in the Poem on his own life, that he was born to Nazianzen, his father being at that time a Bishop. Clemens Alexandrinus, anterior to these, shews, (Strom 3.) that in his time matrimony was forbidden neither to Deacons nor to Presbyters. Athanasius, also, clearly shews, that it was allowable even to Bishops to marry: *Many (says he†) of the Bishops did not marry, while, on the other hand, Monks became parents of children; yet you may observe again, Bishops who are fathers of children, and Monks who have scrupled to propagate their species. For so it is allowed, &c.* In short, Augustine, when censuring the error of

* Lib. 5. cap. 21. [See S. Basnagii *Annales Politico-Eccles.*; tom i. p. 526.]

† Epistola ad Dracontium. [See a curious note in the English translation of Dupin, vol. ii. p. 45, on the perversion of this passage by the good Father.]

the Apostolics, [as they called themselves]* shews, by the way that the Catholic Church contained many Monks and Clergy who were living in a married state.

Thirdly, If marriage had been forbidden to the Priesthood by Apostolic authority, I enquire, Whence comes it that so many children of Priests were promoted to the Roman Episcopate in the Western Church? The father of Boniface I. was a Presbyter, as Platina testifies. So of Agapetus, Sylverius, and many others, according to the same authority. And that no one may suppose that they sprang from unlawful union, let him attend to Gratian: *Whereas, children of Priests are found to have been promoted to the highest orders they are not to be looked on as children of fornication, but of lawful wedlock; which Priests were every where allowed to contract till it was prohibited.*†

Fourthly, Since it appears that neither matrimony, nor the use of matrimony, was forbidden the Priesthood by Apostolic authority; neither Syricius, Calixtus,‡ nor any one else, could affix the chain of celibacy on the Ministry by an indissoluble and necessary tie. Nay, it is evident, that although this was attempted in the Nicene Council, yet it was rejected by the authority and weight of Paphnutius.§ In some other Councils, where the Fathers deferred more to their own fancies than to the Scriptures, I admit that a Canon respecting the continence of Priests was proposed and approved.|| But if those rules of the Lawyers are allowed to hold at all,¶ *that laws are established when promulgated; are confirmed when approved by the obedience rendered; and, that a law is sometimes abrogated by no heed being paid to it:* if, I say, these principles have any weight, certain it is, that that law as to the celibacy of the Clergy was never a valid one. For in the Western Church itself it did not succeed in obtaining the force of a general rule,

* Tom. vi. *De hæres. ad Quodvult Deum hæres.* 40. [Tom. viii. Edit. Benedict. col. ii. There can be no objection to quote a few lines of Augustine on those heretics:—Apostolici, qui se isto nomine arrogantissime vocaverunt, eo quod in suam communionem non reciperent utentes conjugibus, et res proprias possidentes: quales habet Catholica et Monachos clericos plurimos, sed ideo isti hæretici sunt, &c. See Krasinski's *History of the Reformation in Poland.* vol. ii. p. 52.

† Decret. part. 1. dist. 56. [cap. 13.]

‡ See Foxe, vol. ii. p. 176.

§ Vide Socrat. lib. 1. cap. 10. (not 8, as in Davenant's margin) et Soz. lib. 1. cap. 22. [Paphnutius was Bishop of Thebais, in Egypt; assisted at the Council of Nice in 325, and was lodged in the palace of Constantine. He opposed a motion for imposing Celibacy on the Clergy, and defended Athanasius at the Council of Tyre.—See Milner's *Church History.*]

|| Concil. Rom. Arel.

¶ *Apud Gratian Decret.* part. 1. dist. 4. [cap. 3.]

until Hildebrand, by violence and tyranny, imposed this yoke upon the murmuring and reluctant Priesthood, as we have before observed.* As for Bellarmine's confident assertion, that this regulation for the perpetual continence of the Priesthood is founded in the strictest justict, we, on the contrary, affirm it to be most impious and unjust: it should, therefore, by the pious, be no ways heeded, how antique soever it may be. For since the freedom of contracting marriage is a law of nature, it is most unjust to deprive the whole order of the Priesthood of this right. For no just reason can be alleged, why generally any order of men should be debarred the privilege of engaging in matrimony, which is essential for the constitution of the Church or the State. Bellarmine answers, that the Church does not absolutely forbid marriage to any one; but only requires this celibacy under a condition, from those who wish to enter upon the sacerdotal office. Bellarmine got this from the puddle of the writer of the Gloss upon Gratian. For thus says he.—*If you enquire how it is that the Church imposed upon any the necessity of continence, when continence is a matter of vow and not of precept, I say that the Church compels no one to continence: but in the Order which she confers, she can impose what condition she pleases, as any one else in delivering over his property,* (in *Distinct. 28, cap. 1*). But this is egregious blundering every way. For if a King should forbid all Lawyers or Merchants marrying, it might be truly said that many were excluded from matrimony, although he should offer no impediment to any one from becoming a Merchant, or taking up the profession of the Law; because the State could not exist without the services of many such. In a similar way, also, the Pope prohibits matrimony to many thousands, whilst he prohibits it to all Priests, without whom the Church cannot exist. Moreover, holy orders, although they are conferred for the service of the Church, yet are not so far subjected to the dominion of the Church, as to repel all from entering them, however fit and serviceable, who are unwilling to renounce their own natural right. Lastly, a conditional prohibition is iniquitous and unlawful, when it cannot be observed by those acceding to it without sin. Much as if the Church should make it a rule, that none should be admitted to holy orders, but such as should take a vow before they were admitted that they would, through life, never make use of medicine, under whatever disease they might be suffering. They no less offend who make it a decree, that no one

* [See Question xxxii, p. 387; and also Note, p. 388, together with Chapter xxxix. of vol. 1.]

shall be initiated into Orders, unless he will first take a vow not to adopt the remedy of matrimony, although he may be in imminent danger of suffering from incontinence.

I come now to consider Bellarmine's closing assertion, namely, that *it is not expedient in this our age, that that Papal decree concerning the celibacy of the Priesthood should be relaxed*. If we admit that that decree was originally neither unjust nor impious, yet now, when all the world attests that it tends to the ruin of souls, something of the rigour of the law ought to be relaxed; for the salvation of souls is a law above all others, to which equity demands that Canons of this description should give place. And here I can never sufficiently wonder, that those rigid sticklers for Canons should be more severe against matrimony, than against fornication itself. It is a Canon of the Council of Neocæsarea (Can. 1), *Let a Priest, if he marries, be deposed from his order; but if he should commit fornication let him be cast out of the Church*. But what say our Romish Catos? *Priests who contract matrimony, they do not suspend from their office, but from a tree*, as Melancthon said formerly: on the other hand, fornicators are treated much more gently. For they say that no one should be deposed for fornication, *unless he should persist in it, and that because our bodies are more frail now-a-days than they used to be formerly*.* Now, if on the ground of human frailty, it has been decided that, in a case of fornication, the severity of the Canon ought to be relaxed, how much more just should it be considered, that the same concession should be made on account of the same weakness in the case of matrimony! And undoubtedly they would have so acted in whom there was any equity, piety, or shame stirring, but for the obstacle made by those, who cared nothing for sincere holiness and piety. This we have before shewn in the case of Pope Pius II, of the Abbe Panormitan, Polydore, Erasmus, and Cassander. In short, the common pretence, that *there is a certain inconsistency, between the sanctity of the priestly office, and the pollution of conjugal intercourse, is plainly impious and heretical*. For Cajetan was quite correct when he wrote,† *There is no proof, either from reason or authority, that, strictly speaking, a Priest sins by contracting marriage.—Neither is the Order, as an Order, nor the Order as it is sacred, any hindrance to matrimony*. And a little after, *In abiding only by those things which we derive from Christ and his Apostles, the Priesthood does not break off the marriage contract, either before or after ordination*. Although it is not to be supposed that

* Gloss. in Distinct. 82. cap. 5.

† Opusc. tom. 1, tract. 27.

the Romanists, by imposing celibacy, had the holiness of the Priesthood in view, since they cannot pretend, but that owing to this constrained celibacy of the Priesthood, almost the whole body of Papal Massmongers has been contaminated with lusts the most infamous. Hence Cassander wrote,* *that matters were well nigh come to that state among the Papists, that they must have Priests with legitimate wives or otherwise.* Before him John Gerson writes :† *This evil (he is speaking of lust) has gained such a height, that now there is greater reason for putting up with Priests who live in fornication, than with prostitutes, lest more flagitious vices be the consequence.* Let Pighius and Coster, however, prate as they please, *that it is more to be tolerated in a Priest, that he commits fornication than that he takes a wife,* I conclude in the words of Cassander,‡ *that they offend grievously who wink at, and in some measure approve, any impure cohabitation as preferable to dispensing with a merely human regulation, in the case of those who cannot observe it, without offending against the Divine law.*§

Marrying in the Sacerdotal Order is then lawful, and the decree for its prohibition, in the Church of Rome, is unlawful, anti-Christian, and evidently diabolical.

* In Consult. [Opera, p. 990].

† *De Vita Spirit.* Lect. 4. Corall. 14.

‡ In Consult. [p. 987, Opera, Paris, 1616.]

§ So Basnage writes in his 7th Dissertation, (included in the *Annales Politico-Eccles.* tom. ii. p. 524). “In eam quoque sententiam pedibus ivit Scholæ theologicæ princeps Aquinas, qui inde colligit, votum continentiae abrogari posse. Verba Thomæ sunt:—Non est essentialiter annexum debitum continentiae ordini sacro, sed ex statuto Ecclesiæ. Unde videtur quod per Ecclesiam possit dispensari, in voto continentiae solemnizzato per susceptionem ordinis sacri. (Th. 2. 2. q. 88. a. 11). Ecclesiæ vero decreta infra illa Apostolorum longe subsident, et gravi de causa mutari possunt, cum Apostolorum leges ubique locorum et temporum firmæ ratæque vigere debeant, quia a Spiritu Sancto manant, fallere fallique nescio, cum sancienti Ecclesiæ non satis sapientiæ sit, ut incommoda constitutionum omnia prævidere possit, atque vitare. Quibus accedit, quod vel unus Apostolus toti Siriciano Concilio autoritate antecedit.”

QUESTION XLIV.

SAINTS ARE NOT TO BE INVOCATED.

THAT superstitious invocation of saints which the Papists have introduced into the Church of God, we reject chiefly upon three accounts: it is opposed to the revealed will of God; it infringes upon the office of the Mediator, and, in fine, it is inconsistent with the condition of the saints.

1.—As to the first, We lay it down as a most solid foundation for our opinion, *That all the necessary acts and duties of religious worship originate so entirely in the will of God, as revealed in his word, that such as are not founded on his word, are contrary to the Divine will.** WHAT THINGS SOEVER I COMMAND YOU, OBSERVE TO DO IT; THOU SHALT NOT ADD THERETO, NOR DIMINISH FROM IT (Deut. xii. 32). With this accords that saying of our Saviour, Matt. xv. 9). IN VAIN DO THEY WORSHIP ME, TEACHING FOR DOCTRINES THE COMMANDMENTS OF MEN. Whatever liberty, then, is permitted the Church, in ceremonies that are indifferent, yet, in the duties of religious worship (among which the Romanists would have this their invocation to rank) God does not require from us, nay, he does not accept it favourably, when we do what he has not commanded us. Thus says Hilary,† *God cannot be understood, except through God; so God does not receive honour from us, except through God. Wherefore, he is not understood to be honoured, unless he himself has instructed us how he is to be honoured. We are taught to know God by God. We must not form our notions of God after human reasonings, &c.* Here applies that saying of Augustine, in his treatise on *the Harmony of the Gospels*, i. 8, that *God must be worshipped in the way in which he has enjoined himself to be worshipped.* And elsewhere, *The holy Scriptures prescribe the rule of our doctrine; I may not, therefore, teach anything else, than explain the words of the Great Teacher.* I pass by innumerable testimonies of this kind, which are everywhere to be met with in the Greek and Latin Fathers;

* [Sermon xv., or p. 524, in the *Morning Exercises at Southwark*, against Popery, or the *Invocation of Saints and Angels unlawful.*]

† *De Trinit.* lib. 5.

and now I confidently add, that the Scriptures teach us access to God in the name of Christ alone as Mediator: they do not teach (nor in the slightest way intimate) that we should invoke the Saints in religious prayer, and make our approach to God the Father through their intercession. There is no command in the whole volume of the Scriptures to invoke the departed Saints; no example, even of any pious man, who has ever done it; no promise of grace if we wish to do it; no punishments if we refuse to do it. Romanists do themselves confess this. Bellarmine admits,* that this invocation of Saints was wholly unknown under the Old Testament; and gives as a reason for it, *Because the Patriarchs and Prophets were detained in the prison of hell!* We have it, then, at once conceded to us, that this invocation of the Saints has not any foundation, either in the Scriptures of the Old Testament, or in the practice of the Jewish Church. Come we to the New Testament, and to the practice of the Apostles and of the Primitive Church; and let us see whether the Papists could discover from thence, that this invocation of the Saints, which they maintain, is in accordance with the Divine will. The testimonies of the Scriptures, respecting God's being invoked through Christ the Mediator, are well known: *If ye shall ask the Father anything in my name, he will give it you* (John xvi. 23). *Through Him we have access to the Father* (Eph. ii. 18). *He is able to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them* (Heb. vii. 25). But that we should make our approaches to God by the medium of invocation to Saints, we have learnt, neither from Christ nor from his Apostles. It is the frank admission of Bannes,† that *the Holy Scriptures teach neither expressly, nor indirectly, that prayers are to be made to the Saints.* The doctrine is, consequently, made to find its place among the jumble of those things which have issued from unwritten traditions. But we deny that any unwritten tradition is sufficiently valid to form a ground for acts of religious worship; and we fully accord with Augustine, as regards the duty of invocation, that *to pray otherwise than the Lord hath taught, not only betrays ignorance, but is blameworthy.*

2.—Secondly, That invocation of Saints which has now obtained a prevalence among Papists, obscures, and is injurious to the Mediatorial office of Christ, and with sacrilegious daring transfers it to his servants, and our fellow-servants. It is certain that Christ

* *De Sanct. Beat.* in Ord. disp. [See Archbishop Usher's *Answer to a Jesuit*, pp. 238, 39, 52. Edit. Cambridge, 1835.]

† 2. 2. Quæst. 1. art. 10.

is not a Mediator of *Redemption* merely, but of *Intercession* also : In the Church of Rome, however, the office of *intercession* is assigned, for the most part, to Saints, and especially the blessed Virgin. For seeing that it is the prerogative of Christ to present himself in such a character before God the Father, in our stead, so that, by virtue of his merits, he may obtain all good things for us from a reconciled God ; the Romanists invoke the Saints, because they suppose that, by means of their merits, they shall obtain not only temporal, but spiritual benefits. So says Hales,* *The Saints are invoked by us, because of our inefficiency in meritoriousness, that where our merits are insufficient, another's may aid our cause.* Thus also says Lombard,† *We pray that they would intercede for us, that is, that their merits may plead for us.* If the Romanists were in the habit of seeking the prayers of dead saints, with no other object than we are accustomed to do when petitioning the living to pray for us, (although they are unable to give a fair reason for so doing,) yet they would not be violating the Mediatorial office of Christ, nor transferring it to Saints. For, to worship any being by an act of religious invocation, is very different from intreating another to call upon God, together with us. We do not make the individual a Mediator whom we desire to pray with us ; but we do make those whom we invoke religiously, and whose merits we endeavour to secure, and make the channel to ourselves of the favour of God. What is there so peculiarly belonging unto Christ, as the character of an Advocate of his people with God ? What is there, then, that casts more reproach on Christ, than to assign him colleagues in that office which he ought to sustain alone ? But the Romanists say, that they do not give Christ colleagues in the office of being Mediator ; they merely place under him certain subordinate Mediators, who are dependent on him, having access to God through him, and who, in short, promote his glory by this their subordinate mediation. All these statements are, however, both futile and false. For who, in the first place, commissioned them to appoint any inferior Mediators under Christ ? *The Son of God*, says Athanasius,‡ *was made the Son of Man, that he might be the Mediator and Umpire between God and men, and administer the things of God to us, and tender what are ours to God.* He stands in no need of inferior Ministers to enable him to exercise this office ; he has given us no command to avail ourselves of such assistance, in order to obtain this object ; he suffers not

* Part. 4. quæst. 26, art. 5.

† Lib. 4. dist. 45.

‡ Athanas. Orat. in illud dictum, *Deus ex Deo.*

the office of Mediation to be exercised by inferior Ministers. He who intercedes for us with God, as Mediator, presents to God that humanity which he assumed on our behalf, and all that he did and underwent in order to restore us to the favour of God.* This the Saints cannot do; they cannot, therefore, become Mediators, even subordinately, *save he for whom no one interposes, but he himself for all, he is that one and true Mediator*; as Augustine has well said (*contra Parmenianum*, lib. 2. cap. 8). As to the pretence, that these subordinate Mediators do much for advancing the honour of the Supreme Mediator, experience itself has taught us that it is just the reverse. For ever since the introduction of the invocation of Saints, the honour of Christ has been constantly diminishing, and, at last, the mere title of Mediator is all that is reserved to him; while, as regards whatever relates to the honour of the office, that has been transferred almost wholly to the Saints and Saintesses. There are two points especially which seem to appertain to the honour of Him, who has been solemnly appointed Mediator between God and men: One is, that all should be fully assured of the willingness of God to make him the channel, as it were, of his mercy and beneficence, to all others; the other, that we should be prepared to recognise this Mediator as especially merciful, and most ready to assist miserable sinners. But how stands the matter? why those invocators of Saints have left Christ, as regards the outward benefits of God, scarcely any opening for rendering us any direct succour. There is no country, no condition of mankind, which has not its peculiar Mediator, to whom they have recourse, in direct prayer, as often as there is anything to be obtained from God. No disease, scarcely any evil can be thought of, for the express removal of which they have not set up some Saint, as the Gentiles formerly used to do with their gods. Hence it comes to pass, that in shipwreck, war, disease, or outward evil of any description, there is scarcely one out of ten of the adherents of Rome, who, hoping for deliverance from God as the author,† looks to any other Mediator than that Saint to whose guardianship, in preference to all others, he supposes this particular department has been entrusted.

But, perhaps, in cases where it is necessary to apply to a Mediator for the obtaining of spiritual benefits, and the avoiding evils, they do, then, confer so much honour on Christ, as to come to him without any intervention. Nay! Christ cannot succeed so far as that even with the Romanists; so far from it, whatever there is which concerns the dispensing of Divine mercy and grace, that

* Vide Aquin. *Com. in viii. ad Rom.*

† [A reference to Bellarmine's language, *de Sanct. Beat.* 1. 17.]

part of the office, according to their account, with the Divine approbation, has been transmitted by Christ to the blessed Virgin, his own mother. Berthorius,* lib. 19. *Moralitatum*, cap. 4, says, *That is the truth, because, seeing that the kingdom of God consists of two parts, namely, righteousness and mercy, God hath conferred one half of his own kingdom, namely, the distribution of mercy, upon the Queen of Paradise (that is Maria): she is, therefore, called the Queen of Mercy, &c.* But the boldness of Bernardin de Busti is excessive, who instructs us that no grace comes from heaven to earth unless it passes through the hands of Maria.† *From the time*, says he,‡ *that the Virgin Mother conceived in her womb the Word of God, she obtained (so to speak) a certain jurisdiction or controul in every temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, so that there is no creature who obtains any grace or virtue, but only as the pious Mother herself is pleased to dispense it.* In what they call the office of the Blessed Virgin, they address her thus. *Hail, O Queen! Mother of Mercy. O our life, sweetness, and hope, hail! We flee to thy protection, despise not our prayers in our necessities; but deliver us from all dangers now and evermore, O glorious Virgin, &c.*§

* OR BERTHARIUS; he was of noble French origin, and flourished in the 9th Century, first a Monk, and then Abbot of Monte Cassino, in Italy, from A.D. 856 till his death in the year 884. The Saracens frequently plundered that Monastery, and at last slew Bertharius at the Altar. See Mabillon, *Acta Sanctor. Ord. Bened.* tom. vi. p. 472, &c. He wrote several discourses, poems, and Lives or Eulogies of the Saints; most of which remain unpublished in the Archives of his Monastery. Two books on the Scriptures, reconciling difficult passages of Scripture, are ascribed to him.—See Soames's *Mosheim*.

† DR. ANDREW RIVET, and some other writers, make a very proper distinction between the Blessed Virgin and *Maria*, the Catholics' Queen; and it is to be regretted that Protestant authors should so often speak of pictures of an "elegant, tasty" Madonna and her attendant in petticoats, as if representing the Virgin Mary of Holy Writ.—See Rivet's *Apologia pro B. M. Virgine*, in his Opera, tom. iii. p.

‡ Serm. 61. art. .1 cap. 8. [BERNARDINUS DE BUSTIS, an Italian Franciscan Preacher, learned and superstitious. He died about A.D. 1500, leaving several series of Sermons, and Offices for the festivals of the conception of Mary, and the name of Jesus.—Soame's *Mosheim*. See large extracts from this writer in Usher's *Answer to a Jesuit*; pp. 416, 18, 19, 20, &c., Edit. 1835. Bernard of *Siena* has raved about Maria just as freely.

§ The Reader is referred to Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, for extracts from Prayers to the Saints in *the Garden of the Soul*, and the Roman Missal; pp. 104, 105 of the 2nd Edition; and to Chapter xv. p. 345, of the same work, for an ample view of this whole subject: as regards the special worship of the Virgin, he may be referred to a small volume by the Very Rev. P. R. Kenrick, London, 1841, under the recommendation of F. P. Kenrick, one of the Roman Catholic Bishops of Philadelphia; entitled, *THE NEW MONTH OF MARY, or reflections for each day of the Month, on the different Titles applied to the holy*

It is not their Virgin, however, who is made the sole channel of grace between man and God; they have conferred this privilege upon the whole troop of Saints also. Thus says Hales,* *The descent of the Divine graciousness is made to us through the Saints; hence it is befitting, that our ascent to God should be made by the means of these holy Mediators.* In this the Archbishop of Florence accords: *It is the rule of the Deity, says he,† to lead by the lowest means up to the supreme: now, as regards the gifts of grace, the blessed are the means between God and pilgrims. Divine blessings, consequently, come down to us through the medium of Angels and of holy souls.* It is, then, detracting very much from the honour of Christ, to set up as many channels of grace as there are Saints between God and miserable sinners. The consequence of this veneration is found to be, that Christ has been almost shut out of doors.

Secondly, it tends very materially to the honour of an Intercessor and Mediator, that he can, above all others, be regarded as full of mercy, so as to render it easy for the miserable to make their approaches to him; and not have the character of being so harsh and stern, that it should be necessary to seek to another Mediator to conciliate this Mediator. Such an one the Holy Scriptures commend unto us, Jesus Christ the Son of God. It is

Mother of God, in the LITANY OF LORETTO: but a few samples from Liguori's GLORIES OF MARY, in addition to the above, must not be withheld, especially as he was one of the FIVE SAINTS canonized by the present Pope (Gregory XVI.) on Trinity Sunday, May 26, 1839; and it is said of him, in the Lives of those Saints, published in London, 1839, p. 9, that "his life was saved, when in a dangerous illness he was at the very point of death, by the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, a Statue of whom was brought to his bed-side." He thus speaks of his idol:—

"O illustrious Virgin! you are Queen of the Universe, and consequently mine. I desire, then, to consecrate myself more particularly to your service; dispose of me according to your good pleasure; direct me, I abandon myself wholly to your conduct," &c.: p. 10. Again,

"St. Epiphanius calls Mary, *multoculam*, of many eyes, and, indeed, with reason, for the compassionate eyes of this Mother of Mercy are always opened on us, and seem to be multiplied for the relief of our wants. A possessed person replied, when the Exorcist demanded what the Blessed Virgin did,—that she ascends and descends, that is to say, this gracious Queen descends to earth to bring grace to man, and ascends to heaven to present man's petitions to God. St. Andrew Avellino styled Mary the *negociatrix* of Paradise," p. 143, Dublin, 1835. A very suitable agent for the *Company* of modern Liguorists, i. e. Jesuits.

* Part. 4. quæst. 26. artic. 5.

† Part. 3. Tit. 3. [Antoninus de Foreiglioni, advanced to the Archbishopric of Florence by Eugenius IVth, in 1446: See Dupin's *Eccles. Hist.* vol. xiii. p. 85; and Echard's *Scriptores Ord. Prædicat.* tom. 1. pp. 818, 19.]

the voice of this Mediator himself, *Come unto me, all ye that labour, and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest* (Matt. xi. 28). *If ye shall ask anything in my name, I will do it, that the Father may be glorified in the Son* (John xiv. 13). The doctrine of the Apostle is the same: *In whom we have boldness and access with confidence, through the faith of him* (Eph. iii. 12). *Having a great High Priest, who is passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God, let us hold fast our profession. For we have not an High Priest who cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities.—Let us, therefore, come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy* (Heb. iv. 14—16.), with Christ, that is to say; as our Leader and Intercessor: not a man, not an angel, not the most glorious Virgin. But what do our Romanists in this case? Do they leave this honour entire to Christ, when they introduce the invocation of Saints? Hear ye: *Christ is not an Advocate alone, but a Judge, whom the righteous man, and much more the man defiled with sin, may shrink from approaching; therefore, God has provided us with an Advocate, who is mild and gentle, and in whom nothing austere is found*: So says Antony.* Hence it is that the Papists, in their own temples, (as Chemnitz writes) depict Christ as threatening and hurling his darts at sinners, and represent men as fleeing in their fright to Maria, who, as a Mediatrix, interposes herself, and repels his arrows.† So much for the honours which Christ, as Mediator, derives by the invocation of Saints,—he is less loved, less sought to, and accounted less merciful by his servants. The Romanists themselves cannot think to deny this to be the case. *Most of us are more inclined, says our Hales, towards some Saint, at times, than towards the Lord*, part. 4. quæst. 26. memb. 3). *Sinners are sometimes more anxious for the favour of the Saints, than of their Judge.*‡ In

* And so says the present Archbishop of Lyons, M. de Bonald:—"When the Christian Religion was born on Mount Calvary, of the blood of Jesus Christ, she appeared in the world with a *countenance austere* as her language; and daughter of the Man of Sorrows, she had received in heritage only a *crown of thorns*; her hands bore no sceptre but the Cross. But this garb would have frightened the human heart too much, if the Saviour had not given to Religion, through her cradle, a *companion* whose gentleness should temper her severity; whose charms should make men *forget* the rigour of her laws, and support the weight of *her yoke*. This faithful companion was, our dearly beloved brethren, the worship of the holy Virgin."—Bickersteth's *Divine Warning*, p. 325, where more.

† The Bishop has dropt the phrase importing the *means* of repulsion, which we may well give in Latin:—"et ostentatis filio uberibus, jacula ejus pallio suo excipiat." *Examen Decret. Conc. Trident.* pars. iii. loc. 4, *De Invocat. Sanct.* §. 3.

‡ Biel. in *Can Miss.* lect 30.

short, James de Valentia confidently asserts,* *that in this our pilgrimage, there is no other refuge left us in our adversities, except to have recourse to the Mediatrix, the Virgin Maria, who will appease the anger of her Son.* But to these superstitious figments of Papists, I oppose those sentiments of Tertullian, *What the Son requires is always easily obtained; (De Pœnit).* *The calling upon a mere man, in order to the procuring salvation, is deemed ineffectual; (De Trinit).*—You perceive, then, that this invocation of Saints, is not only inconsistent with the will of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, but is opposed, also, to the honour of the Mediator himself.

3.—We come now to our last argument, and I affirm, that that religious invocation which Papists are in the habit of making to their Saints, is unsuited to their condition, be they ever so high in favour with God, and in glory.

And here it must be carefully borne in mind, in the first place, that prayer, properly so called, is, from the common acknowledgment of all Divines, an act of religion, or of religious worship. So says Aquinas, *It is manifest that prayer is properly an act of Religion.*† Now Religion, in the opinion of all, is a certain power (virtus‡), which inclines a man to manifest a becoming reverence and honour towards God, as the Creator and Lord of all. He, consequently, who yields religious invocation to Saints, exalts them into the place of God. Whence says the Apostle (Rom. x. 14). *How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?* There are many descriptions of religious prayer quoted from the writings of the Fathers, many from those of modern Theologians; in all which, God alone is mentioned as the proper object of invocation, not Saints, not Angels. *Prayer is converse with God,* as Chrysostom says.§ *Prayer is a requesting of suitable things from God,* as Damascenus has it.|| Not to quote, however, too largely, prayer is so peculiarly an act of Divine worship, that it is used constantly in the Scriptures; for the whole of religious worship, and the house itself of God, is called *The House of Prayer*, (Isa. lvi. 7).

The condition, then, of the Saints, inasmuch as it does not exceed the degree of created beings, is not such as will allow of their receiving the invocation which is due to the Creator alone.

* *In Exposit. Cantic. Mariæ.*

† 2. 2. quæst. 33. art. 3.

‡ Acting power, or secret agency, seems to be the sense of “virtus” in this place, tantamount to what is implied in our Collect for the 7th Sunday after Trinity.

§ Hom. 30, in Gen.

|| Lib. 3. cap. 24.

Nor does it help the cause of the Romanists, if they say that they only ask the Saints to call upon God, together with them, in the same manner as Paul asks the Thessalonians, (1 Epis. v. 25.) *Brethren pray for us.* For an intercessory petition of this kind differs very much from that religious invocation, which Papists are wont both to claim for, and offer to their Saints. Bellarmine terms this invocation of the Saints, *an admirable kind of adoration.** Azor the Jesuit contends, *That the Saints are not honoured with such worship, merely as men excelling in virtue or any other dignity are, but even with Divine worship and honour, which is an act of Religion.†* And upon what plea is it that they offer that worship to creatures, which is due to God alone, that is, Divine worship? Listen to the same writer again:‡ *We do not give Divine worship to the Saints on their own account, but on God's account, who made them Saints.* But he cannot stop there: he is making them Gods, making them Creators, if he intends they should receive Divine worship at all; for *he who supplicates another God, and not the Creator, does not pray to him, but brands him with infamy.§* *That which the highest Angel worships, that must be worshipped by the lowest man,* as Augustine truly says.

Secondly, Invocation is not only an act of Divine worship, but such an act as cannot shew itself in any inferior respect towards a creature. *For, as Aquinas truly remarks, the individual who calls upon another, offers a spiritual sacrifice to him who is thus invoked, namely, his own mind, which he reverently places in subjection to him, whilst by making petition, he professes that he needs him as the author of all his good,* (Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 83, art. 3). It was, then, as allowable for the Jews to sacrifice to Abraham, as being the friend of God, as it is for us to offer up our religious prayers to Peter or Paul, as being the friends of God. Hence the holy Fathers were accustomed to compare with, and to prefer prayer to the sacrifices. Clemens Alexandrinus calls this, *The best and holiest sacrifice.||* Tertullian, *The best and noblest offering.* The Scriptures, also, every where recognise the prayers of believers as sacrifices most acceptable to God. It is called *a pure offering,* (Mal. i. 11). It is likened to *incense,* and *the evening sacrifice,* (Psalm cxli. 2). Lactantius, speaking of sacrifices of this kind, elegantly remarks,¶ *That is the true sacrifice which is offered, not*

* Lib. 1. *de Beat. Sanct. in ord. disp.*

† Azor. *Instit. Moral.* tom. 1. lib. 9. cap. 10.

‡ Ibid.

§ Tertull. *advers. Marc.* lib. 4.

|| Strom. 7. [cap. 6. §. 31.]

¶ *De opificio Dei,* cap. 2.

from the altar, but that which comes from the heart; nor is that it which is given by the hand, but what flows from the mind. If, therefore, it has been always unlawful to offer sacrifice to the creature, then also to call upon the creature in religious prayer is impious and sacrilegious.

But our opponents imagine that they can satisfactorily meet this argument, by making a distinction between the religious invocation which is offered to an individual, as the Author of the blessings which are sought for, and that which is offered to some one as an Intercessor, through whom the object desired may be the more easily obtained from God. *In the former way is it, that it is allowable to offer religious prayers to God alone; in the latter way, they can be offered even to dead Saints.*

But such notions as these are easily refuted: for to request from any one of the Saints, whether alive or dead, to pray, together with us, to God, in order to the obtaining some blessing, this is not to call upon the Saint religiously, but to invite him to join in religious invocation of God. If this be all that Papists do, it is mistaken and foolish to maintain that religious worship is thus offered to them. Much more truly and learnedly says Augustine,* *The worshipping of dead men should be no part of our Religion; they are to be honoured in being imitated, but not to be adored in offering them religious honour.* And elsewhere,† *Their names are mentioned by the Priest, but not invoked.* In short, whoever is invoked by us religiously is, by the same act, recognised as God, and is placed above the creature. The Fathers, supported by this most firm foundation, demonstrated against the Arians, that Christ is the true God, inasmuch as he receives religious worship from us. The Romanists deprive this argument of its strength, so long as they teach that it is not unsuitable for created beings to receive the religious worship of invocation.

Thirdly, He whom we invoke religiously, ought to be in such a situation as to be acquainted with the state, and to be able to hear all the prayers of all who are invoking him throughout the whole world; and also to be qualified to discern the disposition of mind with which he is invoked by each individual, and to decide what is suitable for them, what not so. If he is unable to do this, he will often be invoked in vain; sometimes he will commend the prayers of hypocrites to God; at others, he will require of God for his worshippers what is prejudicial. But all the qualities we have mentioned are the prerogatives of God alone, not of Saints, nor of

* *De vera Relig.* cap. 55.

† *De Civit. Dei*, 22, 10.

Angels. Thus says the Psalmist, (lxxv. 2.) *O thou that hearest prayer, unto thee shall all flesh come.* And in 2 Chron. vi. 30, and 1 Kings viii. 39, we read, *Thou that hearest from heaven,—and thou wilt give to every man according to his ways, whose heart thou knowest.* For thou, even thou only, knowest the hearts of all the children of men.* It is God alone, therefore, who is to be invoked by us. On the other hand, I am well aware, how confidently Papists assert that the Saints are perfectly well acquainted with these things, either from angelic revelations, or from Divine revelations, or as viewed in the mirror† of the sacred Trinity. So far as relates to Christ the Mediator, we know well, that he perceives the state, knows the prayers, the thoughts, and those inward desires of the hearts of all; but not the whole company of Jesuits will ever be able to prove it to be an article of faith, that Peter or Paul, or the blessed Mother of Christ, sees the actions, hears the petitions, or looks into the hearts of the individuals by whom they are invoked. But while engaged in praying, our faith ought to feel itself supported by the foundations of the Scriptures, not resting on the dreams of conjecturers. There is in Augustine (on Psalm cviii. enar. 1.) much enquiry as to the points, whether, or how far, or in what way, the spirits of the departed are acquainted with those things which are done among men. He elsewhere‡ plainly denies that the dead, even the Saints, have any manner of acquaintance as to what the living are doing, even their own children. In other places he admits, that the dead are not, to be sure, aware of what may be doing here, and whilst it is being done; but that afterwards, they learn it from those who, in dying, pass from hence to them, or from the Angels, what in their opinion it is right that any of them should be favoured with knowing, from Him to whom all things are subjected. To Augustine, we may add Gregory of Nazianzen, who,§ as often as he addresses in his declamatory style, rather than invokes, any of the Blessed, does it, at the same time, admitting that he is in doubt whether he is heard by them or not. Neither is it sufficient for establishing the faith of Papists in this matter, that the Saints, whom they invoke, are enjoying the beatific vision, and bathe in the beams of the light of glory. For, even admitting with Scotus,|| the probability that God

[* Or, *which thou knowest he has in his heart*—*quas nosti eum habere in corde suo*, according to Prov. xix. 21. *There are many devices in a man's heart.*]

[† See Calvin's *Institutes*, lib. iii. cap. 20. §. 24.]

‡ *De cura pro Mort.* cap. 15. [See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 24.]

§ Orat. 1. in Julianum, et orat. in funere Gorgoniæ. [See Dupin, vol. ii. p. 167.]

|| Lib. 4. dist. 45. quæst. 4.

reveals to the Blessed the prayers which are offered to them; yet, with him, we will maintain also, that it is not necessary, from the nature of that blessedness, that any one there should obtain a knowledge of our prayers.

But if this invocation is to be practised, it ought not to proceed on the mere subtleties of Schoolmen, but be grounded on the infallible testimonies of Scripture. Although, if we should leave those Saints, to whom the Scripture has given its testimony as to their undoubted holiness, and come to those whom the authority of Popes has enrolled among the ranks of the Blessed, I venture, with the most learned Mirandula, to assert,* that *No one is bound, as a matter of faith, to believe that those so canonised are in glory*: much less that, by virtue of the light of glory, they have a perception of the prayers of those who are invoking them throughout the whole world. But, indeed, Him whom we rightly and religiously invoke, we are bound to believe is existing, not only in glory, but possesses himself, *the kingdom, the power, and the glory*; and forasmuch as this is applicable to none of the Saints, so no one of them ought to be invoked by us.

* Apolog. pag. 223.

See the *Enchiridion Theol. Anti-Romanum*, for an excellent Treatise on the subject of this Quæstio, by Dr. Clagett, vol. iii. pp. 367—480, Oxford, 1837.

In some of the foregoing Notes under this Question, the doctrine of Romanists in the present day, on the subject discussed, has been exhibited pretty clearly; but as the members of that communion constantly persist in endeavours to evade it, as a dogma of by-gone days, or even venture to deny that it is the doctrine or practice of their Church, when charged with it by Protestants; it may be useful to adduce some evidence from authorities among them of a period which cannot be disputed.

In a letter dated Wolverhampton, August 18, 1815, addressed to the Editor of the *Orthodox Journal*, and signed John Milner, D.D., we have modern proof of the position we maintain. His object was to recommend a continuation of "Alban Butler's Lives of the Saints," and to suggest that it should contain the Lives of those "canonized or beatified since the Pontificate of Benedict XIV." And this distinguished Divine among the Romanists, stated as follows:—"A work of this nature would be equally curious, edifying, and useful. It would shew, in particular, that the Catholic Church has not been less illustrious for the sanctity of several of her children, or *for the splendour of the most wonderful and incontestable miracles which God has wrought, at their intercession, in these irreligious times*, than it was in the golden ages of primitive fervour. Among these eminent servants of God, whose names are already enrolled in the sacred catalogue, or who, after long and scrupulous enquiries and examination on the part of the Apostolic See, are far advanced in the road to this distinction, I will mention the venerable Liguori, a late Bishop in Apulia, the author of many pious treatises, [and among them, as we have seen, *the Glories of Mary*] at whose intercession, as has been incontestably and publicly demonstrated within

these few months, a woman, whose breast had been cut off for a cancer, and buried in the Church-yard, it was suddenly restored to her, so that her infant drew milk from it in the same manner as from the other breast, which had never been diseased" (!!) It will be recollected that Dr. Milner was Vicar Apostolic of the Midland District.

A second proof is afforded us by the Allocution of his Holiness Pope Pius VII., in the secret Consistory held Sept. 4, 1815, which concludes thus:—

"It is now our duty, O venerable Brothers, to unite our prayers, in order to render to God, the Author of all good, and whose special Providence we have lately experienced, the just tribute of the thanks we owe Him; and since we are persuaded that he has granted us so many favours through the INTERCESSION and MERITS of *the most glorious Virgin Mary*, and the Holy Apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, we will, on the day consecrated to the Nativity of that holy Virgin, Mother of God, after the solemn Mass celebrated in our presence in the Cathedral of the *Prince of Apostles*, address to God our thanksgivings with psalms and hymns; and we will then offer the tribute of our homage to the most Holy Mary, and to the glorious *Princes of the Apostles*, St. Peter and St. Paul, in order that, by their powerful *intercessions*, God, along with the *most ample gifts* with which he has gratified us, may grant a perfect tranquillity to the Church of which we are visible head, and give unto all the Princes whose benevolence we and the holy See have experienced, an increase of glory and happiness."—See *Protestant Journal* for 1834, p. 427, 428.

A third evidence from modern authorities, for the merits, mediation, and intercession of Saints, and the idolatrous invocation of the Virgin Mary, must not be omitted. In the Encyclical Letter of the present Pope, Gregory XVI., addressed to the Prelates of the Romish Church in 1832, shortly after his assumption of the Pontifical dignity, his Holiness, in the beginning of his letter, observes, "We select for the date of our address, this most joyful day (August 15), on which we celebrate the solemn festival of the most blessed Virgin's triumphant assumption into heaven, *that she, who has been through every great calamity our Patroness and Protectress, may watch over us, writing to you, and lead our mind, by her heavenly influence, to those counsels which may prove most salutary to Christ's flock.*" The closing paragraph contains the following sentences:—"But that all may have a successful and happy issue, *let us raise our eyes to the most blessed Virgin Mary, who alone destroys heresies, WHO IS OUR GREATEST HOPE, YEA, THE ENTIRE GROUND OF OUR HOPE. May she exert her patronage to draw down an efficacious blessing on our desires, our plans, and our proceedings, in the present straightened condition of the Lord's flock.*"

Surely these are sufficient evidences to affix the most gross idolatry on the Church, and demonstrate the applicability of the foregoing subject to the present times; but, if the reader is desirous of seeing more on this subject, he may be referred to "Mariolatry," by the Rev. T. H. Horne; or to a masterly sermon before the University of Oxford, by the Rev. Dr. Jeune, Master of Pembroke College, entitled, "The Mariolatry of the Church of Rome, set forth, on the authority of statements accredited by the reigning Pope, Gregory XVI. and nine Prelates."

QUESTION XLV.

IGNORANCE DOES NOT EXCUSE SIN.

IGNORANCE sometimes denotes that there is an innate privation or deficiency of due knowledge; and in this case it is attributed to *original* sin; sometimes it denotes negligence itself, or carelessness, or contempt of knowledge; and then it falls under the description of *actual* sin. Neither of these presents any excuse for sin: that is, it does not release the individual who acts as he ought not to do, from the guilt thereof, although overwhelmed in the ignorance described; nay, this very ignorance itself is regarded as sin.

They are not excused, who, blinded by this *original* ignorance, commit sin; seeing that, by the voluntary sin of our first parents, (which was imputed to all their posterity) we have been immersed in this darkness. But it is a principle in Morals, that that which springs from a voluntary cause is itself to be reckoned voluntary. Hence that saying of the Apostle (Ephes. iv. 18)—*Being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart.* This ignorance, upon which is imposed so heavy a punishment, which has the guiltiness of sin clearly proved on it, cannot excuse the sin which takes its rise from it. For the Fathers have, by common consent, laid it down that, this darkness, which is innate in our minds, is not free from the guilt of original sin. Jerome, in his Dialogue against the Pelagians, affirms,* *The language of the Scriptures denotes, that even ignorance should be accounted as sinful.* It was the opinion of Augustine that this ignorance, before Baptism, entailed guiltiness upon the unregenerate; after Baptism, (although guilt be removed) he considered that it retained the nature of a culpable evil.† *Is that but a little evil, through which man is disabled from perceiving the things which are of the Spirit of God? Or can that ignorance be wanting in evil, through which innumerable crimes are perpetrated by those unconscious of it?* Lastly, Bernard‡

* Lib. 1. cap. 10.

† *Contra Julian.* lib. 6, cap. 5.‡ *Super Cant.* Sermon. 36.

pronounces ignorance, whether of ourselves, or of God, to be *worthy of condemnation*. Neither let any one allege here, that this innate ignorance does not involve the guilt of sin, because it is not in any man's own power to be born with a mind fully enlightened with a knowledge of himself and of God; for Aquinas rightly says,* *There is sin, not only when a man has not what he ought to possess, but also when he has that of which he ought not to be possessed*. It is, therefore, to be laid to the account of original sin, as well that man is destitute of the spiritual light which he ought to possess, as also that he is involved in that darkness which ought not to be in him. Seeing, then, that this *habitual*, or *original* ignorance, partakes of the nature of sin, it can in no way excuse the sin which springs from it.

Now, to pass to that ignorance which we denominate *actual*,—the first and worst is that, which has added to it a disinclination for learning anything, and a contempt of knowledge; and by the Schoolmen is called *affected* [that is, voluntary or determined] *ignorance*. Such were they who, in Job, are represented as saying to God, *Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of thy ways* (Job. xxi. 14). This ignorance not only does not excuse, but aggravates the sin of the ignorant; because, from an insane love of sinning, they persist, in spite of the natural desire of the soul, in repelling knowledge, in order to wallow the more freely in sin. From the punishment impending over such, it is easy to conclude, how great is the guilt of this affected ignorance. *These are the dwellings of the wicked, and this is the place of him that knoweth not God*: Thus speaks Bildad, after he had described the horrible state of the ungodly (Job. xviii. 21). *In flames of fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God*; So speaks the Apostle, concerning those who obstinately refuse the light of the Gospel, (2 Thess. i. 8). *Such persons involve themselves in darkness solely through the thick mist of pride,—and are the more inexcusable, on the score of ignorance, in proportion as that which they actually know is opposed by them, even in spite of themselves*; as Gregory rightly observes, Moral. 25. cap. 16.

The next kind, is that which arises from the neglect of gaining knowledge; when men, either deterred by the labour, or pre-occupied by other concerns, are not in the least desirous of making any acquisition of knowledge, and thus remain ignorant of those things connected with faith and practice. This want of intelligence does not excuse those who offend in consequence, because the un-

* Quæst. disp. *De Pecc. Orig.* art. 2.

derstanding is bound to put forth its powers in enquiring after the truth, whether as regards faith, or in what relates to holiness of living. Such ignorance, then, because it is a voluntary neglect of a bounden duty, must, of necessity, take the nature of sin. And that knowledge, and the desire of acquiring it, come within the Divine precept, cannot be doubted. *We are commanded to get understanding, where it is said, BE YE NOT AS THE HORSE AND THE MULE, WHICH HAVE NO UNDERSTANDING, (Psalm xxxi. 9). We are commanded to become wise, where it is said, IF ANY OF YOU LACK WISDOM, LET HIM ASK OF GOD, (James i. 5). We are commanded to take pains in acquiring it, where it is said, SEEK WISDOM, WHICH IS BETTER THAN GOLD; AND GET PRUDENCE, WHICH IS BETTER THAN SILVER (Prov. xvi. 16).** He, then, who offends through ignorance, while that ignorance proceeds from neglect of learning those things which it was his duty to know, is so far from remaining excusable on that ground, that he becomes chargeable with sin both of omission and commission. He is held guilty of sin, inasmuch as he has neglected to do what he ought for the acquisition of knowledge; because such omission is deemed voluntary, at least indirectly. He is held to be guilty, also, inasmuch as in consequence of such ignorance, he has committed an act which he ought not; because voluntary ignorance transmits its quality of willingness to any act consequent upon it. *Many things there are, says Bernard,† which ought to be known, and are not, either owing to indifference about acquiring knowledge, or to slothfulness in learning, or diffidence in enquiring; and for ignorance of this kind there is, indeed, no excuse.*

The third kind of ignorance is that which by accident follows some previous voluntary action. Thus drunkards offend from ignorance, though it is ignorance into which they have fallen through their voluntary indulgence in excess of wine. Such ignorance as this does not excuse the sin to which it gives occasion; nay (as the philosopher maintains‡) *such persons deserve double punishment, because they might at the commencement have avoided being overcome with wine, from which the occasion of their ignorance proceeded:* Which statement is correctly applied to those who find a pleasure in the intoxication itself. But even though they do not take pleasure in intoxication for its own sake, but have been unawares overcome with the wine, and thus ignorantly have fallen into sin, yet such ignorance cannot excuse the sin committed in consequence. *Lot was not aware what he was doing, when lying*

* August. Epist. 95 [clxxvii. §. 5. Edit. Benedict.]

† Epist. 77.

‡ Ethic. 3. cap. 5.

with his daughters, and having (as Jerome says) been made drunk by them he could not be charged as knowingly offending: nevertheless his error was sinful.* Although, therefore, that which arises from an intention of offending, with a contempt of the Divine law, is a more grievous sin than one which is consequent on that ignorance just described; yet this ignorance does not relieve a wicked action from partaking of the nature of sin, nor diminish or extenuate the sin by any proper effect of its own. The proper effect of ignorance is, to exclude a consciousness of having committed an offence from the mind of the perpetrator; but not to be affected with a sense of evil, when committed, is in itself an evil, and vicious, and does not tend in any way to extenuate the sin committed. But a secondary, and as it were an accidental effect of ignorance is, to exclude the notion of intention of evil, or contempt as existing in the mind of the agent; and in this sense it diminishes the sin, that is, it shews it to be less, than if it originated in a certain knowledge of, and a fixed determination to evil. And hence it is, that they who sin from ignorance obtain pardon more easily, than they who sin knowingly: *I obtained mercy* (says the Apostle, 1 Tim. i. 13.) *because I did it ignorantly.* Another consequence is, that such as offend in ignorance, if they do not obtain pardon, yet they experience a milder punishment. On this point Augustine speaks well and appositely,†—*A man possessed of knowledge offends more grievously than one who has not knowledge, yet no man would on this account take refuge in the darkness of ignorance, so as to seek in it exculpation from his sin.* A little after he says:—*Such ignorance as characterises not those who are unwilling to learn, but such as are merely uninformed, will not furnish any one with a plea against suffering everlasting fire, though perhaps the punishment may be somewhat lighter.*

Lastly, there is a certain kind of ignorance which, in the Schools, is called *invincible*; and has reference, as much to ignorance of the *rule* of conduct, as to *fact*. And they define the invincible to be, when an individual has exerted all sufficient diligence for acquiring the desired knowledge, and yet cannot extricate himself from ignorance. The Schoolmen philosophise about this in different ways. Some say, that this forms an excuse for sin, entirely, seeing that it tends to relieve the act from being altogether voluntary. And here, the instance of Jacob, co-habiting with Leah, who was not his wife, is alleged; and his connection with her, on the score of this invincible ignorance, they affirm to have been quite free from sin. Yet

* Dialog. advers. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 10.

† De Grat. et Lib. Arb. cap. 3. [tom. x. col. 721.]

others decide differently, and among these, William Bishop of Paris holds the first place, who expressly maintains,* that no kind of ignorance altogether excuses sin, *because, where the ignorance is, as regards ourselves, invincible, God will assist us, if we do not by our own fault, turn away his assistance from us.* This most learned man, therefore assumes, that this ignorance, which is commonly called *invincible*, could have been conquered and overcome, unless some fault of the agent had put an impediment in the way; and, consequently, that it does not exculpate from the guilt of sin, that act which results from ignorance of this kind—an opinion by no means improbable, and peculiarly adapted to illustrate the Providence of God. I know that this opinion is rejected by the modern Romanists as inadmissible;† but Jerome seems to have approved it, when endeavouring to shew from the Scriptures,‡ that error and ignorance are sinful, making no difference between them. Augustine, also, seems to have been of the same mind, who clearly maintains,§ Whatever any man does amiss through ignorance, and whatever any man is unable to do, though he wills to do right, are called sins, for this reason, namely, *because they derive their origin from that sin committed by the free-will of our first parents.* Moreover, elsewhere|| he says, *If men would seek wisdom from God, in that way and measure proportioned to the importance of the gift, God would bestow it bountifully.*

Every kind of ignorance, therefore, by which men are precipitated into sins, is to be blamed, because it derives its origin from our own deficiency in the search after wisdom.

* *De Leg.* cap. 21.

† Vide Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 124.

‡ *Dialog. advers. Pelag.* lib. 1. cap. 9, 10.

§ *De Lib. Arb.* lib. 3, cap. 19. [§. 54, tom. 1. col. 632.]

|| *De Nat. et Grat.* cap. 17.

QUESTION XLVI.

THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH WHICH WE BELIEVE, CONSISTS OF
THE ELECT ALONE.

THE Romanists are constantly reiterating, that the Church of Rome is the Catholic Church ;* and that none but Romanists are truly Catholics. This is a point, certainly, the truth of which Papists may very easily maintain, after having previously framed a new definition of the holy Catholic Church ; since, according to Bellarmine,† *That one and true Catholic Church is a body of men united in the profession of the same Christian faith, and participation in the same sacraments, under the government of lawful Pastors, and especially of the Roman Pontiff.*—From this definition, it is evident, that three things only are required for constituting the Church Catholic ; namely, outward profession of the faith, outward participation in the sacraments, and outward subjection to the Bishop of Rome. In whomsoever these externals are found, although they should not be possessed of any virtue, or any gift of internal grace ; although they should be reprobate, wicked, or hypocrites, yet are they, upon the authority of Bellarmine,‡ true members of the holy Catholic Church. We, on the contrary, insist, that Christians do certainly become members of particular Churches, such, for instance, as the Roman, the Anglican, or the Gallican ; they also become *presumptive* members (if we may so speak) of the Catholic Church, by outward profession, communion, and subjection under legitimate Pastors ; yet do not become *true* members of the holy Catholic Church, which we believe, unless they are sanctified by the inward gift of grace, and are united to Christ, the Head, by the inward bond of the Spirit. To this Holy Catholic Church, then, which forms the mystical body of

* “Happy would it be for Rome, if she could give any rational proof that her Creed is *Catholic*, her works *holy*, and her Church at *unity*. But she has bound her Catholicity within the narrow pinfold of Pope Pius’s Creed ; contempt of God’s word and commandment most abounds where her works and doctrines most prevail ; and her boasted unity was a mere uniformity, engendered in darkness, and upheld by tyranny ; but which crumbled in every gale that breathed forth liberty and light.” Hearne’s *Man of Sin*, London 1844, p. 125.

† *De Eccles. Mil.* 3. 2.

‡ *Ibid.*

Christ, we deny that the ungodly, hypocrites, or any belong, who are not partakers of spiritual life, and are void of inward faith, charity, and holiness. The most learned Augustine has denied it as well, giving it as his opinion,* that all such should be ranked among the members of Antichrist: *If thou lovest, and wilt embrace thy sins, thou art walking contrary to Christ. Be thou within or without, thou art an Antichrist; be thou within or without, thou art chaff. But why art thou without? Because thou hast not found opportunity of returning?* In short, Bellarmine himself must unite in denying this (unless he prefers to be inconsistent with himself): This I shall clearly demonstrate by four arguments, derived from Bellarmine's own writings.

1.—They who occupy the same place in the Church of Christ, which evil and putrid humours do in the human body, are not *parts* of the Church, but *pests*. Now all the wicked, and hypocrites, who are void of faith, hope, and charity, are, on the admission of Bellarmine himself,† like the hairs, nails, and bad humours in the human body. To form a portion in the Church, in this way, does not prove men to be *members*, of the Holy Catholic Church, but *ulcers*. Such, plainly, was Augustine's opinion, who did not scruple to affirm of such,* that *Whether they seem to have a place within, or are, undoubtedly, without the Church, that which is flesh, is flesh, and that which is chaff is chaff.* He also teaches elsewhere,† that they who, whilst the Church knows them not, have, on account of their evil and defiled conscience, been condemned by Christ, do not form a part in the body of Christ, which is the Church. Nay, Bellarmine himself, when not engaged in controversial disputation, unites his suffrage with ours and Augustine's: *Such Christians, (says he)‡ as have a faith devoid of charity, and who profess that they know God, but in works deny him,—such do not belong to the dove, except as dried and dead members, or, (as St. Augustine speaks,) they belong to the Church in number, not by merit.* It is absurd then, for our opponent to maintain, that members of this kind are true members of the Holy Catholic Church.

2.—They who are true members of the Catholic Church militant, hold true communion with the Church triumphant. *For the Church triumphant, (as Bellarmine rightly judges) is united to,*

* *In Epist. Joann. Tractat. 3. [§. 9. tom. 111. p. 11. col 848.]*

† Vide Bellarm. *De Eccles.* 3. 2.

* *Lib. 1. De Bapt. cont. Donat. cap. 17.*

‡ *Cont. Cresc. lib. 2. cap. 21.*

‡ Bellarm. *De Gemitu Columbæ*, lib. 1. cap. 2.

nay rather, is one with the militant, so that no one could desire a separation from the one, without being at the same time separated from the other. But most assuredly, all the unclean and hypocrites, whatever profession they put on outwardly, belong to the Church of the malignants, and are utter aliens from the Church triumphant; nay, even from the militant; unless we intend to call *that* the Church militant, which is fixed in its determination to fight against Christ under the devil. Hugo de St. Victor excluded all such from the body of the holy Church, defining the Church in this way,* namely—*The Holy Church is the body of Christ, quickened by one Spirit, and united by one faith and sanctified.* Augustine also excluded them, and with warmth, in opposition to those who ventured to maintain a contrary opinion. *I do not think, (says he†) that any one can be so silly as to imagine, that he who has not charity, forms a portion of the Church.* But Bellarmine is thus silly, and would bring us in as quite mistaken, because we are unwilling to be as silly as himself in this point.

3.—When anything is expressed by a name to which some term of abatement is adjoined, that thing is not really and essentially what the name itself denotes, but only in an equivocal sense, and by adaptation of the word: as a *dead man* is not a *real* man, but a corpse. But Bellarmine himself declares,‡ that ungodly and hypocritical Christians, notwithstanding their outward profession and union with the Church, are not living members of the body of Christ, but are withered and dead; and yet (which is the very height of folly) he strenuously maintains that they are real and actual members of the body of Christ. And he endeavours to defend himself by this distinction:§ *They are not true members of the body of Christ, so far as relates to the characteristic nature of a member, but they are real and true members in the character of an instrument.* A most absurd distinction, more worthy of a horsewhip than of serious refutation! For who can attach any meaning to a *member without the characteristic nature of a member?* or who can form a notion of a *member consisting of the mere character of an instrument?* Allow me to adopt such distinctions as this, and I will maintain any hypothesis whatever. If I should assert that an ape is a real and true man, the style and defence adopted by Bellarmine would be ready for my use:—the ape is not a real man as to the possession of the characteristic nature of man, but it is a real and true man, so far as depends on the characteristic nature of animality! But this extraordinary dis-

* *De Sacr. Fid.* lib. 2. part. 2. cap. 2.

† *Cont. Cresc.* 1. 29.

‡ Bellarm. *De Eccles. Mil.* 3. 9

§ *Ibid.*

putant ought to know these two things: that the specific nature of each thing no longer remains when its formal characteristic has been withdrawn; and that the common character of the genus cannot constitute the distinguishing nature of the species.

4.—Those whom the Church herself would never acknowledge as members, or parts of herself, if she was aware what they really were; these undoubtedly Christ himself, who knows all things, does not acknowledge as true members of his body mystical. But, on Bellarmine's testimony,* *If the Church could distinguish the ungodly, unbelievers, and hypocrites, she would either never admit them, or if by chance admitted, would immediately exclude them.* Who then will deny that Christ himself, the omniscient and omnipotent, utterly removes and excludes the wicked and unbelievers of this stamp from the communion of his mystical body, which is that holy Catholic Church which we believe? But they who are excluded on the decision of Christ himself are, of all, most infallibly excluded from the Church. To this applies that saying of Augustine,* *Away with the notion altogether, that monsters of this class should be reckoned among the members of that one dove; away [with the notion] that they can enter the borders of that enclosed garden, of which He is the keeper who cannot be deceived. Hence, says Cyprian, the Church bears with such sometimes; but what advantage is it not to be cast out from the assembly of the godly, if thou deservest to be cast out? To be mingled in the assembly of Saints in the temple made with hands is useless, if a man is removed from fellowship with God, and from the whole mystical body of Christ.* They, therefore, are not just the truest members of the holy Catholic Church (as Bellarmine erroneously maintains) who are separated from fellowship with God and the body of Christ.

But let us dismiss Bellarmine, and come to the Scriptures, which clearly teach, that the holy Catholic Church, which is called the mystical body of Christ, consists of the elect alone, the called, justified, and sanctified (Rom. viii., 29, 30; Rev. xvii., 14, latter part).

First, Because the holy Catholic Church is built upon a rock, so that not the gates of hell even can prevail against it (Matt. xvi., 18). This is the privilege of the elect and believers; for all the ungodly and hypocrites are built upon the sand, are overcome by Satan, and are sunk at last into hell. How, then, can they form a part of the mystical body of Christ, which admits not condemned

* *De Eccles. Milit.* lib. 3. cap. 10.

† *Contra Cresc.* 2. 21.

‡ *De duplici Martyr.*

members? Why, therefore, should we not, with Augustine,* conclude, *If the Church stands upon a rock, they who are upon the sand, inasmuch as they are apart from the rock, are, indeed, out of the Church.*

Secondly, Because Christ is not only the living, but the quickening and saving head of the whole body. Thus says the Apostle to the Colossians (ii., 19) :—*The whole body by joints and bands, having nourishment ministered, and knit together, increaseth with the increase of God.* So also, to the Ephesians (v. 23), Christ is called *the head of the Church, and the Saviour of the body.* Now, elect believers alone are quickened and saved; but the ungodly live in their sins, die, and are lost; it is not, therefore, of the ungodly but of the elect alone, that this mystical body of Christ, which is called the holy Catholic Church, consists. I do not believe that the Papists can produce even one Father who thinks that the ungodly and condemned ought to be ranked on account of their external communion alone, and a profession of the Christian faith, among true members of the holy Catholic Church, which we designate the mystical body of Christ. On the contrary, Irenæus teaches,† that *God brings Abraham and his seed, which is the Church, into the kingdom of heaven by Christ Jesus. The elect alone are introduced into the kingdom of heaven; they alone, therefore, constitute the Church of Christ, truly and unanimously so called.* Clemens Alexandrinus speaks much more explicitly. *The true Church is one into the catalogue of which are drafted those who are justified according to the purpose.* And yet more plainly, *The Church is an assemblage of the elect.* It would be easy to bring together innumerable testimonies from other Fathers and Schoolmen; but we must not enlarge.

Thirdly, because the Holy Catholic Church is not only called *the body*, but *the fulness* of Christ (Ephes. i., 23). Now consider with yourselves whether it is more correct to say, that dead and putrid members contribute to the completion of the body on which they are growing, or that they corrupt and deform it? Certainly in the opinion of learned Augustinet the beautiful dove, that is, the holy Catholic Church, is not adorned or filled up, but disgraced by such pestilent members, because that multitude of the wicked, lying alongside without the Church, far outnumbering it; to which Church truly belongs a certain number of Saints, predestinated

* *De Bapt. contra Donat.* 6. 24.

† *Contra Hæres.* lib. 4. cap. 18. [p. 304 Edit. Oxon. 1702.]

* *Strom.* 7. [cap. 17, §. 107.]

† *Vide Aug. De Bapt. contr. Donat.* 5. 27.

before the foundation of the world. Since then, the godly and believers alone make up this body of Christ, while, on the contrary, the ungodly and unbelievers rather corrupt it, it is manifest that this body does not consist of the ungodly. That foul, corrupt, and corpse-like body, therefore, which is in the main composed of dead and putrid members, let the Vicarious head [the Bishop of Rome] attach them to itself as he pleases; yet the true Head will acknowledge and embrace living members only as his own.

Fourthly, As soon as any one is made a true member of the body of Christ, he is constituted a child of God: *As many as received him to them gave he power to become the sons of God* (John i., 12). *He hath adapted us as children by Jesus Christ* (Eph. i., 15).

Now, it is plain, on the contrary, that infidels, ungodly, and hypocrites, although they may attach themselves to some particular Church in an outward communion, yet remain children of the devil, members of Antichrist, and that, consequently, the holy Catholic Church does not consist of such characters, but of those believers alone who, by the Spirit of Christ, are united to Christ the Head. This was what extorted from the Bishop of Spalato that true admission which shall form the close of our discussion. *I do not think* (says he*) *that the reprobate have a place really and truly in the true Catholic Church, although they may have a place in the Catholic Church presumptively. And to this presumptive Church alone is it that the assertions of Scripture and of the Fathers must be understood to have reference, whenever they speak of the good and the bad as forming parts of the Church.*

QUESTION XLVII.

NEITHER PETER, NOR THE POPE OF ROME, WAS CONSTITUTED BY CHRIST SUPREME HEAD OF THE WHOLE CHURCH.

BELLARMINE† affirms that it is not a *simple error*, but a *pernicious heresy*, to deny that this supreme primacy of the blessed Peter, was instituted by Christ. But, whatever he may put forward, concerning the headship of Peter, what he wants alone is, that we should allow the Roman Pontiffs, to occupy this throne as Mo-

* *De Repub. Eccles. lib. 7. cap. 1.*

† *De Pontif. Rom. lib. 1. cap. 10.*

narchs over the Universal Church.* Romanists would not be so solicitous about establishing the supremacy of Peter, had they not taken up the fancy, that the Roman Pontiff was the successor of Peter, in this Ecclesiastical supremacy.† And we admit that there are many things which may be brought, as well from the Scriptures as from the Fathers, which seem to ascribe some prerogative of honour to Peter. He is reckoned first among the Apostles, for many reasons: he usually answers in the name of all the Apostles, when any question is put to them in common; hence he is sometimes called by the Fathers, *the Leader, the Prince, the Head of the Apostles*. But from these, or from any other titles and prerogatives, which are assigned to Peter, we affirm that there is nothing more to be gathered, than that he obtained the presidency, or a certain primacy, as to order, among the other Apostles; not that he enjoyed authority or jurisdiction, as to government, over the body. This primacy of order, (without which business cannot be properly conducted in any assembly), was conferred upon Peter, not by divine right, but either, as Jerome supposes, on account of his age, or (as I rather judge) on account of his disposition; because he was the most energetic and brave of the Apostles, and always ready to ward off dangers and transact business. But, from such a primacy of order, to attach as the Papists do, a primacy of supremacy to Peter, and to transmit the same to the Roman Pontiffs, has not even an appearance of truth, and is clearly refuted by the following arguments:—

First, because Christ himself (whom they suppose to have promised the supremacy to Peter, and to the successors of Peter, in these words,—*Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church*, Matt. xvi., 18.) shews, that he had no such intention, by what he says in Matt. xx. 25, 26: *Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you, &c.*; where, then the Apostles were dreaming about some such authority, he does not say, I have assigned this supremacy to Peter, and to the successors of Peter; but he teaches them that no one of them

* “The *Bishop* of Rome [under favour of Constantine] was made rich: in due time he became a proud Courtier; afterwards he sought and found the title of ‘Universal Bishop;’ subsequently he obtained the Emperor’s throne, and finally, wearing a triple crown, and calling himself ‘the Vicar of Christ, the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords,’ he claimed sovereignty of ‘all the kingdoms of the world,’ and demanded an universal tribute, in the rather doubtful right of ‘the regalities of St. Peter!’”—Hearne’s *Man of Sin*, p. 11. 12mo, Seeley’s, 1844.

† Vide Bellarm. *De Pont. Rom.* 2.. 2.

ought to exercise a lordship of this kind over the rest. Nay, the very light of truth itself, with the opinion commonly entertained among the Fathers, compels us to acknowledge, that this rock upon which the Catholic Church is built, is not Peter, but Christ: Peter is built, the rest of the Apostles too are built, and the whole Church of God is built, upon Christ; (Ephes. ii., 20.) Let Peter be attached as closely as you please to this rock; yet so likewise are the other Apostles. Let him be called a foundation, because by preaching Evangelical doctrine, he founded the Church; yet so also are the twelve, called twelve foundations, (Revel. xxi., 14.) But suppose Peter to be that very rock, which so firmly sustains the whole Church, that the gates of hell cannot prevail against it, (an assertion, however, that no one in his senses will venture to make), what has this to do with the supremacy? How does it go to prove the supremacy of the Bishops of Rome? It is one thing to sustain a house; another thing to rule a house with supreme dominion. In fact, the Popes are unable, by means of this their external and supreme authority, to defend even one branch of their Church against the gates of hell: who, notwithstanding this supremacy of theirs, have themselves been swallowed up by hell, or at least may be so. I am grieved indeed for the Roman Church, (whose rock even, by their own confession,) may fall into the lowest pit of hell.*

Secondly, [we object to this claim,] because there can be nothing alleged in favour of this supreme power of Peter, which does not as strongly apply to all the Apostles. That text is quoted—*I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, &c.* (Matt. xvi., 19). But we deny that a supremacy of power is conveyed in these words; we deny, moreover, that they were directed to Peter alone: for, at that time, Peter, as an individual, represented the Church, so that the keys are promised to the other Apostles, just as they had been to Peter. In short, if the keys had been promised to Peter alone, they would have been delivered to him alone. But that they were delivered equally to all is plain from Matt. xviii., 18, *Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, &c.* And still more clearly in John xx., 22, 23, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, &c.* The keys, therefore, are not given to Peter, either alone, or principally, but to all the Apostles equally and in common.

But lest it should be supposed, that some degree of supremacy

* See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, vol. i. p. 30, edit. 1843; or Baxter's *Key for Catholics*, &c.—art. "Popery" in the Index, Edit. by Allport, 1839.

should be couched under the word *keys*, when they were promised to Peter, but that something less is conveyed by the words *binding* and *loosing*,* when that power, though without mentioning the word *keys*, is entrusted to the rest of the Apostles, we have Bellarmine himself confessing, that the keys were promised to all the Apostles, and were given to all, in this passage, John xx., 21, *As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you*. This was Jerome's opinion also, who affirms in express words,† that *all the Apostles received the keys of the kingdom of heaven*. If, then, keys constitute a supremacy, here we have twelve appointed by Christ heads of the Church! In short, we must here also again press the question—What have the keys of Peter to do with a supremacy at all? What have the keys given to all the Apostles to do with establishing the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome *alone*?

Again: That passage also is alleged, *Feed my sheep*, &c., John xxi., 15, 17.‡ Whence they argue that the entire government of the whole Church was committed to the care of Peter alone. But these words, *Teach all nations* (Matt. xxviii., 19); *Preach the Gospel to every creature* (Mark. xvi., 15), addressed to all the Apostles, are no less universal. For, by virtue of this command, they could feed the sheep of Christ, wherever found, and that by power derived not from Peter, but immediately from Christ. So teaches Augustine,§ *When it is said to Peter, FEED MY SHEEP, it is said to all, FEED MY SHEEP*. Add, also, that remark of his,|| *Peter is a shepherd, and Paul is a shepherd, and the other Apostles are all shepherds*.

It is, consequently, idle and foolish to be looking for a supreme headship in one shepherd alone, unless they are willing to acknowledge as many to be heads, as they see were appointed by Christ to be Pastors to the Universal Church. Yet, if we are willing to acknowledge the truth, there is in those words, *Feed my sheep*, no new power, much less a supremacy bestowed, either upon Peter or any one else; on the contrary, Peter is admonished, and all the rest are admonished, diligently to discharge the Pastoral duty, which had before been committed to them. Bellarmine may sooner extract water from out of a rock, than the supremacy from a passage like this.¶

* Matt. xvi. 19; Matt. xviii 18.

† In Psal. xxxviii.

‡ For a curious exposition or Gloss on this passage, see the translation of Davenant's *Exposition on the Colossians*, vol. i. p. 17. Note.*

§ *De Agone Christi*. cap. 30.

|| Tract. 47, in Joann.

¶ The advocates for Papal supremacy and Episcopal influence of a certain kind, in the present day, leave Bellarmine far behind in inferential fancies. Thus says Dr. Wiseman, in a sermon preached and printed in the 36th year of the 19th century:—"What a thought, that when on the coming festival of

Thirdly, it is plain that the rest of the Apostles were not put in subjection to Peter, as the universal head of the whole Church, because they conducted themselves in all things as on a perfect equality, neither did they recognise this supreme power by any kind of submission. First, as relates to the right itself, of exercising supreme power over the rest of the Apostles, that there was none in Peter is plainly confessed by the Fathers; nay more, by the sounder of the Romanists. What can be more express than that statement of Cyprian? *The rest of the Apostles were indeed in the same situation that Peter was, invested with an equal common share both of honour and power; but a commencement is made from unity, that the Church of Christ may be shewn to be one.** Chrysostom, too, was clearly of the same opinion, who writes,† *That Paul, when he had no need of Peter, and wanted not his sanction, nevertheless, though equal in honour to him, went up [to him] as to an elder, &c.‡* If Peter had been the chief among the Apostles, they would have been guilty of a want of due respect for his regal authority, had they made it public that his subjects were alike and equal in authority to their own sovereign. But let us hear the Romanists themselves. Franciscus de Victoria lays down this conclusion,§ *that all the Apostles had equal power with Peter, and for accomplishing all the ends for which Peter had it.* And before him John Gerson had taught,|| *That there is no power in the Pope available for anything more than is possessed by other Ecclesiastical power.* Lastly, Cusa maintains,¶ *that the Pope is not an universal Bishop, but first among others, and that the authority of sacred councils is not founded in the Pope, but in general consent.*** All these, although allowing a primacy of order to Peter, and to the Roman Pontiffs, have nevertheless most clearly skouted the notion of an Ecclesiastical supremacy.

Faster, the Sovereign Pontiff shall stretch forth his hand and bless his entire flock, that blessing will *fly over seas and oceans*, and reach climes to which the sun will not yet have risen; and *fall as dew* on Churches which will not receive tidings of that day till long after the buds which are now swelling on the trees, shall have seared and fallen into their autumnal grave!"—Sect. viii. p. 291.

* Cyprian, *De Unit. Eccles.*—[For an account of the extraordinary way in which this passage has been interpolated and corrupted by the Romish sectarians, See Dr. Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, pp. 627—30.]

† *In I. ad Galat.* [tom. x. p. 804, Edit. Paris, 1837.]

‡ The allusion is to Galat. i. 17.

§ *Relect. De Potest. Eccles.*

|| *De Potest. Eccles.*

¶ *De Concord. Cathol. cap. 13.*

** That is, if the Archbishop of Canterbury has no power of this kind, ergo the Pope of Rome has none.

You perceive that Peter was not supreme head over the rest of the Apostles *de jure*; let us see now whether they yielded any subjection to him as a sovereign over them *de facto*. The chief obedience which is due to this supreme authority of Peter, according to the opinion of Romanists, is this: that all other Pastors are bound to submit, and make their doctrine conform, to the infallible judgment of this commander-in-chief. Let them shew, then, that the Apostles received the form of their doctrine from Peter, or acknowledged Peter as their supreme judge in matters of faith. They can bring no proof for such an opinion, whilst we can prove the contrary from the example of Paul (Galat. i., 16, 17, &c). Besides [they allege] that the supreme head of the Church ordains, deposes, directs, passes judgment on, punishes the Pastors subject to him, as it seems to himself expedient. But where is the Papist so bold as to dare to assert, that Peter either ordained the rest of the Apostles, or could depose, pass judgment on, or punish them, if they had committed anything which they ought not to have done? We read that Peter himself was sharply reprov'd by Paul, without any indication of subjection;* but we never read that any Apostle was so treated by Peter, in any case, from which we might collect even the slightest intimation of the existence of such a supreme power. More than that, we have ground for the contrary conclusion. For when James, Cephas, and John gave the right hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas, that the latter should exercise their Apostleship among the Gentiles, the others among the circumcision,† it is manifest that no one of these behaved himself as though he were the supreme head of the Church. It must also be here objected that, even admitting Peter to have been the spiritual head of the whole Church, how will it be made to appear that this supremacy devolved to the Roman Pontiffs‡ by Divine right? The Papists fetch their right of succession from the circumstance of Peter's having fixed, as they assert, his abode at Rome, by the command of God.§ But how uncertain is all this! That Peter ever was at Rome is not recorded in the Scriptures, but in history only; that Christ appeared to Peter when leaving Rome, commanded him to return into the city, and foretold that he should be

* Galat. ii. 11.

† Galat. ii. 9.

‡ "The heathen title, 'Pontifex Maximus,' has been assumed by the Pope of Rome, although, in the IVth Cent. it was rejected by the Emperor Gratian, as an unseemly mark of Paganism, and to be esteemed odious in one bearing the Christian name." Hearn, *ut supra*, p. 58.

§ Bellarm. *De Pont. Rom.* lib. 2. cap. 12.

crucified there, no Prophet or Apostle, but only uninspired historians, have informed us.*

In short, (and this is the main point in the dispute) that the plenitude of Peter's power should descend to the Bishops of that city in which he should die, and that on them, alone, it was as firmly bolted for perpetuity as if with a ship-nail; are so far from being built even upon the faith of historians, that they are but the vain conjectures, and weak reasonings of the advocates for the Papacy. Owing to this, Bellarmine himself at length begins to waver, and all but confesses, that this supremacy of the Roman Pontiff is *not* founded on Divine right.† *It must be observed* (says he) *that although, perhaps, it is not by Divine right, that the Roman Pontiff, as Roman Pontiff, succeeds Peter; yet, that it appertains to the Catholic faith* [to believe as much.] If it is "*perhaps*," not of Divine right, "*perhaps*," also, it has no necessary connection with Catholic faith; more, it is "*perhaps*," even opposed to the Catholic faith. For (let Bellarmine contradict it as much as he pleases) it is no more deducible from the Scriptures, that the Bishop of Rome, or any one else, is the rightful successor to Peter in the presidency of the whole Church, by Divine right, than he is to Paul, John, James, or any one of the Apostles, who, (as we have before shewn) equally with Peter, obtained an universal power over the Church. Is it, then, really credible, that this article of faith,

* From Cave's *Lives of the Apostles* (Edit. Oxford, 1840, p. 205.) the reader may be furnished with an account of this incident:—"While the fatal stroke [the persecution under Nero] was daily expected, the Christians in Rome did, by daily prayers and importunities, solicit St. Peter to make an escape, and to reserve himself to the uses and services of the Church. This, at first, he rejected, as what would ill reflect upon his courage and constancy, and argue him to be afraid of those sufferings for Christ to which he himself had so often persuaded others; but the prayers and tears of the people overcame him, and made him yield. Accordingly, the next night, having prayed with, and taken his farewell of the brethren, he got over the prison wall, and, coming to the city gate, he is there said to have met with our Lord, who was just entering into the city. Peter asked him, 'Lord, whither art thou going?' from whom he presently received this answer, 'I am come to Rome, to be crucified a second time.' By which answer Peter apprehended himself to be reproved, and that our Lord meant it of his death, that he was to be crucified in his servant. Whereupon, he went back to the prison, and delivered himself into the hands of his keepers, shewing himself most ready and cheerful to acquiesce in the will of God." Cave's reference for this legend is to Ambrose. See Basnage *Annales politico-ecclesiastici*; ad an 65. §. xi. for learned remarks in refutation of the story; the mere English reader may be referred to the *Protestant Journal* for 1836, pp. 576, &c., for an excellent article on the general subject of the supremacy, and especially as grounded by Romanists, on the supposition of St. Peter having been located at Rome.

† *De Pont. Rom.* lib. 2. cap. 12.

(as the Papists will have it to be,) so specially necessary to the welfare of the Church, should have been overlooked by all the sacred writers? Is it probable that the supreme power of the Roman Pontiff, over all Churches, is founded upon Divine right, and that not even the name of a Roman Pontiff, nor any mention of this prerogative of Rome, should appear extant in the sacred writings?

To these arguments, I add, in conclusion, the confession of Bellarmine, who was quite unable to maintain the supremacy of Peter over the rest of the Apostles, without involving a manifest contradiction. For thus he speaks,* *The chief Ecclesiastical power was not given to Peter alone, but to the other Apostles also.—Now, it was given to Peter as a Pastor in chief, who should have perpetual successors; to the others, as delegates only, who should have no successors.* And cap. 11, *All were heads and Pastors of the Universal Church,—but yet, so that Peter was the head of them, and they were dependent upon him.* Lastly, in cap. 12, he says, *A chief power was conferred upon all, but only as delegates, and with a kind of subjection to Peter, not as Pastors in chief.* But how is any one to understand that the Apostles had a supreme power, and a subject or subordinate; seeing that a supremacy in power, and a power in subjection to another, are utterly contradictory? Besides, who can imagine that Peter, alone, was a Pastor in chief, but the others only delegates? I ask, of whom were they delegates? Not of Peter, for their unvarying assertion is, that they were sent by Christ. And Peter himself was no less a delegate of Christ than the other Apostles; nor the others less constituted Pastors by Christ than Peter himself. Lastly, how will Bellarmine hence prove, that Christ would have the Pope of Rome to be the successor, in this Ecclesiastical primacy, and yet no one to succeed the rest of the Apostles? Such figments are intended but to subserve the ambition and advantage of the Papists, meeting with no confirmation, by the way, from any certain testimony of Scripture. Let us, however, but look into the proceedings of Councils, and consider what decrees they have passed, in spite of the wishes of the Roman Pontiffs, and it will be very evident, that they never were acknowledged as supreme heads of the Universal Church;—not by the Nicene Fathers, who brought this head within proper limits, and would have him confine himself to the sphere of his own proper jurisdiction, no less than other Patriarchs: not by the Africans in the Council of Milevi, who forbade appeals to be made

* *De Pont. Rom.* 1. 9.

by their own subjects to this head, under pain of excommunication :* not by the Fathers assembled in the 5th and 6th General Councils, who anathematised two Roman Pontiffs, namely, Vigilius and Honorius, together with their decrees and dogmatical epistles. Let us run through every age of the Church, and I think there will be found none in which there does not exist some public testimony of the Church, against this despised and deservedly opposed Roman supremacy. More than this, in the Council of Constance, and that of Basil, the same doctrine was settled by the unanimous votes of the Roman Church itself, wherein it was taught, that a Pope may err both in faith and morals ; and it was decreed in both, that he ought to yield submission to a General Council ; and all those were censured as heretics who should resist this decree.†

All Papists, therefore, who vehemently hold, and obstinately maintain, that their Pontiff is not to be subjected to the Universal Church, but ought to preside over it, as the Commander-in-Chief, are the real heretics.

QUESTION XLVIII.

ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES DO NOT SET ASIDE THE OBLIGATIONS OF DUTY IN CIVIL LIFE.

THE Canonists, by a Censure, mean in general, nothing more than a punishment imposed by Ecclesiastical authority, the object of which was to deprive offenders of the use of some spiritual privileges. They teach that there are three things comprehended under this term :‡ An Interdict, Suspension, and Excommunication. An interdict is laid upon a Kingdom, a City, or a Church ; in one word, against some body collectively : a Suspension is declared against an individual person, but of the Clerical Order : Excommunication is what is pronounced against any, indifferently, be they Clergy or Laity.

It does not belong to my present purpose, to enquire very particularly how far these three accord with one another, or how far

* See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, vol. i. pp. 31, 34, 38 ; Edit. 1843.

† See L'Enfant's *Council of Constance* ; vol. ii. p. 336 ; or, Dr. Elliott's *Delineations of Roman Catholicism*, p. 605, London Edition.

‡ Sylvest. *in verbo* Censura.

they differ; because, the question which we have in hand, has reference properly to excommunication alone. For that others can communicate in the duties of life with those who are under suspensions and interdicts, Romanists themselves do not deny. So far, therefore, as concerns excommunication; sometimes it is meant to denote merely that lighter degree of censure, which restrains the offender from entering the precincts of his Church, and from partaking in the communion of the body and blood of the Lord; sometimes, that heavier one, which separates the excommunicated person from all intercourse with believers, and is called, the being *anathematized*.*

Concerning the minor excommunication, (which we call *suspension*,) it is at once admitted, that the obligations of civil life are not loosened by it; but, that notwithstanding it, believers may freely communicate with those so situated in such civil offices as attach to the intercourse of ordinary life. The controversy turns entirely upon the greater excommunication, which cuts off, not only from a participation of the sacraments, but is considered to separate the excommunicated from all intercourse with believers. It is to such excommunication that the common distich* is applied,

Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur.†

By which we are taught, that we must not manifest any signs of kindly feeling or regard towards the excommunicated; that we

* Vide Gratian, caus. xi. qu. 3. cap. [24] *Ad mensam*.

† See M'Ghee's *Laws of the Papacy*, pp. 43, 171, Edit. 1841.

"On this subject I shall quote a portion of the Examination of the Rev. Dr. Crotty, before the Commissioners of Education in Ireland, in the *Appendix* to the 8th Report (pp. 80, 81). He is asked:—

" 'Are not the consequences [of Excommunication] summed up in the Class-book of Maynooth, in this line—*Os orare, vale, communio, mensa*?'—Yes; these are the various ways in which a man may hold communion with a person excommunicated; and thereby incur an excommunicatio minor himself.—'Will you describe the consequence that is there intended by *os*?' 'Os' means conversation; that it is not allowed us to hold oral communications with such persons.—'What are the consequences intended by the second word, *orare*?'—That it is unlawful to join him in the participation of the sacraments; or in public or private prayer.—'What are the consequences alluded to by the word *vale*?'—It means that we are prohibited from saluting such persons.—'What is meant by *communio*?'—It implies a prohibition of civil intercourse, such as buying and selling, or entering into other contracts without necessity.—'What is meant by the word *mensa*?'—That it is not lawful to eat with him, or to board with him. 'Is there any authority in the Pope to inflict the sentence of Excommunication in Ireland?'—Catholics [Papal] do recognise such an authority in the Pope and in Bishops." &c.—*Romanism as it Rules in Ireland*, vol. ii. p. 308. The opportunity may be taken of recommending to the general reader these admirable volumes, abounding in illustration of Papal fraud, management, and faithlessness.

must not impart religious privileges to them, nor participate in sacred things with them; in short, that we must not hold any civil intercourse with them in matters of ordinary life. For the chain of excommunication is, as it were, twofold; one, which forbids the excommunicated to hold communication with believers; the other, which withholds believers from communicating with the excommunicated. Hence, the Apostle forbids us *to keep company, or to eat* with such, 1 Cor. v. xi. *Have no company with that man, that he may be ashamed* (2 Thess. iii. 14). And here we must observe, that, according to the generally admitted opinion of Theologians, this positive prohibition against intercourse with the excommunicated, rests on positive and Ecclesiastical law, not on natural or divine. For Christ the Lord never made it a rule, as coming immediately from himself, that the Church should employ such punishment, by settling any particular mode of exercising it: but *the decision of applying individual censures was left to the prudent determination of the Church*, as correctly stated by Suarez (*De Censuris*, disp. 2. assert. 2, et 3). Hence Sylvester concludes,* *that the Pope can dispense, as regards communication with the excommunicated, because this obligation is contracted by a positive law*. And a General Council can do the same too, which the Papists acknowledge was done in the Council of Constance; and the very tenor of the decree is extant in Soto 4. Sent. dist. 22. quæst. 1, art. 4. For since in accordance with laws, both common and ancient, believers were bound to avoid all the excommunicated, this prohibition was restricted to those who were publicly denounced, and notorious bodily assailants of the Clergy. Hence Suarez infers† that, *setting aside this prohibition, which comes from Church authority, it is not, in itself, wrong to hold intercourse with one who is excommunicated*. And, on this same account, the Church which has interdicted believers all communication with the excommunicate, as well in civil intercourse as in religion, has, so far as relates to the outward offices of ordinary life, limited this prohibition so as to apply merely to undue and voluntary intercourse. For, inasmuch as the obligation of law, divine, natural, or civil, binds us to perform our duty towards them, we are not released from this obligation by virtue of the excommunication directed against them. Indeed, the decrees assert generally,‡ *With the excommunicated it is allowable neither to pray, nor to speak, nor to eat; no one may receive the excommunicated, nor participate with them in prayer, in eating, drinking, or embracing, nor say*

* *In verbo excommunicatio*, sect. 5.

† Disp. 2. sect. 2.

‡ Gratian. caus. xi. quæst. 3. [cap. 17.]

to them good day; for they who knowingly hold communication with the excommunicated, subject themselves to a similar excommunication.

But it has, on due consideration of the subject, been found, that these edicts cannot be observed without causing very great inconvenience to the generality. They have, accordingly, by an express law decided, that certain parties should be released from the censure of excommunication, even though they should hold communication with the excommunicated. Hear the decree itself:* *We release these following from the bond of Anathema, by Apostolical authority, namely, wives, children, men-servants, maid-servants, or slaves; also labourers, and all others who are not so far attached to courts, as to have crimes committed on suggesting their counsel, and such as unwittingly hold communion with the excommunicated.*

But after that, a controversy having sprung up, whether, by virtue of this decree, the parties alluded to might, by permission only, communicate with excommunicate husbands, masters, parents, &c., or were bound to do this, moreover, of necessity; Innocent the IIIrd answers:† *They are bound, indeed, to perform domestic kindnesses, and, consequently, to that measure of intercourse, without which they cannot render them.* But there is one point in which we agree with neither Gregory nor with Innocent, namely, in supposing that, for liberty to make these exceptions, we are indebted to the kind indulgence of the Bishop of Rome; for intercourse of this sort with the excommunicated is allowed, from an intrinsic exception, founded on a law natural or divine; nay, what is proper and necessary, for the benefit of nature, or the individual, whether the Pope of Rome permit it or not. The Canonists comprehend the usual and legitimate exceptions in this line,

Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse,‡

And on these accounts they resolve, that it is allowable for a wife to communicate with her husband, a servant with his master, children with their parent, notwithstanding excommunication. We shall see how equitable this is by the following reasons:—

In the first place, the Church cannot deprive the excommunica-

* Gratian. caus. xi. quæst. 3. cap. [103] *Quoniam.*

† Decret. Gregor. lib. 5. Tit. 39, *De Sent. Excom. cap. inter alia.*

‡ “Principem suum Aquinatem secuti Scolastici fatentur varios casus esse, in quibus cum Excommunicatio societatem inire licet, qui memoriæ causâ eo carmine continentur:—

Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse.

—*Utile* refertur ad verba salutis; *lex* ad matrimonium; *humile* ad subjectionem.”
S. Basnage in *Annales Politico-eccles*; tom. ii. p. 486.

ted, except of those privileges of which he became a participator through the ministry of the Church. Now a paternal right over children is founded on natural and divine law; a master's right over servants, is supported by civil and political law; the case is the same with a husband. No one of these parties, therefore, loses his natural or civil control over the other, by being laid under excommunication, nor can that be made a pretext for refusing them due respects. For when excommunicated persons are deprived of communication with believers, it must be understood of such communication as the Church can bestow or regulate. It may restrain the excommunicated, then, from sharing in religious rites, inhibit wives, children, or servants, from associating with their husbands, parents, or masters, who are justly excommunicated, in the reception of the Sacraments; but, to stand in the way of their performing the duties of ordinary life, which they are bound to practise by law, both divine and human, that is what no Ecclesiastical power can pretend to; seeing that *the precept of an inferior power conveys no obligation to obedience, when it contravenes the precept of a superior.**

Secondly, were we to assert that these obligations are relaxed, by the circumstance of a party being excommunicated, the Church would be punishing the innocent, in cases where there was no just cause for inflicting that punishment. For, on a servant being excommunicated, his innocent master would be deprived of his labour and service; when a father was excommunicated, his harmless children would be deprived of their subsistence, and the blameless wife of her solace. But this is repugnant to equity, and to the very intention of excommunication, which is used, not to produce injury to believers, but for the punishment of the contumacious.

Thirdly, If the obligations to mutual kind offices were to be broken off by Ecclesiastical censure, the excommunicated would very often derive advantage from their crimes, which is very unreasonable. For it would not be allowable for a master to employ the services of his domestics, nor a father the duties of his children, whenever they were placed in a state of excommunication. And thus, in consequence of their mischievous excommunication, they would derive the advantage of being relieved from any obligation to perform their customary services and labours. But this is just as absurd as the opinion of some Canonists,† whose notion it was that the excommunicated debtor was not bound to discharge his debts, so long as he was lying under excommunication. For if

* Durand. lib. 2. dist. 39. quæst. 5.

† Lessius *de Jure et Justitia*.

matters could be arranged in this fashion, there are no few bankrupts who would consider excommunication quite a benefit. From this Ecclesiastical censure, what advantage would result to debtors, and likewise to parents, or children, and the husbands or wives of the excommunicated, if, in virtue of its publication, the mutual obligations of civil life were thenceforward to be set aside? The excommunicated are, therefore, bound to hold intercourse with others, so far as is necessary for discharging offices of mutual kindness; and it is allowable to believers to make use of their services, so far as necessity, or some great advantage requires it.

Lastly, to all these considerations, I add, that the censure of excommunication makes or declares a man to be unworthy to have the enjoyment of spiritual privileges, but, of the benefit of civil intercourse, or of temporal things, it neither can deprive him absolutely, nor declare him to be deprived. Hence, the Canonists themselves (as before shewn) concede, that intercommunication with such, in matters affecting civil life, is not evil in itself, being only wrong so far as prohibited, but that the prohibition reaches no farther than reason and equity allow of. Here, however, it may be asked, whether the aforesaid exceptions, comprehended in that line,

Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse,

as they enjoin obedience on wives, children, and servants, do not so on subjects also, notwithstanding excommunication, that they should render due allegiance to Sovereigns, discharge their bounden services, and hold civil communication with them in matters of ordinary life? Now we must here advert to two points—the unjust dealings practised by Bishops of Rome towards Emperors, Kings, and excommunicated Princes, whilst under this pretence they absolve their subjects from the duties due to them by human and Divine law; and the reasonableness, also, of the aforesaid exceptions, equally applicable as regards Sovereigns and Princes; whose subjects they shew, are, in bounden duty, obliged to render all the services of civil life, notwithstanding they may be under excommunication. And here, I shall say nothing of those most vain and imperious decrees* of Nicholas and Gelasius, which are to be found in Gratian (Distinct. 96). For although they would set aside the Emperor from interfering in the government of the Church, and subject him to a Pope to be excommunicated; yet they do not deprive him of sovereignty as regards the State; do not absolve the subjects of an excommunicated Emperor from their fealty and duty;

* [See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, edit. 1843, vol. iv. pp. 146, 159.]

nor, in short, do they deprive him, though excommunicated, of his authority and rule. Pope Hildebrand, however, advanced somewhat farther. *We (says he*) in maintaining the decrees of our holy predecessors, do, by our Apostolic authority, absolve from their oath of allegiance, such as were bound thereby to excommunicated Sovereigns, and we utterly forbid their rendering any fealty to them, until they make satisfaction.* We find from history that the Emperor [Theodosius†] was, for a grievous sin, kept back from the sacrament by St. Ambrose; but we do not find that the subjects of the Sovereign so inhibited were absolved from their fealty. Gregory ought to have given the names of those holy predecessors of his; he ought to have taken that Apostolic authority (of which he boasts) as derived from the writings of the Apostles. *That* he has not done, nor could he do it; and so this iniquitous decree is worth—just nothing at all. Innocent III. far exceeded Gregory in his outrageous degree concerning heretics;‡ where he has laid it down that temporal lords, who should neglect to clear their lands from the infection of heretical pravity, should be placed under the bond of excommunication by the metropolitan and the other provincial Bishops; and if they should contemptuously refuse satisfaction, that their vassals be absolved from their fidelity, and their land be transferred to Catholics, who, when the heretics were exterminated, should keep possession of it, without any one objecting, &c. Gregory IX. chimed in with these notions, and ruled,§ *That they*

* Gratian; Causa xv. quæst. 6. [cap. 4. See Barrow *on the Pope's Supremacy*, p. 13, Oxford, 1836; and N. Alexander's *Hist. Eccles.*; sæc. xi. et xii., art. 9, p. 551, tom. xiii. for a refutation of Hildebrand's notions of Ecclesiastical liberty.]

† See Gieseler's *Text Book of Eccles. History*, vol. i.

‡ Decretal. Gregor. lib. 5. Titulo 7, *De Hæreticis*, cap. 13.

[See M'Ghee's *Laws of the Papacy*, pp. 129, 141, edit. 1841.—“Thus, in fact, we have Popes, Canonists, Patriarchs, Metropolitans, and Bishops, of both the Eastern and Western Churches, all bearing witness to this Canon; we have this evidence recorded, too, in the body of their own Canon law, and the most authoritative standards of their own Colleges, while these men were attempting, on their oaths, to get rid of every tittle of this testimony, to blind the Protestants of this Empire as to its authenticity and its existence. But this is not all. The canon itself is quoted and referred to, directly, as the very standard law of intolerance and persecution, in every one of their standard authorities on the subject. If it were not to swell these pages far beyond their intent and object, I could multiply quotations of this canon from their books of authority. But it is only necessary to meet the direct testimony of those Bishops by a direct negative, and by proof of the falsehood of their evidence, at the time it was given, before we proceed to expose their subsequent criminality.”

§ Ibid, cap. 16. [See Gieseler's *Text Book of Eccles. History*, vol. ii. p. 216 :—

should consider themselves absolved from the debt of fealty to their liege lord, and from all dutiful service, whensoever they should have manifestly fallen into heresy, let the obligation by which they were so attached have been the strongest possible. If, then, we are to believe these Pontiffs, whenever the Bishop of Rome shall see fit to charge any Prince or people with being heretical, he has it in his power, by means of excommunication, to deprive the Prince of his subjects' allegiance, and to strip the people of their lands and all their property. Lastly, that it might not be said that the Roman Pontiffs were exceeding the limits of their spiritual power, in depriving of their temporal possessions, those whom they ought to reach at only with the spiritual sword, Boniface the VIIIth attached both swords firmly to the Pontifical Chair, propounding it as a new article of faith for Christians to receive as necessary to their salvation, in these words: * *Moreover, we declare, we affirm, we define, and pronounce it to be altogether of necessity to salvation, that every human creature should be in subjection to the Roman Pontiff.* The Jesuits are not ashamed to defend this tyrannical power assumed by the Popes of Rome over Kings and Emperors. As a proof of this, it will be quite sufficient to cite the opinion of Suarez, and so learn those of all the rest. Thus, then, he: *There are three things which pertain to sovereignty and subjection—magisterial jurisdiction, obligation to obedience or fealty, and sovereignty over the kingdom and the people, with tributes and services corresponding to it. The magisterial jurisdiction is suspended by excommunication. The obligation of fealty is done away after sentence has been pronounced; but so far as concerns the third, communication between a Prince and his subjects does not cease, by virtue of a censure and of itself.* He wishes to appear to treat excommunicated princes somewhat tenderly; but observe the folly as well as Jesuitic perfidiousness of this. What can be greater folly than to imagine, that when jurisdiction on the part of the Sovereign is suspended, and the claim of fealty on the part of the people is broken, either the King can require the services which appertain

“The Decretals of Greg. IX. have been adopted as the common law throughout the Church. They are considered in the Canon, what the Justinian Code was in the civil, that is, a supplement to the particular laws and usages of each Church; and are considered binding, in all cases in which they do not conflict with each other, or with the municipal law of each country—say the same of the other parts of the Corpus Juris.” Dr. Slevin, in *Appendix to 8th Report of Commissioners of Irish Education Enquiry*; 1826, p. 212. Veron is made use of afterwards (as usual) to get rid of the whole, if they shall prove inconvenient.

* Extrav. Commun. lib. 1. tit. 8. cap. *Unam Sanctam*. [See Foxe's *Acts and Monuments*, vol. iv. p. 145.]

to the government of his kingdom; or that the people released from their bond of fealty would be willing to render them? Foolish then it is to talk of things being separated, which cannot exist when set asunder. But note again the fraud of the Jesuit.—*Subjects are not absolved from their oath of fealty, unless after sentence has been issued: Excommunication of itself, and in virtue of the censure, does not deprive a prince of his dominion, nor of the obedience of his subjects.* But how is a sovereign the better off notwithstanding this, when it is immediately added,—*By itself indeed it does not* [in all cases] *effect this, there is occasionally a particular regulation in this law concerning heretics and the like, which is specially expressed in the sentence: When such an effect is added to the excommunication, it is not the consequence of the excommunication itself, but a special penalty imposed at the same time together with the excommunication?* What difference does it make as to the iniquity of the sentence, whether the excommunication by itself deprives a sovereign of his dominion, or by some other means? whether the Pontiff does it directly or indirectly? Language of this kind savours of scholastic subtilty, and affords little relief to the miseries of the sovereign. Then again, in reference to the expectation of sentence going to be pronounced, the Jesuit deals no less subtilly with princes:—*It may happen* (says he) *that although a secular Prince is an heretic or schismatic, and a rebel towards the Church, yet the Pastors of the Church may be unable, or do not venture, to issue a declaratory sentence against him; and in such a case some think that it is lawful for subjects to recede altogether from their obedience, on the ground of some approved, or tacit agreement, with the Church; concerning which, owing to the magnitude of the danger and other circumstances, there is sufficient ground for presuming it to be in conformity with its wishes.* I add no more: you may now understand clearly enough, from what has been adduced, the injustice of the decrees of the Papacy in regard to Kings and Princes. It now only remains to shew that subjects are just as much under obligation to communicate with and obey their Sovereigns, although excommunicated, as wives are bound to their husbands, children to their parents, or servants to their masters.

First, whatever impediment exists to hinder the obligation to mutual kind offices, from being in the least loosened between the parties just mentioned, is equally available towards its not being loosened between sovereigns and their subjects. For a Sovereign occupies the station of a husband, the State of the wife;—a King is the father of his country, subjects are accounted as his children.

A King, in short, is supreme Sovereign in his kingdom ; subjects occupy the station of ingenuous servants. Since, then, communication with the excommunicated in matters affecting civil life is prohibited merely by Ecclesiastical law, and that the performing of mutual kind offices, as well on the part of sovereigns as of their subjects, is founded upon Divine right ; Ecclesiastical censure neither ought nor can dissolve the bond. They who, in the case of wives, children, and servants, have discerned the propriety and necessity of this interchange, and have sanctioned it by law,* ought not on any account to have excluded kings and their subjects from the benefit of this law.

Secondly, With regard to the Sovereign himself, he is not released by excommunication from the duty and care of governing the people committed to him: For, as the individual who by his office is bound to give instruction, and cannot discharge this duty by deputy, may, for the benefit of the community (which always demands to be attended to,) follow this occupation, notwithstanding excommunication ; in a similar way, a Sovereign also, who from his office is bound to govern, cannot, without great danger to himself, and extreme disadvantage to his subjects, even for a time, abdicate his power ; but both may, and ought, to continue exercising his functions as a Sovereign. It is a rule with the Canonists,† that *a Proprietor is answerable for calamities, the occurrence of which, within his own province, he might have anticipated, but did not.* If, therefore, a Sovereign, terrified by the threat of Papal excommunication, should withdraw himself from the government of the State, and that, in the meantime, should receive some injury (which could hardly be avoided) he would be regarded before God and men as guilty of causing that mischief.

Thirdly, *An unjust sentence‡ carries no obligation with it, in the view of either God, or the Church,* as Gregory truly observes, in Gratian, caus. xi. quæst. 3. cap. *Non debet.* So, also, Gelasius§ before him, (ibid. cap. 46, *Cui est*). *If the sentence be unjust, it cannot fall heavy upon the individual in the eye of God and his Church. There is no necessity, consequently, for any one to desire absolution from that whereby he does not feel himself by any means bound.* But only admitting that the sentence of excommunication is just, by which a sovereign is restrained from admission to receive the sacrament, or from entering a Church ; yet, inasmuch

* Suarez.

† Eman. Sa, Aphor. in verbo *Dominis*.

‡ See some curious and instructive matter on this subject in Phelan and O'Sullivan's *Digest of Evidence on the state of Ireland*, vol. ii. pp. 169—174.

§ He was Bishop of Rome A.D. 492.

as he is deprived thereby of his sovereignty, and is removed from the helm of the State, it is manifestly unjust, and of no validity at all. What right has a Pope, by an external punishment, to restrain a Sovereign? What has excommunication to do with the deprivation of temporal goods? It is the province of Kings to inflict corporal punishment, of Priests to impose spiritual vengeance. For, as the Lawyers have it, *Disobedience meets with impunity, where there is no legitimate authority in the command.* Now the Roman Pontiff oversteps the limits of his own jurisdiction, when he deprives of his sovereignty and sceptre and of the obedience of his subjects, him whom it was competent on his part to deprive only of participation in sacred things, and of spiritual privileges.

Ecclesiastical censures, then, do not divest a King of his office as a Sovereign, nor deprive him of an interchange in civil duties with his subjects, apart from which he cannot fulfil this office.

And now, as regards the *people*, let us enquire whether, in consequence of a Papal excommunication, and more than that, of a sentence declaring subjects to be released from their fealty, and for the deposition of the Sovereign, they are, on that ground, under obligation to deny him their dutiful services as subjects.

In the first place, If we look to the law of God, we find that that requires a dutiful obedience from subjects in all things just and lawful, and does not permit the obligation to be shaken off, because, in consequence of some grievous offence on the part of the King, he has been excommunicated by the Priesthood. It is the command of Christ himself, and his Vicar is unable to set it aside, *Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's* (Matt. xxii. 21). It is the doctrine of Paul, which the Roman Pontiff ought not to despise, *Put them in mind to be subject unto principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, &c.* (Tit. iii. 1). *Submit yourselves, (says St. Peter) to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether to the king, &c.* (1 Pet. ii. 13). Nor can they, under any pretence, apply to these passages this excepting clause, *Unless he be an heretic—Unless for some mortal sin he be excommunicated. For the power of a Sovereign is not lost, unless by the loss of that in which it is founded.** Now that is not founded in his faith or holiness, nor in the participating in sacred things: These, therefore, may be lost, whilst his dominion remains untouched as concerning sovereignty; and obedience, and the obligation of fealty, as regards his subjects. *It is a general*

* Gerson, part. 3.

agreement of human society (says Augustine) *to obey Kings*: he did not annex, nor wish to have it understood, with the proviso, *Until such time as the Roman Pontiff shall absolve them from their oath of fealty*. Nay, be he wicked, or an heretic, or apostate, *The Sovereign*, says Augustine, *is always to be honoured, if not on his own account, yet because of his station*. Aug. Quæst. Vet. et Nov. Test. quæst. 35. *For He who gave the kingdom to Constantine the Christian, the same gave it to Julian the Apostate* Aug. De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 21.

Secondly, To waive the consideration of a Divine command, subjects are bound, by law, both human and Ecclesiastical, to obey, and if necessary, to succour their Sovereign, notwithstanding any censure of excommunication. Suarez says correctly,* *If the party excommunicated should stand in need of our aid, assistance, or defence, lest he should suffer heavy loss, or injury, either in body, in reputation, or in his temporal possessions, we may come to his succour*. This is so true, that, according to the opinion common among the doctors, if any one should attempt to strike an excommunicated Cleric; and another, when he might with advantage, did not come to his assistance, or not hinder his being hurt, he would be deemed to fall under excommunication. Thus far Suarez. Now in the case of a Sovereign being excommunicated (especially when the Pontiff of Rome adds, besides, to this censure, the depriving him of his dominion,) all these particulars are found concurring:—He is in danger of losing his temporal possessions, his reputation, his life; he then especially stands in need of the defence of his subjects. If, then, they were not to defend their Sovereign with their best exertions, they would be deserving of a much heavier anathema, because, when they were able, they did not ward off the injury from their liege lord and the anointed of Heaven, than if they should let some excommunicated mass-monger be persecuted, stripped, or slain [without coming to the rescue].

Thirdly, When it was made a question among the Canonists themselves, *Whether the vassals of an excommunicated lord are excused from intercourse with him*,† the Doctors acknowledge that they are in doubt about the matter, and take different sides. The first is of those who say that they are not excused; the second, of those who hesitate about it; the third party makes a distinction, namely, that vassals are bound to avoid their lords when the sentence is pressed home, and they are commanded not to obey them; otherwise they are excused when communicating with them.

* De Censuris, disp. 15, sect. 3.

† Sylvest. titulo Excommunicatio, sect. 5.

Sylvester himself settles the controversy in this way :‡ He says that *Sovereigns, while under excommunication, cannot act ; yet that their vassals are bound to render all due obedience, and so far are acting properly, in communicating with their masters, even by rendering their services in their own persons.* If, therefore, these opinions of Theological writers are to be allowed weight, that *among doubtful opinions the safer is always to be selected ; that in doubtful cases it is consonant with reason always to adhere to the more favourable part ;** then, indeed, must Sovereigns be communicated with, and stood by, let the Bishop of Rome, excited by anger or hatred towards a Sovereign, pass what decree he please to the contrary. There may be taken into consideration, besides, in this case, the circumstance that, as Papal advocates have themselves admitted,† *for avoiding a great detriment, which it is morally feared may happen through external compulsion, that may be done without committing sin, which is forbidden by Ecclesiastical censure. For it does not bind with such rigour, but that when there is danger of death, of loss, or of great disgrace, it should not be observed.* Now who is so blind as not to see all these evils threaten subjects, if they refuse to hold intercourse with their Sovereign lords when excommunicated, at least in civil and political affairs ? For, if they should decline doing that, it would endanger their Sovereign's reputation, whilst they will be ranked as rebels ; it would endanger their property, which would be pronounced forfeited for their rebellion ; it would endanger their lives, seeing they would be doomed to be beheaded for treason. The apprehension of losses so great and manifold on the part of the people, plainly does away with any obligation to heed Pontifical censures, however just they may be considered, so far as the Sovereign is himself concerned.

Lastly, (and this puts the matter out of the reach of doubt) I affirm, that a Sovereign cannot be excommunicated by a Pope, with that which is called the greater excommunication, and which is viewed in the light of Anathema. And the minor excommunication, or suspension from sharing in sacred rites, never passes to a third person : For those who participate with an individual excommunicated by this minor excommunication, do not, on that account, incur any sentence being declared against them, or sin. So says Sylvester,* and so all Theologians and Canonists. In the

* Sylvest. titulo *Excommunicatio*, sect. 5.

* Mirand. *Apolog.*

† Suarez, *De Censuris*, disp. 6. sect. 3.

‡ Quæst. xxii. art. 5.

additions to Aquinas, the Gloss of Augustine on Matt. xiii. is cited, which says, that *the Prince and a multitude is not to be excommunicated*. Radulph Ardens* teaches, that the sentence of the greater excommunication may be launched against private individuals, but not against Princes. But what would follow, were the Pope of Rome to fulminate such a sentence against the head of a King? It would be treated with perfect indifference, as impious, and as utterly invalid. For (not to enter into a dispute with the Bishop of Rome about his own supremacy in spiritual matters) it is evident that, in temporal concerns, *Kings are in their own dominions inferior to God alone*, as Tertullian says, when writing to Scapula.† He cannot, consequently, by excommunication, strip a King of his authority as concerns temporal matters, nor deprive him of the obedience of his subjects: Since, to deprive any one of his temporalities is an act of temporal power; so, to deprive a King of his temporal privileges is an act of superior power: But the Pontiff of Rome neither exercises temporal power in excommunicating, nor is he superior to the King in inflicting temporal punishments.‡

We come, then, to the conclusion, that a sentence of excommunication directed against kings does not suspend that intercourse in matters of civil life, which ought to exist between them and their subjects, because it contravenes the tenor of their privileges as Sovereigns, is contrary to the intention of Christ, who delegates this power of excommunicating to the Priesthood; and, in short, because it involves many intolerable offences against the laws both of God and man.

* Homil. in Dominic. 1. post. Pasch. [RADULF ARDENS flourished at the beginning of the xiith century, was surnamed the *Preacher*, chaplain to William III., Duke of Aquitaine, and composed many *Sermons* on the Festivals, Saints, Epistles, and Gospels for the whole year; 8vo Colon. 2 vols. 1604; Antwerp, 1576. Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*.]

† Tertullian *ad Scapulam*.

‡ Vide Sylvest. tit. *Excommunicatio*, sect. 2.

“Veterum quidem excommunicatio, de Principum magistate nihil unquam delibavit, dignitates eripuit nemini bona hominesque non proscripsit. Ariano-
rum fautorem acerrimum se Constantius præbuit: religionis desertorem et
persecutorem Julianus egit: neque unquam Præsules potestatem adhibere suam,
ut Ecclesiæ perniciosissimi illi hostes solio deturbantur.” S. Basnage *Annales
Politico-Eccles.*; tom. ii. p. 846.

QUESTION XLIX.

SUFFICIENT ASSISTANCE IS NOT GIVEN TO EVERY ONE FOR SALVATION.

To make the meaning of this proposition plain, [observe] He is considered to be furnished with sufficient assistance for salvation, who, by the gift of God, has obtained that supernatural grace by the help of which he can freely perform all that is requisite for the attaining salvation: these are—conversion to God, faith in Christ, and whatever else there is without which salvation is neither to be procured nor hoped for by miserable sinners. Moreover, that we may not appear to be circumscribing the effectual grace of God within too narrow limits, we admit that those who have not yet obtained such assistance as to enable them immediately to accomplish what we have mentioned, ought, nevertheless, to be regarded as provided with a sufficiency of assistance, if they have received such a measure of aid from above, by means of which they were qualified freely to perform something; so that, according to the rule prescribed by God, they would certainly and infallibly attain, in the end, all the graces to which allusion has been made. Such as have obtained neither, have, it is evident, neither proximately nor remotely, neither mediately nor immediately, received assistance sufficient for salvation. In short, and I would have you to observe it well, that in this thesis we are not denying, That in those universal resources ordained by God (such as the death of Christ, the preaching of the Gospel, the institution of the Sacraments) there is a treasure of grace hidden sufficient in itself for the salvation of all; but that the point we would maintain is, that God is neither bound to impart to all and every individual among men, grace sufficient out of this treasure; nor to provide in his providence that it should actually be imparted to all without exception.

With this brief reference to these points, we shall proceed to establish the truth of the opinion we hold, First, in the case of the infants of Pagans; secondly, in that of Pagans themselves, who have arrived at full age; thirdly, in those who are living within the bounds of the Church, yet are not living members of

the Church, but *stand in the same relation to the Church*, as Belarmine himself says,* *as evil humours do to the body*.

1.—We may commence with the infants of Pagans, in reference to whom (while we leave the secret things of God alone) we can pronounce in accordance with the general opinion of the Church, that they are, ordinarily, void of the supernatural and saving grace of God. For they are not only born *children of wrath* (Ephes. ii. 3,) strangers altogether from the covenant of grace, and for this reason deemed *unclean* (1 Cor. vii. 14), but they die fettered with the condemning guilt of original sin. Here applies that saying of Prosper,† *Children having as yet done no acts of their own, are differently treated, and that not without the judgment of God; some, that is to say, are accounted as heirs, others are reckoned as debtors*. Those to whom this original debt has not been remitted, have not had a sufficiency of assistance communicated for obtaining salvation. The Romanists themselves, who generally contend very eagerly in behalf of grace being universal, yet shew symptoms of failure here, and at last frankly admit, that *the infants of Pagans who die but under the guilt of original sin alone, have received no supernatural assistance*. So says Bannes.‡ Vasquez also, persuaded by this argument, confesses that *in the case of some infants means sufficient for salvation have been neither bestowed, nor provided for by God*.§ If any one should be for maintaining here, that a sufficiency of grace for the said infants was furnished in Adam, or that heretofore it had been laid up and bestowed in their forefathers, and that it had subsequently been denied them on account of their own demerits, he would be wandering wide away from the point in question. For it is not whether saving grace is denied to these infants, so long as no cause of demerit interposes — this is what no one asserts; the point is, whether it is simply refused or not. If there is even one of these infants to whom, in his own person, God had not granted grace sufficient for salvation, we have established our point, while our adversaries lose their cause.

2.—From *infants* let us pass on to *adult* Pagans, whom no one will affirm to have received assistance sufficient for salvation, unless they have received whatever is necessary for willing and performing those things without which salvation is unattainable. I ask, then, how can they who are supposed dead in their sins, be furnished with assistance sufficient for repenting truly, who have

* *De Eccles. Mil.* 3. 2.

† Epist. ad August. *De Reliq. Pelag.*

‡ Bannesius, in 1. quæst. 23.

§ Vasques. disp. 96, in 1. part. *Summæ Aquin.*

not the slightest notion (and this is the first step to penitence) that they are dead in their sins? how for believing in Christ the Mediator, who have not the information even of a report, or actual hearing, whether there be such a Mediator or not? I would have that appeal of Paul (Rom. x. 14) particularly noticed, *How shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?* Because, if any one assert that saving grace, and that too sufficient, has been granted to these Pagans apart from Christ, let him listen to what Augustine would whisper in his ear—*I doubt whether he who promises salvation to any one apart from Christ, can himself have salvation in Christ.** Our opponents will say, That such indeed have not assistance sufficient directly at hand, and in operation, for believing and for acquiring salvation; yet that they have it remotely and in effect; inasmuch as they have it in their power to do something, and if this be attempted, they will undoubtedly in the end obtain a knowledge of Christ, faith in Christ, and salvation itself. Let them make it plain, then, of what description that may be, which any Pagan, sitting in darkness and the shadow of death, in subjection to the miserable service of sin and the devil, can effect of his own free will, so as finally and infallibly to obtain the Gospel, faith, and salvation from God; and we will own ourselves vanquished, and will acknowledge the dominion of grace to be as extensive as that of nature. But in this case they are wretchedly perplexed, whilst they have recourse to the miserable remains of nature, and from the good use of them endeavour to educe saving grace, as [hopefully as one would] water from a stone. *If any Pagan (say they) does what lies in his power; if he rightly, or at least without missing his aim altogether, makes use of the light of nature, God will reveal Christ to him, and bestow on him grace and faith, and all other things necessary to salvation.* But such arguments as these are easily refuted, and in the first place by experience itself. Let them produce but one instance of a Pagan, since the beginning of the world, who being wholly destitute of the knowledge of Christ, and the light of the Divine word, has attracted towards himself this saving grace, by the good use of his natural faculties. When they have done this they may feel themselves at liberty to expunge on just grounds that saying of Paul, *He hath called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace.* (2 Tim. i. 9). A Pagan of the kind described may be truly said to be called from his own

* *De verbis Apostol.* Serm. 14. [now 294, cap. 4, col. 1185.]

works to the participation of saving grace; yet the Apostle has observed that God has not followed this rule in the dispensation of the grace of the Gospel, 1 Cor. vi. 11; Ephes. ii., in the first ten verses, and elsewhere in all his Epistles. Augustine also has observed it, *De Pec. Mer. et Remiss.*, lib. 1., cap. 22. Most true are the remarks of Alvarez also, who comes to the conclusion* that, *There never was a law laid down about giving the aids of grace, to such as do all that in them lies from the capabilities of nature; Christ has neither obtained by his death, nor wished to obtain such a law.* But let it be assumed, that God has imposed a law on himself, by which he is laid under obligation to impart his own grace to such as make a good use of free-will and natural light, and who oppose no bar to his grace. But who is there that could ever make a proper use of free-will, until made free by the Son of God? Who is there that, in the midst of corruption, could render service to any other master than to his corruptor, that is the devil? Who, in short could do otherwise than oppose perpetual obstacles arising from his own sins, to Divine grace? *When a strong man armed keepeth his palace his goods are in peace.* (Luke xi., 21). This is the condition of all Pagans on whom Christ hath not shed the light of his Gospel; they wallow in sin; some more refined, others more gross; but all live *according to the course of this world.* (Eph. ii., 2), all obey *the prince of the power of the air.* We must not fancy then, that any one of those so situated, could, by the good use of their natural faculties attach to himself the gifts of grace, whether on the ground of an agreement made to that effect, or from congruity.† It was on the score of this very error, that formerly the Pelagians incurred denunciation. *We denounce the Pelagians* (says Augustine‡) *not undeservedly, who are so inimical to the grace of God, which hath come thro' Christ our Lord, that they affirm it is not bestowed freely, but according to our merits, and make it rest in free-will only—that whereby man has been sunk so low; asserting that, by making a proper use of it, an individual can merit grace: whereas no one can make a good use of it, except by grace, which, from the mercy of God, is bestowed freely.*—But we have dwelt sufficiently upon this argument.

A second may be derived from the righteous dealing manifested in the case. God does, indeed, behold just cause enough in all Pagans, why he should for ever withhold from them the influences

* Disp. 56. p. 251.

† See Question xxxiv.

‡ *Cont. duas Epist. Pelag.* lib. 1. cap. ultimo.

of his grace. For, to say nothing concerning their actual sins, he views them universally involved in the contagion and guilt of original sin. Yet there has no promise been made of any one of them being favoured with grace. What reason, then, can any patron of the Pagans produce, why God should not be at liberty to leave whom he chooses destitute of all supernatural grace? In those things, indeed, which depend on the free-will of God, God is accustomed as well to exhibit his freedom of acting by withholding, which he may do in *justice*, as by conferring the same grace, to shew what it is his good pleasure to do in *mercy*. God made an open exercise of this liberty when for many ages he suffered the nations to lie in darkness and death, and, to use the language of a most learned Father,* *to pass their days without his grace*. Since then there is no obligation on God's part, claiming a bestowal of his grace on any one, and on man's part there is always cause of demerit found, why it should not be bestowed, Bellarmine himself does not hesitate to affirm,† that there would be no unjust dealing in God, were he to refuse some, nay, all men, assistance sufficient for salvation. But Aquinas goes yet farther,‡ and admits, that the aid of Divine grace is not bestowed upon some men, as a punishment on account of preceding sin, especially original sin. If there be any one who has ventured to cavil this point with God, we shall demand of him, with the Apostle, Who has first given to God, as if he would be bound by law to recompense him again? or, Who shall forbid God not to have mercy on whom he will, and whom he will not, on them not to have mercy? (Rom. xi., 35, and ix. 18.)

In the last place, Let us examine what that grace is, which they maintain was given indifferently to men living apart from Christ, aliens from the Church, strangers from the covenants of promise, and having no hope, (Ephes. ii. 12, 13.) and it will soon appear that it cannot be designated assistance sufficient for salvation. It may be the illumination of the mind, the admonishing of the will, or the encouragement of free-will to some good actions; yet, even by the confessions of our very opponents, it is not the creating of a good-will, which is the peculiar privilege of the grace of Christ, as Augustine has taught in many places.§ Who then, ventures to assert, that that grace which cannot properly be called *the grace of Christ*, is sufficient for converting and saving the sinner; which exists without faith and a good-will, which neither regenerates

* Prosper *ad Cap. Gall. Sententiâ super object. decima.*

† *De Grat. et Lib. Arb.* 2. 4.

‡ 2. 2. quæst. 2. art. 5. Resp. ad. 1.

§ Vide August. lib. *de Grat. Christi.*

men, nor, by being bestowed, itself makes the good distinguishable from the evil? What? does not the decision passed in opposition to the doctrine of the Pelagians,* namely, *that the grace of God is not given to all men*, prove with abundant clearness that that universal grace, which they maintain is given to all men, is not to be called the grace of God, and, therefore, is insufficient for man's salvation?†

3.—But, dismissing the Pagans, let us consider a little whether assistance sufficient for salvation is given to all who belong to the Church in outward profession. And here it must be borne in mind that there is no controversy about a sufficiency of grace being bestowed, as it were in Adam, upon all his posterity; nor of a sufficiency of grace laid up in Christ, and in the merits of Christ; neither of the sufficiency of the Divine administration, in order to vindicate God from all appearance of injustice, and to deprive ungodly men of being able to offer any proper excuse; but all these points being confessedly admitted, the only matter in debate is whether grace sufficient, not for producing any supernatural act, but for an act of saving faith, and effecting the individual's salvation, is imparted to all, without exception, who compose the outward Church. That such assistance is not the common privilege of all, appears to my mind evident, from these considerations:—

First, the Scriptures appear to withstand it. Of some who were living in the Israelitish Church they declare, *The Lord hath not given them an heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear* (Deut. xxix., 4). Of the Pharisees Christ himself thus speaks, *To them it is not given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven* (Matt. xiii., 11). How then could men, blind by nature, hard, and unbelieving, possess a heart soft and believing, if it were not given them from heaven by Him, *from whom cometh every good and perfect gift?* (Jas. i., 17). Excellently says Augustine,‡ *Faith, incipient and perfect, is the gift of God; and that this gift is given to some and not given to others, cannot be any way a matter of doubt, where there is not an intention, at least, of contradicting the plainest testimony of Holy Writ.* But they will say, that all who are living within the Church, may, at least under this proviso, namely, *if they are willing*, receive from God, an understanding, a softened, and believing heart; which is just the same as if they should say, That all can receive a goodwill from God, if they have it before they have received it. Christ

* August. Epist. 107.

† What motives are presented by the preceding considerations for the encouragement of Missionary labours!

‡ *De Præd. Sanctor.* cap. 9.

himself teaches us otherwise : *No man can come unto me except the Father which hath sent me draw him* (John vi., 44). The Apostle teaches us otherwise : *It is God who worketh in us both to will and to do* (Phil. ii., 13). The most learned Fulgentius teaches us otherwise ;† *God who prepares the will, himself bestows it ;—which if God does not by his grace impart to man, man can never be willing to believe in God.* Idle, then it is, to make the possibility of having faith, depend upon the state of the human will yielding itself to God, before faith has been received ; since to obey God, and to be willing to practise good, is not the condition on which faith was originally given, but a proof of faith being already imparted.

Secondly, The special mercy of God, so largely celebrated in the Scriptures, refutes the notions of the patrons of universal grace. For it must, in the first place, be observed, what is their object in endeavouring to establish this doctrine of universal grace ; namely, to make men believe that God does not exactly intend the conversion and salvation of any to be owing to special mercy, but provides a sufficiency of grace for all, on the principle that the full efficacy of grace and salvation should, for the rest, depend upon the free-will of each individual. Were we to embrace this opinion, those declarations of Paul would fall to the ground, *It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy,—God will have mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will be hardeneth.* (Rom. ix., 16, 18). That saying of Augustine also would be done for,* *The efficiency of the mercy of God cannot be dependent on the power of man, that God should in vain have pity upon him, if the individual is unwilling.* In one word, a consequence of this opinion will be, that God has no more pity upon those who are saved, in the administration of his grace, than he has of the lost ; but that the saved, by making a better use of sufficient grace than the lost, have rendered it efficacious to themselves by their own free-will!

To conclude : the supporters of this opinion are driven to occupy innumerable other inconvenient positions, unrecognised by the Catholic faith. First, that God awaits the consent of the goodwill of men, and depends thereon, in the bestowal of efficacious grace. Secondly, that the very grace of Christ, which causes us indeed to act, does so, according to their opinion, only under a condition, namely, it leads us to act, if we are not unwilling. Thirdly, it affords even to unregenerate men the greatest opportunity for

† *De Verit. Prædest.* lib. 1

* *Lib. 1. ad Simp. quæst.* 11.

boasting ; whilst what is inferior, that it leaves, in the administration of sufficient grace, to God in some measure to accomplish ; that which is of more importance, namely, their effectual conversion, it reserves to their free-will.

It would be easy to bring together much more ; but I am unwilling to weary you, by these my somewhat hurried observations.

QUESTION L.

THE ROMAN CHURCH HAS UNJUSTLY TAKEN AWAY THE CUP FROM
THE LAITY.

[This Question is added to the second Edition of the Determinationes of Bishop Davenant, published at Cambridge in 1639, and to the Index of the Questions to which, the following Note is appended :—"Postremam hanc Determinationem, quæ seriùs in Typographi manus venit quàm ut unà cum cæteris in lucem antea exiret, huic saltem Editioni adjiciendam curavit, nè hâc parte literati ulterius fraudarentur.]"

THE Tridentine Fathers denounce, with their Anathema, all those who assert, that the Roman Church had no good ground for depriving the Laity of her communion, a partaking in the [sacramental] cup. We are not greatly affrighted by their idle bolts ; and, notwithstanding the decree of these men, relying on the justice of our reasons, and the strength of our arguments, are bold to affirm, that the Ecclesiastical Prelates, in so doing, acted unjustly, impiously, and sacrilegiously.

1.—The first reason (which the advocates for the Papacy are accustomed to call our primary argument,* and not without cause) is derived from the institution of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone has the keys of excellency, and, in virtue of his omnipotent power, annexes, on certain *conditions*, to visible elements and corporeal signs, invisible and spiritual grace.

Now, this supreme Head of the Church, the Lord of the sacraments, instituted the sacred supper under a twofold species, administered under a twofold form, and established the perpetual twofold administration, as well by his *appointment* as by his *exam-*

* "Achilleum nostrum" in the original :—meaning an insuperable argument ; see Erasmi Adagia, Opera, tom. ii. p. 243, edit. 1540.

ple. We have his express words in three of the Evangelists, which, when seriously taken into consideration, will have weight amongst all pious and dutiful Christians, whether they rank among the Priesthood or as Laymen.

As regards the cup, about which alone we are now enquiring, St. Matthew thus speaks (xxvii., 27): *He took the cup, and when He had given thanks, He gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of this.* St. Mark (xiv., 23) states the same: *He took the cup, and when He had given thanks, He gave it to them, and they all drank of it.* In fine, St. Luke, after mentioning the distribution of the bread which he had blessed, straightway adds (xxii., 20): *Like-wise also the cup, saying, This cup is the New Testament in my blood, which is shed for you;* by which words he indicates clearly that the same individuals had an interest in the blood shed in the cup, equally as in the blood about to be shed on the cross.

This argument, derived from the institution, and the act of the Institutor himself, has so perplexed Romanists, that they have been compelled to allow* that the receiving of both kinds is necessary, so far as regards the sacrament itself, being instituted under both kinds; but their quibble is, that it is not necessary, so far as the receivers, generally, are concerned; but that it is sufficient if it be taken entire by some, namely, by Priests. But this distinction of Bellarmine destroys itself. For sacraments are not instituted for their own sake, seeing that they are corporeal things, and, as regards themselves, incapable of sense, and, consequently, of spiritual grace; but with a view to men endowed with reason, and made partakers of grace through the sacraments. Seeing, therefore, that the sacraments were instituted for the sake of the receivers, as this is an ingredient essential to the character of a sacrament, it possesses this its essentiality for the advantage of all those who have a right to participate in the sacraments. The very words, moreover, of Christ, *Drink ye all of this*, were themselves used in reference to the receivers, and not the sacrament itself, and they take in all those for whom the blood of Christ was to be shed. To presume, then, as Bellarmine does, to exclude any who are right partakers from a reception of the blessed cup, is equivalent to maintaining, that they are to be excepted also from the benefit of the blood shed. In short, since the Romanists confess that some, and that by virtue of the institution, are bound to partake in both kinds, it rests with themselves to show us the existence of a twofold institution of the Lord's supper; one, which necessarily

* Bellarm. *De Euch.* lib. 4. cap. 23.

obliges the Priests to receive in both kinds; another, which prescribes, or at least, permits Priests to exclude the people of God, generally, from a participation of the cup. But hitherto there is only one, and an uniform institution of the most holy Eucharist known to the Church; and this, if it has an obligatory power, is either binding on all equally, or on none. They, therefore, who, in spite of the institution of Christ, exclude some (namely, all the Laity) from the communion of the cup, are equally at liberty to make the same exceptions as to *their* partaking of the communion of the body; and at length the matter will come to this, that it is the Priests alone who are under obligation to be partakers of the Lord's supper, by virtue of the institution; all the rest to be admitted by favour, and at the pleasure of the Ecclesiastics. The pretence usually made in reference to this point, *that the Apostles were Priests, and received both kinds because they were Priests, and not as a portion of the faithful*, is frivolous, and contrary to the practice of the Roman Church. It is a frivolous and vain notion, because the cup was administered to them on the same grounds, and with the same view, as the bread was in the first instance; now the bread was given, not because they were Priests, but because they were believers; as the Papists do, indeed, acknowledge, seeing that they allow the bread, not only to some of the Laity, but even to females, who are altogether excluded from assuming the sacerdotal rank. But Bellarmine is in this case upholding a notion at variance with the institution of the Roman Church, and contrary to received custom. For if the cup is due to Priests because they are Priests, why is it denied to the Clergy just as much as to the Laity, when they are not personally officiating?* The Apostles, in the instance of the first supper, were not officially engaged, but were recipients merely: Christ, however, made it evident that the Eucharist was to be communicated to them under both kinds. But the Papists, placing themselves in every respect in opposition to the institution and example of Christ, exclude the Laity from a full and perfect communion, under the pretext that the cup belongs to Priests alone; next they exclude the Priests-themselves also, under the pretext that, by virtue of the institution, it concerns the individual alone who is officiating [to partake]; which is much as if they should say, our good pleasure shall be the model for Christian institutions. The holy Fathers were not thus actuated, who ever regarded the form of administration, instituted and observed by Christ himself on the celebration of the

* Concil. Trid. Sess. xxi. (which is the fifth under Pius IV.) can. 2.

first supper, in the light of a rule, a law, and an inviolable injunction, and paid a careful attention to everything that constituted the essence of that sacrament. That very ancient Father, Justin Martyr, describing the mode of celebrating the Lord's supper, relates* that the wine, as well as the bread, was distributed to each of the communicants; no mention of a distinction between Priest or not Priest; the only requirement being, that the individual had been baptized, was of an upright life, and a maintainer of the orthodox faith. In the same place also (and this suits the matter in hand), he says that this was done, because the Evangelists had *so delivered it down,† that Jesus had enjoined them thus to do*; thus shewing that Christ's institution, consequently, and the practice handed down by the Evangelists, carry with them the force of a law, and were not to be viewed as a bare narration. The most holy Cyprian was of the same opinion, everywhere calling it the institution and act of Christ,—*the precept, command, and authoritative direction of the Church*. Let us hear him speaking himself.‡ *From what Christ commanded and did, we ought not to depart for any human and novel arrangement.—We do not observe what is commanded, unless we also practise the same things which the Lord did.—If we are desirous to walk in the light of Christ, let us not depart from his precepts.—In the sacrifice, which is Christ, none but Christ is to be followed; and to practise what Christ did, and what he commanded to be done, we ought to pay earnest attention.* Now, Christ commanded, saying, *Drink ye all of this*: this, then, must be observed by all who celebrate the Lord's supper. Bellarmine would fain have it that Cyprian, in that epistle, is contending against the Aquarii, who used to put before the people mere water to drink in lieu of wine; and that none of those points which are urged by Cyprian at all concern [says he] the Romanists, who take away the cup altogether, do not sub-

* Apolog. 2. near the end, [now Apolog. i. §. 66.]

† It may, perhaps, be well to observe, that *παράδοικαι* is the word here used the same in substance as used by St. Paul in 2 Thess. 11, 15, which, by Papa Sectarians and the like, is considered as of course implying *unwritten* tradition: See *Enchiridion Theol. anti-Romanum*, Oxford, 1836, vol. iii. p. 274, &c.

‡ Epist. lib. 2. epist. 3. [No. 62. p. 90, edit. Paris, 1836.]

“Citat hunc locum Gratianus dist. 8. cap. *Si Solus*. cap. *Si Consuetudinem*, et cap. *Consuetudo*. Ad locum autem istum Cypriani, ubi dicit solum Christum audiendum esse, Joannes Cardinalis de Turrecremata ait vocem *solus* non excludere Papam vel Prælatos vel alios doctores aut prædicatores bonos, sed tantum antichristos, id est contrarios Christo, qui contrariæ prædicant.” Cypriani, Oper. Paris. 1726. Note p. 480.—A fine specimen this, of the way in which passages from the Fathers, if opposed to the tenets of modern Rome, are contradicted with very little ceremony!

stitute water. But Bellarmine cannot escape in that way; for, admitting that Cyprian in that epistle is arguing against the Aquarii, yet arguments which derive their force from Christ's institution avail to the refutation of Papists as well as the Aquarii. These latter are charged with violating the form of its institution, because, in spite of the example and command of Christ, instead of mixing the blessed wine with water (as Cyprian thought should be done), they put off mere water upon believers; the former are chargeable with no less guilt, because, contrary to that same command and example of Christ, in dispensing this sacrament, they withhold the wine entirely, and only give bread to the people, instead of both bread and wine.

Next to the form of the institution adopted by Christ himself, established and recommended to us as being a rule for perpetual observance, the religious practice of the Apostolic and primitive Church, exactly conformed to the institution and example of Christ, will supply us with

2.—A second argument, For what, upon Christ's prescribing and setting the example, the Apostles themselves considered ought to be retained and followed; what the Catholic Church for upwards of one thousand years had religiously observed, that could admit of no variation from any decree either at Constance or at Trent, nor ought ever to have been violated. But it is most certain that, for many hundred years, in the public and solemn celebration of the Eucharist, the Laity were never denied the partaking in the cup. And this was the general practice not only in the Eastern Church, but (also) in the Western, and in the Roman Church itself. Let Paul state, on behalf of the Apostles, what it was he had received from Christ; what rule he had delivered to be observed by the Churches, in reference to a due celebration of the Lord's supper. Among other things (in 1 Cor. x.) he shews (v. 16) that *the cup of blessing*, no less than *the blessed bread*, should be offered to all, and that it should be drank by all believers (verse 17). For he speaks of believers in general when he says (v. 21), *Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils*. He is speaking of believers, not of the Priesthood alone, when he says (xi., 23) that he had delivered to the Corinthians the same form of communion which he received from Christ himself. Lastly, he is speaking of all believers when he says (verse 30) that some were afflicted of God, because they had partaken unworthily, as well of the cup as they had also of the bread. All which goes to prove that the Eucharist was presented under both kinds equally to all believers.

But there are some Romanists who reply* (not with the approbation, however, of the sounder of them) that this custom was observed in the Corinthian Church, but that in the Church of Jerusalem the practice was otherwise. They place James, who [as they say] used to administer in one kind only, in opposition to Paul, who dispensed both kinds to the Corinthians. They have recourse for evidence to a particular passage (Act ii., 42, 46), in which the *breaking of bread* is spoken of alone, there being no mention made of the cup being dispensed. James would, consequently, appear to have administered the Lord's supper, in the Church over which he presided, under one kind only, that is, bread.

I answer, that there is no evidence to this effect, nor do the adherents of Rome themselves, who point us to the liturgy of James,† think so; for in that there is clear mention as well of the *cup*, as of the *bread*, being exhibited to the people. But the Romanists are not agreed among themselves whether those words should be considered to refer to sacramental or to common bread. The interlinear Gloss leaves the matter in doubt. Lyra makes the words accommodate both. If we were to grant (which, however, is not so very likely) that that passage should be understood to relate to the sacred supper, yet we have an answer ready. As, in reference to an ordinary meal, Scripture, by a figure of speech,‡ under the one term, *bread* (Gen. xliii, 45), includes all that is necessary for the perfect refreshment of the body; so in this celestial banquet (it includes) all that is necessary to a perfect sacramental refreshment. If they admit that in the foregoing words this figurative‡ mode of expression is made use of, the whole strength of the argument is gone. If they are unwilling to admit it, it will follow not only that believing Laics, but that the officiating Priests themselves have been used to celebrate [the supper] and communicate under one kind only, which, in the estimation of Papists themselves, amounts to the crime of sacrilege. But those very Fathers who interpret this place as referring to the Lord's supper never dreamt even of inferring from thence that it was customary to celebrate the Eucharist at that time under the species of bread alone; which goes to prove that, under the term *bread*, they understood that the Eucharist, when properly administered, consisted as well in partaking of the cup as in the eating of bread. Nay more, have we not the most learned Romanists acknowledging that this

* Cajet. in 3; Aquin. qu. 80. art. 11.

† Biblioth. Patr. tom. 1. p. 19. [See Faber's *Difficulties of Romanism*, p. 522, Edit. 1830.]

‡ "Synecdoche," when a part is put for the whole.

dry communion of the believing people was altogether unknown to antiquity? Alfonsus á Castro says,* that *it is not acting contrary to the Evangelical institution to make the Laity participate in the Eucharist under both kinds: for, from the writings of various holy men, we learn, that, during many ages, it was the customary practice among all Catholics.* Cassander says,† *I do not think it can be shewn that, for a continuous period of a thousand years, there was in the administration of the most holy Eucharist to the faithful at communion times, any deviation from the practice of partaking under the symbols of both bread and wine.* The Council of Constance itself acknowledges this, which could not help perceiving that Christ and the primitive Church used to administer the Eucharist under both kinds, though it would not decree consistently, as is manifest from the Canon itself. Lastly, John Baptista de Ru-beis, in his new Rationale, has made this candid admission:‡ *In the primitive Church all the faithful every day, and at any time, communicated in the body and blood of Christ; and this is plain from the very collects which are recited in the name of the people.* If among all Catholics, as Alfonsus confesses; if for more than one thousand years, as Cassander affirms; if daily the communion, under both kinds, was allowedly administered to all the faithful, as Baptista admits: [then] impudent and faithless are those Papists, who, relying on the authority of James, prate about the sacrament having been administered to the faithful in the Church at Jerusalem under one kind only. Clear, however, as these points are, and admitted by such of the Romanists as are not unacquainted with antiquity, yet some modern Divines have endeavoured to deprive us of this argument, derived from the constant practice of the Apostles, and of the ancient Church; but the attempt has not succeeded.

In the first place, they say that there prevailed, even among the ancient Fathers of the Church, a certain custom of keeping and reserving the blessed Eucharist, and also of permitting Laymen to carry it home with them. They maintain, too, that it was the bread only to which these customs would apply, on account of certain inconveniences, which might happen to the consecrated wine if so reserved, or whilst being conveyed from one place to another.

Now, with regard to the reservation, while Baronius contends for it, he completely demolishes the argument of the Papists. In

* Tit. *Euchar.* p. 444. [fol. cxx. edit. Colon. 1543.]

† Consult. *De Sacr. Comm. sub utraque specie*, pag. 1027. [Oper. Paris 1616.]

‡ Lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 49.

the fifth volume of his annals* he speaks thus: *We see that the most holy Eucharist used formerly to be reserved, not only under the form of bread, but also under the form of wine.* With regard to the carrying the same Eucharist into private houses, Justin Martyr, in his second† Apology, teaches, that *the wine* as well as *the bread* used to be taken to the houses of the sick, and administered to them. Nazianzen bears testimony,‡ that [his sister] Gorgonia had kept preserved, at her own house, the antitypes not only of *the body*, but also of *the blood* of the Lord. But suppose that in this and the like cases the custom of reserving or of administering the Eucharist under one kind only had crept in, are Papists at liberty thence to conclude that the Laity were in general debarred partaking of the cup in the public and solemn celebration of the Lord's supper? Absurd, indeed, is it, and as averse to reason as to religion, that a regulation established by our Lord, and sanctioned by Apostolic practice, should be made to accommodate to the schemes§ of private individuals. Customs may acquire some force when the law fails, or at least does not forbid, or is not in direct opposition to them. But that a law should be abrogated to make place for customs rashly introduced, is most iniquitous.

Secondly, They labour to shew that the communion under one kind only was approved of by the ancient Fathers, as well from the fact of Lay-communion which we read of, imposed as a punishment upon the Priesthood, as well as from the communion of infants, which, it is very well known, was in use in the time of Augustine.

But this mode of arguing fails both ways. For this Lay-communion, mention of which frequently occurs in the correspondence of the Bishops of Rome, was not (as they mistakingly imagine) a dry communion, owing to the cup being withheld; but a partaking outside the chancels, or the choir, among Laymen—a punishment wont to be imposed upon the Clergy for some crime committed by them. *For the Priests and Levites used to communicate before the altar, the Minister within the choir, the people without the choir.*|| But we have before shewn, and that too from the admission of Romanists themselves, that Laymen in those ages used to communicate under both kinds. Moreover, if this was enjoined upon the

* Ad annum, 404, §. 32. p. 212.

† [Now Apolog. 1. §. 65.]

‡ Orat. funebr. in laud. Gorgoniæ.

§ “Ad Lesbiam regulam,” an expression equivalent to “a nose of wax.” See Erasmi Adagia, Opera. Tom. ii. p. 189. Edit. 1540.

|| Concil. Tolet. 1. [a mistaken reference—it should be to Concil. Tolet. iv. cap. 18; held A. D. 633.—See Binius, tom. 2, pars 2. edit. 1618.]

Priests in the place of a punishment, how is it that they now compel all Priests and non-officiating Clergymen to undergo it, when no crime is alleged against them? Nay, with what face do they maintain that communion under one kind only was laid upon Priests as a punishment, and yet, with loud clamour, assert, *that there was no greater advantage derivable from communion under both kinds than under one; that there was nothing of spiritual benefit derived from partaking of both kinds, which might not be derived from that of one;** *that communion under the species of bread only was more useful to a Christian people, than under both kinds.*† A grievous punishment, indeed! which is so far from depriving the Priests of any benefit, useful or desirable (for this ought to be the nature of a punishment), that it fairly compels them to a more useful method of communicating, and (if we are to believe Papal affirmations) is far more calculated to express the reverence that is due to the Eucharist. But we need not say more; for Pamelius, Lindanus, Tapper, Baronius himself, have all shewn‡ that all have been in error who interpreted Lay-communion, as if it were equivalent to *a withdrawing of the cup.*§

Let us now proceed to consider the communion of infants, to whom they contend that the Eucharist used to be administered under one kind; and hence they imagine that the Councils of Constance and of Trent derive some support for their generally refusing the cup to Laymen. But it is useless to adduce such a custom as this to give sanction to the mutilation of the Eucharist,—a custom which they themselves even do not venture to maintain; inasmuch as it is repugnant to the Apostolic rule (1 Cor. xi., 28): *Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup.* Owing to this, the communion of infants (of whatever description it was) has been long since disapproved of, and entirely laid aside, as well by Romanists as by the orthodox. More than that: whilst the custom of giving the Eucharist to infants prevailed, they used to distribute to them not the bread only, or the wine only, but both elements. This is evident from the 23rd Epistle|| of Augustine (to Boniface), and his 107th¶ (to Vitalis) and from the Hypognostes.** It is evident, also, from the Expurgatory Index; in which this proposition, inserted in indexes ap-

* Bellarm. *De Euchar.* lib. 4. cap. 23.

† Cajet. in 3; Aquin. qu. 80, art. 12.

‡ Tom. iii. ad annum 314. §. 88.

§ [See Bingham's *Christian Antiquities*, Book. xv. ch. v.]

|| Now 98; tom. ii. col. 298, edit. Bened.

¶ Now 217, col. 799.

** This was not written by Augustine; See Cave's *Hist. Liter.* vol. i. p. 298.

pended to the edition printed by Froben,* and in the Annotations of Erasmus upon Augustine, is ordered to be expunged—*The Eucharist used to be given to little children under both kinds*. If, then, the ancient Fathers were unwilling to withhold half the sacrament from even the very infants of believers, much less would they do so with regard to adult believers, who were desirous of receiving it, and looking for an entire Eucharist. In fine, if there had been cases in which the Eucharist had been given to little children under one kind, Bellarmine supposes that that would have been, not under the species of the bread, but under the species of the wine. Very little ground then has he, in his endeavour to establish the tyrannical regulation of withholding the cup from the Laity generally, derived, as it is, in this instance, from a custom peculiar, extraordinary, and introduced with too little prudence, namely, that of allowing infants to communicate in the blessed cup.

The Papists are accustomed to summon to their aid, as a support of their forlorn cause, certain other customs of the ancient Church; which it is not however necessary to refute seriatim. It is enough for us that in the solemn and ordinary partaking of the Eucharist, so far were the ancient Fathers from sanctioning the people's being deprived of the blessed cup by any law (which the Tridentine Fathers have done) that they considered, that a dividing of this one and the same mystery could not take place without a person's incurring the charge of having committed a great crime.†

3.—The circumstance of Christ's having so instituted, and the religious practice of the Christian Church in observing this institution both make for us. Now, in the third place, let us see what there is required to constitute the perfection of the Sacrament itself. And here a twofold perfection comes under our consideration; one is that which we may call *essential* or *integral*; the

* For an account of this publication, emanating from the See of Rome, and so frequently confounded with the *Prohibitory* Index, the Reader is referred to Mendham's *Literary Policy of the Church of Rome*, p. 144, which furnishes the fullest account existing of *this* engine for upholding the Tridentine Sect and its notions.

† Grat. [Decret. pars. iii.] *de Consecr.* distinct. 2. cap. 12. *Comperimus*.

This is a quotation from Gelasius, Bishop of Rome, A.D. 492; whose testimony an attempt has been recently made to enervate by reproducing (though without mentioning names) the assertion of Card. Baronius, (ad an. 596. §. 20.) repeated by Raynaldi (ad an. 1557, §. 40.) and Bona (*Rerum Liturg.* lib. 11 cap. 18. §. 1.), that the injunction here to partake of both kinds was levelled against the Manichees, who objected to using the creature, wine—but Gelasius never mentions them, and his directions are general. See Gerhard's *Loci Theolog.*; loc. xxii. cap. 9. §. 43.

other we shall call *significant* or *representative*. Neither of these is it allowable, by enacting any set law, to violate: as regards the former, all sound Theologians are agreed that the form was prescribed by Christ, and that the matter made use of by Him, in the holy Eucharist, is altogether essential to the complete perfection of this sacrament. For as in things natural, the matter and the form are what make up the essential parts of the substance of a thing; and if either one or the other is taken away or mutilated, the entireness or completeness of the thing itself is violated; the same takes place with reference to the divine sacraments: to take away, to corrupt, or to mutilate either one or other portion is to deprive the sacrament of its full perfection. Now it is known to every one that in this sacrament, it is not the bread alone, nor the wine alone, but both conjointly make up its entireness; which elements, although they have, as respects themselves, a twofold, and different meaning, yet, as regards the entireness and perfection of the sacrament, they are considered as one; consequently, if in the act of using or participating of it, the bread or the wine be absent, the Priest dispenses not an entire or perfect sacrament, nor as such is it received by the people. Thus Durandus asserts: *He who partakes of the host alone, receives not sacramentally an entire sacrament; because it is not a complete sacrament which is administered under one kind only.* And the person who lately published the new Rationale,* writes *Although in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, there is a plurality of elements, and of forms; and these as to matter, are more than one; yet there is not a plurality of Sacraments, but a sacrament which as to its formal nature, and the entire combination of its parts, is one.*† This they learnt from the old School-

* Rational. lib. 4, cap. 54.

† Baptista de Rubeis [lib. 2., cap. 61, p. 256].

The reference here (which was found to be very inaccurate) has been corrected from the original. BAPTISTA DE RUBEIS was a Genoese, and in one of his works distinguishes himself as Genuensis Congr. Somaschæ. He published Commentaries on five different works of Aristotle, between the years 1558 and 1618, though Böhle, in his edition of Aristotle, while he professes to enumerate all the commentators on Aristotle, does not mention him. He also published, in 1602, a treatise, *De immortalitate animæ*; in 1608, *De Divinis Officiis* Libro quatuor (the work which Davenant quotes), and, in 1628, *Commentaria in Psalterium Romanum, cum hymnis, canticis, antiphonis, &c., et suo Rationali*—the “newly-published work” to which Davenant refers, *en passant*:—these works are all published in small 4to., and printed at Venice, except the *De Divinis Officiis*, which was printed at Placenza. It is remarkable that none of the Biographical or Historic Dictionaries notice him; and for this account the writer is indebted, as for many other such services, to the kind investigations of an esteemed friend at Oxford.— See Append.

men. For Bonaventure has clearly asserted,* that *from two signs there results one perfect thing ; the reason of the complete entireness of which follows from its being so instituted by the Lord, who by one institution ordained these two signs, &c.* Aquinas also allows† that, *with reference to the sacrament itself, it is befitting that both kinds be received, namely, the bread and the wine, because the entireness of the sacrament depends on both kinds being administered.* Add to these that the modern Papists, after having taken the cup from the Laity, are obliged to admit‡ that for the sake of the perfection of the sacrament which we plead for, *that Priest is acting sacrilegiously, who, when he celebrates the sacrament, partakes of the bread, yet does not of the cup.* Neither does it help the Romanists to have these, their philosophical ideas, concerning the entireness of Christ himself under one kind only, in view ; for our present enquiry does not refer to the entireness of the body of Christ, which cannot be torn asunder or mutilated by any sacrilegiousness of man : The matter in question is concerning the entireness of the sacrament itself, which on the setting aside the cup is, it is conceded, rendered imperfect and mutilate. For what mortal has such power delegated to him over the sacrament of Christ, as to enable him to change that which is agreeable to the nature of the sacrament itself, unto what is incongruous with it ; and instead of an entire and perfect sacrament instituted by Christ himself, to put off upon the whole body of the Laity an imperfect sacrament, deprived of half that constitutes its entire perfection ?

Thus much as regards the *essential perfection* of the Eucharist.

Let us come to consider the *perfection of signification.*

It is an opinion commonly entertained among all Theologians, that the sacraments convey signs by their institution, and not only do that, but exhibit to the faithful the things so signified. Now the Eucharist was instituted on purpose that it might signify and exhibit to all who truly partake thereof, a perfect refreshment for the soul ; nor this alone, but an express and lively commemoration of the body of Christ, broken and lacerated on the cross, and of his blood shed for us on the same cross for the remission of sins. The Roman Church, therefore, is guilty of injustice, inasmuch as by withdrawing the cup from the Laity, she neither signifies nor exhibits in Lay-communion this refreshing of souls, which Christ vouchsafes graciously to bestow upon all his followers, in its entireness. She is guilty too of impiety towards Christ, seeing that she would willingly keep out of sight of all Laymen, and all but abro-

* Lib. 4, dist. 8, qu. 2.

† Part 3, qu. 80, art. 12.

‡ Cajet, ibid.

gate and hide, the blood which he shed, and which in the use of this Sacrament, he intended to be perpetually represented. Concerning the setting forth, and the exhibiting of this refreshment in its entirety, Durandus thus speaks.* *This sacrament was divinely ordained for spiritual refreshment, which is signified in a corporeal manner: nor is it perfect unless there be offered in it a something as food, and a something as drink.* Biel is of the same opinion: *The species of bread (he says†) and the species of wine, have primarily, and in their own nature, not merely one, but different significations, and different notions comprehended in them.* More, they differ in operation, and in sacramental efficacy also; for Tapper truly observes,‡ *Although Christ be entire under both kinds, yet his operations are guided according to the significations of each, and under one he makes use of the body as an instrument, under the other of blood; and seeing that sacraments confer the grace of which they are significant, the more perfect the signification is, the more complete must be the effect.* Prior to all these writers however, our Hales observes,§ *The receiving under both kinds,—the mode of receiving which our Lord has handed down—is superior in efficacy and completeness.* They, therefore who withhold from the Laity the wine, in the communion, filch from them what has been by Christ himself ordained to signify and effect sacramentally, the perfect refreshment of their souls. Now, as regards the commemorating the death of Christ, which was completed in the shedding of his blood, who does not see, that it is obscured, when his blood is not suffered to be poured out and dispensed even in a sacrament, for the refreshing of the souls of the Laity?

What have Romanists to say to these things? Some, that they may not be charged with putting the Laity off (in contradiction to Christ's institution) with an imperfect refreshment, hold out that subtil notion of *concomitancy*, affirming that the flesh of Christ, apart from the blood, or the blood apart from the flesh, is nowhere to be met with or can be communicated. Hence are they accus-

* Lib. 4, dist. 7, qu. 1, p. 693.

† In 4, dist. 8, qu. 2, p. 171.—[The translation of the passage here referred to has been made from the original of Biel, Davenant's quotation being inaccurate, perhaps through trusting to memory, or an inaccurate memorandum. It stands thus in Biel: "Species panis et vini non sunt unum sacramentum unitate significati et contenti per se et primo modo; sunt tamen unum utroque modo, loquendo de totali significato et contento. Patet, Iº, quia species panis et species vini habent diversa et non unum significatum et contentum per se primo.

‡ Tapp. apud Cassan. *de comm. sub utraque specie*, p. 1032.

§ Lib. 4, qu. 11, Memb. 3, p. 225.

tomed to conclude, that an entire Christ is exhibited, whole and perfect to communicants, under the species of bread alone. But they are altogether mistaken; for the question is not concerning a natural union of the flesh of Christ, with the blood, but concerning a sacramental union, signification, and entire operation. The bread does not by itself alone convey sacramental signification, nor an exhibition of refreshment in its fulness, nor a perfect commemoration and representation of the bloody death, which Christ intended should be represented in lively colours, by the pouring out of wine, and be tasted of, in the drinking of the consecrated wine, to the comfort of the communicants. Why, then (when they are enjoined to set the blood shed before the faithful to drink thereof,) do they substitute instead, the blood not as shed, but as it were, included? Cajetan has recourse to the perfection of the sacrifice, *which [argues he*] is always consecrated by the Priest under both kinds, and is taken by him under both kinds. Then comes the people's turn to communicate (he says) after the sacrifice and the sacrament have been perfected by the Priest. But that which comes in addition to anything, does not contribute, when the matter is completed, towards its perfection.* What he says about a perfect sacrifice of this description has no foundation in the holy Scriptures. Christ is said, in the Lord's supper, to have instituted a sacrament in representation of the sacrifice that was soon to follow, and for a perpetual commemoration of the same in future times; but that he offered himself for a sacrifice elsewhere than on the cross, or intended that he should afterwards be offered by others, we do not find. And what he adds about the sacrament being received entire by the Priest alone, is little to the purpose. For the point in dispute is, whether the dry communion, which is offered to Laymen, can be considered in the light of a perfect sacrament, or not. Cajetan replies, that *the Priest receives an entire sacrament, because he receives it in both kinds.* We reply, that consequently (on his own shewing) the people receive it imperfect and halved; because they receive in one kind only. Cajetan's closing remark—*That the people come to communicate after the sacrament has been perfected by the Priest, and that then their doing so is of no consequence, either to its perfection or its diminution*—such arguing as that, sure enough, is of no consequence. Our dispute with the Papists is not concerning the perfection of the Eucharist, as respects the officiating Priest alone, but as regards the (Lay) communicant. Although, therefore, the Mass-Priest (among Romanists)

* In. 3, Aquin. qu. 80, art. 12.

always favours himself with the Eucharist entire, both in respect to the signification as also to the representation, yet he presents to all others an imperfect one ; and that is a sufficient demonstration of the unfair dealing of the Roman Church. The notion, however, which seems to have entered Cajetan's brain—that *the communion of Laymen under one kind cannot be called imperfect, because there precedes it the entire communion by the Priest himself under both kinds*—is absurd enough. For as the imperfect Lay-communion, which immediately follows, does not prejudice the perfection of the Priests' communion, so the communion of the Priest which preceded that, howsoever perfect, can neither remedy nor supply the imperfect communion of the Laity which follows it. Whatever fine arguments, therefore, Papists may employ, the people's communion among them is proved to be halved, curtailed, and imperfect.* But to decide that, in subservience to the ambitious lust of Prelates, the supper of the Lord, which Christ ordained to be received by all believers, without distinction, in its perfect form and completeness, should be administered to Laymen, only in a curtailed and imperfect way ; not a man is there who will vindicate from the charge of injustice, impiety, and sacrilege.

4.—We may argue fourthly, in opposition to the Canon of Constance and Trent, with reference to the taking away the cup from the Laity, as follows: that to deprive the whole body of the Laity of what is equally due to all believers, cannot be effected, without inflicting very great injury upon them. But the blessed cup is just as due to them as to the Priests ; namely, by Divine right, being ordained by our Lord and Saviour himself, for all who are proper members of his body. For every baptized person, when he hath arrived at that time of life in which he can examine himself, and prepare for the reception of this Divine sacrament, has the same right to demand it, as well under the species of wine, as under the species of bread ; because, it was Christ's wish that the sacrament, whole and entire, should be reckoned among the blessings common to the Christian Church, not the peculiar privilege of the Priesthood. The duty of dispensing the Eucharist devolves upon the sacerdotal Order, and therefore, cannot be usurped by Laics ; but the right of demanding and receiving depends upon baptism, faith, and thirsting for Christ ; and therefore, concerns the Laity

* And yet, in a *Protestant* Country, the cause of "the people" is made at times quite a matter of apparent concern by the Romish Priesthood ; if it opens (that is) any prospect of advancement, then "the people" are used most liberally. We have had remarkable evidences of this of late, as the circumstances of the times seemed to require.

no less than it does Ecclesiastics. Such, therefore, as imagine, that Laymen may upon good grounds be debarred from receiving the sacrament of Christ's blood, by which the remission of sins is sealed to the faithful, may, on the same ground, intercept them equally well from the benefit of the blood shed; yea, from that communion of saints which in the Creed we profess to exist. In the writings of holy Fathers, the right of a Christian people to participate in the cup is fully recognised. Cyprian acknowledges,* that the people ought to be admitted, *by right of fellowship*, to partake of the Lord's cup in the Church. Chrysostom admits that, as far as regards the receiving of the Eucharist entire, Christians have as full a right to it in general, as Priests themselves: It is a very well known passage in which he thus speaks:† *In some cases, there is no distinction between the Priesthood and those over whom they preside; as when the tremendous mysteries are to be received; for all alike are worthy of them.* To this argument we may add, that this right of the people has been confirmed and established by the testamentary disposal of Christ. Now the rights of wills ought to be held most sacred; nor, after the Testator's death, can they be violated or altered in subservience to the humour or dictation of others. So it seemed to the Apostle himself, in Galat. iii 15. And Lawyers say, that a legacy is of no value which is left to be disposed of as another person pleases. Papists, consequently, ought to maintain, either that Christ did not bequeath this legacy of his blood to the Christian people, or confess that the Tridentine Fathers have, with sacrilegious daring, been guilty of violating the sacred rights of a testamentary provision.

But Bellarmine meets this argument of ours, derived from Christ's so willing it, by replying that the inheritance left to Christians was neither bread nor wine, but the body and blood of the Lord; which two are given as well under one kind as under both. This, therefore, is the only difference—that the Priests who drink of the cup receive the inheritance in virtue of two instruments (tabulis‡); the people who drink not, receive the same in virtue of one. But this difference is so immaterial, that it in no way affects those who share in heirship.§

But Bellarmine is mistaken: in the first place, because he would

* Epist. lib. 1, p. 2.

† In 2, *ad Cor.* Homil. 18 [tom. x., p. 670, edit. Paris, 1836.]

‡ “Testaments were usually written on *tables* covered over with wax.” Adams's *Roman Antiquities*, edit. by Boyd; p. 50. “Legal documents, and especially wills, were almost always written on such tablets.”—Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*.

§ Bellarm. *de Euch.* lib. 4, cap. 27.

make us such simpletons as to imagine that the bread itself, or the wine, is the inheritance destined for the faithful ; on the contrary, not even the body or the blood is what constitutes the inheritance promised to the adopted sons of God ; it is the enjoying of God in life eternal, which is attainable by no one among men, unless so far as he is joined to and united with the beloved son of God.

Secondly, Bellarmine has shamefully erred in this respect, in imagining that the blood and body of Christ were the only legacy bequeathed to the faithful in this last supper. Christ left, indeed, his body and blood to be participated in by believers, but accompanied with the most precious coverings or clothing of visible signs. To the devisees, therefore, belong the body, the blood, the bread, the wine, and whatever Christ in his will bequeathed to them. For if the legatee himself cannot divide the legacy left him, and in part accept it, and the other part decline, how much less is it allowable for the servants of the Testator (such as the Romish Priesthood would fain have themselves considered) to permit one part of the legacy, which Christ ordained, to be given to the faithful, and to intercept the other !

Lastly, Bellarmine's pretence that the thing is of no importance, whether in the Eucharist the body and blood of Christ be given to believers under one or both kinds, reflects as well upon the benignity as the foresight of Christ. Beyond doubt, our Saviour considered that he was providing for his sacred guests more liberally and kindly by dispensing to them both bread and wine, than he would have done by setting before them a dry feast ; as in his foresight also he judged, that it was more conducive to the design of this sacrament that he should impart it to believers under two kinds, rather than under the one of bread only. For since means are used in order to an end, it is not the part of wisdom to multiply means uselessly ; but those are useless which are of no importance for promoting the end in view. Bellarmine, then, is not far from uttering blasphemy when he makes no account of the partaking of the cup, and asserts that it may be omitted by Laymen when they communicate, as a thing of no consequence ; nay, that it is forbidden by a plain law. Suppose this legacy of the cup was a thing of no great moment, yet if it is due to all Christian believers by a testamentary right, he is acting injuriously who denies a thing, even of little moment, to a legatee when he demands his right ; and much more so he who backs the denial by an anathema. What we plead for concerning the right of the Laity is not a notion peculiar to heretics or Lutherans ; on the contrary the more candid among the Romanists have themselves entertained

the same opinion that we do on the matter. The Christian world recognised this right of the people to participate of the cup even at the Council of Trent, when the orators of the Emperor, of Sovereigns and Princes, earnestly importuned the Bishop of Rome, and also the Council itself, for the restitution of the cup.* Cas-sander writes, that very many of the more excellent Catholics were inflamed with the greatest desire to partake of the cup.† And Lorichius says somewhat severely,‡ *They are Pseudo-Catholics who put any hindrance in the way of the Reformation of the Church, Such are those who spare no blasphemies in their attempts to keep the Laity still refused a participation in the other species.* And so much on the right of the Laity to the cup.§

5.—The last argument we employ shall be derived from the office necessarily attaching to the Priesthood; because the holy Mother||—the Roman Church—recognises her own authority only in the administration of the sacraments, being in the meantime wholly unmindful of her duty and fidelity. But they who are constituted *Ministers*, not *Lords*, of the word and sacraments, are bound, from their office, to feed the souls of believers, as well with this sacrament as with the word, in accordance with the will of the Lord, and not their own. And as in preaching the Gospel he is not pure from the blood of the people, who shuns to declare unto them *the whole counsel of God*, revealed for their salvation (Acts xx., 27); so he is also guilty of their blood, who, in the administration of the Eucharist, declines to set before them any portion of that aliment which has been ordained by Christ himself for nourishing spiritually the souls of his people. Nor is it suffi-

* See Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, edit. 1841, pp. 242, 253.

† Consult. *de Comm. sub utraque specie*, p. 1046.

‡ *De Missa*. [GERARD LORICIUS, a German. The book quoted from was published in 1536, according to Gesner's *Bibliotheca*, edit. 1583, p. 281. Miræus says that he was originally a Lutheran.

§ See an interesting work recently published, *The Reformation and Anti-Reformation in Bohemia*, (vol. i.), for useful illustrations of this subject *historically*. It shews the constant need the Trent sect finds of having recourse to *secular* aid to keep up her numbers, and to enable her to *outvie*, if possible, every other Church.

|| "England stands on high ground in resisting the impositions of the Church of Rome, upon the principle of antiquity, because it is generally acknowledged, not only by Protestants, but also by some of the most learned and eminent of the Roman Communion—as Baronius and Suarez, that there was a Christian Church in Britain, even before there was one at Rome. The Church of Rome is not therefore, our Mother Church, but a sister only, and that a younger sister, however her flatterers may make her Mother of all Churches—(Dr. Pagitt's *Christianography*, Part. ii. p. 3. 1640)." From Mutter's *Discourse on Confession in the Tavistock Lectures*, 1827—28.

cient to say, that we set before them bread, although we withhold the cup: For he is not properly fulfilling the duty of a faithful steward, who defrauds his fellow-servants of any part of that allowance which has been liberally granted and appointed by the Lord for their use. For every one, as he has received grace, so is, he bound to administer it for the benefit of others, if he is desirous to maintain the name of *a good steward* with God and men (1 Peter, iv., 10). That man is consequently an unjust and niggard steward of the manifold grace of God who, when he has received from Christ the twofold nutriment of his body and blood in the Eucharist, for distribution to a believing people, takes upon himself to withhold one part of this spiritual food.

Let the Romanists, then, either declare that there is no flow of spiritual grace into the souls of believers, through the channel of the blessed cup; or at once admit, that in depriving men of this mean of grace, they are themselves sinning against the honour of God and the love of their neighbour, and so are acting most wickedly and unjustly. The retort of Romanists here, *That the sacramental use of the bread is not absolutely necessary to the salvation of believers, and consequently need not necessarily be dispensed to them*, avails but little for covering their unjust dealing. For if it were allowable to deprive the people of any mean of spiritual grace which has been instituted by Christ, under this pretext—that it is not absolutely necessary to salvation; then, not the cup alone, but the bread, yea, baptism itself, might be withheld from the Laity: seeing that to be willing and desirous to partake of the outward sacraments, is sufficient for the salvation of those who are debarred from doing so by the impossibility of the thing, or the wickedness of others.

And thus you have the wrong doing, in the withholding of the cup, proved by manifest arguments. But because, notwithstanding all these evidences, the Tridentines assert, that the Roman Church is justified in withholding the cup from the Laity, we shall drag to the light those just reasons, which the Tridentines were ashamed to bring forward into open daylight. We have them, however, in Gerson, Bellarmine, and others.*

1.—The first and their grand reason is, the danger of spilling the wine—a hazard to which the wine is almost necessarily exposed when the number of communicants is large. Hence Cajetan says,† *It is impossible (humanly speaking) to celebrate the communion among so many people under both kinds without a spilling of the*

* Part. 1. Contr. hæres, *de Comm. sub. utraque specie.*

† In 3. Aquin. Quæst. 80.

*blood under the species of wine. But it is an act of irreverence, nay of sacrilege, to expose the blood of Christ to this hazard, imputable as well to the people as to the rulers. Cajetan calls this a solid and main ground for introducing the custom for the people to communicate under the species of bread alone; and Bellarmine says just as much.**

I admit that great respect is due, even to the visible signs, because they represent and shew to us spiritually his living flesh and precious blood. I grant also, that neither rulers nor people are free from blame, if they behave irreverently towards these mysteries, or neglect to manifest towards them all due regard. But, admitting all this, I answer, that when we are enquiring about the reverence which ought to be manifested in the use of the sacred Eucharist, it is absurd to urge the disuse and withdrawal of the cup, under that pretext, from the whole believing people of Christ. Reverence towards the sacrament consists in partaking of it in a religious manner, agreeably to the intention of him who instituted it; not in a necessity of abstaining according to the tyrannical regulation of the Romish Church. The reverence arises from the opinion entertained of a supernatural and divine grace to be derived to believers through the sacrament; and this of itself tends to beget a desire and anxiety to participate of them. If any one should, out of reverence, decline to receive the sacrament, that is an incidental case; the individual considering himself, under existing circumstances, so ill prepared, that he cannot partake of it but with injury to his own soul. A continued refusal, therefore, of the blessed cup does not argue a reverence for the ordinance, but neglect of the interests of the people; the systematic withholding of it does not shew reverence for the sacrament in the Prelates, but contemptuous treatment of the people. Moreover, it is false to assert that the spilling of the blessed cup cannot be sufficiently provided against, when the number of communicants is large, unless by the cup being taken from and forbidden to all the Laity. The Christians, in the time of Tertullian, had filled all the cities, islands, townships of the Roman Empire, and even the camp not excepted.† After the conversion of Constantine to Christianity, the capacious temples would be thronged with Christians coming together to partake in the sacred solemnities; and they used to receive the Eucharist much more frequently and devoutly than is the case now-a-days; yet no one entertained the notion that the Laity should be denied a share in the cup, from an idle apprehension of spilling the wine, or on the

* *De Sacr. Euchar.* lib. 4. cap. 24

† *Apol.* cap. 37.

silly pretence of reverence. If it should at any time happen that the wine was spilt, it would be reckoned among those unexpected and rarely occurring cases, on account of which, as there is no necessity, so neither do we find that general regulations are made to give way to them. Lastly, the point on which the Papists dwell so much,* that *there is irreverence and sacrilege, if by chance the blessed wine be spilt on the ground*, is not to be conceded to them. If, through contempt or carelessness, this should at any time happen, whosoever should be the occasion of it might be under a heavy load of guilt; yet this circumstance would not tend to lower the dignity of the body of Christ or of his blood, as Aquinas admits, part. 3, qu. 80, art. 8. For I would learn of Papists what that is which would be exposed to indignity, supposing a spilling of the cup upon the ground were to happen? Not the body, not the blood of Christ; for that which is immortal and impassable cannot ever come into contact with a corporeal agent, much less be injured; not the wine: for (if we are to believe Papists) there is no wine remaining there, which by falling upon the earth can either be lost, or contract any uncleanness. It remains, therefore, that this crime of irreverence must be incurred from the mere elements being let fall upon the ground. And yet Christ himself (who knew better than a thousand Fathers of Trent what tended, or otherwise, to increase reverence towards his blood) permitted, nay commanded, the species of bread and wine, as they term them, to be let down into the stomach of communicants; a place, in my opinion, not more cleanly than the pavement of the temple. But strange and foolish notions of this kind, originating as they do in the strange dogma of transubstantiation, I am unwilling to stay longer in refuting.

2.—It is objected again, that the communion under both kinds is less profitable to the people than under the species of bread only, in places where the fervour and devotion of Christians has become weak.† Now, it is plain enough [say they] that that fervour, which heretofore existed in the Christian body, is not to be met with in the present times. As the Church then, aware of the existence of this imperfection and failing on the part of the Laity, prudently and justly desisted from administering a daily communion, as was formerly the custom; so for the same reason, she now very properly desists from making the Laity communicants under both kinds, from the circumstance of its having proved unedifying and dangerous to the common people.

* Aquin. quæst. disp. *De Luxur.* art. 2. resp. ad 12, et 14.

† Cajetan, in 3. qu. 80.

I reply, that if, in this period of the world's existence, the devotion of Christians has grown cool, it must be rekindled and roused up by the spiritual exhortations of Pastors, not be lulled into deeper sleep, and more and more chilled by edicts the most iniquitous. Nor is Cajetan acting fairly in holding up the custom in the early Church. For although she might, when the fervour of the people began to grow cold, omit assembling the Laity, or admitting them to daily communion, as used to be the custom in the Primitive Church; yet she never forced the people by any set law, and the terror of punishment, to relinquish frequent communion. But the Papal Church has not only ceased offering the communion to the Laity, however devout, under both kinds, but has put forth a terrible Canon, and sanctioned it by anathema, whereby all, except the individual officiating, are debarred from communicating in both kinds, and are bid to content themselves with a dry supper. Lastly, whoever among the Laity has attained to that degree of devotion which is sufficient to render him a true partaker of the body of the Lord, such an one is meet enough to become a profitable partaker also of the blood of the Lord. For (as our Hales has truly remarked,*) *whosoever receives the sacrament worthily, his charity is increased by that action or habit.* Now the grace which has been obtained and increased by the act of communicating in a prior case, renders him more holy and meet for any following. And, in truth, Cajetan himself did not venture to deny this: *If (says he†) any one finds himself indeed increased with spiritual dispositions, so that he is more worthy for receiving under the second species than he was in receiving the first, undoubtedly, in taking the cup, he receives the spiritual fruit of the sacrament, namely, greater grace either in degree or extent. And no one so disposed ever doubted that it was more useful to communicate under both kinds than under one only.* And let me, with the good leave of Cajetan, add, that there is no one of the Laity who rightly receives the blessed bread, but gains from thence some increase of spiritual grace; for partaking of the cup, he will, consequently, become more worthy and more holy: and in such a case, this participation under both kinds would be neither unfruitful nor dangerous, on the contrary, to all Laymen to whom the Priest gave the bread with advantage, he might offer the cup with greater. Again,

3.—They object that, *Many persons have a dislike to wine, and are abstinents, either by nature or education. What, there-*

* Lib. 4. qu. 11. pag. 207, b.

† Ubi. supra, in 3. qu. 80.

fore, are such persons to do? Must they abstain from the communion altogether? But that is not allowed by the Divine laws. It seemed, then, to the Romanists, that it was, on that account, competent to the Council of Trent to make a law for generally withholding the cup from the Laity.*

I answer, Never was there a more unjust or foolish scheme thought of. It is unjust, that merely for the sake of one man among a thousand who is abstemious, the whole multitude of believers must be deprived of a participation in the cup bestowed by Christ. It is foolish to reason thus:—There are some few abstemious persons, to whom it is difficult to determine how the Eucharist should be administered; therefore, the Council of Trent did rightly in making a law not to allow the cup to any of the Laity at all.† Innocent VIII. acted somewhat more justly, when, on account of a deficiency of wine among the Norwegians, he did not forthwith interdict the use of the cup to all Europe, but allowed the Norwegians to communicate without wine. The Tridentines, too, would have shewn more consideration if, in accordance with the examples thus set them, they had allowed the abstemious to receive the Eucharist in what manner they could partake of it; they would not, then, have decreed, that both they who could, and were desirous to partake under each kind, should be excluded from the cup altogether. It is certain, that there were not fewer abstinents in former times than in our day; yet the Primitive Church never was so foolish as to make this circumstance a ready pretext for mutilating the sacrament, and of denying the cup even to those who were not abstemious. Although among myriads of men there is hardly even a single individual to be met with who is so abstemious as to be unable to sip a small portion of wine, such as would suffice for observing the institution of Christ. Hales records,‡ that there have been persons who loathed all substantial food, who yet retained the Eucharistical elements well. Why should they not expect the same favour from God, who devoutly thirst for the cup? so that, although they cannot bear the taste of wine elsewhere without a loathing, yet they could at the table of the Lord.

4.—A fourth disadvantage [objected] and which follows from the necessity of receiving in both kinds, is almost identical with the preceding. For Bellarmine urges§, *That there is a great scarcity of wine in some countries, nor can it be bought but at a high price;*

* Bellarm. lib. 4. *De Euchar.* cap. 24.

† Bellarm. *De Euchar.* lib. 4, cap. 24, ex Volaterr. lib. 7.

‡ Part. 4. qu. 11, p. 226.

§ *De Sacr. Euch.* 4. 24. [tom. iii. col. 681. edit. Paris, 1613.]

consequently, if the cup is enjoined to be partaken of by all, the generality can never, or very rarely communicate. And he instances the Japanese.

To which we reply, that the point in question is not whether the Japanese, or any other nations who find it impossible to procure wine for the service of the Eucharist, do right in celebrating it under one kind only; but whether the Roman Church was acting justly, when, under an anathema, she deprives the Italians, French, Germans, English, and, of course, all the Christian world, of a participation in the cup, because of the scarcity of wine in Japan? It is not, however, very likely, that either the Japanese, or any nation which has intercourse with Europeans, are so much put to it to obtain wine that they have none to make use of in the Lord's Supper. The reason Bellarmine pretends to find,* in the great expense of procuring it, is mean enough, and unworthy of an answer. Nor ought an infrequent communion to be a matter of anxiety to Romanists, among whom it suffices to receive the Sacrament once a year. Although then we quite agree with Innocent, that in a case of necessity, and much more of impossibility, there is an excuse from the positive obligation of receiving in both kinds, because it is better to have an imperfect supper, than none; yet is there no justifiable plea, on which a law for mutilating the Lord's Supper can be defended, where there exists no impossibility against observing the Rule of the Institution, no necessity for departing from it; nay, every facility for fulfilling the same exactly. But again, they allege,

5.—God himself has, by signs and wonders, manifested his approbation of the wisdom of the Church of Rome, in her rule of administering the Eucharist to the Laity under one kind only.† Hence, as Bellarmine seems to intimate, what has proved so pleasing to God, cannot be justly displeasing to any pious man. And in this connection he brings forward a little story from Hales‡ to this effect: that—Once upon a time there were certain Monks among whom one species only was in use, who began to require both elements; but in the mean time it happened, that when the Priest, during the solemn rites, was breaking the host, the whole hollow of the patin filled with blood, flowing from the host itself. By which [they would have us understand] God intended to signify, that it was useless for them to be crying out for the cup of blood, when they had blood already under the species of bread.

* Apud Bellarm. *de Euch.* 4. 24.

† Bellarm. *ibid.* 4. cap. 24. [col. 682.

‡ Part. 4. qu. 11. pag. 224. b.

I answer with Gerson, (part 1.,) *That the world in her old age is liably to be deluded by the exhibitions of false miracles; and therefore miracles of this description are very much to be suspected.* Nay Hales himself teaches us,* *that no great faith is to be put in such prodigies, because appearances of this kind sometimes happen by the contrivance of men, and by the suggestion of the devil.* Nor is it improbable that this fable has been foisted into the new edition of Hales† by those who wanted to give communion under one kind the support of a miracle. Lastly, if it were worth while, to seek a confirmation of our cause from this prodigy, we might say that God meant to signify, that he was not pleased that those Monks should have access to the blood of Christ shut up in the veins, through the means of concomitancy alone, but desired that being poured into the cup, it should be communicated to believers in the way in which it had been instituted by Christ; for although in the natural body of Christ, the flesh is not found apart from the blood, yet in the sacramental participation of Christ, the flesh is taken separately and the blood separately; because the body of Christ does not exist sacramentally under the species of wine, nor his blood under the species of bread; as Hales himself frankly admits ‡

These, however, formed but the more slight objections put forward by Cajetan and Bellarmine. There are others of far greater importance, which we shall select from a treatise of Gerson,§ and briefly refute.

1.—He says—Were the communion to be granted to the Laity under both kinds, there would be a hazard of its leading to the delusive presumption, that there was as much honour conferred on Laymen, in reference to partaking of this sacrament, as there is upon the Priests themselves. Accordingly Romanists have entertained the notion, that the only way to eradicate an error so pernicious and injurious to the Sacredotal Order, was to withhold the cup from the Laity altogether.

* Part. 4. pag. 227. b.

† After a careful examination of various Editions of Hales's works accessible in the University Libraries at Oxford, it does not appear that there is any ground for the surmise of Bishop Davenant.

‡ For a clear elucidation of these and other distinctions, both in this and the sacrament of baptism, and of the views of the framers of our Liturgy on the points in which we differ from the Church of Rome, in reference to them, the Reader may be referred to a short, but important article—Cranmer's PREFACE to his answer to Gardiner, in the volume of his works on the Lord's Supper, recently published by the Parker Society, and by which that Society has rendered great service to the Church.

§ Cont. hæres. *De comm. Laic. sub utraque specie.*

I answer, that Popish Mass-men may flatter themselves as they please ; yet it is very certain, that the worthiness of all true believing Christians is, as regards the taking of the body and blood of Christ, just the same. For the Sacerdotal Order imparts to the ordained the power of *celebrating* the sacrament of the Eucharist—a privilege of which the Laity are not partakers ; but it does not impart a worthiness to *partake*. Hence it follows that a Layman, who approaches the Lord's Supper with any measure of faith, charity, and holiness, is more worthy to partake of the body and blood of Christ, not only than any ordinary Priest, but than even Cardinals themselves, or the Roman Pontiff. It is not *external* conditions which make the difference in a greater or less worthy receiving of this sacrament ; this worthiness or unworthiness depends altogether upon the *internal* dispositions. If any Layman, if a mendicant even, drawn by a measure of enlarged faith, and inflamed with an increased measure of love, approach this table of the Lord—he who in this frame partakes of the body and blood of the Lord, is assuredly more worthy than any Priest or Prelate, however he may shine and glitter in any external dignity.

[But again they assert]

2.—That were the cup to be generally allowed, there would be danger lest the people should think that to take the Eucharist under both kinds was, and is still, a thing so plainly necessary, that all those will perish who have thought, done, or taught otherwise, or who now teach otherwise. Lest the Laity should fall into this danger, the Papal Priests are of opinion, that the cup cannot be restored to them again.

I answer, that there is no danger of that at all, were Christians only satisfied in their own minds, that it was and is always necessary, on the score of the obligatory nature of the precept, and of the obedience consequently due to it, to administer and receive the Eucharist in that manner in which Christ our Lord administered the same on the first institution of it : and which he gave directions how to observe in future, as well by his example as his command. For it does not depend upon the authority of the Church, as if it were a thing left undecided, to direct what signs are to be used in Divine sacraments ; but that rests upon the Divine authority of the person who instituted them : to whom it is necessary that all of us should yield obedience. If then God had directed the Sacrament of the Eucharist to be received under the sign of bread alone, the Church ought to have been content with it. But now, since God has thought proper to institute this sacrament under two signs, it is necessary for us to take both ; it is unlawful to exclude com-

municants by a sweeping law either from one or the other. And yet, while the necessity for doing so is admitted, it ought not forthwith to be inferred, that all who have thought, or acted, or taught otherwise, are lost. Many individuals have made grievous mistakes on various subjects; yet to pronounce such absolutely condemned, would be to offend still more grievously. Nor must it be taken at once for a settled point, that all, who by ministering or communicating under one kind only, have acted contrary to the institution of Christ, are, on that account, lost and cut off from salvation. For if the Priests involved in a common error supposed that the Eucharist might, without contravening the institution, be presented to the Laity under one species only, it was a sin of ignorance which, with a God so merciful, would meet with a ready pardon: if though their conscience protested against it, they so acted through fear of anathema or death, it was a sin of infirmity, of which it is not improbable that the greater part repented at their death. Lastly, it is not our business to pass any opinion as to the salvation, even of those who have taught and urged the erroneous doctrine of taking away the cup from the Laity. To their own Master they stood or fell, who alone knows with what intention they taught this, and with what disposition they at last departed this life. It is sufficient for us to be assured, that the cup has been taken from the Laity through the error and injustice of Prelates; but what decision God may have passed, concerning men acting so wrongfully and unjustly, must be left to himself. [Yet again they remark.]

3.—*From conceding the cup, the people might be led into the notion of supposing that the virtue of the Eucharist did not consist so much in the consecration itself as in the taking of it.* And the Papists are apprehensive, that if this notion should become fixed in men's minds, it would tend to detract much from the veneration and honour due to the holy Eucharist.

I answer, there is no danger to be apprehended from this opinion, one against which Gerson so warmly set himself. For the virtue which attaches to the sacramental signs, in consequence of the institution and consecration, is not inherent to the elements themselves, which are not capable of receiving spiritual grace, but for man's sake is, in way of a *contract*, annexed to the sacraments. The virtue of the Eucharist therefore manifests itself, and puts forth its strength, not merely in the circumstance, that the bread and wine are consecrated, nor inasmuch as they are viewed, carried about in procession, or preserved in vessels, but because being consecrated, and prepared for the spiritual use of believers, they are

participated in by them according to the institution of Christ. It is not from the sacramental signs themselves that the virtue of them is derived, but by those communicating; and there is consequently more regard had to the disposition in partaking, than to the consecration. Nor does this opinion detract anything from the honour due to the sacraments; for it is on this account that they are held in the greatest veneration, namely, that they are applied to, and received by the faithful, in accordance with the institution of Christ, and are as it were vehicles and channels through which the streams of spiritual grace may descend on men.

4.—There remains the last argument of the Romanists to be considered, and which is with them the greatest of all, and it alone (if they would confess the truth) forms the grand hindrance to restoring the cup to the Laity. For (as Gerson remarks very truly) *it would follow that the Roman Church has hitherto been mistaken in her decisions concerning this Sacrament; and that General Councils have erred in faith and good manners.* For whilst Gerson was alive the Council of Constance had decreed in spite of the institution of Christ to the contrary,* that the Eucharist should be communicated to the Laity under one kind only. The Council of Trent† came to the same decision, and ratified it; and this decree the Roman Church still maintains and contends for up to the present day.

I answer, the consequence Gerson feared would indeed follow, and however true as it is, the Roman Church ought not to err for ever in not confessing that she has erred.‡ There is no Council held in which it might not happen, that a majority would sometimes get the better of a wiser portion; which it is sufficiently clear from the history of the times, was the case at the late Trent meeting.§ For the better and sounder Catholics were desirous to have the custom, which had been unhappily introduced, brought into conformity to the rule of the institution as originally framed. But the stronger and more heretical, who decided [as if it were] right that the institutions of Christ should be made to yield to the laws of

[* See the original of the Decree in Perceval's *Roman Schism*. pp. 144, 5.]

† The managing *Directors*, that is to say, got a decree passed to this effect, after long debates, and much opposition, See Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, (pp. 243—6) proving that the members of the Church of Rome would themselves have completely subverted their own Church, so far as anti-Catholic, had they not been overborne and wearied out by the artifice and management of the Popish faction—the “wretched Tridentines,” as Mr. Froude has termed them. The Council of *Trent* is the unique Council of an unique Church!

‡ Canus, lib. 5. cap. 5. [pag. 129. edit. Venet. 1759.]

§ Vide Cassand. pp. 1039 and 1046.

the Roman Church [managed] to have it retained. But in such a case the advice of Mirandula ought to be followed.* *If a majority decree anything which is in opposition to the Divine writings, while the remainder of a contrary opinion are the fewer, we must yet abide with the minority.* In short, every Church ought to be more solicitous about Divine truth, than for maintaining its own authority. Let Augustine advise us†:—*If the Church have erred in any provincial Council, it ought to be amended by that of a fuller assembly; if any error has been committed in a full and general Council, the error of the former must be amended by the authority of the latter.*

We may then come to the conclusion that the Church of Rome had not, even from the beginning, any just reasons for taking away the cup from the Laity; nor does there exist any good reason now, why she should not in justice restore what has been unjustly withheld.

* Tom. 2. *De Fide et Ord. credendi*, theorem. 16.

† Lib. ii. *De Bapt. contra Donat.* cap. 3.

ADDITION TO NOTES.

Addition to Note, p. 327.

"'Tis under Leo IX. that Hildebrand begins to be distinguished, a man the most celebrated of his age. Born in Tuscany, where his father, they say, was a carpenter, he studied in France, embraced the Monastic rule there, and returned into Italy to give counsel to Leo IX., Nicholas II., and Alexander II., and finally to succeed them in the Pontifical Throne. The idea of a universal Theocracy had assumed in his fiery and iron soul the character of a passion; all his life was devoted to the undertaking. To assure the empire of the Priesthood over the rest of mankind, he saw the necessity of reforming their manners, and concentrating their relations, to isolate them more strictly, and to form them into one great family, the members of which should no longer recollect having belonged to a secular one. Ecclesiastical celibacy was as yet but a general practice, introduced into, and renewed in almost every Church, but in almost all, nevertheless, modified by exceptions or transgressions. Hildebrand resolved to reduce it to a vigorous law; at his instigation Stephen IX., in 1058, declared marriage incompatible with the Priesthood; treated as concubines all the Priests' wives; and excommunicated both them and their husbands, if the union was not instantly divided. The Clergy made some resistance; the Priests of Milan, especially, objected the permission granted them by St. Ambrose to marry, but in first nuptials only, and provided it was with a virgin.* Hildebrand, to cut these remonstrances short, classed in the number of heretics the obstinate gainsayers.†—*The Power of the Popes*, vol. 1., pp. 100, 101. Tims, Dublin, 1838.

Page 400.

The following addition to what is said in the Note on the page referred to, and from the pen of a learned and valued friend, may not be unacceptable, nor without its use to the reader:—

"The words *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος* properly denote whatever is discernible by the sense of sight; and consequently are used to signify *appearance*, *form*. But they are employed by Plato (not always, but when he used them in describing his philosophical opinions) in a figurative application, to denote what we may call the *absolute and primitive forms* of all created things. In speaking, then, or thinking of the Platonic theory of *ideas*, it is absolutely necessary to discard from the mind the modern application of that term *idea*, in the sense of thought, conception, or notion.

"Plato deemed that all created things and qualities, being themselves produced and destructible, cannot properly be said to 'be,' or have a real existence; but derive their supposed and apparent existence from certain absolute forms, which he conceives to be *real existences*, eternal, unchangeable, unaffected by any adjuncts or accidents. He sometimes speaks of these as *pro-*

* Landulph Senior, *Hist. Mediol.* 1, 3, et 4: *Rer. Italie.* v. 4, p. 6, &c. Cocio. *Hist of Milan*, pa. 1, b. 6. &c,

† Baron. *Ann. Eccles.* ad ann. 1059.

duced by the Deity;—sometimes he seems to imply that they are *parts* of the Deity, or co-existent and co-ëternal *emanations* from the Deity. They are the models, archetypes, from which all things perceptible by human sense, or the *ordinary* exercise of understanding, are but impressions, imitations, becoming what they are in consequence of a certain participation of the absolute form. He illustrates this by a mirror. What the reflection of the sun, stars, &c., on a mirror is to the visible sun, stars, &c., the same are those visible objects to the *ἰδέαι* or absolute forms of *sun-ness*, *star-ness* (if such terms may be allowed). In fact, that which we recognise simply as an intellectual abstraction, the notion of which is deduced from comparison of the several objects of sense and reflection, Plato conceived to be an actually existing, independent, eternal being:—*οὐσία, τὸ ὄν αἰεί, τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, unproduced, indestructible, invariable, invisible, imperceptible to the senses, discernible only by the intellect.

“ For example. He deems that there is an actual existence, an *αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος* (not merely what we, in reference to our mode of thinking, call the abstract notion of man independently of all distinguishing particulars of classes or individuals; but) *an absolute man-ness*—really possessing all the essential qualities which constitute *man* as *man*, but without any adjunct whatever; not tall nor short, nor wise or ignorant, nor of any colour, or country, or character, or anything else, but pure *man*, and nothing but *man*. You, and I, and Socrates, and Alexander, are only *εἰκονες* and *μιμήματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπου*—images, imitations, formed on that model, receiving from it a certain impression (*τυπωθέντες*), and so partaking of that which constitutes us men; *οὐ τούτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον*. So the *αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν*, the *absolute form of goodness*, the *primary model of good*, is that which conveys *goodness* to each thing and class of things which bear that quality, and causes them to be *good*. In like manner, he uses in different parts of his works terms denoting the absolute form or being of *animality*, *fire-ness*, *justice*, *equality*, *size*, *health*, *strength*, *moral excellence*, or *physical beauty*. Nay, he says, that the Deity produced a single couch or bed, which is purely a couch without size, locality, material, &c., but *ἰδέα κλινῆς* the absolute form or model of *couch-ness*!

Such are the theories of Plato, as they lie scattered through his works; chiefly in his *Parmenides*, *Timæus*, *Phædo*, *Republic*, &c.

“ It has been supposed by some that he means by all this no more than what is ordinarily meant by intellectual abstractions, namely, the mere mental notion of animality, health, rationality, &c., without any direct reference to any *supposition* or subject, but as in imagination withdrawn from every subject;—expressing this, however, only in a more fanciful and poetic manner. But, to mention no more, an argument which he uses in his *Phædo* shews that he intended his language to be understood literally. He attempts to prove that our souls have existed in a former state, and that all our present knowledge is but reminiscence, by observing, that the qualities which we now see embodied in their respective subjects *remind* us of the *absolute forms*, which could not be the case unless we ourselves, that is, our souls, had *previously* seen and been acquainted with those *ἰδέαι* in their absolute state. Besides, the occasional remarks of Aristotle, and, in one of his works, the laboured refutation of one branch of Plato's theory, shews that his view of it was just what is above described. And no one had better opportunities of knowing his instructor's views; nor is there any writer, ancient or modern, who is more fair and correct in his statement of any sentiments which he thinks it necessary to controvert.

“ The subject became a matter of warm controversy among the Schoolmen

of the xiith century; Duns Scotus maintaining nearly the Platonic system; Occham contending, in the opposite extreme, that our abstract words are merely conventional symbols, not only not representing actual things in existence, but not even having any prototype in our intellect or imagination. It is happy for us that we have no need to trouble ourselves in the war between the Nominalists and the Realists.

"If we suppose, then, Davenant to have used the term *Platonic Idea or Form* in its scientific and accurate sense, he intends to shew that Protestants, when they use the expression, *The Invisible Church*, do not mean that there is in nature any *αὐτὸ—ἐκκλησία*: any invisible, eternal, independent, absolute essence which may be called by the abstract term *Church-ness*, which by imitation, application, or emanation, constitutes all particular Churches to be such. [He might have added, neither do we refer to the intellectual conception of the abstract quality.] But the term is applied to the actual, concrete, really-existing Church of God, in the various references which his Determination describes.

Page 518,

Respecting the birth-place of Rubeis, the *Dictionnaire Géographique Universel* (Paris, 1132), contains the following information:—

"SOMASCA, a village in the kingdom of Venetian-Lombardy; province of Bergamo, from which it is 31 m., North West; district of Caprino, on the left bank of the Adda. It contains a Monastic establishment of Somascan Friars ('Frères Somasques'); founded by Jerome Emilien, who devote themselves to the care of orphans, and the education of the poor."

The "Permit" of one of Rubeis' works is "D. Mauritius de Domis, Præpositus Generalis Cler. Reg. Congreg. Somachæ et Doctrina Christianæ, in Gallia R. P. D. Jo. Baptistæ De Rubeis, Sacerdoti Professo nostræ Congregationis." This work is dedicated to D. Tiberio, Muto Viterbiensi Episcopa.

GENERAL INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

A.

ACTION, a lawful one becomes unlawful from circumstances, i. 480, 481.

ADOPTED the, in Christ, alone attain to life eternal, ii. 80.

ADOPTION, an act of the mere mercy of God, ii. 78—88; a right to the kingdom of heaven obtained by it, i. 340, ii. 82; does not confer worthiness for life eternal on good works, *ibid.*

ADULTERY, 401; distinction between different primary acts, *ibid.*

APOSTASY of Romanism proved, ii. 335.

Applying the **CAUSE**, often attributed to what properly agrees to the thing applied, 250—52.

ASSURANCE of Faith, its saving effects where genuine, ii. 233.

B.

BAPTISM, how far it takes away sin, 19; the virtue of its operation perpetual, 22; frees from the guilt of sin at once, and from its contagion by degrees, 24, 50, 54; compared to the Red Sea, 43; frees from original condemnation, not from the poison of inbred corruption, 80; remits concupiscence, but leaves it in the baptized, 84; in what sense it does away crime, 92.

BELIEVER, how he is said to be light, 169; how righteous, 13, 188; how unrighteous, 187; how he overcomes his spiritual enemies, 182.

BELIEVERS, how they may be said to die to sin, 26; how they sin more grievously than others, 37; why not wholly sanctified in this life, ii. 46; how said to be *worthy* of such and such things, ii. 134.

BELIEVERS, true, may be assured of their salvation, ii. 226; what constitutes a true one, 227.

BELLARMINE, his shamefully lying, 5; calumnies against Augustine, 91; against Luther and Melancthon, 176; against Luther and Calvin, 291; opinions of his akin to blasphemy, 46; a silly joke by him,

110; his *Justification* of an Ethiopian examined, 187.

BISHOPS, according to Romanists, are in a more perfect state than Monks, 412, 419.

BLASPHEMIES of Papists, 227.

BLIND OBEDIENCE of the Jesuits dangerous and unlawful, ii. 248, 362.

C.

CELIBACY, 454; compared with conjugal life, 456, 490; not necessarily connected with Holy Orders, ii. 448. [See its practical working illustrated in the *Christian Magazine* for March, 1846.]

CHARITY, CHRISTIAN, imperfect in this life, 181; pays due regard to the circumstances of works left optional, 423, 441; its absence renders all else of no avail, i. 445; according to its nature fulfils the law, ii. 38.

CHASTITY, its true nature, 367, 391.

CHILDREN not fitted for performing works of Counsels, 409. [An important and extended consideration of this subject by Davenant, in his *Exposition on the Colossians* (ch. iii. 20, or Translation, vol. ii. pp. 175—189) should have been referred to on the above page, as admirably calculated to meet the intriguing of Priests and Jesuits in the present day.]

CHRIST, the Head of his Church on the score of dignity and influence, 11; what it is to be buried with him, 25; to what extent he assumed our nature, 190; fulfilled the law for us, 239; in a meritorious degree, 241—43.

— how his righteousness becomes ours, 188, 189.

— our surety, 248; what was ours imputed to him, what was his put to our account, 240; yet not constituted a sinner inherently, &c., *ibid.*; how he justifies and sanctifies us, 209—243.

CHRIST, our justifying righteousness, we the righteousness of God in Him, but justified, 211; his righteousness imputed for that end, 242, 43.

CHRIST'S obedience the formal cause of our justification, 163; but from its imputation we are not inherently righteous, 242; its place and efficacy in our justification, 237.

CHRIST could not sin, 89; his obedience merits for us inherent grace, 239; in what manner and to what extent, 189; his merit avails for us after the infusion of inherent grace, 226—251.

— to "put on Christ" and the gifts of sanctification what, 247; to what the phrase applies, *ibid.*

CHRIST'S incarnation was not merited by the ancient Fathers, *ii.* 290; his sacrifice alone is expiatory, *ii.* 404.

CHRISTIANS termed temples of God, 33; ought to render testimony to the true faith, 277; how far they are established in it, *ibid.*

CHURCH INVISIBLE, what it is, *ii.* 400.

CHURCH MILITANT described, 23, 43, 191.

— of what it consists, *ii.* 474.

CHURCH OF ENGLAND fully competent to bind to the observance of ceremonies, *ii.* 330.

— OF ROME an apostate Church, *ii.* 334.

COMMANDS of God not to be confounded with one another, 125; are delighted in by the regenerate, *ii.* 38; were not impossible to man in his state of uprightness, 48; are not possible to be fulfilled in our fallen state, 50; the impossibility does not argue that God is cruel, 56; from it many advantages accrue to the regenerate, 57.

COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE cannot exist between God and us, *ii.* 102.

CONCUPISCENCE unrestrained is sin, 84; in whom in particular, 60; definition of its first motions, 63; has both the matter and the form of sin, 130; sense in which it may be called sin figuratively, 86; is part of the old man, 129, 373; is sometimes taken for the corrupt disposition, 127; how far it is formally opposed to the Divine law, and how far not, 70; its act is the violation of the moral law, 124; its guilt two-fold, 50.

THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWER, the act of concupiscence and its irregular motions distinguished, 78. Why called languor, 87; in what sense infirmity, 95. Opinion of Augustine concerning the remission of the condemning nature of its actual

guilt, 83. It defiles the best works of the regenerate, 335; its motions two-fold, 374; its influence affects every good work, 375:

CONCUPISCENCE considered at large in its sinfulness, *ii.* 209.

CONFESSION OF THE FAITH, a public one in some measure necessary to salvation, 311.

CONSCIENCE, its testimony and dictates, 276.

COVENANT, the legal, requires perfect obedience, 287; the Evangelical, the condition of faith only, 288. The regenerate are not brought to salvation by it, *ii.* 46.

CREATURE, NEW, 8; how we are so called, and how made such, 169.

— in what sense all creatures and their works are pleasing to God, 322.

CULPA, among the Schoolmen, what, 140; why they abstain from the word after regeneration, 148.

CURIOSITY for knowing secret and unnecessary things is sin, 113.

D.

DAVID, how he loved God with his whole heart, 184.

DECREE OF GOD, does not take away man's freedom, *ii.* 337.

DEGREES OF VIRTUE come under a precept, 334.

DEVIL, how he incites to sin, 127.

DISORDERS of the body and of the mind distinguished, 112.

DIVERSITY of Degrees in the Ministry, scriptural, *ii.* 438.

DIVINE FAVOUR not obtained by merit of congruity, *ii.* 393.

— foreknowledge, not the cause of man's fall, *ii.* 350.

DUTY, obligation to, twofold, 489; no one can compensate by it for what he receives, *ii.* 103.

E.

ECCLESIASTICS may exercise civil jurisdiction, *ii.* 275.

ECCLESIASTICAL censures, their nullity for abrogating the duties of civil life, *ii.* 487.

EFFECTS of predestinating grace, 199.

ELECT, have many things which Adam never possessed, 189.

EVANGELICAL COUNSELS; opinions of Romanists concerning them, 382; their six errors respecting them considered, *ibid.* How far admissible, 389; their works not more perfect than those prescribed in the law, 392; when they become works of righteousness, 395: are not re-

compensated with greater reward than those required by the law, 399. The matter of a Counsel not better than that of a precept, 400, 455; nor more difficult, 453. Their acts, when they become more perfect than other acts, 401. Their object twofold, 429; their works are not certain effects of internal perfection, 430; do not indicate a state of perfection, 407, 455. How any embrace them rightly, 433. They who are influenced by the Holy Spirit sin, if they do not fulfil the Counsels, 435, 456. Works of Counsels without love of no avail, 445. In what sense the greater reward is due to them, 457, 65, 80, 84. The Papistic Counsels pre-suppose a greater measure of love than is required by the law, 460, 61. See this subject discussed again in the *Determinations*, ii. 386.

F.

FALL OF ADAM, what injury it brought upon us, 44, 164, 237.

FAITH, its effects, 181, 259; is the previous condition for obtaining justification, 274; is imputed to us for righteousness, *ibid*; is the instrumental, not the formal cause of it, 161; is not perfect in this life, 181, 216; how it may be said to remain in the future life, 181.

Faith of Abraham, and of the Eunuch, 182. What is attributed to faith is due to Christ, 249. A public profession of it in some measure necessary to salvation, 211. It may be understood separately, but cannot be separated from good works, 315; makes good works acceptable to God, 321, 340.

— its nature and object, ii. 228; what is justifying, 408; what saving, 374; True, cannot be disunited from love, 415.

FOR, the particle, does not always indicate the cause of a thing, 311.

FORM, what, 232; is properly called *substance*, 186; when to be understood in a less strict sense, *ibid*.

FORMAL CAUSE, what, 186, 232; different application of it, 206; different effects, 228.

FORMS of speech which heretics may abuse should be avoided, 295.

FREE-WILL not adequate to spiritual good, ii. 265; its real properties, 339.

G.

GIFTS OF GOD do not merit with God, ii. 91.

GLORY OF GOD, the chief end of

Christians, 277; our obligations to promote it, and in what way, 425.

GOD, his essence consists neither of parts, nor accidents, ii. 344. His decree does not take away man's freedom, 387; would have all men come to the knowledge of himself, 424.

— will be glorified not only in our justification, but in our holy conversation, i. 225; in giving, does not surrender his own right over what is given, ii. 189; not bound from justice to reward us, 78, 89; nor is he a debtor to us from gratitude, 100. In what sense he is said to be just in bestowing eternal life, 139. His promise does not make him our debtor on the ground of justice, 140. There would be no injustice in Him, though he should not give eternal life to those living piously, 177. Commutative justice does not exist with Him, 193; knows no respect of persons, 145; his benefits cannot be repaid, 103.

GOD'S love always produces a lovely effect in the object beloved, ii. 10; is founded not in the perfection of the regenerate, but in Christ the Mediator, 30.

GOOD arises from perfect causes, 310.

GOOD WORKS depend for their reward upon the merits of Christ, ii. 154: See MERITS.

GOOD WORKS, what are such, i. 273, 317; on what ground required in the Gospel, 288. Necessary in adults, 274; those of the dying malefactor considered, 279; internal required for justification, 274, and after obtaining it, 275; ultimate objects of them, 277, 321. Necessity of, neither denied by Luther, nor Melancthon, nor Calvin, 281, 282. Do not prove merit in grace, 337; ii. 105, 108, 140; do not evince that God is a respecter of persons, 146. To give oneself to good works, and to keep the Divine commands, not one and the same thing, i. 283, 284.

GOOD WORKS of the regenerate are truly good, 317; they are in a supernatural sense acceptable and well pleasing to God, 321, 322; are destined for rewards, 324. They flow from a heart purified by faith, 323; yet are imperfectly good, 328; are defiled by the adhesion of sin, 332; do not satisfy the Divine law, ii. 93; they need the fatherly compassion of God that they may be accepted, i. 337; cannot stand the scrutiny of the Divine justice, *ibid*;

yet are not to be regarded as mortal sins, 342. Have in themselves a supernatural goodness, 320; are accepted not in themselves, or on their own account, but for the sake of Christ, 322; are the gifts of God, 424.

A right intention alone is not sufficient for producing good works, 354.

GRACE, why its constant assistance should be sought, 64; inherent makes a difference between the works of unbelievers and the regenerate, 320; a measure adequate to the fulfilling of the law given to no one, ii. 15; and that for two reasons, 16. The infusion of grace does not oblige God to recompense from justice, 84, nor does it merit with God, 85; the fruits of it are the mere gifts of God, i. 468; effects of predestinating grace, 199. Infused grace not to be trusted to, 245. Augustine refers many passages to inherent grace improperly, *ibid.* That which shall enable the regenerate to fulfil the law, God can bestow, ii. 2, 3.

GRACE not conferred by the mere external act of the Sacraments, ii. 342.

GUILT of original sin how taken away, 25.

—— of concupiscence twofold, 50.

—— remission of considered, ii. 391.

H.

HEART, its cleansing not the cause of justification, but the companion, 192.

HOLINESS inherent, not the cause of sonship, but the consequence, 220—223; the consequence of, and attendant on, justification, 171, 173, 222—226; it has its increase and degrees in this life, 193; how it differs from justification, 170; an inherent quality of it vouchsafed to the regenerate, not an article of faith with Papists, 212.

HOLY SPIRIT, his saving gifts, ii. 229, 265; He alone effects the true regeneration in man, ii. 269.

HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH, of what it consists, ii. 474.

HOPE, how compared to an anchor, 183; is not perfect in this life, 116; defined according to Romanists, ii. 113.

I.

IDOLATRY of the Popish Mass, ii. 260.

——, what constitutes its proper character, 315.

IGNORANCE is original sin, 116.

—— does not excuse sin, ii. 469.

IMPLICIT FAITH is not saving faith, ii. 370.

IMPOSSIBLE things why commanded by God, 70.

IMPUTATION what, 231; its necessity, 178; upon what it rests, 180, 187; Imputation and remission, although simultaneous as to time, yet the former precedes as to Causality, 178. The Divine imputation of a thing, not at all inherent, may be the cause of that which is positive and really existing, 180. The imputation of Christ's righteousness constitutes a man at once, and perfectly righteous, 209.

J.

JESUITS, their blind obedience unlawful, ii. 248, 362; cannot be good subjects, 307.

JUSTICE, the rule of, presupposes two things, ii. 172; what is the formal object of it, 174; the obligation of of commutative justice, in what founded, 176; what conditions it requires, 188. What it is in God, 192.

JUSTIFICATION, what the word signifies with St. Paul, 157; used in a twofold sense by Augustine, 198, 202; consists in the remission of sins, ii. 65; for obtaining which three things required, i., 273, 274. No one justified into whom God does not infuse grace for performing good works, 197. In the very act of justifying God produces a quality of righteousness, which yet being imperfect, cannot justify us before God, 195, 201. The order in which God justifies, 125; the act on God's part not mere imputation, but a true and valid gift, 165, 171, 188. Justification is opposed sometimes to corruption, 200. What is its formal cause as respects us, 163, 211; what according to Romanists (See *Formal Cause*). Justification with Papists is but half the thing, 217; they regard it as one thing when disputing, another when meditating before God, 228; what that ought to be which will bear us out at last, *ibid.*

JUSTIFICATION and sanctification are neither to be confounded nor separated, 170, 222. Bellarmine's justification of an Ethiopian fails in three points, 187. We are justified not only by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, but by that which he bestows upon us, 177. Our free justification glorifies God,

225. How it is to be understood that the justified are free from all sin, 24; those justified by inherent righteousness, according to the Romanists, remain not only deserving of, but destined to punishment, 217; every justified person not only pronounced, but constituted righteous, 165. Justification is not merited by faith and repentance, ii., 115. The justified have the Holy Spirit and his fruits, ii., 65; yet in a measure, *ibid.*

K.

KING, every, is supreme in his own dominions, ii., 326.

KNOWLEDGE, what kind forms a part of sanctification, 169; not the cause whereby we stand justified before God, *ibid.*; defective in the regenerate, ii., 17.

L.

LAW, of God its force, 125; is attuned to the possibility of the upright man, not to the infirmity of the fallen, *ibid.* Relation between the law of our creation, and the written law considered, 126; the former requires good works, but to be done by the strength of nature, 228; it inflicts death for the lightest sin, *ibid.*; it has the force of a covenant on the condition of good works, 289; it obliges to exact obedience as to internal affections and external actions, ii., 92. The law of God is perfect, i., 393; obliges strictly to internal works, 421; prescribes external acts only indefinitely, *ibid.*, and 448. The legal covenant requires exact obedience, but the grace of the Gospel helps our imperfect obedience, 70. The law of God cannot be fulfilled by us, 428, ii., 1, 11; never was fulfilled by any one, 12. To fulfil the law of God, and to live without sin, one and the same thing with Augustine, 12, 13. Internal causes whence the impossibility of fulfilling the law arises, 17. The law, if fulfilled, would give life eternal, 26; it justifies no one, 28; that the law cannot be fulfilled proved from the Fathers, 29; man cannot fulfil the law, however greatly he may wish it, 31; even on Bellarmine's confession, 34; it may be fulfilled by us imperfectly, 38. The regenerate have all things necessary for obtaining salvation, yet cannot fulfil the law, 46; it is not fulfilled by performing external acts only, 48. Although the law be not fulfilled by the rege-

nerate, yet the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in them, and that in a threefold manner, 59; it is fulfilled in the regenerate through Christ, 58. Freedom from the accusations of the law does not infer the fulfilment of the law, 62.

LIBERTY, CHRISTIAN, in what it chiefly consists, 290.

LIFE ETERNAL, how given to the regenerate, 325. It is the gift of God, ii., 82, 110, 111; and of his free mercy, 91, 93; is neither due from him on the score of justice nor of gratitude, 101, 102, 108; is disproportioned to our works, 109. In what respects it is called a reward, 137; is promised under a twofold condition of works, 144. The proportion between our works and eternal life considered, 150.

LOVE OF GOD, in what sense Augustine considered it to justify, 199; imperfect in this life, 216, and ii., 22; does not justify, i., 201, 202; perfect commanded in the law, 334, 426. Command of loving God and our neighbours not fulfilled, 427. A supreme degree of it comes under a precept, 438; is the perfection of the Christian life, 449; the intention of it commends an external work, 423; defect of it does not incur fresh guilt, 439.

LOVE OF THE CREATURE is the cause of sin, 440. Man's love too intent on temporal things, 126, 216.

M.

MAN FALLEN is the subject of the Divine predestination, ii., 354.

MASS, Popish, sinful and dangerous in Protestants to attend it, ii., 257; is not a propitiatory sacrifice, 283.

MERIT, and to merit, meaning of among the ancient Fathers, ii., 66; the sounder Schoolmen and some of the Romanists, 71.

——, Parties who have *no* claim to it. See Servants.

To merit with God, and to do an act pleasing to God, are not things equivalent, 134. See the whole of chap. lx.; and Appendix, p. 195.

MERITS: the imputation of Christ's justify, 203, 209. Of the Fathers, what, *ibid.* The godly change their merits for the merits of Christ, ii., 135.

—— of congruity do not obtain the Divine favour, ii., 393.

—— of the different opinion of Romanists about their condignity, ii., 73. Not the term, but the opi-

nion of the worthiness of merits is opposed by Protestants, 75. Gifts of God have no merit with him, 80.

MERITS exclude the free acceptance of the rewarder, 95; are not to be inferred from the word reward, 108. Between merits and the reward no proportion exists, 109; between merits of condignity and the gifts of grace there is a formal repugnance, 110. It is not heretical presumption to hope for the forgiveness of sin without merits, 112. The contrary doctrine refuted by the opinion of Fathers, 117; by the testimonies of several Romanists, 122. Merit of congruity is not merit in reality, 131. Arguments of the Romanists for merit of condignity, with answers, 139. Merits of condignity cannot be grounded on the Divine promise, 160.

MINISTERS of the Gospel have no temporal power, ii., 296.

N.

NAMES, terms, or predicates, have not always respect to the inhering form, i., 232.

NEIGHBOUR, the good, of ours ought to be regarded by us, 277; love of our neighbour not perfect in this life, 437. Who is our neighbour, 484.

O.

OATHS: doctrine of the Jesuits respecting them, ii., 309.

OBEDIENCE to God dictated by conscience, 275; from what acceptable obedience flows, 204; how the obedience of Christ is the formal cause of our justification, 163; how it avails more to constitute us righteous, than our unrighteousness to render him unjust, 192. The obedience of the Monks does not place a man in a state of perfection, 410, 411, 418. That which the Jesuits require is unlawful, ii., 248.

ORIGINAL SIN denotes two things 57; its names are synonymous, 87; it exists in the mind, the will, and affections, 101, 102; is done away as to its guilt, but remains as to its nature, 25, 179; differs in the regenerate and unregenerate, 103.

P.

PAPISTS, what they regard as the formal cause of justification, 212; their opinion concerning justification by inherent righteousness, 218, and ii., 417.

— led into sin by their supe-

riors, ii., 253; ought not to absent themselves from Protestant worship, 359.

PELAGIANS made infused grace to be in a manner useless, 214.

PEOPLE, proper duties belonging to them, ii., 281.

PER, the preposition, its broad application, 167.

PERFECTION of our righteousness, in what it consists, 172; what perfection is required to place any one in a state of salvation, and in the state of glory, 65; what the term denotes, 13; how some are said to be perfect, 185. Why perfection is attributed to the regenerate, ii., 40; to what it can apply in this life, 42. Due perfection of good works, in what it consists, i., 328. What is denoted by a state of perfection, 399, 403; to be in two contrary states of perfection at the same time is ridiculous, 405. In what perfection does not consist, 407, 416—18, 455. Neither Prophets nor Apostles bound themselves by vow to works of perfection, 412; nor did Christ himself; *ibid.* The perfection necessary to the being of a Christian does not consist in the observance of counsels, 407—8, 455; nor in the observance of precepts, 503.

PERSEVERANCE, **FINAL**, falls not under any merit, ii., 59; is a subordinate gift necessary for the attainment of life eternal, 60.

PETER, never constituted supreme head of the Church, ii., 479.

POPE, the, dispenses with irregularities in his subjects, i., 414; his jurisdiction not universal, ii., 365; is not the supreme head of the Church, 479; has no temporal power over kings for their spiritual good, 234; his claims to temporal power unlawful, 239; has none by Divine right over kings, 298, 381; has no infallible authority committed to him, 241.

POPERY, an enemy to the Scriptures, ii., 421; robs Christ of his due, 405.

POPISH invocation of the saints is idolatry, ii., 321.

POVERTY, voluntary, does not constitute a state of perfection, 410; nor is it a sign, a cause, or a part of perfection, 417.

PRAYERS for the dead useless, ii., 248.

PRIDE, the first sin of angels, 429.

PRIESTS of Rome usurp Christ's prerogative, 286.

PRIESTHOOD, its power wholly spiritual, 294.

PROMISE OF GOD, what it is properly, ii., 143; does not bind him in strict justice to recompense works, 169, 185; does not add any new value or worthiness to works,—effect of the promise does not bind God, 169. The promises are made to us by God, through the merits of Christ, 168; proper effect of them, 171, 177; an obligation only to fidelity founded thereon, 177.

R.

REGENERATE, are united to Christ, 11; are accounted righteous by God, *ibid*; in them is discerned the effects of new righteousness, 10; in what manner the power of sin is done away from them, 25, 53; in what way they are changed, *ibid*; why they are not condemned, *ibid*. In them is found not only a lack of due rectitude in the will, but a positive proneness to unlawful desires, 119. They need the daily pardon of sin, 230, ii., 21; are the friends of God, i., 326. They endeavour to serve God according to the grace given them, 323; their works not free from sin, ii., 274.

REGENERATION, in what it consists, ii., 265.

RELIGION, and its exercises, to be made intelligible to all, ii., 432.

REWARD, how the heavenly is estimated, 399, 443; use of the term, ii., 108; does not pre-suppose merit as its correlative, ii., 117; given beyond the value of the service, ii., 105.

RIGHTEOUS, believers so regarded by God, 177; the order of God in making us such, 225.

RIGHTEOUSNESS, the essence of original, 99; how we are considered to have lost it, 190; inherent in all the regenerate, 13; what, 14, 211; its parts, 16; is imperfect in this life, 216; what, in this state of pilgrimage, inherent righteousness is, 212; infused posterior to justification, 222; inherent righteousness merited for us by Christ's obedience, 238; his righteousness is imputed to us for justification; 240—43; how, to what extent, and to whom, 189. We are not inherently righteous from this imputation, 241, 248; how it affects our justification, 237;

through its imputation all believers are accounted righteous by God himself, 11. It is the formal cause of our sanctification, 169; the gift and ornament of the justified man, 225; an appendage to our justification, 165, 168. Why it is bestowed upon us, 203; is not a created quality, 218. Romanists' view of it, 163, 220. Inherent righteousness cannot please God of itself, 203, 221, 236. It makes us godly inchoately and imperfectly, 208; it receives daily increase, 209. According to the opinion of Papists, is easily lost, 230. It does not expel sin, 218.

In what way Christ's righteousness becomes ours, 168, 188, 189; how it justifies, 236; why we need this, 251; when imputed to believers, 168, 250; our justification which is founded on this is true and real, *ibid*. Our righteousness is not putative, although it is imputed, 174. Actual righteousness, in what it consists, 213; is not perfect in adults, 212; it neither justifies formally, nor meritoriously, *ibid*, and 214. Infused righteousness must be exercised, imputed righteousness relied upon, 208, 242; Augustine applies the term justification to both, 203. How far the Papists agree, and how far they differ with us in these things, examined, 234. Habitual righteousness alone, constitutes no one justified before God, 212, 213. Justifying righteousness and the righteousness caused by justification, 195; justifying righteousness and righteousness justified, 211. The effect of justifying righteousness, 218. What it is to be righteous according to the Scriptures, 172. The difference between the righteous and the justified, 8, 14, 233. How we are accounted righteous, 188. The righteousness which is to be attributed to man in this life, ii., 43.

ROMANISTS, how to discuss the subject of works with them, 295; their views of sin, 20; of inherent righteousness, 230; agreement and disagreement with us as to the mode of justification, &c., 234: Is but half a benefit with them, 217.

S.

SACERDOTAL OFFICE, its proper acts, ii., 295.

SACRAMENTS do not confer grace by their external use merely, ii., 340.

SALVATION, the cause of it, and the

way to it, i., 171, 237: whether generally attainable or not, ii., 501.

SAINTS are not to be invoked, ii., 456.

SCRIPTURES, the, not to be withheld from the people, ii., 421; what they teach respecting the one holy Catholic Church, 477.

SIN, who are said to be dead to it, 26, 74, 93; hatred of God to it twofold, 30; how regarded by philosophers, 93; how by Augustine, 86, 91, &c. What it is in its origin, cause, and progress, 48. Its matter and form, 112, 130; its lawlessness, 125; its principle, whence estimated, 129. Two things to be considered in it, 223. Not seated in the body as its proper subject, 109. How it is considered as expelling grace, 219. In what sense Augustine regarded it as differing from evil, 84. The offence of it in every mortal infinite, 218. Its root not extirpated by baptism, 20; its fuel not wholly extinguished in our members, 21. Sin of the same kind worse in believers than in unbelievers, 87. In what sense called mortal, 343. The best of men polluted by it, 329, ii., 9. The children of God themselves very often sin, ii., 63; in what sense they are said not to sin, 64. Sinners cannot merit with God, 85.

SIN against knowledge dangerous, ii., 253; all sin in its own nature deadly, 382.

SPIRIT, 122; given to the regenerate according to measure, ii., 61; acts efficaciously in justification to newness of life, i., 278; is the principal cause of good works in the regenerate, 318. They who are influenced in a special manner by the Holy Spirit are bound not to resist him, 433, 434.

SUPEREROGATION, explained, 421; works of, not allowed, *ibid.* How far a man may supererogate, 498; the doctrine is not to be inferred from a difference in degrees of glory, 506; nor from the heroic virtues, 424.

T.

TEMPORAL dominion not founded in grace, ii., 375.

TEMPTATION, how it operates, i., 48.

U.

UNBELIEVERS, their moral works are sins, 320: as they differ from works truly good, 317; are not pleasing to God, 321; are often re-

compensated by God with temporal rewards, but not with life eternal, 322.

V.

VALENTINIANS denied that good works were necessary to spiritual men, 280.

VASQUEZ's opinion of good works, ii., 82; rejects the argument which others deem insuperable, i., 233; his ingenuous confession concerning inherent righteousness, 218.

VENIAL sin, as regarded by Papists, 31; what sins they consider such are not only beside the law of God, but contrary to it, ii., 14, 15.

VIGILANTIUS, his heresy, ii., 444. [Vigilantius is in that passage spoken of in the style usual or adopted in Bishop Davenant's times; but for a juster estimate the reader will do well to peruse his life, as lately given to the public by Dr. Gilly, in his *Vigilantius and his Times*, London, 8vo., or *Ancient Christianity*, vol. i., pp. 370, 40.]

VINDICATION, what is lawful, 493.

VIRGINITY cannot place men in a state of perfection, 410; that gift of which Christ speaks (Matt. xix., 11) is more perfect than the gift of conjugal chastity, 416; it is also more difficult, 454; some are bound to observe it from a peculiar call, 469; the gift not bestowed indiscriminately, 477; in what sense optional, 492.

W.

WORKS, of the law, do not justify, 210. They denote a good man, do not make him good, 284; are not the causes, but the fruits of justification, 285; some defect cleaves to the best, *ibid.* Required from those who are under the Legal covenant, and those who are under the Evangelical, but in a different respect, 288. How to contend with Romanists on these points, 295. No works are the meritorious causes of justification or salvation, 298; nor of preserving justifying grace, 299; yet some are necessary as concurrent or preliminary conditions, *ibid.* How necessary for preserving justification, 301; how as regards salvation, 302; how far they may be called efficient causes of salvation, 304, and ii., 138. Case in which unnecessary ones are not obligatory, 480. The circumstances of works do not fall under a definite precept, 441; works of believers and of unbelievers how distinguished, 317,

327; none meritorious of life eternal. See Merits.

No work of ours obliges God to reward it, ii., 179. Bad works are to be avoided by believers, although not imputed to them, 289—91. Who are said to be workers of iniquity, 30. The person of everyone pleasing to God before his works, 322.

WORKS of supererogation not allowed, 421.

— of penance no satisfactions for sin, ii., 262.

— of the regenerate defiled with sin, ii., 271.

WORTHY, and worthiness, in what sense applied to the saints, ii., 134.

INDEX

TO THE

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES, &c.,

APPENDED BY THE TRANSLATOR.

	Vol. I.	Vol. II.		Vol. I.	Vol. II.
A.			I. and J.		
Alfonsus a Castro	450		Issidore Clarius	269	
Alfonsus Mendoza		357			
Alvarus Pelagius	412		L.		
Andradius	32		Lindanus	330	
Antoninus	146	461	Lorichius		525
Antony, St.	428		Ludolph	60,	105
Armachanus		443			
B.			M.		
Baptista de Rubeis		518	Major John		448
Becan	19		Maldonat	485	
Bernardin de Busti		460	Marsilius		343
Bertharius		460	Maziques	507	
Boniface VIII. (Pope)...		365	Medina		79
Brulifer		128	Messalians	16	
Bucer	282		Middleton	145	
C.			Molanus		428
Capreolus		74	Monimus		119
Casimir I.	414		Moses (the Abbot)	446	
Celestius		11	Munster	414	
Clictovæus		74	N.		
Clingius		128	Naclantus	159	
Coster		130	Netter or Walden		113
Council of Orange		46	O.		
—— of Toledo		515	Occam		298
Cusa		34	Osiander	161	
D.			P.		
Downes		149	Pagninus	104	
Dyonisius		223	Paludanus	40	340
E.			Panormitan		450
Ægidius	147		Paphnutius		452
Ærius		441	Paul of Burgos		86
Eckius	280		—— of Samosata	277	
Essenes... 471, 488, and	508		Peter de Ailly		85
Eusebius of Emesa		68	Pighius	207	
F.			Polydore Vergil		450
Ferus		129	Proclus	16	
G.			R.		
Gillibert	23		Radulphus		500
Grabbon	449		Rheticus	76	
Gregory de Valent.	64		Rubeis, Baptista de		518
H.			—— and Addenda p. . .		539
Hales		213	Rupert	121,	296
Hermas	150		T.		
Hildebrand (Pope)	300, 327		Tapper ..		74
Hosius	98, 128		W.		
			Waldensis, <i>alias</i> Netter .		43

INDEX

OF

SUBJECTS INCIDENTALLY GLANCED AT IN THE NOTES.

A.

APOSTOLICALS, ii., 452.

Arrogance of Popery, ii., 330, 380, 482.

Assassination of William, Prince of Orange, i., 311.

B.

Baptism, where correctly considered, ii., 45.

Basnage quoted respecting Popish regulations for Continence, ii., 455.

Bayle quoted on Papal dispensations, i., 414.

Bede's Commentary, of what it mainly consists, ii., 210.

Bishop of Rome, progress of his assumptions, ii., 480.

Burke on the French Revolution, ii., 283.

C.

Celibacy, when first enjoined, ii., 387.

Church of England not schismatical, 360.

———, her claims prior to those of Rome, 525.

Council of Orange, ii., 46, 396.

——— of Sens' decree on merit, 127.

——— of Trent, apology for, 5; 535.

———, its approach to Protestantism, 83.

D.

Decretals of Gregory IX. the common laws of the Papacy, ii., 494.

Douay Bible, errata of, 133.

E.

Esse and Essentia distinguished, 345.

Evangelical Counsels, when invented, i., 382.

———, quotation from Gerhard's *Loci Theol.* respecting them, 502.

Excommunication, consequences of Papal, ii., 488.

F.

Form and formal cause, i., 214.

Formaliter, ii., 191.

G.

Geddes (Alexander), his opinion of Popery, ii., 307, 310.

Grotius in unison with Rome, 153.

H.

Hammersmith Discussion quoted in reference to 1 Cor., iii., 12, i., 357.

Heroic virtues explained, 424.

Heylin's remarks on the term Papist, Preface, xvii.

Hildebrand, his alleged confession and repentance, ii., 300.

I. and J.

Indexes of Rome, ii., 517.

Indulgences, compulsion respecting them, ii., 405.

Jesuitism, i., 475.

Jesuits described by Dr. Andrew Rivet, 411.

———, quotation from their constitutions on obedience, ii., 248.

———, the murderous character of their principles, 311.

———, their hatred of true religion, 359.

Justification, Hooker quoted on, ii., 112, 114.

———, Popish distinction in, 393.

———, Bishop O'Brien quoted on, 413.

L.

- Lady Stafford's interment, allusion to, ii., 218.
 Laws of the Papacy, 493.
 Love of God, how distinguished, i., 10.
 ———, distinction explained by Bernard, ii., 22.

M.

- Mariolatry, ii., 468.
 M'Ilvaine, Bishop, on Tractarianism, i., 389, and Preface, vol. ii.
 Melancthon, on the Augsburg Confession, i., 391.
 Merit, quotation on, from Gerhard's *Loci Theol.*, ii., 75.
 Milner, Dr., on the Lives of Saints, ii., 467.
 Monasticism from the *Legenda Aurea*, i., 428.
 ——— from Alfonsus à Castro, 450.
 ——— exploded, ii., 388.

O.

- Oaths, danger of laxity in regard to their observance, ii., 309.
 Obedience of Papists servile, 253.
 Objects, difference respecting, as viewed through different mediums, 38.

P.

- Papal supremacy, ii., 369, 482.
 ——— unity, 71, 73, 109, 126.
 Papists, their ungrateful behaviour, 363.
 Perfection, quotation on, from Rev. Richard Cecil, 23.
 ——— from Dr. Manton, 36.
 People, how treated by the Priesthood, 522.
 Peter, on his alleged meeting with Christ after his ascension, 485.
 Philpots (the Martyr), his defence of Luther, i., 293.
 Platonism, ii., 400, and Appendix.
 Popery, an enemy to civil liberty, 243, 310.
 ——— to the Scriptures, 361, 421.
 Prayers to the Virgin, samples of, 461.
 Purgatory, when introduced, 224.

R.

- Reformation, unfit characters for promoting it, ii., 283.
 Reformers (the English) on their alleged accommodating spirit, 374.
 Roman Catholic Laity, how misled, 360.
 ——— Misquotation noticed, 187.
 Romanism, its un-Catholicity, 474.

S.

- Salls' work (Dr. Andrew) noticed, i., 371.
 Sandys (Abp.) quoted in reference to Ceremonies, 481.
 Schisms in the Church of Rome, ii., 243.
 Scriptures, their impartiality, 42.
 ———, on allegorical interpretations of, 47.
 Sects among the Jews, i., 471.
 Sin, mortal and venial, 430.
 Stillingfleet, quotation from, on Vows of Virginity, ii., 390.
 Subjects in the Church of Rome, who, 251.
 Synod of Piotrkow, 98.

T.

- Tecta candida, the allusion, i., 13.
 Tillotson's (Abp.) vindication of Protestantism quoted, ii., 364.
 Trent decree on original sin, i., 31.
 ——— on merit, ii., 67.

V.

- Variations of Romanism, ii., 71, 73.
 Virgin Mary and Maria of the Romanists distinct, ii., 460.
 ——— placed above Christ by Papalines, 468.
 ——— Papal adoration of, 461.
 Vows, the great one, 390.

W.

- Wilberforce, Bishop, on adherence to Scripture, 426.
Will, its acts how distinguished by the Schoolmen, 315.
Wiseman, Dr., his aspiring anticipations, 482.
Worship of the Mass explained and illustrated, 260.
——— Popish distinctions respecting it, 313.

INDEX

OF

PASSAGES OF SCRIPTURE

EXPLAINED BY THE WAY.

GENESIS			
Chap.	verse	vol.	page.
iv	4	I	322
vii	9	..	172
vii	21	..	66
xv	1	II	135
xvii	1	..	40

DEUT.			
vi	5	I	184, 437
xxx	6	II	39

JOB			
i	22	I	350
ix	2	II	9
—	15	I	263, 337
xiv	4	..	104
xv	14	..	ibid.

PSALMS			
iv	5	I	359
v	5	..	30
vii	8	..	352
xviii	21	..	353
xxv	11	..	67
xxvi	1	I	352
xlvi	5	II	149
—	7	I	30
li	1	..	21
—	7	..	24
cxix	101	..	352
cxliii	2	..	104, 215, 338

PROVS.			
xvii	15	I	158
xviii	17	..	207
xx	9	..	104
xxiv	12	II	132

CANT.			
iv	7	I	23

ISA.			
i	18	I	24
xliii	26	..	207
xliv	22	..	24
liii	5	..	239
—	12	..	ibid.
lvi	3, 4	..	463
lxiv	6	..	106

JEREM.			
Chap.	verse	vol.	page.
xvii	9	I	104
—	14	..	105

EZEK.			
xxxvi	25	I	23
—	27	..	319

DAN.			
ix	9	..	67

MICAH			
vii	18*	..	21
* [It is worthy of remark, that though Davenant has given such a list of texts of Scripture referred to, and the Apocrypha is several times quoted, and passages adduced from it by the Romanists, discussed, he has given no one reference to them;—the reason is obvious: “We refer,” says he, chap. lx. vol. ii. p. 131, “to the Canonical Scriptures.”]			

MATTHEW			
v	12	II	135
—	48	..	40
vi	10	..	58
—	22	I	353
x	32	..	311
xi	30	II	37
xiii	23	I	467
xv	9	..	453
xix	12	..	469
—	17	I	305
—	21	..	470
—	—	II	53
—	28	I	28
xx	28	..	239
xxv	34, 35	..	311

MARK			
ix	41	I	326
x	23	..	473

LUKE			
i	6	I	172
x	33	..	106
—	35	..	484
xi	36	..	353
4 B			

JOHN				1 CORIN.			
Chap.	verse	vol.	page.	Chap.	verse	vol.	page.
i	16	II	148	vi	14	I	28
—	17	I	168	vii	10	..	308
—	19	..	21		GALAT.		
iii	3	..	27	iv	4, 5	I	241
—	8	..	237		EPHES.		
—	16	..	ibid.	i	4	I	24
iv	14	II	150	iv	7	..	168
v	14	I	359	v	26	..	22
—	24	..	237		PHILIP.		
xiii	10	..	23	ii	12	I	307
xv	2	..	107	iii	9	..	246
—	13	..	183	—	20	..	175
	ACTS				COLOSS.		
viii	37	I	182	i	12	I	11
	ROM.				2 THESS.		
iii	24	I	166	i	5	II	134
iv	4	II	187		1 TIM.		
—	18	I	182	i	13	I	68
v	5	..	169		2 TIM.		
—	9	..	221	iv	8	II	143
—	17	..	165		TITUS.		
			168, 179	ii	14	I	35, 193, 224
—	17—19	..	164	iii	5	..	27, 171
v	19	I	237		HEBREWS		
vi	2	..	25	vi	10	II	140
—	4	..	ibid.	—	19	I	183
—	7	..	174	vii	22	..	248
—	12	..	108	ix	26	..	34
vii	7	..	124	—	28	..	ibid.
—	15	..	128	xi	4	..	172
—	17	..	50, 108	xiii	12	..	193
—	—	II	43	—	16	II	132
viii	1	I	31, 53, 90		JAMES		
—	3	..	240	i	14, 15	I	48
—	4	II	58	—	25	..	312
—	10	I	175	iii	2	..	358
—	13	..	309		1 JOHN		
—	29	..	173	i	8	I	110
x	3, 4	..	240	ii	5	..	184
—	10	..	311	iii	4	..	536
xiii	8	II	38	—	9	II	63
	1 CORIN.			—	—	..	153
i	30	I	242	v	3	..	87
iii	8	II	138		REV.		
—	12, 13	I	355—7	iii	4	II	134
—	16	..	33	xiv	3, 4	I	438
vi	11	..	32, 169	xvi	16	II	135
vii	8	..	477	xxii	12	..	135
vii	38	..	ibid.				
—	40	..	ibid.				
ix	15	..	482				
xiii	8	..	181				
xv	49	..	173				
	2 CORIN.						
iv	17	I	308				
v	21	..	243				

Davenant, John,

A treatise on justification; or the Disputatio de justitia habituali et actuali Transl. from latin together with translations of the 'determinationes' of the same prelate: by Josiah Allport
Bd.: 2

London 1844

Polem. 684 c-2

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10773038-0